NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK   •    BOSTON   •   CHICAGO    •  DALLAS 
ATLANTA   •   SAN  FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  LOOTED 

LONDON    •  BOMBAY    •  CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  LTD. 

TORONTO 


NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND 
SOCIETY- 


A  STUDY  OF  NATIONALISM  AND  ITS  CONCOMITANT, 

WAR,  IN   THEIR   RELATION  TO  CIVILIZATION; 

AND  OF  THE   FUNDAMENTALS  AND   THE 

PROGRESS  OF  THE  OPPOSITION  TO  WAR 


BY 
EDWARD  KREHBIEL,  PH.D. 

|k  V 

PROFESSOR  OF  MODERN  HISTORY 
IN  LELAND  STANFORD  JUNIOR  UNIVERSITY 

WITH  AN  INTRODUCTION  BY 
NORMAN  ANGELL 


fork 
THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

1916 

All  rights  reserved 


'••+  J7/r'*~*^-f'*-^  «-- 


7^ 


„ 

COPYRIGHT,  1916 


BY  THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
Set  up  and  electrotyped.    Published  June,  i9t6. 


To 

MY  MOTHER 
SUSANNAH  A.  KREHBIEL 

WHO  TAUGHT  ME  TO  HATE  WAR 


338565 


4 


PREFACE 

The  presumption  of  this  book  I  frankly  acknowledge;  to 
present  impartially  subjects  of  so  wide  a  variety  and  so  com- 
plex and  controversial  a  character  is  nothing,  if  not  ambitious. 

For  the  faults  and  errors  which,  I  fear,  may  have  crept 
into  these  comprehensive  pages  I  crave  lenience;  they  are 
the  result  of  finite  capacity,  and  not  of  conscious  straying 
from  the  truth. 

For  the  aims  of  the  book,  the  dissemination  of  ideas  and 
ideals  which  shall  make  for  a  reduction  of  war,  I  offer  no 
apology;  indeed  if,  having  this  cause  at  heart  as  I  do,  I  were 
remiss  in  it,  I  should  hold  myself  deserving  of  great  blame. 

For  the  help  I  have  had  from  whatever  source  I  gladly 
give  thanks  and  credit:  To  David  Starr  Jordan  for  his  in- 
spiration and  his  permission  to  use  such  portions  as  seemed 
useful  of  a  Syllabus  formerly  published  by  us  jointly;  to 
Norman  Angell  for  invaluable  suggestions  and  contributions 
as  herein  appear;  to  Dr.  John  Mez  for  ideas  and  sound  ad- 
vice; to  Dr.  Denys  P.  Myers  for  sundry  useful  and  exact 
information;  and  to  all  those  who,  whether  knowingly  or 
unknowingly,  have  contributed  ideas  and  labor  to  this 
agreeable  enterprise  now  happily  finished. 

EDWARD  KREHBIEL. 
WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 

April  3, 1916. 


vii 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

FUNDAMENTALS xi 

INTRODUCTION xiii 

PART  I 

NATIONALISM,  rrs  CHARACTER,  FALLACIES  AND  FAULTS 

j 

I.  Nationalism i 

II.  The  Corollaries  of  Nationalism 9  ' 

III.  The  Case  for  Nationalism  and  the  War  System 16 

TV,  Th«^  Faults  of  Nationalism  and  the  War  System 26 

V.  "The  Great  Illusion" 36 

VI.  The  Armed  Peace  and  Its  Fruits 46 

VII.  The  Economic  Consequences  of  War 58 

Vni.  Public  Debts 68 

IX.  War  and  Sociology 81 

X.  War  and  Biology 87 

XI.  War  and  the  State:  Political  Aspects  of  War  and  Mili- 
tarism    95 

XII.  Nationalism  and  Morals 101 

PART  II 

MODERN  POLITICAL  \ND  SOCIAL  CHANGES  AND  THEIR  REACTION 
ON  NATIONAL  RIVALREB 


XIII.  The  R61e  of  Force.     From  Force  Through  Law  to  Justice 

and  Peace  .........................................   105 

XIV.  The  Change  in  the  Institution  of  Warfare  ................   114 

Modern  Communication  and  Internationalism  ...........  126 


PART  III 

PROGRESSIVE  FORCES,  WHICH  SEEK  TO  OVERCOME  THE  FAULTS  OF 
NATIONALISM  AND  ESTABLISH  AN  ORDER  OF  THINGS  IN  AGREE- 
MENT WITH  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  SOCIETY 

XVI.  The  Fundamentals  of  the  Opposition  to  War 141 

XVII.  Deductive  or  Idealist  Pacifism  to  1789 150 

ix 


s:  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

XVIII.  Deductive  or  Idealist  Pacifism  since  1789 157 

XIX.  Inductive  or  Practical  Pacifism.    International  Political 

Engineering 166 

PEACE  THROUGH  DIPLOMACY:  NATIONALISM  RETAINED 

XX.  International  Law 168 

XXI.  International  Arbitration 177 

XXII.  The  First  Hague  Conference 193 

XXIII.  The  Second  Hague  Conference 200 

XXIV.  The  International  Judiciary 205 

XXV.  Miscellaneous  Projects  for  Peace  through  Diplomacy. ...  212 

PEACE  THROUGH  COOPERATION:   NATIONALISM   ABANDONED 

XXVI.  International  Organization  and  Federation.    The  Limita- 
tion of  National  Sovereignty 219 

XXVII.  Miscellaneous  Forces  Working  for  the  Improvement  of 

International  Relations 227 

XXVIII.  Schemes  for  Diminishing  the  Chance  of  War  and  for  Com- 
pelling Nations  to  Keep  Peace 232 

XXIX.  Education  and  Peace 242 

XXX.  The  Great  War  and  Pacifism 250 

APPENDIX 

I.  Total  Naval  Expenditures  by  Principal  Naval  Powers 257 

II.  Army  Appropriations  of  the  Principal  Powers 258 

ITT.  Leading  Pacifist  Periodicals 258 

IV.  Fiction  and  Drama 260 

V.  Cases  Decided  by  the  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration 262 

INDEX 265 


FUNDAMENTALS 

Strife  among  men  appears  in  many  forms  —  personal  rivalry 
of  all  kinds,  commercial  competition,  brawls,  strikes,  riots, 
revolutions,  wars  and  others  —  which  need  to  be  distinguished 
from  each  other.  Particularly  mischievous  is  the  failure  to 
distinguish  martial  force  from  police  force,  which  leads  to 
the  common  error  that,  if  war  be  eliminated,  we  shall  also 
be  without  police  protection.  Hence,  it  is  necessary  to  es- 
tablish this  fundamental  distinction  at  the  outset. 

Martial  force  is  exercised  by  the  interested  party  in  his 
own  behalf;  it  is  competitive  and  seeks  to  impose  its  will, 
which  it  identifies  with  the  right,  upon  its  adversary  by 
violence  if  necessary. 

Police  force  is  not  exercised  by  the  interested  parties  to 
a  dispute,  but  is  the  force  exercised  by  the  agents  of  a  co- 
operating society;  its  function  is,  not  to  help  one  of  the  dis- 
putants to  impose  his  conception  of  right  on  the  other,  but 
to  see  that  each  is  protected  against  the  other  and  that  both 
are  obedient  to  society. 

War  is  the  condition  wj^ich  exists  when  social  groups  known 
as  nations  employ  martial  force.  Obviously  one  may  be  op- 
posed to  war  and  yet  sanction  other  kinds  of  force. 

Militarism  is  the  religion  of  martial  force. 

Pacifism  repudiates  martial  force  (and  martial  force  only) 
and  demands  the  extension  of  police  force.  It  is  not  content 
to  pronounce  peace  desirable  but  proves  its  sincerity  by  labor- 
ing for  conditions  which,  according  to  its  lights,  make  for 
peace. 


INTRODUCTION 

A  day  or  two  after  receiving  Professor  KrehbieFs  request 
to  write  a  brief  introduction  to  this  handbook  my  eye  hap- 
pened to  fall  upon  a  review  (appearing  in  one  of  the  most 
widely  read  and  highly  esteemed  of  New  York  papers)  1  of 
the  symposium  edited  by  Mr.  Charles  Roden  Buxton, 
"Towards  a  Lasting  Settlement." 

The  reviewer  admits  handsomely  enough  that  what  the 
authors  of  the  book  have  to  say  is  "all  very  true  and  exceed- 
ingly well  said."  But,  he  is  exceedingly  annoyed  —  and  says 
so  —  that  true  things  bearing  on  war  should  be  said  either 
well  or  ill  when  war  has  become  the  most  important  fact  with 
which  men  can  concern  themselves.  Then,  he  implies,  we 
should  cease  to  think  about  it  at  all. 

I  do  not  think  that  that  is  a  travesty  of  the  reviewer's 
thought.  I  am  not  attempting  a  cheap  jibe.  Such  is  not 
only  the  obvious  opinion  of  this  particular  reviewer;  but 
he  expresses  what  is  quite  simply  and  exactly  the  attitude, of 
very  many,  perhaps  most,  average  folk  towards  the  whole 
problem  of  war,  peace,  and  world  organization.  And  that 
such  is  a  prevailing  view  is  perhaps  the  most  important 
fact  of  all  in  the  whole  problem. 

That  will  excuse  my  dealing  with  it  at  some  length.  The 
reviewer  in  question  says: 

To  most  people,  however  ardently  they  may  love  peace,  the 
present  will  hardly  seem  a  propitious  moment  to  discuss  the 
settlement  of  Europe  after  the  war.  .  .  .  There  comes  a  time 
when  one  nation  thinks  it  had  better  fight  and  other  nations  must 

1  New  York  Times,  March  12,  1916. 


\ 


\ 


xiv  INTRODUCTION 

fight  too  or  knuckle  under,  and  the  statesmen  must  deal  with  the 
varying  phenomena  of  nationality  as  with  any  other  complica- 
tion of  real  life.  .  .  .  One  might  go  through  the  book  and  point 
out  a  curious  refusal  to  recognize  this  as  a  hard  world  in  which 
certain  forces  must  come  into  conflict  at  one  time  or  another. 

Why  should  not  this  be  a  propitious  moment?  Is  the  war 
settlement  going  to  be  so  simple  and  easy  that  the  peoples 
of  Europe,  coming  to  it  after  a  long  period  of  war  passion, 
will  be  able  to  solve  all  its  problems  without  preparation  or 
study?  Are  the  problems  of  European  politics  of  such  a 
nature  that  we  can  acquire  wisdom  and  understanding  in 
them  as  in  no  other  problem  of  public  affairs  —  without  dis- 
cussion? Of  course  we  know  —  as  the  reviewer  must  know  — 
that  this  present  war  is  raging  because  it  is  the  habit  of  peace 
settlements  to  be  very  bad  and  defective,  of  the  kind  that 
lay  the  seeds  for  future  wars.  It  is  because  these  past  settle- 
ments—  at  Vienna,  Versailles,  Frankfurt,  Berlin  —  have  been 
the  outcome  of  a  political  vision  obscured  by  the  passions 
of  victory,  or  fear,  or  historical  resentment,  or  cupidity,  or 
sheer  ignorance  and  stupidity,  unchecked  by  a  public  opinion 
clarified  and  prepared  by  sane  discussion,  that  they  "settled" 
nothing. 

" Because,"  argues  the  reviewer  I  have  quoted,  "our  minds 
are  very  apt  to  go  astray  after  a  war,  therefore,  we  should  not 
fortify  them  by  discussion,  nor  prepare  them  for  their  task 
by  study;  nor  check  the  formation  of  hasty  opinion  by  the 
consideration  of  contrary  opinion." 

Surely  a  moment's  reflection  convinces  us  that  if  the  close 
of  this  war  is  to  be  free  from  the  mistakes  that  have  marked 
past  settlements,  if  its  vast  agonies  are  to  serve  any  large 
human  purpose  at  all,  we  must  take  as  much  trouble  with 
the  politics  as  with  the  fighting.  We  who  have  not  fought 
may  well  by  our  mistakes,  our  failure  to  be  ready  for  the 
peace  when  it  comes,  render  useless  everything  which  the 


INTRODUCTION  xvii 

presumed  to  postulate  a  somewhat  naive  faith  in  the  good 
intentions  of  men  and  nations;  the  naturally  peaceful  charac- 
ter of  their  nature;  their  reasonableness,  and  aversion  from 
war.  Whereas,  it  would  be  much  truer  to  say  that  those 
of  us  who  are  Pacificists  are*  so  very  often  —  it  is  certainly 
the  case  of  the  present  writer  —  not  because  they  think  man 
little  inclined  to  drift  into  wars,  but  because  they  think  him 
much  inclined  so  to  do;  because  they  believe  that  there  are 
in  his  nature  elements  pushing  him  to  war  which  need  control; 
that  war  is  often  merely  the  failure  of  a  control  which  a  more 
definite  moral  effort  or  a  better  understanding  of  certain 
facts  of  human  relationship  could  perfectly  well  have  as- 
sured. The  needed  moral  effort  is  not  "natural."  It  is  ex- 
ceedingly unnatural,  like  most  social  discipline;  if  not  de- 
liberately developed  it  will  fail  us  when  we  need  it  most. 
That  is  the  reason  for  deliberately  developing  it,  the  justifica- 
tion for  Pacificism.  We  are  Pacificists,  some  of  us  at  least, 
because  we  have  in  one  sense  little  faith  in  human  nature; 
because  we  believe  that  that  nature,  unless  we  watch  it, 
will  betray  us  into  very  stupid  courses.  Wisdom  in  inter- 
national politics,  like  wisdom  in  most  fields,  is  exceedingly 
unnatural  in  that  it  is  very  painfully  acquired,  and  not  to 
be  acquired  at  all  if  all  effort  towards  so  doing  is  to  be 
derided. 

And  there  is  a  related  misapprehension  as  to  the  interna- 
tionalist attitude.  The  case  as  between  the  Pacificist  and 
his  opponent  is  very  generally  supposed  to  be  that  of  Force 
13.  No-Force.  But  this  is  a  quite  false  antithesis.  Outside  a1 
special  and  very  tiny  group,  advocates  of  a  completer  world 
organization  do  not  base  their  case  upon  opposition  to  the 
employment  of  physical  force.  They  base  their  case  upon  the 
need  of  making  force  effective  —  effective,  that  is,  to  the  com- 
mon needs  and  ends  of  human  society.  In  the  present  con- 
dition of  anarchy,  force  in  the  international  politics  is  gen- 


xviii  INTRODUCTION 

erally  effective  to  no  end  —  certainly  not  that  of  national 
security  as  the  present  plight  of  some  three  hundred  millions 
in  Europe  shows.  As  things  stand  the  force  of  one  unit  is  neu- 
tralized by  that  of  another  —  "cancelled  out";  and  both 
reduced  to  ineffectiveness. 

Pacificists  as  a  body  do  not  object  to  physical  force  in 
the  shape  of  the  police  for  instance.  There  is  no  such  thing 
as  "  anti-policism,"  as  there  is  anti-militarism.  Why?  Be- 
cause military  force  is  not  the  enbodiment  in  power  of  the 
will  of  civilization,  of -the  society  of  nations,  in  the  way  that 
the  police  represent  the  social  will,  the  law  to  which  all 
parties  have  subscribed;  of  "right"  as  far  as  the  combined 
intelligence  of  the  whole  community  can  determine  it.  On 
the  contrary,  militarism  connotes  the  enforcement,  not  of 
the  will  of  the  community  —  the  community  of  nations,  that 
is  —  but  of  the  will  of  one  party  to  a  dispute,  and  of  the 
determination  of  that  one  party  to  insist  upon  his  own  view 
of  his  rights  simply  because  he  believes  that  he  has  the 
power  so  to  do.  Militarism  implies  the  enforcement,  not  of 
national  right  duly  determined  after  discussion  by  all  the 
various  parties  concerned,  but  our  view  of  the  right  in  a  case  to 
which  we  are  parties;  a  determination  to  uphold  the  view  of 
our  nation  as  against  another  nation,  a  means  to  enable  us  to 
be  judge,  jury  and  executioner  in  our  own  case.  Such  an 
attitude  makes  all  law,  all  society  impossible.  It  is  anarchy. 
It  is  might  defying  the  essential  law  of  any  organized  society. 
It  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  each  individual  (indi- 
vidual nation,  that  is)  is  fit  to  be  judge  in  his  own  case,  and 
to  be  trusted  with  the  means  of  enforcing  his  own  judgment. 
And  that  is  to  assume  that  men  are  perfect;  it  is  the  refusal 
to  "face  the  hard  facts  of  the  world,"  the  "phenomena 
of  imperfect  human  nature,"  with  a  vengeance.  At  the 
bottom  of  the  perfectly  sound  and  healthy  instinct,  how- 
ever muddle-headedly  at  tunes  it  may  express  itself,  against 


INTRODUCTION  xix 

militarism  lies  this  realization  of  its  essentially  anti-social 
motive.1 

This  false  parallelism  of  the  police  and  the  army  is  the 
pons  asinorum  of  the  Pacificist's  opponent.  The  function  of 
the  police  is  the  exact  contrary  to  that  of  the  army.  Armies 
are  for  the  purpose  of  fighting  other  armies;  a  police  force  is 
never  created  for  the  purpose  of  fighting  other  police  forces, 
but  for  aiding  them.  An  army  —  like  the  revolver  of  a  pio- 
neer in  a  lawless  community  —  is  for  the  purpose  of  enabling 
the  individual  that  employs  it  to  assert  his  view  of  the  right  as 
against  a  rival  view,  by  force.  The  police  are  for  the  purpose 
of  preventing  that  very  thing.  When  a  police  force  increases 
its  numbers,  that  extra  power  is  not  immediately  cancelled 
because  some  other  police  force  is  increased.  When  a  police 
force  is  created  or  increased  all  concerned  know  its  purpose: 
the  maintenance  of  the  laws  of  its  state.  When  an  army  is 
increased  nobody  knows  its  purpose,  how  it  will  be  used: 
not  even  those  who  have  created  it ! 

And  yet  to  ask  the  Pacificist  if  he  objects  to  the  police  is 
supposed  to  be  a  complete  poser;  to  demonstrate  that  in 
his  misgivings  concerning  militarism  he  is  inconsistent! 

Force  is  of  course  an  instrument  of  the  human  intelligence, 
and  whether  well  or  ill  used  depends  absolutely  upon  that 
intelligence.  We  are  often  told  that  the  world  is  governed 
in  the  last  resort  by  physical  force.  Well,  there  are  animals 
on  the  earth  that  have  immeasurably  greater  physical 
strength  than  man.  They  do  not  govern  the  world.  Man, 
who  is  so  much  weaker,  eats  them,  or  makes  them  work  for 
him.  The  world,  indeed,  was  once  peopled  by  immense 

1 1  beg  the  reader  to  note  that  there  is  no  argument  here  against  de- 
fence. I  am  a  thorough  believer  in  that;  in  no  way  opposed  in  certain 
circumstances  to  great  navies  and  great  armies.  I  have  gone  over  that 
ground  elsewhere. 


xx  INTRODUCTION 

beasts  of  a  physical  strength  bearing  about  the  same  relation 
to  man's  that  man's  does  to  the  blackbeetle's.  These  colossal 
creatures  have  all  disappeared,  superseded  by  others  that 
were  smaller  and  physically  weaker. 

The  savage  who  happened  to  be  born  with  a  longer  "  reach  " 
than  others  of  his  tribe  was  the  bully  of  the  whole  until  two 
weaker  men  put  their  heads  together  and  agreed  to  cooperate 
and  so,  by  taking  him  front  and  rear  at  the  same  time; 
brought  his  tyranny  to  an  end,  replacing  it  by  their  own, 
which  continued  until  three  weaker  men  were  able  to  act 
as  one,  and  so  on,  until  finally  we  got  a  combination  of  the 
whole  community  in  the  policeman.  The  effectiveness  of 
the  policeman  resides,  not  mainly  in  the  fact  of  the  force 
that  he  wields,  but  in  the  fact  that  he  personifies  a  common 
will,  which  is  the  outcome  of  things  of  the  mind. 

When  you  have  something  resembling  a  common  will  you 
can  get  the  policeman:  but  until  you  get  that  agreement, 
"force"  cannot  be  used  for  the  ends  of  the  community  at 
all.  The  final  triumph  of  the  community  represented  the 
slow  growth  of  a  common  purpose  as  against  conflicting 
purposes. 

We  are  told  that  law  and  civilization  rest  in  the  last  resort 
upon  force  —  the  police  or  the  army.  Yet  the  police  or  the 
army  obeys  the  instructions  of  the  law.  What  physical 
force  compels  it  to  do,  ensures  that  it  shall  do  so?  Who  guards 
the  guardians?  What  is  our  final  "  sanction,"  or  means  of 
compulsion?  It  is  an  oath,  a  contract. 

When,  as  Democrats  or  Republicans,  we  vote  against  an 
existing  President,  how  do  we  know  that  he  will  obey  our 
votes  and  quietly  walk  out  of  office?  The  army?  But  it  is  he 
who  commands  the  army;  the  army  does  not  command  him. 
The  army  would  stand  by  the  country?  Then  what  is  con- 
trolling its  act  is  a  conception  of  constitutional  right,  not  phys- 
ical force,  since  it  could  easily,  presumably,  make  itself  master 


INTRODUCTION  xxi 

of  a  hostile  Republican  or  Democratic  party,  as  the  case  may 
be.  Obviously  it  is  not  because  the  North  American  is 
more  military  that  he  is  saved  from  certain  defects  of  South 
American  civilization.  Just  as  obviously  it  is  because  he 
is  less  military. 

An  Englishman  says:  "It  is  force  alone  which  vindicates 
Belgium's  rights."  But  what  put  the  force  in  motion?  What 
decided  England  to  go  to  the  rescue  of  Belgium,  instead  of 
remaining  at  home?  It  was  a  thing  of  the  mind,  a  moral 
thing,  a  theory:  the  tradition  of  the  sanctity  of  treaties,  the 
theory  of  international  obligation,  a  sense  of  contract,  if 
you  will,  like  that  which  makes  the  President  respect  the 
hostile  vote  instead  of  intriguing  with  the  army,  and  the 
army  obey  its  oath  instead  of  intriguing  with  the  President, 
or  against  him.  Without  this  moral  thing  you  cannot  get 
even  the  effective  employment  of  force  in  things  that  look 
at  first  sight  like  sheer  violence.  You  cannot,  for  instance, 
have  piracy  without  an  agreement  and  cooperation,  without 
the  observance  of  treaty  rights  as  between  pirate  captain  and 
crew.  If  every  member  of  the  crew  said:  "Don't  bother  me 
about  rules  and  obeying  the  captain.  I've  got  a  pistol  and 
I  mean  to  make  my  own  rules  and  act  as  I  see  fit"  —  why,  , 
of  course  you  could  not  run  even  a  pirate  ship.  Success  inv 
piracy  depended  a  great  deal  on  the  morals  and  discipline 
of  the  pirates  —  on  the  mind  of  the  captain;  his  fairness  in 
dividing  the  booty;  the  capacity  of  the  crew  to  hang  together. 

Anyway,  alleges  the  man  who  is  so  sure  that  nothing 
but  physical  force  matters,  nations  cannot  depend  upon 
anything  but  their  own  strength;  and  all  international 
agreements  are  futile. 

Well,  the  simple  truth  is  that  the  present  war  is  a  complete 
demonstration  that  no  nation  can  depend  upon  its  force  ^   , 
alone;  that  virtually  all  depend,  for  their  very  national  exist-    ^ 
ence,  upon  international  arrangement. 


xxii  INTRODUCTION 

Could  France  have  repelled  the  German  attack  unless  she 
could  have  depended  upon  the  aid  of  her  allies,  which  in 
turn  depended  absolutely  upon  the  keeping  of  an  international 
arrangement? 

Could  Belgium  defend  her  nationality  without  the  aid 
which  she  secures  by  treaty  arrangement? 

The  European  nation  which  should  discard  all  arrange- 
ments with  foreign  nations  would  find  its  power,  however 
great  it  might  be,  outdone.  War  itself  has  become  interna- 
tionalized. 

And  if  Germany  is  beaten,  as,  despite  her  immense  forces, 
she  probably  will  be,  it  is  because  she  depended  mainly  upon 
her  own  strength  and  neglected  the  element  of  "opinion" 
in  other  nations  which  has  enabled  her  enemies  to  range  the 
world  against  her.  "Opinion"  —  a  mere  moral  thing  —  was 
something  that  the  German  military  leaders  seem  to  have 
held  in  immense  contempt;  and  that  contempt  will  be  paid 
for  by  Germany  at  the  price  of  defeat.  For  opinion  comes 
before  force,  since  it  determines  the  direction  that  force  shall 
take;  how  it  shall  be  used. 

The  plain  implication  of  the  criticism  from  which  I  have 
quoted  is  that  because  wisdom  in  the  international  field  is 
very  weak  we  should  make  no  effort  to  strengthen  it.  The 
fact  that  situations  arise  in  which  two  nations,  both  believ- 
ing themselves  to  be  in  the  right,  come  to  blows  is  taken  as 
demonstration  of  the  futility  of  trying  to  understand  why 
each  fails  to  see  the  point  of  the  other;  why  they  come  to 
blows,  and  of  trying  to  prevent  it.  Because  physical  force  is 
the  last  resort  no  effort  should  be  made  to  avoid  it. 

This  falsification  of  the  "last  resort"  argument  is  possibly 
accountable  for  more  human  misery  than  any  other  one 
example  of  human  stupidity.  It  is  worth  getting  straight. 

"In  the  last  resort"  a  badly  managed  community  whose 
sources  of  food  may  fail  will  resort  to  cannibalism.  It  hap- 


INTRODUCTION  xxiii 

pens  not  only  among  Polar  savages,  but  has  happened  dur- 
ing some  of  the  Irish  famines  and  happens  during  some  of 
the  Russian  famines  now.  Cannibalism  in  those  conditions 
is,  if  you  will,  justifiable.  It  is,  like  war,  the  failure  of  every- 
thing. But  the  fact  that  men  may  have" to  resort  to  it,  and 
are  justified  in  so  doing,  is  not  an  argument  for  so  neglecting 
the  tilling  of  the  soil,  that  cannibalism  is  pretty  certain  to 
be  resorted  to;  for  saying:  "Since  in  the  last  resort,  if  the 
crops~fail,  we  shall  have  to  come  to  cannibalism,  cannibalism 
is  inevitable."  Rather  is  it  an  argument  for  saying:  "If  we 
do  not  cultivate  our  fields  we  shall  suffer  from  hunger  and 
be  compelled  to  eat  our  children.  Let  us  therefore  cultivate 
our  fields  with  industry."  So  with  reference  to  the  use  of 
force:  "If  we  neglect  the  understanding  of  human^ relation- 
ship, and  the  cultivation-  of  the  qualities  necessary  to  make 
human  society  workable,  we  shall  in  periods  of  tension  get  to 
flying  at  ene  another's  throats,  because  we  shall  not  be  able 
to  understand  the  differences  which  divide  us.  And  that 
will  lead  to  murder.  Let  us  therefore  so  cultivate  our  weak 
understanding  of  the  things  necessary  for  life  together  inr 
this  world,  and  let  us,  perhaps,  establish  some  sort  of  ma-f 
chinery  for  the  settlement  of  difficulties  and  the  employment . 
of  our  force,  not  one  against  another  but  for  the  common! 
good." 

"And  if  the  machinery  fails?  'Well,  we  are  back  at  the 
starting  point  of  the  argument.  What  if  the  President  of 
the  United  States  refuses  to  vacate  the  Presidential  office 
after  he  has"  been  duly  outvoted,  and,  like  any  Mexican  or 
Venezuelan  President' uses  the  army  he  commands  to  re- 
maiirin  power?  Shall  we  therefore  conclude  that  constitu- 
tions which  depend  in  the  last  resort  upon  a  compact  or 
treaty — the  oath  of  the  President  and  of  the  army — are  nec- 
essarily illusory?  An  army  of  rebellion  is  of  course  "  the  last 

resort "  —  it  is  the  collapse  of  the  whole  thing.    But  if  we  had 


xxiv  INTRODUCTION 

assumed  that  this  contingency  must  arise,  and  had  concluded 
from  that  possibility  that  raising  armies  of  rebellion  was  the 
real  method  of  republican  government  and  democratic  con- 
trol—  well,  this  republic  would  not  be  what  it  is.  If  we 
had  never  made  any  attempt  to  create  a  human  society 
because  it  might  break  down  —  as  it  sometimes  does  — 
why,  of  course  there  would  never  have  been  any  human 
society. 

And  that  is  why  the  fatalism,  conscious  or  unconscious,  of 
the  very  common  attitude  reflected  in  the  criticism  I  have 
quoted  is  so  disastrous.  The  belief  that  men  cannot  by  their 
effort  affect  their  destiny  in  these  relationships  —  among  the 
most  important  that  concern  them  —  deprives  them  of  the 
will  to  make  the  effort. 

"Statesmen  must  deal  with  the  varying  phenomena  of 
nationality  as  with  other  complications  of  real  life  ...  a 
hard  world  with  which  certain  forces  must  come  into  conflict 
at  one  time  or  another  .  .  .  there  comes  a  time  when  one 
nation  thinks  it  had  better  fight.  ..." 

"  These  facts  and  forces  are  there,"  says  the  critic  in  effect, 
"and  your  Pacificist  won't  recognize  them."  It  never  seems 
to  occur  to  him  that  the  Pacificist  recognizes  them  perfectly 
well  —  but  proposes  to  alter  them.  That  seems  to  the  mili- 
tarist preposterous.  They  can't  be  altered,  he  implies.  They 
are  forces  outside  our  volition  or  control;  they  are  a  fate  to 
which  men  must  passively  bow. 

And  yet  obviously  a  phenomenon  like  the  tradition  of  na- 
tionality did  not  come  from  Mars.  Men  made  it  by  their 
discussions  and  writings  —  and  can  unmake  it  or  modify  it. 
"'  It  is  a  relatively  new  invention  and  for  long  centuries  in 
Europe  was  unknown.  Men's  hostilities  grouped  them- 
selves round  other  traditions  and  ideas,  like  religious  differ- 
ences or  dynastic  allegiances,  which  having  made  they  have 


INTRODUCTION  xxv 

since  unmade.    The  nets  in  which  we  strangle  ourselves  are 
of  our  own  weaving. 

I  believe  it  is  hard  to  exaggerate  the  importance  of  this 
'  element  of  fatalism  in  the  popular  attitude  towards  inter- 
nationalism. It  is  the  most  vital  difference  in  two  opposing 
conceptions  of  human  society  —  the  cooperative  conception, 
that  based  on  the  belief  that  men  will  get  most  out  of  life  by 
joining  forces  in  the  common  fight  against  nature;  and,  the 
opposite  one,  which  may  be  termed  the  cannibalistic  concep- 
tion, that  based  on  the  belief  that  men's  interests  are  neces- 
sarily antagonistic;  that  they  live,  ultimately,  by  eating  one  * 
another,  and  that  under  this  law  the  great  human  groups  are 
condemned  by  a  necessity  of  nature,  to  be  in  perpetual  and 
inevitable  antagonism  to  one  another.  This  belief  that  man's 
intelligence  cannot  determine  the  character  o'f  human  so- 
ciety, that  it  is  ruled  by  some  abstraction  called  "force"  — 
the  heaviest  metal  or  the  heaviest  muscle  —  is  not  merely 
crudely  materialistic  but  implies  a  gross  spiritual  slavery. 
Such  a  doctrine  is  not  only  profoundly  anti-social,  it  is  anti- 
human —  fatal  not  merely  to  better  international  relations, 
but,  in  the  end,  to  the  degree  to  which  it  influences  human 
conduct  and  character  at  all,  to  all  those  large  aspirations 
and  spiritual  freedoms  which  man  has  so  painfully  won 
and  which  sanctify  his  life. 

To  all  of  which,  I  fear,  by  the  same  fatal  inversion  of  the 
"last  resort"  fallacy,  most  critics  will  reply:  "Yes,  that  is 
all  very  well,  Iput  what  would  you  have  done  in  August,  1914, 
when  Germany  challenged  Europe?  " 

Well,  it  does  not  invalidate  anything  that  I  am  arguing, 
to  say  that  I  would  have  fought.  But  the  whole  point  of 
my  argument  is  that  Germany  challenged  Europe  in  part 
because  there  was  no  Europe  —  no  internationally  organized 
Europe,  that  is.  If  the  rival  states  had  organized  themselves 
definitely  into  a  community  for  mutual  protection  against  a 


xxvi  INTRODUCTION 

law  breaker,  and  Germany  had  known  definitely  that  in 
violating  certain  rules  of  international  life  she  was  challeng- 
ing, not  only  the  patent  but  the  potential  forces  of  civiliza- 
tion, she  would  not  have  challenged  them.  She  would  not 
have  challenged  them  because  if  it  had  been  evident  to  her 
people  that  the  forces  they  had  for  a  generation  been  asked 
to  contribute  were  not,  as  they  believed  (however  falsely), 
for  defence  but  for  the  purpose  of  challenging  the  law  of 
human  society,  those  forces  would  not  have  been  contributed. 
The  German  government  could  not  have  created  the  instru- 
ment wherewith  to  carry  out  aggression. 

But  there  was  no  society  of  nations;  no  world- wide  or- 
ganization of  states  pledged  not  only  to  protect  any  one 
nation  against  Germany  but  also  to  protect  Germany  against 
any  hostile  state  —  Slav  or  Gallic.  And  so  the  specious  plea 
of  "defence"  against  the  Slav  menace,  or  encirclement  or 
what  not,  bemused  the  minds  of  the  German  people,  seduced 
them  from  their  natural  activities  —  and  gave  us  this  tragedy. 
It  is  the  price  of  anarchy  in  international  politics  and  or- 
ganization. 

But  the  practical  question  now  is.  What  of  to-morrow? 

For  if  war  is  inevitable,  peace  is  no  less  inevitable.  The 
most  gloriously  futile  war  cannot  go  on  for  ever.  The  soldier 
fights  with  a  pacifist  end;  to  establish  a  peace.  What  sort 
of  peace  is  it  to  be? 

Nothing  could  better  illustrate  the  ineffectiveness  of 
mere  military  power,  either  to  protect  a  nation's  interests 
or  vindicate  its  rights;  or  better  illustrate  the  need  of  in- 
ternational organization  as  a  need  of  national  defence,  than 
America's  position  to-day. 

Suppose  that  America  goes  to  war  in  defence  of  the  rights 
violated  by  Germany  at  sea;  is  absolutely  victorious  in  that 
war.  How  will  she  know  at  the  peace  that  she  has  got  what 


INTRODUCTION  xxvii 

she  has  been  fighting  for?  American  demands  at  the  end  of 
the  war  will  be  that  American  rights  at  sea  be  respected; 
that,  most  particularly,  non-combatants  shall  not  be  drowned 
by  attacks  on  merchantmen.  Very  good.  Germany  gives 
us  her  promise.  She  has  given  it  before.  How  do  we  know 
that  it  will  be  kept,  either  by  her  or  any  other  nation  that  in 
a  future  war  may  find  a  ruthless  use  of  the  submarine  the 
only  weapon  left  to  it  against  a  power  commanding  the  sea? 
Can  we  hope  that  if  we  show  now  that  we  are  ready  to  fight 
"at  the  drop  of  the  hat,"  in  future  a  hard-pressed  belligerent 
will  be  overawed  by  the  great  American  navy?  Then  why 
is  not  the  belligerent  we  now  propose  to  deal  with  held  in 
check  by  the  combined  navies  of  Great  Britain,  France, 
Russia,  Italy,  Japan  and  Portugal?  Again,  when  we  have 
that  promise  at  the  end  of  our  victorious  war  how  do  we 
know  that  it  will  be  kept;  that  we  shall  have  got  what  we 
have  been  fighting  for? 

And  what  of  the  American  case  against  the  Allies?  Is 
America  now  to  surrender  rights  upon  which  she  has  in- 
sisted ever  since  she  became  an  independent  state?  Is 
America,  in  fighting  Germany  to  make  the  British  Orders 
in  Council  the  basis  of  future  sea  law,  so  that  when  (say) 
Japan  goes  to  war  with  some  other  nation,  America  will 
have  to  submit  to  Japanese  control  of  her  trade  and  com- 
munication with  neutral  states  —  even  to  mail  and  banking 
correspondence  —  as  she  now  submits  to  British  control? 

It  is  quite  obvious  that  American  claims  have  this  differ- 
ence from  those  of  the  allies:  theirs,  in  so  far  as  they  are 
territorial  can  at  the  peace  be  satisfied  on  the  spot.  America's 
cannot.  Hers  depend  absolutely  upon  the  establishment, 
after  the  war,  of  a  different  and  better  international  order; 
upon  agreement  as  to  what  shall  constitute  international  law 
and  some  method  of  ensuring  its  observance. 

Now  America  is  in  radical  disagreement  with  her  own 


xxviii  INTRODUCTION 

prospective  Allies  as  to  the  former  of  these  things.  Her  his- 
torical conception  of  sea  law  and  the  rights  of  neutrals  comes 
much  nearer  to  that  of  Germany  (monstrous  as  the  state- 
ment may  sound)  than  to  that  of  Britain.  And  even  when 
we  are  in  agreement  as  to  what  the  sea  law  shall  be,  the  only 
hope  that  it  will  be  better  observed  in  the  future  than  in 
the  past,  is  in  very  radical  departures  of  policy  which 
American  public  opinion  as  a  whole  opposes  with  a 
dead  weight  of  hostile  tradition.  Of  course,  it  may  be  ar- 
gued that  when  Germany  is  thoroughly  beaten  the  causes 
which  have  operated  heretofore  in  creating  international 
anarchy  will  cease.  But  such  a  view  implies  an  optimism  as 
to  the  readiness  of  nations  for  cooperation  which  certainly 
this  present  writer  does  not  share.  The  past  relationships 
of  England  and  Russia  or  England  and  France;  or  Russia 
and  Japan;  or  Italy  and  France,  or  France  and  Russia,  are 
hardly  such  as  to  justify  the  hope  that  the  mere  fact  of  de- 
feating Germany  will  dispose  of  the  conflicts,  intrigues, 
ambitions,  fears  and  hatreds  that  have  heretofore  stood  in 
the  way  of  a  sane  world  order. 

Merely  to  maintain  the  present  situation  is  hardly  less 
stultifying  and  not  likely  to  be  capable  of  indefinite  pro- 
longation. To  urge  on  behalf  of  such  a  policy  that  America 
is  not  concerned,  is  to  propound  an  untenable  theory  that 
overlooks  the  obvious  condition.  America  is  involved 
whether  she  will  or  no.  Her  citizens  are  killed,  her  trade 
affected,  her  resources  used  to  influence  the  war's  issue,  and 
resentment  incurred  because  of  the  rules  which  she  is  laying 
down.  It  is  not  a  question  of  whether  she  is  concerned,  but 
of  what  represents  her  greatest  concern.  It  is  hardly  indeed 
a  question  of  whether  she  will  intervene,  but  what  manner 
of  intervention  will  best  subserve  her  chief  ends. 

There  is  only  one  recourse:  for  America  to  recognize  that 
she  is  a  member  of  the  society  of  nations,  and  to  face  the 


INTRODUCTION  xxix 

problem  of  determining  just  what  that  involves;  what  shall 
be  the  foundations  of  the  future  internationalism;  what 
shall  be  America's  place  in  it.  That  cannot  be  determined 
without  some  knowledge  of  the  subjects  with  which  this 
book  deals. 

The  danger  at  present  is  that  the  country,  by  a  one-sided 
demand  for  a  very  incomplete  "preparedness"  will  be  lulled 
into  the  illusion  that  arms  alone,  if  only  she  has  enough  of 
them,  can  render  her  secure  and  solve  her  international 
problems.  They  cannot. 

The  danger  of  the  present  widespread  "preparedness" 
agitation  is  not  in  the  demand  for  arms,  but  in  the  implica- 
tion that  arms  suffice.  It  is  a  half-preparedness.  I  happen 
to  have  indicated  elsewhere  the  danger  of  that  in  the  follow- 
ing propositions,  which  bear  so  directly  on  the  problems  of 
America's  international  relations  just  now,  that  I  will  ven- 
ture to  quote  them, 
'submit: 

(1)  That  preparedness  is  dangerously  incomplete  when  it  does 
not  include  a  clear  formulation  of  foreign  policy  —  what  we  intend 
to  exact  from  or  defend  against  foreign  nations  by  our  military 
power;  the  rights  of  trade,  immigration,  residence,  which  we  are 
prepared  to  grant  to  foreigners,  European  and  Asiatic,  in  our 
own  territory  and  in  that  which  we  now,  or  may  later  by  our  in- 
creasing power,  control;  the  rights  which  we  demand  for  our  citi- 
zens on  land,  as  in  Mexico,  and  on  sea,  as  in  the  conflict  with  Ger- 
many and  England;  just  how  far  we  will  use  our  military  and 
naval  force  to  cooperate  with  other  nations  in  upholding  what  we 
may  decide  to  be  common  rights  on  land  or  sea;  at  what  point  we 
shall  decline  to  allow  such  common  action  to  lead  us  into  entang- 
ling alliances;  the  conditions  upon  which  we  are  prepared  to  live 
together  with  other  nations  in  this  world  of  ours,  and  to  share  it 
with  them. 

(2)  That  so  long  as  it  is  unknown  on  behalf  of  what  policy  and 


, 


xxx  INTRODUCTION 

general  principles  our  military  power  will  be  used;  so  long  as  its 
general  purposes  are  not  manifest,  to  ourselves,  the  world  at  large, 
and  our  prospective  enemy,  it  will,  however  great,  fail  to  protect 
our  nation  and  our  interest,  to  ensure  peace  or  to  secure  our  rights; 
and  if  we  get  the  armament  first  and  leave  the  policy  to  be  an- 
nounced later,  the  increased  armament  may  prove  not  merely 
ineffective  hi  the  attainment  of  such  ends,  but  may  be  instru- 
mental in  defeating  them,  since  sooner  or  later,  in  that  case,  in- 
creased armament  would,  either  by  increase  of  power  on  the 
part  of  other  nations  or  by  hostile  alliances,  be  neutralized, 
canceled. 

(3)  That  it  is  not  sufficient  that  the  intention  behind  a  nation's 
power  should  be  inoffensive  and  in  no  way  threaten  others;  the 
specific  object  of  the  power,  the  foreign  policy  it  supports,  must  be 
made  clear  to  others  in  the  way  that  members  of  an  alliance  like 
that  between  Russia,  England,  and  France  make  their  respective 
objects  clear  to  one  another.  In  the  absence  of  that  definite  under- 
standing power  must  be  mutually  threatening  (as  illustrated  in  the 
past  military  rivalry  of  the  three  nations  just  mentioned),  since 
the  basic  principle  of  national  defence  in  the  modern  world  is  that 
superior  alien  force  the  objective  of  which  is  not  manifest  must 
be  met  by  equivalent  or  greater  force;  which  makes  security  de- 
pend upon  the  attainment  of  a  condition  in  which  each  shall  be 
stronger  than  the  other;  that  is,  upon  a  physical  impossibility. 

And,  in  addition  that: 

(a)  A  successful  American  international  policy  must  be  the 
outcome  of  widely  expressed  public  opinion:  it  cannot  be  presented 
ready-made  to  the  country  by  a  President  or  an  Administration, 
because  it  involves,  in  the  radically  changing  conditions  of  the 
world,  revolutionary  departure  from  precedent;  grave  questions 
of  principle  which  the  public  alone  can  decide.  Nor  can  decision 
be  left  to  a  tune  of  crisis.  Human  nature  being  combative,  co- 
ercive, guided  largely  by  impulse  and  passions  and  very  little  by 
reason  and  reflection,  to  expect  wisdom  at  such  a  time  is  to  ask 
intellectual  and  moral  miracles  of  men. 


INTRODUCTION  xxxi 

(&)  Nothing  in  the  foregoing  implies  a  disparagement  of  arma- 
ment; it  is  an  argument,  not  that  the  advocate  of  preparedness  is 
asking  too  much,  but  that  he  is  asking  too  little;  not  that  we  do 
not  need  armament,  but  that  we  need  something  else  as  well;  it  is  v 
an  argument  not  against  preparedness,  but  against  preparedness 
by  dangerous  half  measures. 

It  is  worth  while  to  recall  a  few  facts,  too  easily  forgotten, 
that  support  these  propositions. 

The  commonest  assumption  behind  so  much  "prepared- 
ness" advocacy  is  that  our  arms  are  simply  for  the  defence 
of  our  soil,  for  repelling  invasion,  and  that  if  only  we  be    • 
strong  enough  our  policy  cannot  endanger  us. 

That  is  a  pernicious  and  dangerous  fallacy.  The  armies 
and  navies  of  great  states  are  not  for  the  purpose  of  defend- 
ing their  territories  so  much  as  their  policies,  as  American, 
like  European  history  shows.  Although  America  has  had 
several  foreign  wars,  and  been  near  to  several  more,  not  one 
has  been  for  the  purpose  of  repelling  invasion.  The  causes 
have  included  resistance  to  piratical  tribute  on  the  high  seas 
—  the  Barbary  war;  resistance  to  other  high-handedness  at 
sea  —  the  1812  war;  defence  of  American  lives  and  interests 
on  foreign  soil  —  the  Mexican  war;  the  termination  of  bar- 
barous government  —  the  Spanish  war;  the  restoration  of 
order  —  the  Philippine  war.  All  good  causes,  but  American 
arms  were  defending  American  poJiG&s,  hot  American  soil. 
So  in  the  European  war:  Austria's  action  in  July,  1914, 
brought  into  the  war  in  turn,  Russia,  France,  Belgium, 
England,  Japan,  Italy  and  Portugal;  but  not  because  Austria 
was  threatening  to  invade  them.  If  Russia  and  Europe 
generally  had  been  ready  to  give  Austria  a  free  hand  to 
crush  Serbia  there  would  have  been  no  war.  But  they  be- 
lieved such  a  policy  dangerous  and  resisted  it. 

The  importance  of  the  distinction  between  defending  a 
policy  and  a  territory,  is  that  in  a  conflict  of  policy  both 


xxxii  INTRODUCTION 

sides  may  plausibly  believe  themselves  to  be  acting  on  the 
defensive  and  defending  the  right. 

If  the  Venezuelan  matter  in  1896  had  led  to  war  between 
England  and  America,  as  it  very  nearly  did,  both  sides 
would  have  believed  that  they  were  defending  their  rights: 
Great  Britain  her  citizens  from  transfer  to  a  disorderly  gov- 
ernment like  Venezuela,  America  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  A 
clear  definition  of  policy  on  both  sides  would  in  such  cases 
obviate  conflict. 

We  cannot  always  count  on  such  conflicts  having  so  satis- 
factory an  ending.  This  country  may,  probably  will,  drift 
into  war  at  no  very  distant  date.  If  in  the  future  America 
is  compelled,  as  she  may  be,  to  go  into  Mexico  and  adminis- 
ter that  country,  and  possibly  cancel  concessions  made  to 
foreigners,  conflict  may  arise  from  the  fear  of  foreign  nations 
that  America  will  use  her  increasing  power  on  this  continent 
(J  to  exact  commercial  preference  for  herself  and  exclude  rivals. 
Such  conflicts  might  easily  develop  into  wars  (which  would 
of  course  be  with  a  group  of  powers  if  at  all)  that  clear  formu- 
lation of  policy  might  avoid. 

Force  has  no  peace-preserving  value  unless  the  prospective 
disturber  of  the  peace  knows  in  what  circumstances  it  will  be 
used  against  him;  and  that  again  implies  a  statement  of 
policy. 

Even  if  England  had  possessed  a  great  army  in  1914,  it 
would  not  have  restrained  German  aggression  unless  Ger- 
many knew  clearly  that  in  such  and  such  circumstances  it 
would  be  used  against  her.  And  very  eminent  English  public 
men  have  declared  that  Germany  did  not  know  the  circum- 
stances in  which  England  would  enter  the  war  against  her. 
If  that  is  true  the  military  power  of  England  as  a  force  making 
for  peace  would  have  been  nullified  by  the  absence  of  any 
clear  policy  on  England's  part. 

So  with  Italy.     Italy's  very  considerable  army  was  use- 


INTRODUCTION  xxxiii 

less  as  a  preventative  of  German  aggression,  and  as  an  ele- 
ment in  the  maintenance  of  European  peace,  because  Ger- 
many did  not  know  it  would  be  used  against  her;  she  may 
have  hoped  even  that  it  would  be  used  for  her.  When  we 
are  told  that  if  only  England  had  adopted  conscription, 
Germany  would  have  been  restrained,  we  should  remember 
that  when  England  first  began  to  consider  the  question  of 
conscription  twenty  years  ago  it  was  for  the  purpose  of 
opposing  France;  at  that  time  England  was  talking  of  an 
alliance  with  Germany;  a  little  earlier  she  was  preparing  for 
war  witkJRussiaj^fiailier  still  —  in  the  Crimean  War  —  she 
was  actually  fighting  Russia  and  upholding  Turkey,  a  course 
which  Palmerston  justified  partly  on  the  ground  that  it  was 
necessary  to  protect  Germanic  civilization  against  Russian 
barbarism!  It  is  partly  because  English  arms  have  defended 
the  Turks  in  the  past  that  we  had  in  the  Balkans  the  condi- 
tions out  of  which  the  present  war  arose.  Where  policy 
shifts  in  this  way  —  one  war  undoing  the  work  of  the  last  — 
no  amount  of  mere  military  preparedness  will  give  a  nation 
security. 

Where  does  America  stand  in  the  grave  questions  that 
will  confront  the  world  to-morrow  at  the  peace?  What  is 
her  international  policy? 

Is  she  prepared  to  pledge  her  power  to  support  more 
civilized  international  conditions:  to  exact  the  maintenance 
of  international  law?  In  that  case  the  slogan  of  "no  en- 
tangling alliances"  must  go  by  the  board.  At  present  her 
attitude  to  international  questions  is  that  any  power  which 
commands  the  sea  can  secure  her  material  support  —  money, 
munitions,  etc.,  —  whatever  the  merits  of  the  cause  that 
power  may  be  defending. 

The  Germans  after  the  war  will  consequently  argue  that 
if  they  had  commanded  the  sea  they  could  have  availed  them- 
selves of  America's  national  resources,  however  bad  the 


xxxiv  INTRODUCTION 

German  cause  might  be.  And  any  other  prospective  belliger- 
ent will  argue  similarly,  that  a  nation  desiring  to  avail  itself 
of  American  resources  does  not  need  to  concern  itself  as  to 
the  nature  of  its  wars,  whether  they  are  just  or  unjust,  de- 
fensive or  aggressive;  all  it  needs  is  to  command  the  sea.  It 
can  then  be  sure  of  what  is  virtually  the  economic  alliance  of 
Americans.  That,  to  say  the  least,  is  unfortunate.  If 
America  were  to  declare  that  on  behalf  of  certain  causes, 
no  nation,  whether  it  commanded  the  sea  or  not,  could  count 
upon  American  material  support,  America's  resources  would 
then  be  a  factor  thrown  on  the  side  of  international  good 
behavior,  instead  of  being,  as  at  present,  a  premium  upon 
armament  competition.  No  one  knows — Americans  them- 
selves do  not  know — where  America  stands  in  international 
matters,  nor  how  she  proposes  to  use  her  increasing  military 
power. 

Is  she  prepared,  for  instance,  to  assure  Europeans  that 
in  going  into  Mexico  or  Haiti  or  San  Domingo  or  elsewhere 
she  is  not  going  to  use  her  power  to  exclude  them  in  any  way 
commercially?  Such  a  self-denying  ordinance  would  involve 
revolutionary  changes  in  our  conceptions  of  national  sov- 
ereignty. Yet,  without  it  she  may  drift  into  conflict. 

Human  nature,  being  what  it  is,  the  very  worst  policy  is 
to  leave  these  things  until  the  crisis  arises.  To  do  so  is  to 
ignore  the  plain  fact  of  human  imperfection.  It  is  not  in 
the  midst  of  an  international  crisis  that  nations  can  decide 
the  wise  course.  At  such  times  we  are  all  likely  to  lose  our 
tempers  and  call  it  patriotism,  and  to  use  our  force  to  ill 
purpose. 

If  we  look  back  in  history  we  find  plenty  of  arms  and 
fighting;  men  never  seem  to  have  shown  much  unreadiness 
for  that;  but  we  find  little  patience  to  understand  each  other's 
purposes,  little  tendency  to  make  those  adjustments  by 
which  alone,  however,  they  can  live  together. 


INTRODUCTION  xxxv 

Force  is,  or  should  be,  the  servant  of  man,  an  instrument 
of  the  human  intelligence;  and  whether  it  is  well  or  ill  used 
depends  absolutely  upon  that  intelligence.  The  same  in- 
strument can  be  either  a  means  of  defence  or  suicide.  Force 
is  not  a  thing  that  operates  of  itself  apart  from  the  human 
will,  and  wisdom  will  not  come  of  itself.  It  demands  a 
definite  moral  effort  to  the  end  that  we  may  use  our  instru- 
ment well  instead  of  ill. 

If  we  are  to  use  it  well  we  cannot  ignore  the  issues  with 
which  this  book  deals.  They  are  of  the  essence  of  the  prob- 
lems that  will  face  America  to-morrow  at  the  peace,  or 
earlier.  They  will  dominate,  certainly  during  our  generation, 
all  other  problems  whatsoever,  for  upon  their  solution  de- 
pends the  whole  character  of  organized  society.  If  it  is 
Utopian  to  concern  ourselves  with  these  subjects,  then  indeed 
is  the  choice  before  us  "Utopia  or  Hell." 

NORMAN  ANGELL. 


NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 


NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND   SOCIETY 


NATIONALISM 

I.  Nationalism:  absolute  sovereignty  of  state. 
A.  At  present  each  nation  (state*)  is  theoretically  sov- 
ereign; that  is,  it  is  independent  of  every  other  state. 

1  There  is  some  confusion  in  the  use  of  the  terms  "state"  and  "nation". 
The  former  when  applied  to  a  unit  like  Great  Britain,  Germany  or 
France,  clearly  means  the  political  unit.  By  "nation"  some  mean  a 
state  in  which  there  is  one  nationality,  a  national-state.  These  would 
say  that  Austria-Hungary  is  a  state,  but  not  a  nation.  However,  in  inter- 
national relations  Austria-Hungary  is  considered  a  nation  like  every 
other.  As  this  study  has  to  do  with  international  affairs,  the  terms  nation 
and  state  (when  referring  to  a  sovereign  power)  are  used  synonymously. 
Nationalism,  thep,  (as  distinct  from  nationality)  is  the  political  system 
of  co-existing  sovereign  states. 

An  excellent  definition  of  a  nation  is  that  of  Lieber:  Nationalism, 
pp.  7-8.  "What  is  a  nation  in  the  modern  sense  of  the  word?  The  word 
nation,  in  the  fullest  adaptation  of  the  term,  means,  in  modern  times, 
a  numerous  and  homogeneous  population  (having  long  emerged  from  the 
hunters  and  nomadic  state)  permanently  inhabiting  and  cultivating  a 
coherent  territory,  with  a  well-defined  geographic  outline,  and  a  name  of 
its  own,  —  the  inhabitants  speaking  their  own  language,  having  their 
own  literature  and  common  institutions,  which  distinguish  them  clearly 
from  other  and  similar  groups  of  people,  being  citizens  or  subjects  of  a 
unitary  government,  however  subdivided  it  may  be,  and  having  an  or- 
ganic unity  with  one  another  as  well  as  being  conscious  of  a  common 
destiny.  Organic,  intellectual  and  political  internal  unity  with  propor- 
tionate strength  and  a  distinct  and  obvious  demarcation  from  similar 
groups,  are  notable  elements  of  the  idea  of  a  modern  nation  in  its  fullest 
sense.  A  nation  is  a  nation  only  when  there  is  but  one  nationality;  and 
the  attempt  at  establishing  a  nationality  within  a  nationality  is  more  in- 
consistent and  mischievous  even  than  the  establishment  of  'an  empire 
within  an  empire'." 

i 


NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

There  are  certain  attributes  of  sovereignty.    Thus  a 
state  to  be  legally  sovereign  must  have: 

1.  The  power  to  make  war  and  peace. 

2.  The  supreme  and  effective  jurisdiction  over  a  given 

area  and  its  inhabitants. 

3.  The  right  to  coin  money,  raise  revenue  by  taxation, 

maintain  a  military  establishment,  make  war  and 
peace,  make  and  denounce  treaties. 

B.  The  Great  War  has  resulted  in  attempts  to  distinguish 

between  German,  British  and  American  conceptions 
of  sovereignty. 

1.  Germany  is  said  to  regard  sovereignty  as  absolute,  and 

seeks  to  make  the  facts  tally  with  this  conception: 
a  sovereign  state  admits  no  obligations  to  other 
states. 

2.  Great  Britain  is  said  to  regard  absolute  sovereignty  as 

a  theory  only,  which  must  be  and  is  modified  to 
meet  the  practical  requirements  of  international 
intercourse:  each  state  must  recognize  certain  rights 
of  others  in  the  present  condition  of  things,  no 
matter  what  the  theory  of  sovereignty  is. 

C.  Current  philosophy  of  the  state  accepts  the  nation  as 

the  best  and  highest  possible  development. 

i.  "Nature  has  decreed  that  the  struggle  for  survival  shall 
be  in  groups.  The  national  group  is  the  only  one 
suited  to  cope  with  conditions.  In  the  war  of  race 
against  race,  the  nation  has  to  foresee  how  and  where 
the  struggle  will  be  carried  on."  —  Karl  Pearson: 
National  Life  from  the  Standpoint  of  Science. 

"The  state  is  the  realized  ethical  idea."  — Hegel: 
Philosophy  of  Law. 

"The  state  alone,  so  Schleiermacher  once  taught,  gives 
the  individual  the  highest  degree  of  life."  —  Bern- 
hardi,  p.  25. 


NATIONALISM  3 

"We  must  bring  to  the  solution  of  every  problem  an 
intense  and  fervid  Americanism,  —  that  is,  broadly 
American  and  national,  American  in  heart,  soul, 
spirit,  and  purpose,  proud  beyond  measure  of  the 
glorious  privilege  of  bearing  it."  —  Roosevelt:  True 
Americanism:  American  Ideals  and  other  Essays. 

"Eliminate  if  you  can,  the  competition  between  the 
several  nationalities.  .  .  .  The  result  may  be  that 
European  civilization  will  not  survive,  having  lost 
the  righting  energy,  which  heretofore  has  been  in- 
herent in  its  composition."  —  Mahan:  Armaments 
and  Arbitration,  p.  10. 

2.  Federation  impossible. 
a.  Theoretical  objections. 

1 '  To  expand  the  idea  of  the  State  into  that  of  hu- 
manity, and  thus  to  entrust  apparently  higher 
duties  to  the  individuals,  leads  to  error,  since  in 
a  human  race  conceived  as  a  whole,  struggle,  and 
by  implication  the  most  essential  vital  principle, 
would  be  ruled  out.  Any  action  in  favor  of  collec- 
tive humanity  outside  the  limits  of  the  State  and 
nationality  is  impossible.  Such  conceptions  be- 
long to  the  wide  domain  of  Utopias."  —  Bern- 
hardi:  Germany  and  the  Next  War,  p.  25,  note. 

"There  never  have  been,  and  never  will  be,  universal 
rights  of  men.  Here  and  there  particular  relations 
can  be  brought  under  definite  international  laws, 
but  the  bulk  of  national  life  is  absolutely  outside 
codification.  Even  were  some  such  attempt  made, 
even  if  a  comprehensive  international  code  were 

,  drawn  up,  no  self-respecting  nation  would  sacrifice 
its  own  conception  of  right  to  it.  By  so  doing  it 
would  renounce  its  highest  ideals;  it  would  allow 
its  own  sense  of  justice  to  be  violated  by  an  in- 
justice, and  thus  dishonor  itself."  —  Bernhardi: 
Germany  and  the  Next  War,  p.  32. 

\ 


NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

"The  work  of  the  nation  is  not  yet  finished,  and  the 
world-state  is  too  remote  a  conception  to  influence 
any  but  a  few  idealists,  who  have  insufficiently 
appreciated  the  intense  exclusiveness  of  existing 
groups.  The  world-state  is  hundreds  and  perhaps 
thousands  of  years  in  the  future."  —  Geoffrey  C. 
Faber:  War  and  the  Personality  of  Nations,  Fort- 
nightly Review,  March,  1915. 

b.  Practical  objections  urged  against  federation. 

Racial  differences  are  insuperable.  Races  could 
not  get  along  amicably,  even  if  their  national 
existence  was  merged  into  a  larger  federation. 
Differences  in  culture  would  merely  be  ac- 
centuated by  biological  differences. 
Federation  requires  some  fundamental  constitu- 
tion. This  could  not  be  secured  if  a  single 
powerful  state  opposed  it;  for  vacillating  states, 
allies  or  dependents  of  the  opposing  state, 
would  join  in  the  opposition. 
Even  if  such  a  constitution  were  devised  and  ac- 
cepted it  would  not  assure  justice  or  greater 
security,  inasmuch  as  the  failure  of  law  to 
secure  justice  would  still  be  true;  it  might  in- 
deed be  worse,  in  the  event  some  clique  or 
machine  secured  control  of  the  mechanism  of 
government. 
D.  The  claims  of  the  several  states  (nations). 

i.  Each  regards  itself,  and  its  ideals,  Kultur  or  civiliza- 
tion, as  superior.  IJence  foreigners  came  to  be 
called  barbarians.  /This  accounts  for  the  perennial 
discussion  of  the  respective  merits  of  Shakespeare 
and  Goethe,  of  the  respective  places  of  German, 
French,  English  and  other  scientists.  It  also  ac- 
counts for  the  claim  current  in  several  nations  that 


NATIONALISM  5 

its  nationals  invented  the  railway  or  telegraph  or 
what  not. 

"Insofar  as  an  Englishman  differs  in  essentials  from  a 
Swede  or  Belgian,  he  believes  that  he  represents  a  more 
perfectly  developed  standard  of  general .  excellence. 
Yes,  and  even  those  nations  nearest  to  us  in  mind  and 
sentiment  —  German  and  Scandinavian  —  we  regard 
on  the  whole  as  not  so  excellent  as  ourselves,  compar- 
ing their  typical  characteristics  with  ours."  —  Memoir 
of  Herbert  Harvey,  by  Earl  Grey.  Cited  by  Angell: 
America  and  the  New  World-State,  pp.  136-137. 

"I  contend  that  the  British  race  is  the  finest  which  his- 
tory has  yet  produced."  —  Cecil  Rhodes'  Will  —  En- 
cyclopedia Britannica  XXXII  (loth  ed.),  p.  228. 

2.  Each  nation  believes  it  has  a  peculiarly  important  mis- 
sion to  perform. 

"God  has  assigned  to  the  German  people  a  place  in  the 
world  and  a  role  in  history  which  demand  continual 
sacrifices.  Our  pride  should  make  us  bear  them  with 
good  heart."  —  The  German  Chancellor:  Speech, 
February  15,  1915. 

"To  us  [the  British]  has  been  given  by  our  history  a 
work  and  a  mission  perhaps  the  loftiest  ever  as- 
signed to  a  people."  —  Wyatt,  Nineteenth  Century,  45, 
p.  225. 

"The  Anglo-Saxon  race  is  infallibly  destined  to  be  the 
predominant  force  in  the  history  and  civilization  of  the 
world."  —  Chamberlain  —  Cited  by  Harris:  Interven- 
tion and  Colonization  in  Africa,  p.  15. 

"France,  Punivers  a  besoin  que  tu  vives!  Je  le  redis,  la 
France  est  un  besoin  des  hommes. "  —  Victor  Hugo  — 
cited  by  Harris,  Ibid., xp.  15. 

In  the  United  States  men  Jfcy.e  been  fond  of  speaking  of 
the  "manifest  destiny"  of  the  nation. 


NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

"His  [De  Tocqueville's]  prophecy  that  'America  will  one 
day  become  the  first  maritime  power  of  the  globe  — 
they  are  born  to  rule  seas,  as  the  Romans  were  to  con- 
quer the  world/  will  doubtless  be  fulfilled  in  time."  — 
Luce:  North  American  Review,  153,  p.  675. 

"We  must  play  a  great  part  in  the  world,  and  especially 
.  .  .  perform  those  deeds  of  blood,  of  valour,  which 
above  everything  else  bring  national  renown."  —  Roose- 
velt: The  Strenuous  Life.  Cited  by  Angell:  America 
and  the  New  World-State,  p.  132. 

3.  Each  nation  claims  its  citizens  show  a  superior  bravery 

and  fighting  quality. 

In  former  times  it  was  customary  to  designate  these  as 
furor  teutonicus,furiafran$aise,  Spanish  Fury,  etc. 

"The  fire  [on  the  Volturno]  grew  worse.  .  .  .  The  cap- 
tainj^iaved  splendidly,  and  so  did  the  officers,  who 
T^S^^nglish.  I  am  sorry  to  say  that  the  crew,  who 

*  were  Germans  and  Belgians,  behaved  very  badly."  — 
London  Newspapers  on  the  Volturno  accident. 

"The  captain  and  the  officers  lost  their  heads.     They 
ran  hither  and  thither  and  behaved  very  badly."  - 
German  newspapers. 

4.  Each  state  believes  that  its  aspirations  and  policies 

are  righteous;  of  course  if  any  other  state  holds  a 
conflicting  policy,  it  must  be  in  the  wrong  (though 
from  its  standpoint  it  is  surely  in  the  right).  Once 
national  feeling  gets  behind  the  respective  views, 
each  regards  itself  as  absolutely  right  and  its  oppo- 
nent as  absolutely  wrong.  A  nation  can  do  no 
wrong. 

"Each  nation  evolves  its  own  conception  of  right,  each 
has  its  particular  ideals  and  aims,  which  spring  with  a 
certain  inevitableness  from  its  character  and  historical 


NATIONALISM  7 

life.  These  various  views  bear  in  themselves  their 
living  justification,  and  may  well  be  diametrically  op- 
posed to  those  of  other  nations,  and  none  can  say  that 
one  nation  has  a  better  right  than  the  other."  —  Bern- 
hardi:  Germany  and  the  Next  War,  p.  32. 

5.  Ear'  i  believes  that  its  highest  duty  is  to  survive. 

"The  state  is  itself  the  highest  conception  in  the  wider 
community  of  man,  and  therefore  the  duty  of  self- 
annihilation  does  not  enter  into  the  case.  The  Chris- 
tian duty  of  sacrifice  for  something  higher  does  not 
exist  for  the  state,  for  there  is  nothing  higher  than  it  in 
the  world's  history;  consequently  it  cannot  sacrifice  it- 
self to  something  higher."  —  Treitschke,  Politik  i,  3. 
Cited  from  Bernhardi:  Germany  and  the  Next  War, 
p.  46. 

»  By  "survival"  is  meant  physical  survival  as  a  state, 
for  it  is  contended  that  national  ideals  depend  on 
the  existence  of  the  nation,  and  would  disappear 
without  the  protection  of  the  latter.  This  is  said 
+r  *  ••'„'  disproven  by  the  Jews. 

"Nations  cannot  be  created,  nor  can  they  become  great, 
by  any  purely  ethical  or  spiritual  expansion.  The 
establishment,  in  great  or  small  entities,  of  tribes  and 
states  is  the  resultant  only  of  their  physical  power;  and 
whenever  there  is  a  reversal,  or  an  attempted  reversal 
to  this,  the  result  is  either  internal  dissolution  or  sud- 
den destruction,  their  dismembered  territories  going 
to  make  up  the  dominions  of  their  conquerors."  —  Lea: 
The  Day  of  the  Saxon,  pp.  10-11.  Cited  by  Angell: 
and  the  New  World-State,  p.  129. 


6.  In  general  each  state  is  supposed  to  stand  for  some- 
thing sui  generis;  to  have  a  personality  and  qualities 


NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

peculiar  to  it  and  not  attainable  by  other  peoples; 
and  its  ideals  or  Kultur  are  supposed  to  be  in- 
compatible with  others  and  to  lead  to  conflict. 

REFERENCES 
See  Chapter  III 


II 

THE  COROLLARIES   OF   NATIONALISM 

I.  Imperialism.    A  vigorous  nation  must  expand. 

A.  Because,  its  ideals  being  superior,  it  would  be  immoral 

not  to  bring  them  to  other  peoples;  expansion  is  a 
part  of  the  national  mission,  it  spreads  civilization. 
Hence,  promises  not  to  add  territory  in  the  future  are 
meaningless,  if  not  unmoral. 

"The  imperialism  of  the  American  is  a  duty  and  credit  to 
humanity.  He  is  the  highest  type  of  imperial  master. 
He  makes  beautiful  the  land  he  touches;  beautiful  with 
moral  and  physical  cleanliness.  .  .  .  There  should  be  no 
doubt  that  even  with  all  possible  moral  refinement  it  is 
the  absolute  right  of  a  nation  to  live  to  its  full  intensity, 
to  expand,  to  found  colonies,  to  get  richer  and  richer  by 
any  proper  means  such  as  armed  conquest,  commerce, 
diplomacy.  Such  expansion  as  an  aim  is  an  inalienable 
right  and  in  the  case  of  the  United  States  it  is  a  particular 
duty,  because  we  are  idealists  and  are  thereby  bound  by 
establishing  protectorates  over  the  weak  to  protect  them 
from  unmoral  Kultur."  —  Seven  Seas  Magazine  (Organ 
of  the  Navy  League  of  the  United  States),  Nov.,  1915, 
pp.  27-28. 

B.  Because  a  state  cannot  stand  still. 

"Strong,  healthy,  and  flourishing  nations  increase  in  num- 
bers. From  a  given  moment  they  require  a  continual 
expansion  of  their  frontiers,  they  require  new  territory 
for  the  accommodation  of  their  surplus  population."  — 
Bernhardi:  Germany  and  the  Next  War,  p.  21. 
9 


io  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

"But  when  the  State  renounces  all  extension  of  power,  and 
recoils  from  every  war  which  is  necessary  for  its  expan- 
sion; when  'at  peace  on  sluggard's  couch  it  lies'  then  its 
citizens  become  stunted."  —  Bernhardi:  Germany  and 
the  Next  War,  p.  26. 

"Colonization  is  for  France  a  question  of  life  or  death. 
Either  France  will  become  a  great  African  state,  or  she 
will  in  a  century  or  two  be  a  second-rate  power."  — 
Leroy-Beaulieu.  Cited  by  Harris:  Africa,  pp.  15-16. 

C.  Because  after  a  war,  even  if  not  undertaken  from  am- 

bition for  territory,  the  victorious  nation  naturally 
enlarges  its  boundaries.  \ 

D.  Whether  necessary  or  not,  all  strong  nations  have  ex- 

panded. 

II.  Each  state  is  the  rival  of  every  other.    Each  is  assumed  to 

be  a  unit  competing  with  every  other,  hence,  we  per- 
sonify the  nation  and  speak  of  its  trade,  as  though  the 
nation  itself,  instead  of  its  individual  citizens,  were  in 
business. 

III.  Each  state,  being  in  competition  for  existence  with  every 

other  does  what  is  in  accordance  with  its  interests. 

The  fundamental  principle  is  that  national  necessity 

is  above  law. 

A.  National  necessity  takes  precedence  of  everything  —  in- 
'  ternational  law,  treaties,  promises,  humane  considera- 
tions, or  ordinary  conceptions  of  justice. 


"Necessity  knows  no  law.  The  injustice  we  thus  com- 
mit we  will  repair  as  soon  as  our  military  object  has 
been  attained."  -  Bethmann-Hollweg:  in  Reichstag 
(August,  1914)  in  explanation  of  the  invasion  of 
Belgium. 

"Nothing  has  ever  been  done  by  any  other  nation  more 
utterly  in  defiance  of  the  conventionalities  of  so-called 
international  law  [than  the  seizure  of  the  Danish  fleet 


THE  COROLLARIES  OF  NATIONALISM  n 

by  Great  Britain  in  1807].  We  considered  it  advisable 
and  necessary  and  expedient,  and  we  had  the  power  to 
do  it;  therefore  we  did  it.  Are  we  ashamed  of  it?  No, 
certainly  not;  we  are  proud  of  it."  —  Major  Murray: 
Peace  of  the  Anglo-Saxons,  pp.  40-41. 

B.  Neutrals  are  expected  to  yield  to  it,  for  the  rights  of 

belligerents,  fighting  for  their  existence,  usually  take 
precedence  and  belligerents  do  not  hesitate  to  in- 
fringe the  interests  of  neutrals  as  far  as  they  can  pru- 
dently do  so. 

German  submarine  blockade  and  the  United  States. 

The  British  long-distance  blockade  of  Germany. 

C.  Citizens  are  expected,  and  required  to  approve  of  the 

course  adopted  by  the  nation,  and  support  it  in  every 
way,  no  matter  what  they  privately  think.  Patriot- 
ism precedes  conscience:  "My  country,  right  or 
wrong."  Conscription  is  employed  to  compel  citizens 
to  aid  the  national  cause. 

D.  God  is  declared  to  be  on  the  side  of  the  nation.    This  is 

extending  conscription  to  Heaven. 

E.  Diplomacy,  being  designed  to  advance  the  national 

interest,  uses  what  means  achieve  this  end;  and  the 
end  justifies  them.  Hence  diplomacy  has  often  been 
filled  with  intrigue  and  treachery.  Secret  treaties 
and  engagements  have  often  emasculated  public 
treaties;  and  have  at  times  committed  peoples  to 
causes  which  they  did  not  approve.  Happily, 
modern  diplomacy  has  improved  somewhat.  In  any 
case  diplomats  cannot  be  actuated  by  the  code  of 
individual  morals. 

$  Governments  are  corporations,  and  corporations  have  not 
souls;  governments,  moreover,  are  trustees,  not  prin- 
cipals, and  as  such  must  put  first  the  lawful  interests  of 


12  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

their  wards  —  their  own  people.  ..."    Admiral  Mahan: 
The  Interest  of  America  in  International  Conditions. 

IV.  Force  is  the  ultimate  solvent  of  differences  between 

nations. 

V.  It  behooves  every  state  to  develop  its  power  for  the  inevi- 

table conflict. 

"I  think,  and  have  always  thought,  that  the  possession  of 
force,  of  power,  to  effect  ends  is  a  responsibility  —  a 
talent,  to  use  the  Christian  expression  —  which  cannot 
by  the  individual  man  or  state  be  devolved  upon  another, 
except  when  certain  that  the  result  cannot  violate  the 
individual  or  the  national  conscience."  —  Mahan:  Arma- 
ments and  Arbitration,  p.  30. 

A .  Means  of  doing  this. 

1.  Developing  the  mental,  material  and  moral  solidity 

of  the  people  by  sound  education,  by  aiding  material 
progress,  and  by  cultivating  loyalty  to  the  nation. 

2.  Arming.    Preparedness  to  assert  one's  rights  in  any 

difference  that  may  arise  is  held  to  make  differences 
less  likely  to  rise,  and  hence  is  considered  a  guaran- 
tor of  peace.     This  system  is  known  as  the  "armed 
peace."    It  was  on  this  theory  that  the  Kaiser  was  \ 
urged  as  a  proper  candidate  for  the  Nobel  Peace  . 

Prize. 

i 

a.  "Preparedness  is  the  best  insurance  against  war."- 
Major- General  Wood. 

"Our  surest  guarantee  would  therefore  be  a  well-trained 
Army,  numerically  sufficient  to  ensure  respect,  stand- 
ing behind  the  overwhelming  Navy  we  may  be  con- 
sidered at  present  to  possess."  —  Maude:  War  and 
the  World's  Life,  p.  200. 

"How  many  people  in  the  British  Isles  realize  that 
Germany  and  France  owe  their  security  from  inva- 


THE  COROLLARIES  OF  NATIONALISM  13 

sion  to  the  latent  threat  of  their  enormous  Armies,  or 
that  they  keep  them  up  to  fullest  fighting  power 
because  they  know  that  the  Nation  who  fails  in  this 
respect  will  inevitably  go  under?"  —  Maude:  War 
and  the  World's  Life,  p.  201. 

b.  These    expressions    can    be    duplicated    in    any 

country. 

Preparedness  is  compared  to  insurance,  fire 
equipment,  quarantine,  ^vaccination  or  inocula- 
tion, window  screens.  Certain  organizations 
have  undertaken  to  keep  their  respective  na- 
tions alive  to  the  need  of  preparedness;  among 
^^Jjiem  the  following: 

Great  Britain:  Navy  League;  Army  League;  Na- 
tional Service  League  (favors  compulsory  ser- 
vice). 

New  Zealand:  National  Defense  League. 

United  States:  Navy  League;  Army  League;  Na- 
tional    Security     League;     American    Defense 
ic;  American  Defense  Society;  Pacific  Coast 
Defense    League;    National    Defense    League; 
Special  Relief  Society. 

Germany:  Wehrverein;  Flottenverein;  Frauenflot- 
tenverein;  Schiilerflottenverein;  Freie  Vereini- 
gung  fur  Flottenvortrage;  "German  Defense 
Alliance." 

France:  Ligue  Maritime;  Ligue  pour  la  service  de 
trois  ans. 

Japan:  Kokubogikai  (National  Defense  League). 

Mexico:  Sociedad  promo vedoro  de  la  defensa  na- 
cional. 

c.  It  is  urged  that  to  secure  adequate  preparedness,  the 

advice  of  experts  (meaning  usually  men  in  the 
army  and  navy)  should  be  followed. 


14  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

B.  The  uses  of  power. 

1.  The  use  of  martial  or  armed  force  has  by  some  been 

classified  under  two  heads. 

Aggressive  force,  to  be  used  for  expansion.  This  is 
said  by  foreigners  to  be  the  purpose  of  the  armed 
forces  of  Germany. 

Defensive  force,  used  only  to  discourage  attack  or  to 
compel  recognition  of  rights.  It  is  stated  that 
Great  Britain,  France  and  the  United  States, 
among  others,  have  military  establishments  for  de- 
fensive purposes. 

2.  There  must  be  no  hesitation  in  using  force  when  con- 

ditions demand  it. 

"  ~x  he  lessons  of  history  confirm  the  view  that  wars  which 
have  been  deliberately  provoked  by  far-seeing  states- 
men have  had  the  happiest  results."  —  Bernhardi: 
Germany  and  the  Next  War,  p.  45. 

"The  statesman  who,  knowing  his  instrument  to  be  ready, 
and  seeing  war  inevitable,  hesitates  to  strike  first  is 
guilty  of  a  crime  against  his  country."  —  Clause witz: 
On  War,  I,  vii. 

3.  The  "utmost  use  of  power  ".    When  once  force  is  em- 

ployed, it  must  be  used  unsparingly  and  in  every 
way  that  will  secure  the  desired  end.  Anything 
less  is  a  source  of  weakness.  This  principle  is  at 
the  bottom  of  " frightf ulness "  or  "thoroughness". 
—  Clausewitz:  I,  5-6.  Col.  Maude  subscribes  t 
Clausewitz. 

C.  Some  contend  that  nations  which  claim  to  be  armed  for 

defense  only,  do  so  because  they  have  already,  by 
aggression,  acquired  what  they  want,  and  now  urge 
the  abolition  of  aggression  and  of  armaments  and 
propose  arbitration  and  peace  programs  as  a  means 


THE  COROLLARIES  OF  NATIONALISM  15 

of  avoiding  competition  with  more  vigorous  nations. 
"National  stand-pattism." 

"Pacific  ideals,  to  be  sure,  are  seldom  the  real  motive  of 
their  action.  They  usually  employ  the  need  of  peace 
as  a  cloak  under  which  to  promote  their  own  political 
aims.  This  was  the  real  position  of  affairs  at  the  Hague 
Congresses,  and  this  is  also  the  meaning  of  the  actions 
of  the  United  States  of  America,  who  in  recent  times  have 
earnestly  tried  to  conclude  treaties  for  the  establishment 
of  Arbitration  Courts,  first  and  foremost  with  England, 
but  also  with  Japan,  France,  and  Germany."  —  Bern- 
hardi:  Germany  and  the  Next  War,  p.  17. 

,*'  Great  Britain  had  all  the  territory  she  needed;  her  obvious 
idea  was  peace  in  which  she  and  her  Daughter  Nations 
should  have  leisure  to  develop  the  resources  of  the  vast 
territories  they  already  possessed."  —  Lord  Roberts: 
Hibbert  Journal,  Oct.,  1914,  p.  9. 

The  balance  of  power.  Instead  of  relying  on  their  own 
strength  to  balance  that  of  individual  rivals,  nations 
may  enter  into  combinations  with  friendly  nations. 
The  threatened  nation  naturally  does  likewise  to  secure 
an  equipoise.  Peace  depends  on  an  equilibrium.  This 
is  the  balance  of  power.  Any  gain  by  one  nation  dis- 
turbs the  equilibrium  and  causes  other  nations  to  de- 
mand gains  in  turn.  The  instability  of  the  combina- 
tions makes  the  instability  of  the  system  quite  obvious. 

REFERENCES 
See  Chapter  III 


m 

THE  CASE  FOR  NATIONALISM  AND  THE  WAR   SYSTEM 

I    War,  and  hence  the  need  of  being  prepared  for  it,  is  in- 
evitable. 

A.  War  is  a  divine  institution.    It  follows,  of  course,  that 

war  is  beneficial  and  desirable. 

"  Der  Krieg  ist  ein  Glied  der  gottlichen  Weltordnung."— 
Moltke. 

"  Unless,  as  I  believe,  war  is  the  divinely  appointed  means 
by  which  the  environment  may  be  readjusted  until  eth- 
ically 'fittest'  and  'best'  become  synonymous,  the  outlook 
for  the  human  race  is  too  pitiable  for  words."  —  Maude: 
War  and  the  World's  Life,  p.  18. 

That  war  is  not  contrary  to  the  divine  will  is  maintained 
by  many  writers  among  them:  Rear- Admiral  Fiske: 
North  American  Review,  Oct.,  1915,  p.  525;  Maxim: 
Defenseless  America,  pp.  46-55;  Speer:  Jesus  and 
War  (Pamphlet  35,  of  the  Navy  League  of  the  United 
States). 

B.  History  confirms  it.     There  have  always  been  wars, 

hence,  judging  the  future  by  the  past,  there  always 

will  be  wars. 

History  is  one  series  of  wars. 

3357  years:  from  1496  B.  C.  to  1861  A.  D. 

3130  years  of  war  in  that  time. 

227  years  of  peace. 

s^3  years  of  war  to  one  of  peace.  —  Bloch:  Future  of 
War,  LXV. 

16 


NATIONALISM  AND  THE  WAR  SYSTEM          17 

C.  Human  nature,  which  is  unchangeable,  is  so  constituted 
that  it  makes  war  inevitable. . 

1.  In  the  case  of  individuals. 

a.  Differences  between  individuals  are  inevitable. 

b.  The  individual  has  a  fighting  instinct;  he  considers 

fighting  for  his  opinion  manly  and  honorable,  and 
despises  one  who  will  not  fight  as  a  craven  or 
coward.  War  is  action,  and  appeals  to  the 
natural  instinct  which  likes  to  do  things;  peace  is 
inaction.  Virile  men  enjoy  a  fight  and  instinc- 
tively recognize  courage.  "Spoiling  for  a  fight." 

c.  This  tendency  to  fight  is  aggravated  by  the  love  of 

adveHfrure,  the  desire  for  change  and  the  struggle 
for/existence.    The  pressure  of  hunger,  economic 
:essity,  makes  man  a  fighter:  avarice,  cupidity, 
and  like  tendencies  lead  men  to  attack  one 
another. 

Man  is  impulsive  and  often  goes  into  strife  regard- 
less of  expediency  or  consequence. 
e.  Even  if  he  is  not  impulsive,  but  deliberate,  he  will 
have  convictions  that  he  considers  worth  fighting 
for  regardless  of  cost. 

2.  In  the  case  of  nations.     Nations,  being  groups  of 

individuals,  show  the  same  characteristics  as  in- 
dividuals, and  often  in  a  more  marked  degree. 

a.  Differences  between  nations  are  inevitable. 
Universal  peace  presupposes  the  same  standard  of 

civilization  for  all  nations;  and  homogeneity 
within  the  nations.  As  long  as  there  are  "in- 
ferior" peoples,  superior  peoples  will  take  advan- 
tage of  them. 

b.  Each  nation  has  its  pride,  its  fighting  instinct,  and 

national  honor,  and  these  impel  it  to  fight  rather 
than  to  submit. 


i8  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

"When  a  state  sees  its  downfall  staring  it  in  the  face, 
we  applaud  if  it  succumbs  sword  in  hand.  A  sacri- 
fice made  to  an  alien  nation  not  only  is  immoral,  but 
contradicts  the  idea  of  self-preservation,  which  is  the 
highest  ideal  of  a  state."  —  Treitschke.  Cited  by 
Bernhardi:  Germany  and  the  Next  War,  p.  46. 

"It  must  be  remembered  that  even  to  be  defeated  in 
war  may  be  better  than  not  to  have  fought  at  all."  — 
Roosevelt:  Message  to  Congress,  Dec.,  1906. 

c.  The  commercial  rivalry  of  nations  is  economic 

competition  which  drives  nations  into  strife. 
Cupidity  leads  one  nation  to  attack  another. 

"  There  is  no  one  lesson  which  history  teaches  us  more 
plainly  than  that  the  possession  of  wealth  by  a  de- 
fenseless nation  is  a  standing  casus  belli  to  other 
nations,  and  that  always  there  has  been  the  nation 
standing  ready  to  attack  and  plunder  any  other 
nation  when  there  was  likely  to  be  sufficient  profit  in 
the  enterprise  to  pay  for  the  trouble."  —  Maxim: 
Defenseless  America,  p.  12. 

d.  Nations,  even  more  than  individuals,  are  impulsive; 

and  when  wrought  up  will  go  into  war  regardless 
of  every  cost  or  consequence.  Crowds  and  masses 
never  act  coolly. 

e.  Even  when  perfectly  calm,  nations  will  have  ideals 

or  aspirations  of  the  justice  of  which  they  are 
convinced  and  for  which  they  will  fight  no  mat- 
ter what  the  cost. 


i 


"It  must  ever  be  kept  in  mind,  that  war  is  not  merely 
justifiable,  but  imperative,  upon  honorable  men  and 
upon  an  honorable  nation  when  peace  is  only  to  be 
obtained  by  the  sacrifice  of  conscientious  conviction 
or  of  national  welfare.  A  just  war  is  in  the  long-run 


NATIONALISM  AND  THE  WAR  SYSTEM          19 

far  better  for  a  nation's  soul  than  the  most  pros- 
perous peace  obtained  by  an  acquiescence  in  wrong 
or  injustice."  —  Roosevelt:  Message  to  Congress, 
Dec.  4,  1906. 

/.  Certain  differences  between  nations  can  be  settled 
only  by  the  use  of  force:  such  as  those  which 
touch  its  honor,  freedom  from  oppression,  slavery, 
states  rights  and  any  conflicting  ideals  or  aspira- 
tions. Force  alone  determines  which  conception 
shall  prevail,  and  in  this  way  is  the  only  practical 
way  of  discovering  which  is  right.  Might  makes 
right. 

"War  was  the  only  means  of  solving  the  great  political 
problem  of  the  abolition  of  slavery."  —  Luce:  North 
American  Review,  153,  p.  676. 

"Between  states  the  only  check  on  injustice  is  force."  — 
Bernhardi:  Germany  and  the  Next  War,  p.  20. 

II.  War  exerts  a  wholesome  moral  influence. 

A.  This  follows  a  priori  from  the  premise  that  war  is 

divinely  ordained. 

B.  It  develops  numerous  virtues  and  good  qualities,  such 

as  patriotism,  sacrifice  of  self  for  the  common  good, 
efficiency,  inventiveness,  a  sense  of  equality  between 
social  classes,  economy  and  frugality,  courage,  dis- 
cipline. 

1.  Military  training  in  time  of  peace  is  beneficial  as  it 

develops  patriotism,  a  sense  of  service  to  the  nation 
and  equality  among  men  with  the  colors,  educates 
the  recruit  through  free  travel  and  in  other  ways, 
and  gives  him  employment,  physical  and  moral 
•  discipline,  at  the  time  he  most  needs  them. 

2.  Only  in  powerful  states  can  individual  capacities 

reach  their  fullest  development. 


20  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

3.  War  stimulates  art  and  literature  and  deepens  re- 
ligious feeling. 

C.  It  preserves  physical  virility  with  its  corresponding 

devotion  and  labor  for  national  culture  and  ideals. 
Rivalry  of  nations  keeps  them  keen  and  alert. 

"Wars  are  terrible,  but  necessary,  for  they  save  the 
State  from  social  putrefaction  and  stagnation."  —  Kuno 
Fischer:  Hegel,  I,  p.  737.  Cited  by  Bernhardi:  Germany 
and  the  Next  War,  p.  27. 

"Yet  unless  human  nature  shall  have  been  radically  modi- 
fied in  the  course  of  evolution,  unless  it  shall  have  at- 
tained a  moral  strength  and  stature  unknown  at  present, 
it  appears  certain  that  the  attainment  of  this  much  de- 
sired universal  peace  will  be  as  the  signal  for  the  beginning 
of  universal  decay."  —  Wyatt:  Nineteenth  Century,  45, 
P-  225. 

"All  the  pure  and  noble  arts  of  peace  are  founded  on 
war.  .  .  .  There  is  no  great  art  possible  to  a  nation, 
but  that  which  is  based  on  battle.  ...  All  great  nations 
learned  their  truth  of  word  and  strength  of  thought  in 
war;  they  were  nourished  in  war  and  wasted  by  peace; 
taught  by  war  and  deceived  by  peace;  trained  by  war 
and  betrayed  by  peace."  —  Ruskin:  "War"  in  The  Crown 
of  Wild  Olive. 

D.  It  helps  progress  by  deciding  differences. 

"If  at  any  given  period  in  the  past,  war  could  have  been 
abolished,  social  evolution  must  have  been  arrested, 
because  the  only  practicable  means  of  effecting  change 
and  movement  among  nations  and  states  would  have 
been  removed."  —  Wyatt:  Nineteenth  Century,  45,  p.  218. 

m.  War  performs  the  biological  function  of  selecting  the 
nation  with  its  ideals  which  is  best  fitted  to  survive. 
Social  Darwinism.  (Huxley  has  noted  that  the  best 
morally  is  not  necessarily  the  best  fitted  for  survival 


NATIONALISM  AND  THE  WAR  SYSTEM          21 

in  the  biological  sense.)  War  is  a  necessary  part  of 
the  law  of  struggle;  hence  military  efficiency  is  an 
expression  of  national  efficiency. 

"War  is  a  biological  necessity  of  the  first  importance,  a 
regulative  element  in  the  life  of  mankind  which  can  not 
be  dispensed  with,  since  without  it  an  unhealthy  develop- 
ment will  follow,  which  excludes  every  advancement  of 
the  race,  and  therefore  all  real  civilization."  —  Bernhardi: 
Germany  and  the  Next  War,  p.  18,  footnote. 

The  struggle  for  survival  among  nations  "is  not,  fortunately 
for  humanity,  decided  by  peaceful  competition  alone,  but 
ultimately  by  .  .  .  war."  —  Maude:  War  and  the  World's 
Life,  p.  243. 

"The  hope  of  banishing  war  is  not  only  meaningless  but 
immoral.  Its  disappearance  would  turn  the  earth  into 
a  great  temple  of  selfishness.  Our  age  is  an  iron  age.  If 
the  strong  vanquish  the  weak,  it  is  the  law  of  life."  — 
Treitschke. 

A.  Some  advance  the  argument  that  war  is  necessary  to 

prevent  over-population. 

B.  To  the  claim  that  war  is  injurious  to  the  race  (see  Chap- 

ter X)  it  is  replied  that  Nature  cares  for  the  species, 
and  but  little  for  the  individual ;  and  that  the  biologi- 
cal harm,  if  there  is  any,  is  more  than  offset  by  the 
rejuvenation  of  a  people  through  the  fact  that  all 
non-essentials  are  sloughed  off  and  men  get  down  to 
solid  living. 

It  is  also  urged  that  the  loss  of  life  should  not  be  ad- 
vanced as  a  condemnation  of  war  any  more  than 
against  orcfinary  economic  conditions  on  railroads  and 
in  factories  which  exact  a  great  annual  toll  of  life. 
—  Stockton:  Peace  Insurance,  95-97. 

IV.  War  is  of  an  economic  advantage  to  the  victor;  (and  in- 
directly it  redounds  to  the  benefit  of  progress  that  a 


22  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

nation  with  strength  and  initiative  blazes  the  way,  for 
all  others  are  forced  to  imitate  or  drop  out  of  the  race). 

A.  The  victor  profits  at  the  expense  of  the  vanquished: 
By  annexing  territory. 

By  exacting  an  indemnity. 

By  levying  tribute  in  the  form  of  tolls,  or  taxes  on  the 

trade  of  the  vanquished. 
By  crushing  the  competition  of  a  rival  nation;  (which 

implies  that  the  prosperity  of  one  nation  is  a  menace 

to  others). 

B.  Political  domination  gives  trade  advantage;   "trade 

follows  the  flag." 

"The  teaching  of  all  history  is  that  commerce  grows  under 
the  shadow  of  armed  strength."  —  Rifleman:  The  Strug- 
gle for  Bread.  Cited  by  Angell:  America  and  the  New 
World-State,  p.  128. 

"Bethmann-Hollweg  had  the  courage  and  the  common 
sense  to  lay  it  down  as  a  maxim  that  .  .  .  the  armed 
forces  of  any  nation  or  empire  must  have  a  distinct  rela- 
tion to  the  material  resources  of  that  nation  or  empire. 
This  position  seems  to  me  as  statesmanlike  as  it  is  un- 
answerable."—  Lord  Roberts:  Message  to  the  Nation. 
Cited  by  Angell:  America  and  the  New  World-State, 
p.  125. 

"The  Navy  and  Army,  therefore,  are  the  foundations  of 
commercial  credit,  and,  as  every  engineer  knows,  it  pays 
to  put  good  work,  and  enough  of  it,  into  underground 
work."  —  Maude:  War  and  the  World's  Life,  p.  80. 

V.  The  war  system  has  certain  obvious  economic  advantages. 

A.  It  gives  employment  to  great  numbers  in  supplying 

military  and  naval  units  with  equipment  of  all  sorts. 
To  abolish  war  or  the  military  system  would  mean 
economic  disaster.  —  Maude,  pp.  78  f. 

B.  Trades  are  taught  in  the  army,  and  army  discipline 


NATIONALISM  AND  THE  WAR  SYSTEM          23 

is  wholesome  training  for  the  economic  life  of  the 
man  leaving  the  service.    He  may  even  save  some- 
thing if  he  wishes,  with  which  to  get  a  start  after 
leaving  the  army. 
VI.  Armies  are  very  useful  to  society  in  times  of  peace. 

A.  They  perform  police  duty:  San  Francisco  Fire;  Earth- 

quake in  Italy;  Strike  in  Colorado;  etc. 

B.  Service  in  sanitary  work:  Panama  and  the  Philip- 

pines. 

C.  They  advance  all  kinds  of  scientific  work:  researches 

in  tropical  anemia  and  hookworm  diseases  in  Porto 
Rico;  yellow  fever  in  Cuba;  typhoid  inoculation. 

REFERENCES 

NATIONALISM 

Stein,  Ludwig:  Wei tbiirger turn,  Nationalstaat  und  internationale 
Verstandigung.  1913.  Sonderabdruck  aus  Nord  und  Sud. 

Lieber,  F.:  Fragments  of  Political  Science  on  Nationalism  and 
Internationalism.  New  York,  1868. 

Chamberlain,  Houston  Stuart:  The  Foundations  of  the  Nineteenth 
Century.  1911. 

Stephens:  Nationality  and  History.  American  Historical  Review, 
January,  1916. 

Fichte:  Reden  an  die  deutsche  Nation  (Reclam).     1872. 

Toynbee,  Arnold  J.:  Nationality  and  the  War.    New  York,  1915. 

Dewe,  J.  A. :  Psychology  of  Politics  and  History.  1910.  [On  na- 
tional progress  and  decadence.] 

Guy-Grand,  G.:  La  philosophic  nationaliste.    Paris,  1911. 

Finot,  Jean:  Race  Prejudice.     1906. 

THE  CASE  FOR  THE  WAR  SYSTEM 

Carton  Foundation:  The  Case  for  War.  As  stated  by  its  Apol- 
ogists. 

Wyatt:  War  as  a  Test  of  National  Value.  Nineteenth  Century,  45, 
216  f. 


24  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

Wyatt:  The  Ethics  of  Empire.    Nineteenth  Century,  45,  516-530. 

Luce:  Benefits  of  War.    North  American  Review,  153,  672  f. 

Maude:  War  and  the  World's  Life.    1907. 

Mahan:  The  Place  of  Force  in  International  Relations.  North 
American  Review,  January,  1912. 

Mahan:  Armaments  and  Arbitration  (Harpers).    1912. 

Mahan:  "The  Great  Illusion."  North  American  Review,  March, 
1912. 

Mahan:  Some  Neglected  Aspects  of  War.    Boston,  1907. 

Mahan:  The  Influence  of  Sea-Power  upon  History.    1890. 

Lea,  Homer:  The  Valour  of  Ignorance.    1909. 

Wilkinson,  Henry  Spencer:  War  and  Policy.    New  York,  1900. 

' '  A  Rifleman : "  S  truggle  f  or  B  read  (Lane) .     1913. 

Ruskin:  Crown  of  Wild  Olive,  "War."    1889. 

Murray,  Stewart  L.:  Peace  of  the  Anglo-Saxons.    1905. 

Maxim:  Defenseless  America.    1915. 

Stockton:  Peace  Insurance  (McClurg).    1915. 

Cramb,  J.  A.:  Germany  and  England.    New  York,  1914. 

Cramb,  J.  A. :  Origins  and  Destiny  of  Imperial  Britain  and  Nine- 
teenth Century  Europe.  1915. 

Johnston,  R.  M.:  Arms  and  the  Race.    1915. 

Bernhardi:  Germany  and  the  Next  War.  Translation  by  A.  H. 
Powles,  American  Edition  (Longmans).  1914. 

Jahns,  Max:  Uber  Krieg,  Frieden  und  Kultur.     Berlin,  1893. 

Lamprecht,  Karl:  Krieg  und  Kultur.    Leipzig,  1914. 

Kattenbusch,  Ferdinand:  Das  sittliche  Recht  des  Krieges.    1906. 

Lasson,  Adolf:  Das  Kulturideal  und  der  Krieg.    1868. 

Stengel,  Karl  von:  Weltstaat  und  Friedensproblem.    Berlin,  1009. 

Steinmetz,  S.  Rudolf:  Die  Philosophic  des  Krieges.    Leipzig,  1907. 

Clausewitz:  On  War.    Third  edition,  translated  by  Graham,  1873. 

Treitschke:  Politik.    1899-1900. 

Wagner:  Der  Krieg  als  schaffendes  Welt-prinzip. 

Molinari:  Grandeur  et  decadence  de  la  guerre.  1898.  Moltke  on 
War,  pp.  240-258. 

von  der  Goltz:  The  Nation  in  Arms.    London,  1906. 

Rohrbach,  P.:  German  World  Policies.    1915. 

Rohrbach,  P.:  Germany's  Isolation.    1915. 


NATIONALISM  AND  THE  WAR  SYSTEM          25 

Dewey,  John:  German  Philosophy  and  Politics.    1915. 
Brunetiere:  Le  mensonge  du  pacificisme.    Revue  de  Deux  Mondes, 

July,  1905. 
Fiske:  The  Mastery  of  the   World.     North  American  Review, 

October,  1915. 

Novicow:  War  and  its  Alleged  Benefits.    1911. 
Excubitor:   The   Blessings   of   Naval   Armaments.     Fortnightly 

Review,  85,  88-96. 

The  Intellectual  Charm  of  War.    Spectator,  58,  542. 
Whewell:  Elements  of  Morality.     1864.     "The  Rights  of  Man." 
Green:  Lectures  on  Principles  of  Political  Organization  (Long- 

man's).   1895. 
Palmer:  Insurance  of  Peace.    Scribner's,  51,  186. 

GENERAL 

Angell:  America  and  the  New  World-State   (Putnam).     1915. 

Hobson,  J.  A.:  Imperialism.    1905. 

Brailsford:  The  War  of  Steel  and  Gold.    1915. 

Stratton  :  Announcement  of  Lectures  upon  The  Psychology  of  the 

War  Spirit.    University  of  California,  1915.    [Contains  bibliog- 

raphy.] 

Nippold,  Otfried:  Der  deutsche  Chauvinismus.    1913. 
Fried,  A.  H.:  Handbuch  der  Friedensbewegung.    Leipzig,  1911, 


Wallas,  Graham:  The  Great  Society. 


IV 

THE   FAULTS   OF   NATIONALISM  AND   THE   WAR   SYSTEM 

I.  At  the  bottom  of  the  current  theories  of  the  relations  of 

nations  there  lie  a  number  of  premises  which  are 
regarded  as  axioms,  when  they  really  are  not.  This 
is  not  strange  as  it  is  quite  natural  for  men  to  formu- 
late working  principles  which,  though  they  become  an- 
tiquated, are  considered  as  authoritative  long  after 
the  conditions  which  produced  them  have  changed. 
Thus  there  are  always  current  a  set  of  phrases  and 
maxims  which  are  ordinarily  accepted  without  reflection 
or  thought.  These  are  considered  irrational  by  the 
opponents  of  war. 

II.  Irrational  phrases  and  maxims,  sentiments  uttered  and 

accepted  without  thought;  often  their  meaning  is 
vague  or  is  anything  that  one  wishes  to  make  it.  They 
all  appeal  to  sentiment  or  passion  instead  of  intellect; 
all  are  difficult  to  define. 

National  honor,  national  destiny,  the  field  of  honor, 
heroism,  glory,  duty,  liberty,  self-sacrifice,  courage, 
victory,  invincibility,  glorious  traditions  of  the  na- 
tion, inevitability  of  war,  human  nature  does  not 
change,  maintaining  the  balance  of  power,  worthy  of 
our  ancestors,  manifest  destiny,  blood  is  thicker  than 
water,  survival  of  the  fittest,  struggle  for  existence 
(Kampf  urns  Daseiti),  a  place  in  the  sun,  war  is  the 
basis  of  all  things  (TroXe/io?  Tranjp  Trdvro&v),  in  the 
time  of  peace  prepare  for  war  (si  vis  pacem,  para 
helium),  white  man's  burden,  yellow  peril,  black  peril. 

Many  terms  applied  to  pacifists  are  of  this  class:  molly- 
26 


NATIONALISM  AND  THE  WAR  SYSTEM          27 

coddles,  weaklings,  poltroons,  degeneracy  of  peace, 
Chinafy,  peace-at-any-price,  Narren  des  ewigen  Frie- 
dens,  dubs  of  peace. 

HI.  Fallacious  assumptions.  Many  of  the  premises  which 
underlie  the  present  national  and  martial  system  and 
are  ordinarily  taken  for  granted  have  of  late  been  ques- 
tioned or  denied.  These  are  here  assembled  with 
the  reasons  that  are  advanced  in  their  support.  In 
some  cases  the  premises  are  no  more  than  personal 
convictions,  and  in  such  instances  the  contrary  view 
may,  —  and  with  equal  foundation,  —  be  posited  as 
a  mere  personal  opinion.  The  proposition  is  stated, 
and  followed  by  the  counter  proposition. 

A .  A  nation  (state)  represents  a  natural  or  sort  of  final  entity. 

For  a  full  discussion  of  this  see  Chapter  XVI,  sec- 
tion II. 

B.  Nationalism  is  the  highest  possible  step  in  progress. 

International  cooperation  is  not  only_possible  but,  as 
analogous  experience  in  history  shows,  aTsQ  bene- 
jjgjal.  Indeed  it  i\  "  pessary.  if  tWp  JQ  tr>  HP  ar^ 
end  of  war^  (See  Chapters  XV  and  XVI.) 

Nationalism  no  longer  corresponds  to  the  actual 
facts'  61  life:  economicajly_and  culturally  men,  are 
world-citizens;  only  politically  are  they  national, 
because  juridicalideas  have  fallen  behind  thTfacts. 
Nationalism  is  so  general  because  it  has  been  em- 
phasized in  the  teaching  of  history;  for  this  is 
devoted  almost  exclusively  to  political  affairs, 
which  are  chiefly  national,  and  hence  is  oblivious 
of  the  great  international  tendencies  in  all  other 
fields. 

C.  The  Kultur  of  each  nation  is  peculiar  to  it  and  the  conflict 

between  national  ideas  is  irrepressible. 

Ideas  or  characteristics,  even  though  at  any  given 


28  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

stage  more  advanced  in  one  nation  than  in  another, 
are  not  peculiar  to  the  first  in  the  sense  that  others 
have  not  the  capacity  to  grasp  and  apply  them. 
Germans  understand  Shakespeare;  the  English 
and  French  have  appropriated  and  applied  various 
things  from  Germany;  Japan  imported  western 

.    civilization. 

Though  the  Kultur  of  another  nation  may  be  adopted 
voluntarily,  it  cannot  be  imposed  by  force. 

National  cultures  are  regarded  as  rivals,  not  because 
they  are,  but  because  the  backward  political  in- 
stitutions, noted  above,  nurture  and  exaggerate 
cultural  differences  for  national  purposes.  This 
is  at  its  worst  during  war,  when  each  government 
paints  its  foes  as  black  as  possible  in  order  to  secure 
a  degree  of  rivalry  that  would  otherwise  not  exist. 

Nations  which  insist  on  the  sacredness  of  national 
cultures,  do  not  hesitate  to  suppress  other  nationali- 
ties. In  short,  the  present  system,  though  pre- 
tending to,  does  not  preserve  nationalities.  Ger- 
many: Alsatians,  Poles;  England:  Irish,  Persians, 
etc.;  Russia:  Finns,  Poles,  Persians,  etc.;  Austria: 
Serbs,  Czechs,  etc. 
i^  D.  The  lives  of  individuals  and  of  nations  are  analogous,  and 

both  are  subject  to  the  evolutionary  law  of  competition, 
{which  when  applied  to  nations  is  called  "social  Dar- 
j&      winism."  -  —  Lea:  Valour  of  Ignorance,  pp.  8  f. 

The  biological  laws  governing  the  struggle  for  exist- 
ence do  not  apply  to  individual  human  beings  hi 
the  same  way  as  to  lower  beings;  the  latter  com- 
pete with  each  other  for  what  sustenance  nature 
has  provided;  human  beings,  instead  of  fighting 
each  other  for  what  nature  has  bestowed,  by  sub- 
stituting labor  for  fighting  can  increase  the  supply 


NATIONALISM  AND  THE  WAR  SYSTEM          29 

of  sustenance  —  and  doing  so  is  the  essence  of 
civilization.  Popper-Lynkeus  estimates  that  an 
efficient  cooperative  organization  of  society  would 
enable  each  person  to  earn  a  livelihood  for  life  in 
an  average  of  seven  years,  working  five  hours  per 
day;  and  that  the  present  resources  of  earth  could 
with  proper  distribution  support  from  four  to  six 
times  the  present  population. 

Social  Darwinism  entirely  overlooks  mutual  aid  as 
a  factor  in  evolution. 

The  laws  of  evolution  apply  to  individuals,  not  to 
groups. 

Nations  consist  of  individuals.  These  die  and  are 
constantly  replaced  by  others,  but  the  complexion 
of  society  remains  much  the  same.  A  nation  is 
like  a  corporation  or  fraternity  whose  membership, 
though  ever  changing,  may  constantly  be  of  the 
same  kind.  As  long  as  the  individuals  composing 
a  fraternity  —  or  a  nation  —  are  sound  and  strong 
the  organization  will  be  strong  and  it  need  never 
reach  old  age. 
E.  War,  or  the  possibility  of  it,  maintains  national  virility 

and  courage;  in  other  words,  peace  breeds  cowardice  and 

degeneracy. 

Martial  nations  have  not  endured;  it  is  alleged  that 
they  declined  precisely  because  war  drained  their 
best  blood  (Jordan,  see  Chapter  X),  and  because 
of  the  degeneracy  which  follows  the  exploitation  of 
the  vanquished  by  the  victor. 

Is  courage  a  trait  of  human  nature  that  is  inherited 
in  its  full  form?  If  so,  how  does  war  increase  it?  If 
it  grows  by  use,  then  may  there  be  "experts"  in 
courage?  Do  such  experts  transmit  their  greater 
courage  to  posterity?  Whatever  be  the  answers 


30  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

to  the  preceding  they  apply  also  to  the  vices  which 
get  their  chance  in  war:  brutality,  lust,  hatred, 
cowardice,  subjection  of  law  to  force,  and  of  jus- 
tice to  victory. 

Not  war,  but  labor,  industry,  and  thrift,  which  make 
for  solidity  of  individuals,  maintain  national  viril- 
ity. Illustration:  the  Swiss  mountaineers;  the 
Hebrew  people;  the  Puritans.  Only  as  war  neces- 
sitates labor  and  effort  does  it  make  for  virility. 
Honest  labor,  compelled  by  other  forces  than  war, 
is  just  as  effective  to  that  end,  without  the  accom- 
panying evils  of  war.  Hence  the  advisability  of 
nations  developing  moral  or  other  equivalents  for 
war.  (James:  Moral  Equivalent  of  War.)  The 
heroes  of  peace:  Miss  Davis,  who  took  gangrene 
anti- toxin  to  test  it;  Salvation  Army  workers.  — 
Addams:  Newer  Ideals  of  Peace. 

The  birth-rate,  not  the  size  of  the  army,  is  the  true 
indicator  of  a  nation's  virility.  —  Graham:  War 
and  Evolution. 

F.  "My   nation   is    superior   to   every   other"      National 

pride. 

This  is  impracticable,  as  it  means  that  each  nation 
considers  itself  superior  to  every  other. 

It  is  also  untrue,  because  no  nation  excels  in  every 
particular  and  it  is  arbitrary  to  assert  that  its  par- 
ticular excellence  is  superior  to  the  chief  quality  of 
another  nation. 

G.  "My  nation  is  right  in  all  disputes" 

This  is  contrary  to  reason,  for  both  nations  to  a 
quarrel  cannot  be  right. 

It  is  likewise  contrary  to  fact:  Germany  did  wrong  in 
invading  Belgium,  England  in  attacking  Denmark 
(1807)  or  hi  forcing  opium  on  China. 


NATIONALISM  AND  THE  WAR  SYSTEM          31 

Finally  it  ignores  personal  conscience  and  universal 

morality,  that  are  common  to  all  men. 
E.  Might  makes  right.    Force  or  war  is  the  final  means  of 
determining  which  of  two  conflicting  views  shall  prevail, 
and  hence,  is  right. 
That  Poland  succumbed  to  might  does  not  make  it 

morally  right. 

Superior  might  or  force  is  sometimes  a  matter  of  acci- 
dent, of  incompetent  generalship,  of  miscarried  or 
delayed  orders,  of  unseasonable  rain,  of  treachery  or 
personal  rivalry  in  high  command,  etc.,  etc.  "God 
is  on  the  side  of  the  strongest  battalions."  "The 
fate  of  nations  often  hangs  on  five  minutes."  -  —  Na- 
poleon. (See  also  Clausewitz,  On  War,  I,  p.  10;  and 
Bernhardi,  p.  53.) 

Force  never  settles  anything  vital,  and  other  things 
can  be  settled  without  resort  to  force.  "Truth 
crushed  to  earth  will  rise  again."  Force  cannot 
triumph  over  faith,  conscience,  reason;  e.  g.,  the 
Christian  martyrs,  the  forerunners  of  the  Reforma- 
tion, the  fathers  of  democracy.  Force  at  best  merely 
hastens  what  men  are  already  disposed  to  consent  to. 
Thus  the  South  would  voluntarily  have  abolished 
slavery  in  tune,  just  as  in  England  this  great  reform 
came  without  war.  —  Johnston:  Arms  and  the  Race, 
p.  156. 
/.  Armaments  secure  peace.  "  The  best  insurance  of  peace  is 

to  be  prepared  for  war." 

Armaments  do  not  preserve  peace  as  Europe  shows. 
When  war  breaks  out  armaments  afford  protection;  but 
they  cannot  prevent  war  or  secure  peace,  because  they 
are  themselves  a  part  of  the  rivalry  of  nations;  and  it 
is  folly  to  think  that,  even  if  all  nations  could  at  some 
time  be  so  prepared  as  to  deter  others  from  attack, 


32  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

they  would  forever  remain  so.  A  simple  change  hi 
alliances,  and  the  whole  of  the  armed  peace  loses  its 
effect.  The  balance  of  power  is  unstable. 

If,  as  is  claimed  (Maxim:  Defenseless  America,  pp.  96  f.) 
preparedness  makes  wars  less  bloody  and  that  there- 
fore "  the  quick-firing  gun  is  the  most  beneficent  im- 
plement of  mercy  ever  invented"  then  preparedness 
would  seem  to  be  less  of  a  deterrent  from  war  than  un- 
preparedness. 

J.  Those  who  seek  to  eliminate  the  use  offeree  place  individ- 
uals and  society  at  the  mercy  of  the  wicked. 

Opponents  of  war  do  not  wish  to  eliminate  all  force;  but 
only  that  one  kind  of  force  known  as  war.  Conse- 
quently if  war  were  extirpated,  there  would  remain 
the  police  force,  which  is  the  basis  of  our  security;  all 
other  forms  of  competition  would  also  remain. 
K.  Human  nature  does  not  change  and  as  long  as  men  con- 
tinue men  they  will  make  war. 

Human  nature  does  change,  even  though  slowly.  To- 
day not  only  does  no  one  burn  witches,  but  no  one 
wants  to. 

It  is  no  justification  for  an  act  that  human  nature 
prompted  it.  The  control  of  human  nature  measures 
the  civilization  of  man. 

Even  if  human  nature  had  not  changed,  the  demands  of 
society  on  human  nature  have  greatly  changed;  and 
where  these  modern  demands  are  enforced,  as  within 
nations,  there  we  are  said  to  have  civilization. 

Courage  is  a  part  of  human  nature;  why  should  mili- 
tarists fear  that  courage  will  decline  through  peace, 
unless  human  nature  is  changeable? 

The  present  manifestations  of  human  nature  are  in 
some  degree  the  result  of  education  of  children,  for 
human  nature  is  not  solely  hereditary,  but  is  infill- 


NATIONALISM  AND  THE  WAR  SYSTEM          33 

enced  by  environment:  war  toys,  exhibition  drills, 
military  bands,  attractive  uniforms,  etc. 

Reason  is  a  part  of  human  nature.  Its  influence  grows 
greater  with  increasing  knowledge.  If  men  believe 
that  war  does  not  pay  and  that  there  is  a  better 
way  of  settlement  reason  will  not  be  ineffectual. 

Folly  is  also  a  part  of  human  nature.  When  it  asserts 
itself  war  is  not  unlikely.  Obviously  this  phase  of 
human  nature  should  be  combatted  and  not  urged 
in  extenuation  of  its  manifestations.  Certainly 
doctrines  or  influences  which  deliberately  lead  men 
to  act  foolishly  or  impetuously  should  be  op- 
posed. 

L.  War  is  inevitable  unless  human  nature  is  changed;  until 
men  become  angels  there  will  be  war. 

Peace  also  is  inevitable. 

Death  is  inevitable  if  one  swallows  poison,  but  swallow- 
ing poison  may  be  avoided.  Similarly  war  results 
not  from  human  nature,  but  from  the  conditions 
unde7~which  liuman  nature  is  compelled  to  work, 
that  is,  in  rival  nationaf  groups  which  are  arbitrary 
and  not  inevitable.  If,  then,  the  conception  of  rival 
nations  is  replaced  by  a  conception  of  friendly  co- 
operating nations,  peace  will  come  without  one  iota 
of  change  in  the  human  or  moral  nature  of  men.  Il- 
lustration: —  the  creation  of  the  United  States  out 
of  thirteen  rival  states,  and  the  unification  of  the 
hostile  states  of  Germany  brought  peace  within  the 
new  units,  without  necessitating  a  moral  improve- 
ment of  citizens.  All  that  happened  was  putting  the 
existing  human  nature  under  conditions  that  favored 
peace  instead  of  war.  The  average  man  does  not 
want  war,  and  never  did,  as  appears  from  folksongs 
which  always  bemoan  wars  and  express  a  longing  for 


34  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

peace.    Hence  the  difficulty  of  human  nature  as  an 
obstacle  to  peace  is  exaggerated. 

M.  War  is  divine  institution. 

Does  this  mean  that  God  by  a  special  act  of  will  sends 
war,  or  that  war  is  a  natural  factor  in  human  strife 
and  is  divine  in  the  sense  that  God  permits  it?  Many 
repudiate  the  former  interpretation.  The  latter 
carries  with  it  the  vital  conception,  that  war  is  man- 
made,  and  hence  can  also  be  abolished  by  man. 
The  dilemma  of  those  who  try  to  justify  war  as  a  divine 
institution  and  who  at  the  same  time  must,  as  civil- 
ized human  beings,  deplore  it,  is  illustrated  by  the 

^       following  quotations  from  the  same  article: 

\  "The  truth  is  that  war  is  an  ordinance  of  God."  —  Rear- 
Admiral  Luce:  The  Benefits  of  War,  North  American  Re- 
view, 153,  p.  683. 

"War  is  certainly  a  great  evil,  and  abhorrent  to  every 
right-minded  person."  —  Ibid.,  p.  680. 

N.  The  present  war  discredits  the  opponents  of  war. 

The  Great  War  discredits  the  present  national  system 
which  produced  it,  and  justifies  those  who  have 
sought  to  change  this  system  to  one  that  shall  tend  to 
prevent  rather  than  produce  war. 

O.  Military  force  is  necessary  to  secure  reforms,  freedom  or 
relief  from  oppression,  e.  g.,  the  American  Revolution, 
Wars  of  Liberation  waged  against  Napoleon,  etc. 
The  right  of  revolution  cannot  be  denied.  If  it  was 
ever  true  that  salutary  reforms  had  to  be  secured  by 
force  of  arms,  it  is  less  the  case  to-day,  when  demo- 
cratic institutions,  particularly  free  elections,  furnish 
a  means  of  ascertaining  popular  desire,  and  self- 
government  gives  the  means  of  putting  the  desire  into 
execution.  Every  extension  and  improvement  of 
democracy  diminishes  the  necessity  of  war. 


NATIONALISM  AND  THE  WAR  SYSTEM          35 

P.  Victorious  nations  profit  at  the  expense  of  the  vanquished, 
This  is  what  Angell  has  called  the  "  Great  Illusion."    It 
is  treated  separately  in  the  next  section. 

REFERENCES 

Angell:  Great  Illusion.    1913. 

Angell:  America  and  the  New  World-State.    1915. 

Angell :  The  World's  Highway.    1915. 

Hirst:  The  Arbiter  in  Council.    1906. 

Fried:  Handbuch  der  Friedensbewegung.    1911,  1913. 

Novicow,  J.:  Die  Gerechtigkeit  und  die  Entfaltung  des  Lebens. 

Berlin,  1907. 

Novicow,  J.:  La  critique  du  darwinisme  social.     Paris,  1910. 
Novicow,  J.:  La  moral  et  1'mteret  dans  les  rapports  individuels 

et  internationaux.    Paris,  1912. 
Nasmyth:  Social  Progress  and  the  Darwinian  Theory.    New  York, 

1916. 
Kropotkin,  Peter:  Gegenseitige  Hilfe  in  der  Tier  und  Menschen- 

welt.    Leipzig,  1908. 

Kropotkin:  Mutual  Aid  a  Factor  in  Evolution.    1902. 
Zimmermann,  J.:  Strictures  on  National  Pride.    Translated  from 

German.    Philadelphia,  1778. 

Kellogg,  Vernon  Lyman:  Beyond  War.    New  York,  1912. 
Popper-Lynkeus:    Die   allgemeine  Nahrpflicht   als   Losung   der 

sozialen  Frage.    Dresden,  1912. 
James:  Moral  Equivalent  of  War.    New  York,  1910. 
Mitchell:  Evolution  and  the  War.    1915. 
Addams:  Newer  Ideals  of  Peace.    1907. 
Graham:  Evolution  and  War.    1914. 
Lyon/:  Christian  Equivalent  of  War.    1915. 
Chittenden,  H.  M.:  War  or  Peace.    A  present  duty  and  a  future 

hope.    Chicago,  1911. 

Lea,  Homer:  Valour  of  Ignorance.    New  York,  1909. 
Johnston :  Arms  and  the  Race.    1915. 
Maxim :  Defenseless  America.    1915. 
(Note  also  the  references  to  other  Chapters.) 


"THE  GREAT  ILLUSION" 

I.  Current  theory. 

A.  The  universally  accepted  theory  is  that  commercial 

and  social  advantages  are  secured  for  a  nation  by 
military  and  political  power  over  others  and  that 
hi  the  struggle  for  sustenance  in  a  world  of  limited 
space  and  opportunity  the  survivors  will  be  those 
militarily  strong,  the  weaker  going  under. 

B.  The  theory  involves  the  notion  that  victorious  na- 

tions increase  their  prosperity  at  the  expense  of 
the  vanquished,  through  an  actual  transfer  of 
wealth  by: 

1.  Territorial  acquisition. 

2.  Indemnities  or  tribute  in  some  form. 

3.  Economic  or  commercial  control  of  the  conquered 

area  especially  in  the  way  of  securing  preferential 
treatment  for  the  commerce  of  the  conqueror, 
"concessions,"  etc. 

C.  Admiral  Mahan  voices  the  current  conception  when  he 

says  that  "just  as  it  is  an  advantage  for  the  Steel 
Trust  to  own  its  ore  fields,  it  is  an  advantage  for 
a  nation  to  own  its  raw  materials"  and  goes  on: 
"It  is  the  great  amount  of  unexploited  raw  material 
in  territories  politically  backward,  and  now  imper- 
fectly possessed  by  the  nominal  owners  which  at  the 
present  moment  constitutes  the  temptation  and  the 
impulse  to  war  of  European  States."  —  "Force  in 
International  Relations." 
36 


"THE  GREAT  ILLUSION"  37 

He  makes  an  important  extension  of  the  same  thesis  in 
the  following  passage: 

"  Governments  are  trustees,  and  as  such  must  put  first  the 
lawful  interests  of  their  wards  —  their  own  people.  .  .  . 
More  and  more  Germany  needs  the  assured  importation 
of  raw  materials,  and,  where  possible,  control  of  regions 
productive  of  such  materials.  More  and  more  she  re- 
quires assured  markets  and  security  as  to  the  importation 
of  food,  since  less  and  less  comparatively  is  produced 
within  her  own  borders  by  her  rapidly  increasing  popula- 
tion. This  all  means  security  at  sea.  .  .  .  Yet  the 
supremacy  of  Great  Britain  in  European  seas  means  a 
perpetually  latent  control  of  German  commerce.  .  .  . 
The  world  has  long  been  accustomed  to  the  idea  of  a 
predominant  naval  power,  coupling  it  with  the  name  of 
Great  Britain,  and  it  has  been  noted  that  such  power, 
when  achieved,  is  commonly  often  associated  with  com- 
mercial and  industrial  predominance,  the  struggle  for 
which  is  now  in  progress  between  Great  Britain  and  Ger- 
many. Such  predominance  forces  a  nation  to  seek 
markets,  and,  where  possible,  to  control  them  to  its  own 
advantage  by  preponderant  force,  the  ultimate  expres- 
sion of  which  is  possession.  .  .  .  From  this  flow  two 
results:  the  attempt  to  possess  and  the  organization  of 
force  by  which  to  maintain  possession  already  achieved. 
This  statement  is  simply  a  specific  formulation  of  the 
general  necessity  stated;  it  is  an  inevitable  link  in  the 

^  chain  of  logical  sequences  —  industry,  markets,  control, 
navy  bases.  .  .  ." 

D.  Hilaire  Belloc  has  summarized  modern  opinion  as  to 
the  best  way  to  strike  profit  from  victory  as  follows 
(San  Francisco  Examiner,  January  17,  1915).  There 
are  three  sources  from  which  indemnity  can  be  re- 
covered: 


38  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

1.  The  foreign  investments  of  a  country,  e.  g.,  German 

investments  in  Brazil. 

All  these  can  be  transferred  to  the  victor,  so  that  he 
will  secure  the  profits  which  formerly  went  to  the 
rival  nation. 

2.  Domestic  stocks,  which  include  everything  that  can 

be  removed  from  the  soil:  bullion,  particularly 
gold;  stocks;  certain  forms  of  mobile  machinery; 
ships;  unproductive  stocks  such  as  pictures  and 
furniture. 

A  certain  proportion  of  these,  particularly  of  bullion, 
can  be  transferred  from  conquered  to  conquerors, 
but  only  so  much  as  can  be  absorbed.  Under 
modern  industrial  conditions  transference  of  the 
above  "is  for  the  most  part  an  error."  —  Belloc. 
It  kills  the  goose  that  lays  the  golden  eggs. 

3.  The  productive  power  of  a  country,  the  national 

capacity  for  work  and  production. 
This  consists  largely  in  the  health,  thrift,  inventive- 
ness, and  industry  of  a  people,  which  obviously 
cannot  be  transferred  to  the  victor.  All  that  can 
be  done  is  to  levy  some  sort  of  tribute  on  this  pro- 
ductive power,  and  guarantee  the  tribute  by  mili- 
tary occupation.  "The  longer  that  period  of  mili- 
tary occupation  extends,  the  better  for  the  victors." 
-  Belloc. 

n.  This  theory  as  enumerated  both  by  Mahan  and  Belloc 
is  challenged  by  Norman  Angell  who  calls  it  "The 
Great  Illusion"  on  the  following  grounds: l 
A.  The  political  transfer  of  territory  does  not  involve 
the  transfer  of  its  wealth  to  the  conqueror;  the  wealth 
still  remains  in  the  hands  of  its  original  owners.  When 
the  government  of  Alsace  passed  from  France  to 
1 1  am  indebted  to  Mr.  Angell  for  this  statement  of  his  position. 


"THE  GREAT  ILLUSION1 


39 


Germany  and  that  of  the  Transvaal  and  the  Orange 
Free  State  from  the  Boers  to  Britain,  the  land,  mines 
and  factories  did  not  change  hands;  there  was  no 
transfer  of  property. 

B.  Colonies  are  not  "owned"  by  the  mother  country;  if 

successful  they  are  not  even  administered.  The 
British  colonies  are  administratively  independent  of 
the  mother  country;  Britain  has  virtually  no  ad- 
ministrative rights  even  in  such  very  recent  acquisi- 
tions as  the  Transvaal  and  the  Free  State.  The 
British  government  does  not  "own"  the  mines  of 
the  Transvaal  in  the  way  that  the  Steel  Trust  owns 
an  ore  field  which  it  has  purchased.  The  conquest  in 
the  one  case  is  an  operation  having  no  resemblance 
to  the  operation  of  purchase  by  the  steel  trust;  the 
whole  analogy  is  misleading. 

C.  Even  in  the  case  of  politically  backward  communities 

administered  as  "Crown  Colonies"  by  the  great 
European  powers  all  experience  goes  to  show  that  it 
pays  best  to  surrender  the  attempt  to  use  political 
power  as  a  means  of  exacting  commercial  preference 
for  the  ruling  state;  that  trade  monopolies,  preferen- 
tial tariffs,  etc.,  imposed  upon  a  backward  people  by 
its  European  rulers  only  operate  to  the  benefit  of 
small  groups  of  merchants  and  financiers  and  that 
the  people  as  a  whole  of  the  governing  European  state 
gain  nothing  by  this  economic  and  political  servitude 
of  weaker  peoples.  This  is  proven  historically  by  the 
case  of  nations  that  in  the  past  resorted  to  this  form 
of  exploitation  to  the  utmost.  The  mass  of  the  people 

Iin  Spain  during  the  most  flourishing  of  her  imperialist 
period  were  poorer  than  the  people  of  lesser  states; 
the  same  is  generally  true  of  Portugal,  of  France 
when  she  ruled  in  India  and  America  and  of  England 


40  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

when  her  policy  was  imperialistic  in  this  sense.  To- 
day only  a  small  fraction  of  England's  immense 
over-seas  trade  is  with  the  backward  territories 
governed  from  London.  The  great  bulk  of  England's 
trade  is  with  foreign  countries.  Concessions  and 
monopolies  obtained  by  political  power  —  Morocco, 
Bagdad,  etc.,  represent  but  the  tiniest  fraction  of  the 
foreign  trade  of  the  great  states  which  is  mainly  with 
one  another  and  countries  like  the  United  States 
and  South  America.  The  more  successful  colonizing 
nations  like  England  have  indeed  abandoned  the 
method  of  treating  the  territories,  administered  by 
them,  as  a  field  of  commercial  monopolization.  Ex- 
perience has  shown  that  the  attempt  to  do  so  places 
the  administered  territory  necessarily  at  a  commercial 
disadvantage  and  so  checks  its  development  as  finally 
to  diminish  its  value  as  a  market.  Thus  merchants 
and  investors  of  all  countries  are  accorded  about 
equal  privileges  in  territories  like  Egypt  and  India 
and  the  peoples  of  the  European  states,  controlling 
backward  territories,  have  every  interest  in  making 
such  equality  of  treatment  a  matter  of  agreement  and 
treaty  instead  of  paying  the  costs  of  wars  which 
take  from  them  infinitely  more  than  the  monopolies 
can  ever  possibly  return  them.  The  same  order  of 
reasons  apply  with  even  greater  force  to  tribute 
exacted  by  military  occupation  in  the  way  suggested 
by  Belloc. 

D.  Modern  commerce  needing  above  all  markets,  two 
tendencies  have  been  set  up  which  bear  fundamentally 
upon  the  relation  of  military  power  to  national  pros- 
perity. The  need  for  markets  implies  the  steady 
financial  and  commercial  development  of  the  com-  J 
munities  that  are  to  constitute  the  markets.  This 


"THE  GREAT  ILLUSION"  41 

in  its  turn  implies  (a)  the  intangibility  of  their 
property  and  credit  and  (b)  the  forming  of  economic 
currents  that  flow  irrespective  of  political  boundaries 
j  so  that  the  political  unit  —  the  state  —  ceases  to 
J  coincide  with  the  economic  unit. 
With  reference  to  (a):  If  credit  and  commercial  con- 
tract is  tampered  with  in  an  attempt  at  military  con- 
fiscation, a  real  economic  "  conquest,"  the  commercial 
development  essential  to  the  creation  of  an  expanding 
market  is  no  longer  possible  because  the  basis  of 
credit  and  financial  confidence  is  shaken.  This  will 
react  unfavorably  upon  even  the  investments  and 
enterprises  of  the  conqueror;  while  a  country  whose 
finances  are  unsound  cannot  be  a  good  market. 
With  reference  to  (b):  The  competition  is  between 
individuals  or  competing  trades  not  nations:  "If 
we  want  to  sell  harvesters  to  Argentina,  we  should 
be  glad  to  have  Europe  buy  her  wheat;  and  if  Europe 
is  to  buy  her  wheat,  Europeans  must  sell  something 
in  some  foreign  market  wherewith  to  get  the  money 
and  so  become  our  competitors  somewhere.  A  market 
is  not  a  place  where  things  are  sold;  it  is  a  place 
where  things  are  bought  and  sold;  and  the  one  opera- 
tion is  impossible  without  the  other,  a  fact  which 
makes  our  competitors  necessary  to  our  markets  and 
our  markets  impossible  without  our  competitors. 
America  is  no  more  a  rival  of  Britain  or  Germany 
than  Virginia  is  a  rival  of  Missouri." 
E.  War  indemnities  have  never  yet  shown  a  "profit." 
The  only  really  large  indemnity  was  that  obtained 
from  France  by  Germany  in  1872.  Yet  when  we 
consider,  in  addition  to  the  cost  of  the  war  Germany's 
cost  in  preparation,  the  cost  of  meeting  the  ar- 
maments which  France  created  afterwards  in  order 


42  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

to  see  that  "it  should  not  happen  again"  -  in  other 
words  all  the  indirect  cost  to  Germany  of  the  attempt 

\to  make  her  war  against  France  "profitable"  (the 
annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine  was  in  part  due  to 
that  attempt),  this  most  successful  of  all  cases  of  in- 
demnity exaction  is  very  far  from  showing  a  profit. 
But  there  are  certain  subsidiary  considerations.  The 
general  financial  dislocation,  involved  in  the  transfer 
of  enormous  sums  other  than  in  the  normal  course 
of  commercial  transaction,  implies  a  very  serious  dis- 
count on  the  nominal  sum  exacted.  In  the  case  of  the 

« 

French  indemnity  Germany  undoubtedly  suffered  in 
this  way;  a  few  years  after  the  payment,  her  general 
financial  condition  was  not  as  good  as  that  of  her 
enemy  who  had  made  the  payment. 
To  exact  an  indemnity  or  tribute  at  all  implies  virtually 
the  complete  defeat  of  the  enemy  —  the  occupation 
of  his  territory  as  was  the  case  by  Germany  in  France 
hi  1870.  But  with  the  increasing  cost  of  modern  war 
and  the  devastation  such  occupation  involves,  it  is  at 
least  doubtful  whether  the  credit  of  a  country  de- 
feated, devastated,  deprived  of  its  trade  and  normal 
industry,  could  ever  be  made  to  yield  the  enormous 
sums  expended  in  its  conquest.  (The  amount  of 
bullion  that  could  be  seized  would  of  course  be  rel- 
atively trivial.  Payment  would  have  to  be  made 
through  credit  in  some  form). 

F.  The  outstanding  and  unmistakable  fact  as  against  un- 
certain and  elusive  statistics  is  the  high  prosperity 
of  the  small  countries  as  compared  with  that  of  the 
great.  Not  merely  do  then-  national  stocks  stand 
higher  in  the  markets  of  the  world  but  the  standard 
of  life  of  the  populations  of  countries  like  Switzerland, 
Holland,  Denmark,  Sweden,  is  higher  than  that  of 


"THE  GREAT  ILLUSION"  43 

great  imperialist  states  like  Russia,  Austria,  Germany 
and  England.  Yet,  if  prosperity  came  from  con- 
quered territory  and  colonies,  and  political  and  mil- 
itary power,  the  population  of  the  great  states  should 
be  markedly  more  prosperous  than  that  of  the  small. 
G.  Caution  against  misconstruction  of  Angellism. 

In  the  preface  to  "The  Great  Illusion"  Norman  Angell 
writes:  "The  argument  ...  is  not  that  war  is  im- 
possible but  that  it  is  futile  —  useless,  even  when 
completely  victorious,  as  a  means  of  securing  those 
moral  or  material  ends  which  represent  the  needs  of 
modern  European  peoples."  The  mere  fact  of  war's 
futility  will  never  of  itself  stop  war:  there  must  be 
general  realization  of  its  futility.  "Men's  acts  are 
determined  not  by  the  fact  but  what  they  believe 
to  be  the  fact." 

III.  AngelFs  thesis  is  not  based  upon  a  narrowly  economic 
interpretation  of  human  motive  in  international  ac- 
tion.   The  larger  part  of  "The  Great  Illusion"  deals         s 
with  the  psychology  of  international  conflict  and  the    "^ 
relation   of   politico-economic    truth   thereto.     The 
ethic  of  his  thesis  is  summarized  as  follows: 

"For  one  to  impose  his  will  upon  the  other  by  force  im-| 
plies  resistance;  thus  two  energies  are  cancelled  and  end  ' 
in  sterility  or  waste.     For  even  when  one  triumphs, 
there  are  still  two  slaves:  the  vanquished  slave  to  the 
victor,  the  victor  to  the  need  of  maintaining  supremacy 
and  being  ready  to  use  force  against  the  vanquished.! 
This  creates  a  form  of  relationship  as  wasteful  in  eco- 
nomics as  it  is  disastrous  in  morals.    It  explains  the  fail- 
ure of  all  those  policies  based  on  coercion  or  aggression 
—  privilege  and  oppression  within  the  State,  conquest 
and  the  struggle  for  power  between  States.    But  if  the 
two  agree  to  combine  forces  in  the  common  fight  against 


44  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

Nature  for  life  and  sustenance,  both  are  liberated  and 
they  have  found  in  that  partnership  the  true  economy: 
still  better,  they  have  found  in  it  the  true  basis  of  human 
society  and  its  spiritual  possibilities.  For  there  can  be 
no  union  without  some  measure  of  faith  in  the  agree- 
ment on  which  it  is  based,  some  notion  of  right.  It 
indicates  the  true  policy  whether  national  or  interna- 
tional —  agreement  for  united  action  against  the  com- 
mon enemy,  whether  found  in  Nature  or  in  the  passions 
and  fallacies  of  men." 

REFERENCES 

AngelPs  thesis  was  first  printed  as  "Europe's  Optical  Illusion," 
1008.  This  was  enlarged  and  appeared  under  the  title  "The 
Great  Illusion,"  1909,  which  has  since  then  appeared  in  revised 
form  and  has  been  translated  into  various  languages.  The 
thesis  has  been  more  fully  developed  in  the  following: 

Angell :  Arms  and  Industry.  1913.  [Title  of  edition  in  England,  — 
Foundations  of  International  Polity.] 

Angell:  America  and  the  New  World-State.    1914. 

Angell:  The  World's  Highway.    1915. 

O'Farrell,  H.  H.:  The  Franco-German  War  Indemnity  and  its 
Economic  Results.  Carton  Foundation,  1913.  [Contains 
bibliography.] 

Benson,  George:  Thirty  Points  for  Angellism.  Carton  Founda- 
tion. 

Esher,  Viscount:  New  Factors  in  International  Politics.  An 
Address  delivered  at  the  Sorbonne.  Carton  Foundation. 

"War  and  Peace."  Whitehall  House,  29  Charing  Cross,  London, 
S.  W.  A  monthly  magazine  to  develop  the  ideas  of  Norman 
Angell.  Four  shillings  a  year. 

The  Carton  Foundation.  To  promote  the  study  of  international 
polity.  Secretary,  Maurice  V.  Brett,  Whitehall  House,  White- 
hall, S.  W.,  England. 

Novicow:  La  moral  et  I'inter6t  dans  les  rapports  individuels  et 
internationaux.  Paris,  1912. 

Novicow:  War  and  its  Alleged  Benefits.    London,  1912. 


"THE  GREAT  ILLUSION"  45 

Novicow:   Die   Gerechtigkeit   und   die  Entfaltung  des  Lebens. 

Berlin,  1907. 
Dickinson,  G.  L.:  War  and  the  Way  Out.     Atlantic  Monthly, 

December,  1914,  April  and  May,  1915. 
Kobatsch:  Die  volks-  und  staatswirtschaTtliche  Bilanz  der  Riis- 

tungen.    Vienna,  1911. 
The  Struggle  for  Bread:  A  Reply  to  "The  Great  Illusion"  and 

Enquiry  into  Economic  Tendencies  by  A  Rifleman.     1913. 
Mahan:  "The  Great  Illusion."    North  American  Review,  March, 

1912.    Reprinted  in  "Armaments  and  Arbitration." 
Grane,  William  Leighton:  The  Passing  of  War.    London,  1912. 
Barker,   Ernest:   Political   Thought   in   England   since   Herbert 

Spencer  (Holt).    New  York,  1915. 


VI 

THE  ARMED  PEACE  AND  ITS  FRUITS 

I.  The  military  equipment  of  nations.  These  consist  of 
vessels,  aircraft,  men,  guns,  animals,  military  and  naval 
stations,  forts,  barracks,  arsenals,  proving  grounds, 
munition  factories,  uniforms,  utensils,  engineering  out- 
fits, telegraphic  appliances,  stores,  etc.  As  statistics 
relating  to  these  quickly  get  out  of  date  they  are  not 
given  here  except  for  a  few  items.  However,  reference 
is  given  to  annuals  where  up-to-date  information  on 
these  matters  may  be  found.  (Besides  the  following, 
note  the  references  at  the  end  of  this  chapter). 

A .  Naval  strength  of  the  chief  nations. 

Brassey's  Naval  Annual  [The  Naval  Annual].  Navy 
League  Annual.  Statesman's  Year  Book  (under 
each  nation).  World  Almanac.  Hazell's  Annual. 
The  Britannica  Year  Book.  The  World's  Work, 
Nov.,  1915.  Knight:  Navy  Year  Book,  1914. 
Tillman:  Navy  Year  Book,  1915. 

B.  Strength  of  land  forces. 

World  Almanac.  Statesman's  Year  Book.  Whit- 
aker's  Almanac.  Hazell's  Annual.  The  Brit- 
annica Year  Book. 

C.  War  implements  rapidly  depreciate  in  value. 

1.  Every  bit  of  progress  in  science  and  invention  tends 

to  put  the  existing  equipment  out  of  date. 

2.  Under  the  present  system  armaments  must  be  up 

to  date;  old  implements  are  about  as  good  as  none. 

3.  Keeping   armaments   up   with   improvements   costs 

money;  the  more  there  is  of  inventive  genius,  the 
greater  the  cost. 

46 


ARMED  PEACE  AND  ITS  FRUITS  47 

D.  Military  drill,  maneuvers,  mobilizations,  war  games, 
etc.,  which  are  necessary  to  keep  armed  forces  in 
readiness  are  also  costly. 

II.  Cost  of  military  establishments,  of  preparedness;  Annual 
budgets  for  defense. 

A.  Navy  budgets  of  the  principal  navies  (see  Appendix). 

B.  Army  budgets  of  the  leading  powers  (see  Appendix). 

C.  Costs  per  man. 

Cost  of  Armies  per  Unit  of  Fighting  Force.  (Table 
VI.  A.  W.  Allen:  The  Drain  of  Armaments,  pub- 
lished by  The  World  Peace  Foundation,  1912.) 

Austria-Hungary $    278  per  annum 

France 291  " 

Germany 306  "        " 

Great  Britain 378  "        " 

Italy 273  "        " 

Japan 209  "        " 

Russia 232  " 

Spain 282  " 

United  States 1,314  " 

D.  Military  charge  resting  upon  the  individual  citizen. 

Total  Military  Charge  per  Unit  of  Population. 
(Table  III.  A.  W.  Allen:  The  Drain  of  Arma- 
ments, published  by  The  World  Peace  Founda- 
tion, 1912.) 

Austria-Hungary $2 . 56  per  annum 

France 6.64  " 

Germany 4-8i  " 

Great  Britain 7 .80  "        " 

Italy 3-57  " 

Japan 1.81  ' 

Russia 2.32  " 

Spain 2 . 50  " 

United  States. .  2.65  " 


48  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

E.  The  relation  of  military  to  other  governmental  expendi- 

tures. 

The  federal  government  of  the  United  States  devotes 
about  42%  of  its  expenditures  to  army  and  navy. 
Pensions  are  not  included  in  this  calculation;  were 
they,  it  would  bring  the  percentage  to  about  70. 
This  is  another  "peace-at-any-price"  policy. 

If  all  expenditures  of  the  United  States  and  the 
several  states  are  compared  with  their  expendi- 
tures for  military  purposes  the  latter  are  relatively 
small. 

F.  Is  this  expenditure  absolutely  necessary? 

1.  Is  it  all  spent  honestly  and  wisely? 

2.  Does  it  pay;  does  it  achieve  its  object,  and  really 

insure  a  nation  against  attack? 

3.  Is  there  no  other  means  of  securing  the  peace  of  a 

nation  that  is  more  effective  and  less  expensive? 

If  there  is,  the  expenditure  for  armament  is  a  waste, 

no  matter  how  small  it  is. 
III.  The  futility  of  the  armed  peace. 
A.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  cost  of  insuring  peace  by 
competitive  armaments  has  hi  the  last  decade  risen 
very  rapidly  and  out  of  proportion  to  the  increase  in 
population,  wealth,  or  prosperity.  If  armaments 
insured  peace  all  nations  should  be  more  secure 
than  formerly.  On  the  contrary,  no  nation  feels  one 
whit  more  secure.  Even  if  a  nation  outruns  all  com- 
petitors it  gains  no  security,  as  fear  impels  other  na- 
tions to  make  new  alliances  which  change  the  balance 
of  power.  No  ruler  or  prominent  political  personage 
can  visit  another  country  without  creating  endless 
speculation  on  the  political  significance  of  the  event. 
Thus  uncertainty,  suspicion  and  fear  are  abroad  and 
are  subject  to  the  exploitation  of  the  unscrupulous. 


ARMED  PEACE  AND  ITS  FRUITS  49 

(To  appreciate  the  rapid  increase  in  military  expendi- 
ture, see  the  diagram  showing  new  construction  in 
the  British  Navy  since  1882.  Naval  Annual,  1914, 
facing,  p.  ,434.) 

B.  The  fundamental  difficulty  is  illustrated  very  well  by 
the  circumstance  that  German  and  French  bills  of 
1913,  providing  for  an  increase  of  the  army,  each 
advanced  the  same  reason  for  the  increase,  —  the 
change  in  the  balance  of  power. 

IV.  The  "armed  peace"  brings  a  competitive  race  in  arma- 
ments; each  government  strives  to  outdo  and  outwit 
the  other  by  what  means  it  can. 

A.  By  securing  more  or  better  equipment. 

On  the  quality  of  its  equipment  a  government  must 
take  the  opinion  of  its  experts.  These  often  differ 
and  cannot  always  be  trusted.  (See  San  Francisco 
Chronicle,  Feb.  3,  1914,  "  Experts  juggle  figures  to 
reduce  naval  rank  of  the  United  States.") 

B.  By  spying  on  its  competitors. 

One  of  the  great  evils  of  the  present  system  is  that 
each  nation  regards  it  as  right  to  corrupt  the  citi- 
zens of  other  states;  it  tries  to  produce  among 
others  what  at  home  it  regards  as  a  most  heinous 
crime  —  treason.  Espionage  has  become  so  im- 
portant that  nations  have  passed  laws  for  their 
protection. 

France:  "Loi  contre  1'espionage,  April  18,  1886." 
(British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  77,  1198-1200.) 

Great  Britain:  Notification  to  French  Travellers 
against  Sketching,  May  8, 1886.  (State  papers,  77, 
1201.) 

Great  Britain:  Official  Secrets  Act.  August  26, 1889. 
(British  and  Foreign  State  Papers  8,  644-48.) 

Germany:  [July  3?]  1893;  June  3,  1914. 


50  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

United  States:  Act  to  Prevent  the  Disclosure  of 
National  Secrets,  March  3,  1911.  (Statutes  of 
U.  S.  6ist  Congress,  3rd.  Session,  1910,  Part  I, 
1084-5.)  The  statutes  of  the  United  States  have 
proved  inadequate  and  it  is  proposed  to  revise 
them. 

C.  By  keeping  its  own  affairs  secret  and  guarding  against 
treasonable  sale  of  military  secrets.  The  most  con- 
spicuous case  of  the  many  affairs  of  this  kind  was 
lie  Dreyfus  affair. 

V.  Under  the  system  of  the  "armed  peace,"  governments 

are  at  the  mercy  of  those  who  unconsciously  stir  up 

international  feelings  or  deliberately  use  them  for  their 

purposes. 

A.  Armament  makers  profit  by  war  and  by  war  scares, 

which  give  them  contracts. 
They  are  powerful  financial  corporations. 
The  capitalists  in  them  often  own  newspapers. 
They  also  have  great  influence  in  politics  and  on  the 

government. 

It  is  estimated  that  one  man  in  every  six  "employed" 
men  hi  Great  Britain  depends  on  armament  makers. 
(Perris:  Hands  Across  the  Sea.) 
Frequently  they  take  officers  out  of  the  army  and  navy 

into  their  service. 

They  maintain  agents  at  the  several  capitals. 
These  agents  at  tunes  engage  in  crooked  practices. 
In  1912  it  was  disclosed  that  Krupp  agents,  appar- 
ently with  the  knowledge  of  high  officials  of  the  firm, 
had  bribed  government  officials  in  Germany  to 
secure  military  secrets. 

They  may  and  apparently  do  advance  prices  to  the 
government  when,  by  reason  of  war  or  threat  of  war, 
it  is  in  a  predicament. 


ARMED  PEACE  AND  ITS  FRUITS  51 

They  affiliate  closely  with  the  financial  concerns 
through  inter-locking  directorates  and  money  trusts. 

Their  importance  in  the  armed  competition  of  nations 
leads  some  to  give  them  extraordinary  rank  in  the 
body  politic.  Hudson  Maxim  calls  the  area  about 
New  York  "the  heart  of  America"  because  it  con- 
tains the  most  of  the  manufactories  of  armaments 
and  war  materials,  together  with  the  principal  coal 
fields  of  Pennsylvania. 

There  is  evidence  that  the  armament  concerns  of  vari- 
ous nations  cooperate;  indeed  there  is  a  sort  of  in- 
ternational armament  trust.  Firms  of  one  nation 
often  supply  war  materials  to  foreign  nations  rated 
as  unfriendly;  they  even  have  branches  in  these 
nations.  "Although  you  cannot  establish  it,  there 
is  no  doubt  of  an  armor  plate  trust  all  over  the 
world."  —  Secretary  Daniels  before  the  House 
Naval  Committee,  Feb.  2,  1914. 

B.  War  scares  operate  to  open  the  pocket  of  the  taxpayer 
and  to  produce  an  enlargement  of  the  military  es- 
tablishment. 

"Have  you  ever  noticed  that  about  the  time  that  the  ap- 
propriations for  military  purposes  are  under  considera- 
tion in  the  Congress,  in  the  House  of  Commons,  in  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies,  or  in  the  Reichstag,  or  just  before 
such  a  time,  hostilities  are  always  on  the  point  of  breaking 
out  in  two  or  three  parts  of  the  world  at  once?  Just  at 
these  times  war  prophets  begin  to  see  visions  and  to 
dream  dreams,  and  the  poor,  gullible  people  rush  off  to 
their  cyclone  cellars  and  shout  timorously  to  their  repre- 
sentatives to  vote  at  once  and  as  much  as  possible  in 
order  that  great  ships  and  guns  and  forts  may  be  built 
to  protect  them  from  their  fears."  —  Nicholas  Murray 
Butler:  The  International  Mind,  p.  55. 


52  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

1.  The  irresponsible  press  often  creates  or  spreads  war 

scares.  Yellow  journalism,  jingo  press.  The 
tendency  toward  sensationalism,  which  is  a  feature 
of  the  yellow  press,  makes  "news  "  of  possible  inter- 
national friction;  and  paying  reporters  by  space 
induce  them  to  find  sensations.  These  circum- 
stances alone  encourage  stories  of  espionage,  trea- 
son, sale  of  military  secrets,  new  inventions  which 
scrap  all  existing  war  appliances,  night  visits  of 
aviators,  etc.,  etc.  Even  though  canards,  such 
stories  alarm  the  public,  and  newspapers  often 
enough  take  no  pains  to  correct  them. 

2.  Not  all  war  scares  are  the  result  of  misinformation  or 

of  innocent  blundering.  News  is  a  commodity 
which,  like  food,  can  be  contaminated  if  it  pays. 
We  need  pure  news  laws  as  well  as  pure  food  laws. 
Some  newspapers  are  believed  to  be  printing  matter 
designed  to  cause  the  United  States  to  intervene 
in  Mexico.  There  are  several  papers  in  the  United 
States  which  seem  to  have  a  policy  to  keep  rela- 
tions with  Japan  disturbed.  The  Turtle  Bay 
Story;  The  Magdalena  Bay  Story.  The  Lieb- 
knecht  disclosures  in  1913  showed  that  the  Krupp 
concern  tried  to  use  newspapers  in  France  as  well 
as  in  Germany  to  stir  up  national  anxiety  about 
armaments. 

3.  Incendiary  speeches,  books,  plays,  "jingoism,"  "chau- 

vinism," war-criers. 

Their  sincerity  need  not  be  doubted;  but  it  is  possible 
that  they  do  more  harm  than  good  because  their 
country-men,  —  who  know  them  —  regard  them  as 
alarmists  and  ignore  them;  whereas  the  foreigners 
against  whom  they  warn,  —  who  do  not  know  them 
—  consider  them  as  spokesmen  of  their  fellows, 


ARMED  PEACE  AND  ITS  FRUITS  53 

and  in  turn  take  alarm;  thus  they  give  foreign 
nations  a  ground  for  suspicion,  which  tends  to 
ripen  into  open  hostility  and  finally  war. 
The  Battle  of  Dorking  (1875)  describing  imagined 

invasion  of  England  by  Germany. 
"The  Englishman's  Home,"  a  play  with  the  same 

theme. 

"The  Typhoon"  a  play  turning  on  a  Japanese  in- 
vasion of  the  United  States. 
"America  Fallen"  by  J.  Bernard  Walker;  describing 

imagined  invasion  of  the  United  States. 
"Germany  in  Arms"  supposed  to  be  the  work  of  the 

Crown  Prince. 

Hobson  and  the  Japanese  Peril. 

VI.  Defense  becomes  a  political  issue.  Since  1906  the  Tories 
have  tried  to  oust  the  Liberals  by  attacking  the  state 
of  preparedness;  and  the  government  has  protected 
itself  by  ever-increasing  military  budgets.  Much  the 
same  situation  now  exists  in  the  United  States. 
Each  party  tries  to  outbid  the  other;  the  foreign  nation 
which  is  pronounced  the  foe  —  for  one  is  necessary  in 
these  political  machinations  —  is  carelessly  insulted 
and  thoroughly  roused  by  political  panic-mongers; 
the  munition  makers  in  both  countries  secure  orders; 
the  people  pay  the  bills  of  preparation  for  war  —  and 
also  of  the  war  which  these  tactics  sooner  or  later 
produce,  and  which  is  then  declared  inevitable.  What 
of  the  patriotism  of  those  who  seek  power  by  such 
methods? 

REFERENCES 

STATISTICS  ON  MILITARY  ESTABLISHMENTS 

Brassey's  Naval  Annual.    (Clowes  and  Sons.)    London,  published 
annually. 


54  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

Navy  League  Annual.    Published  by  the  Navy  League.    London. 
Statesman's  Year  Book.    (McBride,  Nast  and  Company.)     New 

York. 
World  Almanac.    (The  Press  Publishing  Company.)    New  York 

World. 

Whitaker's  Almanac.    Published  in  London. 
Hazell's  Annual.    London. 
Sundbarg:  Apercus  Statistiques  Internationaux.    1008.    pp.  165- 

166. 

Jane:  Fighting  Ships.    1912. 

Mulhall  and  Webb:  The  New  Dictionary  of  Statistics.     1911. 
Almanach  de   Gotha.     Annuaire  genealogique  diplomatique   et 

statistique.    Published  annually  since  1834. 
Les  armees  des  principales  puissances  au  printemps  de   1913. 

(Chapelot).    1913. 
Allen:  The  Drain  of  Armaments.    Pamphlet  issued  by  the  World 

Peace  Foundation,  1912,  and  distributed  free  of  charge. 
Knight:  The  Navy  Yearbook.     Compilation  of  Annual  Naval 

Appropriation  Laws  from  1883-1914.    63d  Cong.,  3d  Sess.  Sen. 

Doc.  637.    1914. 
Tillman:  Navy  Yearbook.    1915.    64th  Cong.,  ist  Sess.    Sen.  Doc. 

No.  3. 
Consult  also  official  reports  of  respective  governments. 

"PREPAREDNESS" 

Bacon,  Corinne:  Selected  Articles  on  National  Defense.     1915. 
Must  we  Arm?    Hilquit-Gardner  Debate  (Rand  School  of  Social 
Science).   1915.    [Debaters'  Handbook.] 

FOR  "  PREPAREDNESS  " 

Carter:  The  American  Army.    1915. 

Johnston:  Arms  and  the  Race.    1915. 

Maxim:  Defenseless  America.    1915. 

Wilson,  Huntington  W.  :  Stultitia.    1915. 

Huidekoper:  The  Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States. 


Stockton,  Richard,  Jr.:  Peace  Insurance.    1915. 


ARMED  PEACE  AND  ITS  FRUITS  55 

Wood,    Major-General    Leonard:    The    Military    Obligation    of 

Citizenship.    1915. 
The  World's  Work.    November,  1915. 

AGAINST  "  PREPAREDNESS  " 

Villard,  O.  G.:  Preparedness.     1915.     Reprint  from  New  York 

Evening  Post. 
Mead,  Lucia  Ames:  A  Pacifist  Program  for  Preparedness.    Re- 

print from  Advocate  of  Peace.    January,  1916. 
Levermore:  Preparedness  —  For  What?   World  Peace  Foundation. 

December,  1915.    [Contains  references.] 
Leaflets  on  Military  and  Naval  Preparation.    World  Peace  Foun- 

dation.   Boston,  1915. 
Bailey,  Warren  Worth:  "Preparedness"  the  Foe  of  Peace.    Con- 

gressional Record,  January  23,  1915. 
Jefferson,  Charles  E.:  Three  Men  behind  the  Guns.    American 

Association  for  International  Conciliation,  1914. 
Jefferson:  The  Nemesis  of  Armaments.     The  Independent,  Au- 

gust 17,  1914. 
The  Survey.    New  York. 

The  Commoner,  Lincoln,  Nebraska.    November,  1915. 
The  New  York  Evening  Post.    New  York. 
Stokes,   Anson   Phelps:   The   Question   of   Preparedness.      Yale 

Review,  January,  1916. 
Hull,  W.  I.:  Preparedness.    Phila.  Yearly  Meeting  of  Friends. 


See  also  the  following: 

MUNITION  MAKERS  AND  WAR 
Tavenner,  Clyde  H.  :  The  Navy  League  Unmasked.    Congressional 

Record,  January  7,  1916. 
Tavenner,  Clyde  H.:  The  World-Wide  War  Trust.    Congressional 

Record,  February  15,  1915. 

Perns:  War  Traders.     National  Peace  Council,  London,   1914. 
Sombart,  Werner:  Krieg  und  Kapitalismus.    1913. 
Pfeiffer,  Ludwig:  Kriegsgeist.     Ein  Beitrag  zur  Geschichte  der 

Menschheitspriifungen.    Dresden,  1909-1910. 


56  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

Pfeiffer,  Ludwig:  Die  Wahrheit  iiber  die  Kriegsgefahren.    Feststel- 

lung  der  Interessen  einzelner  Klassen  fiir  den  Krieg.    Leipzig, 

1912. 

Childe:  War  and  Business.    Harper's  Weekly,  December  9,  1911. 
Powell,  E.  Alexander:  Masters  of  Europe.     Saturday  Evening 

Post,  June  19,  1009. 
Jordan  :  Unseen  Empire.    1912. 
Delaisi:  Le  patriotisme  des  plaques  blindees.    1913. 
Delaisi,  Francis:  The  Inevitable  War.    1911. 
Snowden:  Armaments  and  Dividends.     World  Peace  Foundation, 

1914. 
Murray,  H.  Robertson:  Krupps  and  the  International  Armaments 

Ring.    London,  1915. 
How  Diplomats  Make  War  —  By  a  British  Statesman  (Huebsch). 


McCullagh:  Syndicates  for  War.    New  York  Evening  Post,  April  i, 

1911.     Reprinted  by  the  World  Peace  Foundation,  Boston. 
Perris,  George  H.  :  History  of  a  Great  Scare. 
Makers  of  War  Scares:  New  York  Evening  Post,  April  12,  1911. 
Influence  of  Capital:  New  York  Evening  Post.    April  12,  1911. 

CHAUVINISM 

Hobson:  Psychology  of  Jingoism.    London,  1001. 

Lea,  Homer:  The  Valour  of  Ignorance.    1909. 

Lea,  Homer:  The  Day  of  the  Saxon.    1912. 

The  Battle  Cry  of  Peace:  Motion  picture  by  J.  Stuart  Blackton, 

Vitagraph  Company.    1915. 
Walker,  J.  Bernard:  America  Fallen.    1915. 
Battle  of  Dorking:  The  Fall  of  England.     Reminiscences  of  a 

Volunteer.    [Lt.  General  G.  T.  Cheseney.]    1871. 
(Crown  Prince  of  Germany)  :  Deutschland  in  Waffen. 
Nippold:  Der  deutsche  Chauvinismus.    1913. 

COSTS 

Emery,  H.  C.:  Some  Economic  Aspects  of  the  War.    1913. 
Bloch:  Future  of  War.    1002,  pp.  63-92,  128-139. 
Cobden  Club:  The  Burden  of  Armament.    1905. 


ARMED  PEACE  AND  ITS  FRUITS  57 

Tawney:  Cost  of  Armed  Peace.    Congressional  Record,  46,  Part  IV, 

p.  3077. 
Griffiths:  Great  Armies  and  Their  Cost.    Fortnightly  Review,  75, 

pp.  249-259. 
Messimy:  La  paix  arm6e.    La  France  peut  en  alleger  le  poids. 

1903. 

Brooks,  Sydney:  Armed  Peace.    Harper's  Weekly,  March  29,  1913. 
Kobatsch:  Die  Volks-  und  staatswirtschaftliche  Bilanz  der  Riis- 

tungen.    Wien,  1911. 
Cobden:  Three  Panics.    1863. 

GENERAL 

Butler,  Nicholas  Murray:  The  International  Mind.    1913. 
Fried,  Alfred  H.:  The  German  Emperor  and  the  Peace  of  the 
World.    London,  1912. 


VII 

THE   ECONOMIC  CONSEQUENCES   OF   WAR 

I.  Destruction  of  property. 

A.  Formerly  an  essential  part  of  war:  war  must  support 

war. 

B.  The  tendency  of  treaties  has  been  to  make  property 

immune  from  warfare  as  far  as  possible. 

II.  Disturbance  of  economic  conditions.    War  is  pathological, 

as  it  produces  an  abnormal  economic  condition. 
Preparation  for  war  in  time  of  peace  has  tended  to  make 
the  disturbance  at  the  outbreak  of  war  less  violent. 
Advance   information   about   war.      (See   article   by 
Childe  hi  Harper's  Weekly,  December,  1911.) 
A.  Credit. 

1.  An  enormous  number  of  businesses  depend  on  credit; 

that  is,  they  are  run  on  borrowed  capital. 

2.  Credit,  or  the  ability  to  borrow  money,  depends  on 

the  risk  and  probable  profit  of  the  investment; 
that  is  on: 

a.  The  character  of  the  borrower,  his  ability,  thrift, 

health,  honesty,  reputation,  friends,  etc.  His 
nationality  does  not  matter  much,  if  at  all. 

b.  The  character  of  his  enterprise  and  the  probability 

of  its  success.  This  in  turn  depends  on  general 
business  conditions  and  is  subject  to  violent  al- 
teration by  external  causes. 

3.  Banks. 

a.  Facilitate  investment. 

By    investigating    the    reliability   of    prospective 
borrowers. 

58 


ECONOMIC  CONSEQUENCES  OF  WAR  59 

By  accumulating  capital  in  the  form  of  deposits. 
By  lending  capital;   or  discounting  notes  in  ad- 
vance. 

b.  They  are  thus  a  sort  of  sensory  system  in  the  finan- 

cial world,  since  the  invention  of  rapid  com- 
munication responding  almost  instantly  to  any 
condition  which  affects  credit. 

c.  For  their  protection  and  to  meet  sudden  demands 

of  their  depositors,  they  must  keep  a  reserve  of 
cash  on  hand;  this  reserve  is,  of  course,  far  from 
equal  to  deposits.  Hence  a  bank  is  not  in  a  posi- 
tion to  meet  all  its  obligations  at  once  and  ac- 
cordingly does  not  want  abnormal  conditions 
or  panics. 
B.  Effect  of  war  on  business. 

1.  Dislocates  business  by  altering  the  demand  for  goods. 

2.  Increases  the  risk,  hence  injures  credit  in  all  enter- 

prises, either  directly  or  indirectly,  because  business 
is  sympathetic  and,  broadly  speaking,  prospers  or 
suffers  as  a  unit. 

a.  Business  is  uncertain,  demand  is  reduced  or  altered, 

sales  doubtful,  as  everyone  holds  back  as  far  as 
possible. 

b.  Prices  fluctuate;  some  rise,  some  fall.    (See  Chap- 

ter IX). 

c.  Freight  rates  are  likely  to  alter. 

Requisition  of  railroads  and  ships  for  war  pur- 
poses. 

In  Balkan  War,  1912,  freight  rates  rose  on  an 
average  from  $2.27  to  $3.44  per  ton,  that  is 
$1.17.  (World  Peace  Foundation  Bulletin.) 

d.  Insurance  rates  are  likely  to  rise. 

Danger  of  loss  in  shipments  of  various  kinds 
through  delay  or  seizure. 


60  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

e.  Wages  affected. 
Men  called  to  colors. 

Laborers  may  take  advantage  of  situation  to  se- 
cure higher  wages. 

/.  Securities  and  stocks  decline  in  value. 
g.  Men  often  cannot  meet  their  financial  obligations 
and  moratoria  are  declared. 

3.  Interest   rates   rise,   that  is,   investors  hesitate   to 

lend    at    the    old    figure    because   the  risks  are 
greater. 

4.  Discount  rates  rise  because  the  probability  of  fluctua- 

tion has  increased  and  banks  must  be  protected 
against  the  greater  risk. 

5.  Cash,  especially  gold,  is  at  a  premium  because  every- 

body wants  something  stable. 

a.  Withdrawal  of  deposits  from  banks,  perhaps  caus- 

ing runs  on  banks.  Banks  may  need  to  suspend 
specie  payment. 

b.  Collecting  outstanding  loans  as  soon  as  possible 

and  refusing  to  renew  except  at  the  increased 
rate  of  interest. 

c.  Hoarding  cash,  preferably  gold;  that  is,  withdraw- 

ing it  from  circulation  and  also  reducing  the 
amount  of  capital  available  for  investment; 
thus  aggravating  the  rise  in  the  rate  of  in- 
terest. 

d.  Securities  are  sold  to  secure  cash. 

They  generally  sell  at  depreciated  value  at  the 
outbreak  of  war. 

This  liquidation  may  assume  such  proportions  as 
to  require  stemming.  Closing  of  all  stock  ex- 
changes, August,  1914. 

The  sale  of  securities  operates  peculiarly  to  the 
injury  of  the  man  who,  to  secure  cash,  has  to 


ECONOMIC  CONSEQUENCES  OF  WAR  61 

sell;  and  benefits  the  man  who  has  available 
capital  for  investment.  The  rich  grow  richer, 
the  others  poorer. 

6.  All  business  enterprises  must  be  more  cautious. 
Those  which  are  near  the  limit  of  their  resources 

(as  is  likely  to  be  the  case  with  any  new  ven- 
ture or  with  one  that  has  undertaken  to  ex- 
pand) are  in  danger  of  failure;  hence  bank- 
ruptcies. 

Business  concerns  to  avoid  reducing  profits  resort  to 
one  of  the  first  means  at  hand  to  cut  down  ex- 
penses, namely,  discharging  employees. 

7.  Unemployment,    with    all    its    consequences.      (See 

Chapter  IX.) 

8.  In  the  course  of  the  war,  business  readjusts  itself  to 

new  conditions  and  confidence  returns. 
It  is  always  apprehensive  because  it  is  subject  to 
severe  disturbance  by  the  events  of  war;  and,  be- 
cause being  a  wartime,  hence  abnormal  business, 
it  has  always  to  guard  against  the  effect  of  peace. 
The  return  of  peace  may  be  as  disastrous  as  was 
the  advent  of  war. 
III.  Effect  of  wars  on  public  finance. 
A.  The  cost  of  wars. 

1.  The  cost  of  wars  in  the  past  (Mass.  Commission 

on  the  Cost  of  Living:  The  Waste  of  Militarism, 
p.  7).  See  Table,  p.  62. 

2.  The  cost  of  the  Balkan  Wars  $1,264,000,000. 

3.  The  cost  of  the  European  War.     (Statements  of 

Asquith  and  Ribot,  Sept.,  1915.) 

France  (June,  1915)  $  8,700,000  per  day 

Great  Britain  (Sept.,  1915)      17,500,000    " 
Russia  (Sept.,  1915)  12,000,000    ' 

Germany  (Sept.,  1915)  16,670,000   "     " 


62  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

THE  COST  OF  WARS 


DATES 

COUNTRIES  ENGAGED 

COST 

1703-181  "\.  . 

England  and  France  

$  6,250,000,000 

1812-1815.  .  .  . 

France  and  Russia  

4^0,62  <,ooo 

1828  

Russia  and  Turkey  

100,000,000 

1830-1840  
1830-184.7.  . 

Spain  and  Portugal  (civil  war).  . 
France  and  Algeria  

250,000,000 

190,000,000 

1848  . 

Revolts  in  Europe  

50,000,000 

184  <; 

United  States  and  Mexico  

England      

371,000,000 

France     

•222  OOO  OOO 

18^4-18  <;6 

Sardinia  and  Turkey  

128  ooo  ooo 

Austria               

68  600  ooo 

Russia         

800  ooo  ooo 

France           

7<r  OOO  OOO 

i8«) 

Austria 

127  ooo  ooo 

Italv 

51  ooo  ooo 

1861-1865 

The  rebellion 

5  ooo  ooo  ooo 

1864 

Denmark  Prussia  and  Austria 

•?6  ooo  ooo 

1866  

Prussia  and  Austria  

330,000,000 

1864-1870  
1865-1866 

Brazil,  Argentine,  and  Paraguay 
France  and  Mexico 

240,000,000 

6tr  OOO  OOO 

0               0                  f 

Germany  

0^4,400,006 

1870-1871..  j 

France   

1,580  ooo  ooo 

»*_,     } 

Russia         

806  ^47  480 

1876-1877..  j 

Turkey          

AQ2  273  74.  ^ 

1898  
1900-1901  
1004-100? 

Spain  and  the  United  States  .  .  . 
Transvaal  Republic  and  England 
Russia  and  Japan 

1,165,000,000 
1,000,100,000 

2  500  OOO  OOO 

Expense  of  wars,  1793-1860 $  9,243,225,000 

Expense  of  wars,  1861-1910 14,080,321,240 


Total $23,323,546,240 


ECONOMIC  CONSEQUENCES  OF  WAR  63 

B.  Credit  of  a  belligerent  government  is  injured. 

1.  Bonds  and  paper  money  fall  in  value. 

For  illustration  of  the  effect  of  former  wars  on  govern- 
ment paper  see  the  Journal  de  la  Societe  de  Statis- 
tique  de  Paris,  1909,  pp.  314-349- 

2.  This  process  is  aggravated  by  the  tendency  to  hoard 

specie.  To  protect  itself  a  government  may  be 
compelled  to  suspend  specie  payment.  Great 
Britain  suspended  specie  payment  in  1797;  the 
United  States  in  1862;  France  in  1870. 

C.  To  finance  a  war,  governments: 

1.  Increase  taxation. 

a.  Direct  taxes,  poll  taxes,  personal  taxes,  income  and 

property  taxes,  etc.  Well  illustrated  by  the 
British  Budget  proposals  of  Sept.  21,  1915. 

b.  Indirect  taxes  (tariffs,  excises,  stamp  duties,  etc.). 
To  maintain  a  supply  of  coin  some  governments 

require  import  duties  to  be  paid  in  coin,  often 
in  gold. 

2.  Borrow  money.     War  loans.     (See  Chapter  VIII.) 

Governments  issue  bonds,  which  must  be  of  a  char- 
acter to  induce  investors  to  buy.  Investors  want: 

a.  A  high  rate  of  interest,  preferably  payable  in  gold. 
The  greater  the  difficulty  of  a  government,  the 

higher  the  rate  of  interest  it  must  pay. 

b.  A  discount.    Anglo-French  bonds  of  1915  sold  at 

97-5- 

c.  Exemption  from  taxes  or  assessments;  as  otherwise 

the  yield  of  bonds  may  be  eaten  up  by  taxes,  as 
was  the  case  with  British  South-African  war 
bonds. 

"d.  Suitable  terms  of  conversion  or  redemption. 
e.  Financial  houses  require  a  commission  for  floating 
the  bonds. 


64  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

It  will  be  observed  that  in  its  plight  a  government 
must  make  loans  that  are  advantageous  to  investors 
(hence  disadvantageous  to  it);  for  profit,  and  not 
patriotism  alone,  persuades  men  to  buy. 
Loans  of  this  kind  mean  debt,  a  mere  deferring,  not  an 
evasion,  of  paying  for  the  war;  in  other  words,  what 
cannot  be  secured  by  taxes  now  is  passed  on  to  the 
taxpayer  of  the  future. 

If  the  bonds  are  well  distributed  among  the  people  of 
the  borrowing  nation,  then  the  repayment  of  the 
loan  consists  in  collecting  taxes  from  the  people  to 
repay  the  people.  This  process,  though  undesirable, 
does  not  reduce  the  total  wealth.  But  if  a  portion  of 
the  people  hold  the  bonds,  then  repayment  consists 
in  taxing  all  to  repay  this  portion;  a  condition  which 
invites  non-bondholders  to  seek  to  evade  taxes  and 
impose  them  on  bondholders;  a  form  of  confiscation. 
The  belligerents  in  Europe  have  tried  to  secure  general 
participation  of  their  people  in  war  loans,  even  to 
the  extent  of  having  banks  advance  money  to  in- 
dividuals to  be  used  in  buying  bonds,  the  govern- 
ment guaranteeing  the  banks  against  loss.  In  this 
way  it  is  hoped  to  make  everyone,  if  possible,  a 
sharer  in  the  financial  burden,  instead  of  having  it 
rest  on  a  fraction  of  the  people. 

3.  Issue  fiat  money  (non-interest  bearing  paper  money). 
This  becomes  increasingly  necessary  when  a  govern- 
ment's credit  sinks,  as  it  does  in  consequence  of 
large  loans,  failure  of  its  arms,  or  other  misfor- 
tunes. 
Fiat  money  must  be  made  a  legal  tender  otherwise 

it  would  not  be  accepted  at  all. 
The  government  must  agree  to  redeem  it,  otherwise 
it  would  depreciate. 


ECONOMIC  CONSEQUENCES  OF  WAR  65 

Not  redeemable  too  soon,  or  the  government  cannot 

meet  its  obligations. 

Not  redeemable  too  late,  or  the  paper  will  de- 
preciate. 

Fiat  money  depreciates  with  the  misfortune  of  a  gov- 
ernment; it  is  worth  only  what  the  government  is. 
Depreciation  in  Civil  War,  Dewey,  p.  293. 
IV.  After-effects  of  the  war. 

A .  Peace  brings  a  reversal  of  war  conditions  and  a  readjust- 

ment, similar  to  that  at  the  outbreak  of  war,  occurs. 

1.  The  demand  for  war  goods  suddenly  stops;  business 

hastens  to  take  advantage  of  the  new  demand  for 
the  usual  commodities;  there  is  danger  of  booms,  all 
the  more  because,  confidence  being  restored, 
hoarded  money  returns  to  circulation  and  capital 
is  easy  to  get. 

2.  The  disbandment  of  armies  suddenly  increases  the 

numbers  engaged  in  the  various  branches  of  busi- 
ness and  tends  to  create  uncertainty. 

B.  The  rehabilitation  of  the  military  equipment  costs  the 

government  much,  but  it  also  gives  employment  and 
tends  to  steady  conditions. 

C.  Pensions,  a  drain  on  the  public  exchequer,  whether  the 

beneficiaries  were  trained  or  not  before  the  war. 

D.  Indemnities,  if  there  are  any,  complicate  the  economic 

situation.    (See  Chapter  V.) 

E.  Transfers  of  territory  and  their  effect  on  victor  and 

vanquished.    (See  Chapter  V.) 

F.  The  Public  Debt.     (See  Chapter  VIII.) 

REFERENCES 

Hirst,  F.  W.:  The  Political  Economy  of  War.     London,  1915. 
Roberts,  George  E. :  Economic  Effects  of  the  War.    National  City 
Bank  of  New  York,  1915. 


66  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

Bowley:  The  Effect  of  the  War  on  the  External  Trade  of  the  United 

Kingdom.    London,  1915. 
Emery,  Henry  C. :  Some  Economic  Aspects  of  War.    Washington, 

Government  Printing  Office.    1914. 
Withers,  Hartley:  War  and  Lombard  Street.    1915. 
Clapp.  Edwin  J.:  Economic  Aspects  of  the  War,  neutral  rights, 

belligerent  claims  and  American  commerce  in  the  years  1914  and 

1915.     (Yale  University  Press.)     1915. 
Lawson,  W.  R.:  Modern  Wars  and  War  Taxes.    1913. 
Withers,  Hartley:  Meaning  of  Money.    New  York,  1909. 
Serrigny,  Bernard:  Les  cons6quences  economiques  et  sociales  de  la 

prochaine  guerre  d'apres  les  enseignements  des  campagnes  des 

1870-1871  et  de  1904-1905.    Paris,  1909. 
War  Risks— British  Parliamentary  Papers,  1908.    LVIII.     [Cd. 

4161.]    Report  by  the  Committee  on  a  National  Guarantee  for 

the  War  Risks  of  Shipping. 

Angell:  War  and  the  Workers  (National  Labour  Press).    Man- 
chester, England. 
Novicow:  Leprobleme  de  la  misere  et  les  phenomen  economiques 

naturell.    Paris,  1908. 
Anitchkow:  War  and  Labor.    1000. 

Journal  de  la  Societe  de  Statistique  de  Paris.    1009,  314-49. 
Dewey:  Financial  History  of  the  United  States.    1907. 
Hartung,   Hugo:    Die  finanzielle  Rustung  der  Kriegfuhrenden 

Staaten.    1914. 
Giffen:  Economic  Inquiries  and  Studies.    1004.    Chap.  I,  Cost  of 

the  Franco-Prussian  War;  Chap.  XXI,  Consols  in  a  Great 

War;  Chap.  XXII,  Economic  Aspects  of  the  South  African 

War. 

Phillipson:  The  Effect  of  War  on  Contracts  and  on  Trading  Asso- 
ciations in  Territories  of  Belligerents.    1009. 
Latin:  Effects  of  War  on  Property.    1009. 
Wells:  Cost  of  the  [American  Civil]  War.    Payment  of  the  War 

Debt.     In   Rand:   Economic   History   since    1763,   pp.   520- 

524- 
Gellender:  Effect  of  War  on  the  Price  of  Commodities.    Banker's 

Journal  22,  415-447. 


ECONOMIC  CONSEQUENCES  OF  WAR  67 

Rauchberg:  Die  Bevolkerung  Oesterreichs.    1895.    [Plate,  p.  27, 

shows  wages  and  prices  in  Austria.] 

Bloch:  Der  Krieg.    1899, 1,  3~3°8;  358-364.    IV,  3-308;  343-364- 
Richet:  Passe  de  la  guerre  et  1'avenir  de  la  paix.     1907.    p.  61. 
Molinari:  Grandeur  et  decadence  de  la  guerre.    1898,  228;  237-239. 
Denifle:  Desolation  des  Eglises.    1897-1899. 
Mass.  Commission  on  the  Cost  of  Living:  Waste  of  Militarism. 

World  Peace  Foundation,  1910. 
Stilwell,  A.  E. :  Universal  Peace — War  is  Mesmerism.    New  York, 

1911. 
Babson:  The  War  will  not  be  over  for  Fifty  Years.     Saturday 

Evening  Post,  October  2,  1915. 
Johnson,  Alvin  S. :  Commerce  and  War.    American  Association  for 

International  Conciliation,  New  York,  1915. 


vni 

PUBLIC  DEBTS 

I.  In  modem  times,  wars  and  the  competitive  armaments 

during  peace  have,  along  with  increasing  taxation,  forced 
governments  to  borrow  money  and  get  into  debt.  Only 
a  part  of  the  present  public  debt  is  for  military  purposes 
but  it  is  now  the  larger  part  in  the  debt  of  most  of  the 
great  powers.  It  should  be  noted  that,  if  there  had 
been  a  system  of  relationship  between  states  that  made 
competition  in  arms  unnecessary,  nations  could  have 
met  all  civil  expenses  and  would  need  to  have  no 
debt. 

II.  The  history  of  public  debts. 

A.  Public  debts  were  small  until  the  end  of  the  eight- 
eenth century.  There  are  several  reasons  for 
this: 

1.  The  absolute  monarchs  of  earlier  times  were  able  to 

levy  practically  unrestricted  taxes  on  their  subjects 
of  the  lower  classes. 

2.  Monarchs   could   repudiate   debts   and   accordingly 

their  credit  was  not  considered  good  by  men  with 
means,  who  therefore  lent  no  more  than  they  were 
forced  to. 

3.  The  nations  were  still  relatively  isolated  and  the 

rivalry  between  them  was  less  insistent  than  to- 
day. 

4.  The  activities  of  governments  were  less  complex  and 

expensive. 

68 


PUBLIC  DEBTS  69 

B.  Constitutional  government,  which  has  developed  since 

1789,  made  borrowing  possible,  as  the  people  became 
the  guarantors. 

Popular  governments  have  not,  except  in  a  few  cases 
to  be  noted,  repudiated  their  debts  partly  be- 
cause so  far  there  has  been  no  need;  but  also 
because  it  is  not  advisable  or  probable  that  a 
people  will  repudiate  a  debt  of  which  it  is  itself  the 
holder. 

C.  Wars  have  increased  public  debts  for  both  victor  and 

vanquished. 

1.  The  Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic  wars  created  the 

first  great  national  debts,  particularly  the  British 
debt.  The  debt  of  France  even  declined  during 
Napoleon's  earlier  wars  because  he  levied  tribute 
on  conquered  nations  and  thus  made  them  pay 
the  cost  of  his  wars  and  help  to  retire  the  French 
debt. 

2.  The  American  Civil  War  increased  the  debt  of  the 

United  States  from  about  sixty-five  millions  to 
over  two  and  one-half  billion  dollars.  (See  plate 
on  page  74.) 

3.  The  Franco-Prussian  war  increased  the  debt  of  France 

by  a  billion  dollars. 

4.  The     present     war     (1915)     has     increased     the 

debts  of  the  belligerents  on  an  unparalleled 
scale. 

How  the  expense  of  the  war  has  increased  the  national 
indebtedness  of  the  countries  involved  is  shown  in 
the  following  diagram.  The  white  part  of  the  line 
gives  the  amount  of  the  debt  per  head  before  the 
war.  The  black  part  of  the  line  gives  its  increase 
per  head  according  to  the  latest  published  figures. 
If  the  war  last  through  a  second  year  the  burden 


70  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

of  the  financial  obligations  of  the  belligerent  gov- 
ernments will  become  almost  unbearable.  It  must 
be  remembered,  however,  that  a  diagram  showing 
the  financial  ability  of  the  various  nations  would 
look  much  like  the  following  diagram  of  their  in- 
debtedness. Great  Britain  and  France  have  the 
greatest  wealth  per  capita  of  any  people,  while 
Italians  and  Russians  are  comparatively  poor. 
Germany  would  come  in  the  order  of  wealth 
above  Austria. 

THE  BURDEN  OF  THE  WAR  DEBT 


TRANCE.    BEFORE*  160;    NOW  4276 


GREAT  BRITAIN.   BEFORE*77:   NOW*233 

••• 
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.    BEFORE*  73;  NOW  $  I  OS 

=• 
ITALY.   BEFORE  »80;   NOW  491 

BSHHB 

GERMANY.  BEFORE  1 17  ;  NOW  *68 

BH 

RUSSIA.  BEFORE*  25;  NOW  *49 


(By  permission  of  The  Independent.    Printed  Sept.  29,  1915.) 

D.  Since   1870  the   "armed  peace,"   the  race  in  arma- 

ments, has  caused  a  rising  debt  in  all  military  na- 
tions. 

The  United  States  adopted  the  policy  about  1890,  with 
like  result. 

E.  Plates  illustrating  the  history  of  debt. 


PUBLIC  DEBTS 


PQ 

I 

O 


I 


NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 


\ 


PUBLIC  DEBTS 
THE  PUBLIC  DEBT  OF  GERMANY 


73 


$4,000,000,000 


$3,000,000,000 


$2,000,000,000 


$1,000,000,000 


n 


1870  1880  1890  1900  1910 

I.  The  Imperial  debt.     Source:  Statistical  Abstract  of  Great  Britain, 

1908,  p.  319;  The  Statesman's  Year  Book,  1914. 

II.  The  Debt  of  the  German  States.     Source:  Pfitzner-Entwickelung 

der  kommunalen  Schulden  in  Deutschland,  p.  36. 


74  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

THE  PUBLIC  DEBT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 
(Net  debt  after  deducting  cash  in  the  Treasury) 


1790      1800        18(0          1820        1830        1840         1850        I860        1870        1880        1890        1900       1910 

Figures  for  the  years  1791-1859  derived  from  Annual  Treasurer's  Report  for 

1893,  page  xcvi. 
Figures  for  the  years  1860-1894  from  Annual  Treasurer's  Reports.    Tables 

on  "Analysis  of  the  Public  Debt." 
Figures  for  the  years  1895-1912  from  Monthly  Treasurer's  Reports. 

m.  The  evils  of  public  debts. 

A.  Ethical  objection.    A  debt  is  a  burden  on  the  future 
Has  the  present  the  right  to  obligate  the  future? 

1.  Some  answer  affirmatively  on  the  ground  that  a  war 

is  for  the  benefit  of  future  generations  as  well  as 
the  present,  indeed  that  it  may  be  like  a  good 
investment,  the  profits  of  which  accrue  to  pos- 
terity (for  instance,  England's  wars  against  Na- 
poleon); that,  therefore,  a  loan  is  a  fair  means  of 
distributing  the  costs  to  all  beneficiaries.  They 
contend  that  it  is  like  a  commercial  loan  of  a  cor- 
poration, which  with  borrowed  capital  builds  for 
the  future;  and  the  future  approves  of  the  process. 

2.  Others  reply  negatively  on  the  ground  that  it  is  not 

right  to  load  a  new  generation  with  debt  without 


PUBLIC  DEBTS  75 

its  consent.  They  hold  that  the  analogy  between 
state  and  corporation  is  not  accurate  because  the 
corporation  borrows  for  a  "going"  concern,  one 
which  produces  wealth;  whereas  a  state  is  not 
in  a  profit-making  business  —  is  in  fact  largely 
excluded  from  profit-making,  which  is  reserved  to 
private  enterprise  —  and  in  going  to  war  actually 
destroys  wealth;  hence  a  corporation  can  repay  a 
loan  out  of  its  profits:  whereas  a  state,  not  being 
in  business,  has  no  profits  and  must  resort  to  taxa- 
tion. If  it  be  contended  that  this  taxation  falls 
on  corporations  and  persons  who  ought  to  pay, 
because  the  successful  issue  of  the  war  increased 
their  business  and  profits,  it  is  replied  that  business 
as  a  whole  is  not  national  and  the  victory  of  the 
nation  does  not  mean  the  success  of  business  within 
its  bounds;  and  per  contra,  that  even  in  defeat 
business  as  such  often  continues  unscathed.  (See 
Chapter  V.) 

«_  3.  The  assumption  that  war  is  of  advantage  to  the  busi- 
ness of  a  nation  probably  results  from  the  fact 
that  "big  business"  by  its  influence  over  the 
government  has  secured,  or  hopes  to  secure,  favor- 
able legislation  in  the  form  of  tariffs,  foreign  loans 
and  concessions,  etc.,  all  of  which  would  suffer 
through  a  defeat  in  war.  War  then  is  chiefly  in 
-  the  interest  of  "big  business."  Are  national  war 
debts  justifiable  under  such  circumstances? 

B.  Practical  objections. 

i.  The  power  which  debt  gives  to  a  government's 
creditors  may  be  injurious,  if  the  loan  is  concen- 
trated in  unscrupulous  hands.  Popular  govern- 
ments are  too  likely  to  be  run  by  men  of  financial 
power  as  it  is,  and  if  they  are,  monarchy  and  aris- 


76  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

tocracy  have  merely  yielded  to  plutocracy.  Hence 
a  wide  dispersion  of  bonds  among  the  citizens  of  the 
state  is  desirable.  But  if  people  can  buy  bonds, 
why  should  they  not  be  taxed  in  the  first  instance? 
The  fact  is  that  people  cannot  be  taxed  and  the 
average  man  has  no  money  to  invest  in  bonds,  which 
therefore  must  be  taken  by  men  with  means.  Thus 
present  wealth  takes  a  lien  on  the  taxation  of  the 
future. 

The  power  of  foreign  creditors,  particularly  of  the  cred- 
itors of  lesser  states,  is  backed  by  the  military  force 
of  their  nations:  Egypt,  Persia,  Turkey,  China  and 
various  states  in  Africa  and  South  America. 

2.  There  is  no  adequate  check  on  this  process,  as  bor- 

rowing on  a  future  which  need  not  be  consulted, 
and  doing  so  in  the  name  of  patriotism,  national 
existence  and  expansion  knows  no  limit  unless  it 
be  national  bankruptcy,  some  form  of  repudiation 
or  excessive  taxation. 

3.  Preparedness  for  war,  which  is  based  on  borrowed 

money,  is  a  bad  investment  and  cannot  claim  to 
be  sound  insurance  for  peace;  for  the  war  prepared 
against  is  no  more  to  be  feared  than  the  effects 
of  a  repudiation  or  of  a  revolution  on  the  part  of 
those  who  refuse  to  pay  the  taxes. 
IV.  The  ultimate  result  of  debts. 
A.  Few  nations  have  done  anything  substantial  in  the 

way  of  paying  off  public  debts. 

There  is  a  partial  justification  for  this  in  the  fact  that 
government  bonds  are  among  the  most  stable  se- 
curities and,  hence,  they  serve  to  steady  markets 
by  furnishing  a  relatively  secure  investment.  For 
this  reason  the  amount  of  government  bonds  may 
properly  increase  with  the  volume  of  business. 


PUBLIC  DEBTS  77 

B.  Public  debts  have  recently  risen  more  rapidly  than 

public  wealth,  or  the  volume  of  business,  indeed  on 
a  scale  unrelated  to  general  economic  conditions. 

C.  How  can  this  process  continue  indefinitely?    What  are 

the  alternatives? 

1.  Bankruptcy.    This  is  not  probable. 

2.  Repudiation  of  the  debt. 

a.  No  nation  of  first  rank  has  done  this  in  more  than  a 

hundred  years. 

The  Confederate  States  were  compelled  to  repudi- 
ate their  obligations  at  the  close  of  the  Civil  War, 
hence  they  escaped  paying  a  large  part  of  the 
cost  of  that  war. 

Certain  South  American  states  have  repudiated 
debts  within  the  nineteenth  century. 

b.  It  is  not  advisable,  as  many  of  the  people  are  them- 

selves bondholders.    (See  II  B,  above.) 

c.  It  is  conceivable  that  if  the  bondholders  are  one 

class  of  society,  other  classes  through  their 
majority  in  legislative  bodies  may  evade  taxa- 
tion and  levy  it  on  the  bondholders  in  the  form 
of  income  taxes  or  the  like.  This  would  in  effect 
be  a  repudiation  except  for  the  fact  that  these 
additional  taxes  can  be  passed  to  the  ultimate 
consumer  in  the  form  of  increased  cost  of  living. 

d.  Increase  of  taxes  on  income  from  bonds  is  a  form  of 

repudiation. 

•»  e.  Fiat  money  by  depreciating  values  increases  prices. 
Hence  a  government  by  issuing  excessive  amounts 
of  fiat  money  really  reduces  the  purchasing 
power  of  the  interest  it  pays  its  bondholders 
and  thus  there  is  the  equivalent  of  the  govern- 
ment shifting  a  part  of  its  burden  to  the  bond- 
holders. 


78  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

/.  After  a  war,  nations  reduce  the  burden  of  their 
obligations  by  refunding  their  debts  at  lower 
rates  of  interest  as  quickly  as  possible.  To  fa- 
cilitate this  they  often  reserve  the  right  of  retiring 
bonds  at  any  time. 

3.  Increased  taxation. 

The  economic  and  sociological  effects  of  higher  taxa- 
tion cause  social  unrest  (see  Chapter  IX)  and  tend 
to  create  opposition,  even  revolution  of  the  masses 
upon  whom  the  burden  of  taxes  ultimately  falls. 

4.  Limitation  of  expenditure  or  restricting  borrowing 

to  certain  kinds  of  enterprises. 

Debts  contracted  for  "going"  enterprises,  those 
which  make  a  profit,  will  have  no  evil  conse- 
quences in  the  future;  hence  states  may  safely 
contract  such  debts. 

Debts  for  destructive  purposes,  war  and  preparation 
for  it,  give  no  convincing  profit  to  the  future  and 
may  have  evil  consequences.  Expenditures  of 
this  kind  should  be  borne  by  those  who  believe  they 
benefit  by  them,  the  contemporaries.. 

REFERENCES 

DEBT  OF  UNITED  STATES 

Hirst:  The  Credit  of  Nations.    Washington,  Government  Printing 

Office,  1910. 

North  American  Review,  1901,  632  f. 
North  American  Review,  1902,  pp.  101,  566,  720.    Table  showing 

United  States  Debt,  1791-1902. 
Bastable:  Public  Finance.    1892. 
Lalor:  Encyclopedia,  "Debts,"  p.  726. 
Adams:  Public  Debt.    1800. 
Statistical  Abstract  (United  States),  1906,  p.  650,  and  appendix 

(United  States  debt). 
Allgemeines  Statistisches  Archiv,  I,  242,  295  (United  States  debt). 


PUBLIC  DEBTS 


79 


United  States  Government  Documents,  Serial  number  5946  (com- 
plete statement  of  United  States  bond  issues). 

Dewey:  Financial  History  of  the  United  States.  1907.  (Refer- 
ences at  the  beginning  of  the  book.) 

Atkinson:  Cost  of  War  and  Warfare.    1902. 

Atkinson:  Cost  of  a  National  Crime.    1899. 

Atkinson:  The  Hell  of  War  and  its  Penalties.    1899. 

Massachusetts  Commission  on  the  Cost  of  Living  [McSweeney]: 
The  Waste  of  Militarism.  World  Peace  Foundation,  1910. 

DEBT  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN 

Statesman's  Yearbook,  1900,  p.  53.    The  same  table  is  found  in 

other  earlier  editions. 
British  Parliamentary  Papers,  1909  [cd.  4657].  L.  43,  44,   113. 

(Debt,  1835-1908). 
Dilke:  Armaments  of  United  Kingdom.    Independent  52:  1294-7. 

DEBT  OF  FRANCE 

Gorges:  La  dette  publique.    1884. 

Journal  de  la  societe  de  statistique  de  Paris,  1860,  pp.  14-16. 

Vol.  34,  pp.  315-17.  Vol.  50,  pp.  359-389.  Bonds. 
Statesman's  Year  Book,  1899,  pp.  521.  French  debt. 
Wuhrer:  Histoire  de  la  dette  publique  en  France.  2  vols. 

1886. 
Nicolas,  C. :  Les  budgets  de  la  France  depuis  le  commencement  du 

19  siecle.    Tableaux.    Paris,  1883. 

DEBT  OF  GERMAN  EMPIRE 

Statistisches  Jahrbuch  d.  deutschen  Reiches.  1910,  p.  307.  Im- 
perial debt  since  1870. 

Sundbarg:  Apercus.  .  .  .    1908,  p.  161. 

Pfitzner:  Entwickelung  d.  kommunalen  Schulden  in  Deutschland. 
1911.  Tables. 

GENERAL 

Statistical  Abstract  (Great  Britain),  1908,  pp.  313  f-  Debt  of 
foreign  countries  in  recent  years. 


8o  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

Lawson:  Modern  Wars  and  War  Taxes.    A  Manual  of  Military 

Finance.    1912. 

Loubet:  La  politique  budgetaire  en  Europe.    1910. 
Bloch:  Der  Krieg,  I,  1899,  pp.  3-245  passim;  pp.  277-308. 
Bloch:  The  Future  of  War.    1902,  128-9;  140-6;  163-318. 
Tarbell:  The  Tariff  in  Our  Times.    1911.    War  Tariffs. 
Stammhammer:  Bibliographic  der  Finanzwissenschaft.    1903. 
Pfeiffer:    Kriegsgeist.      Die   Wahreit   iiber   die   Kriegsgefahren. 

1912. 
Johnson:  Expansion  of  Military  Expenditure.    American  Associa- 

tion for  International  Conciliation.     1911. 
Wilson:  An  Empire  in  Pawn.    1909. 
Atwood:  The  World  in  Debt.    Saturday  Evening  Post,  April  24, 


Angell:  Bankers  as  Saviors  of  Society.    London  Public  Opinion, 

January  26  and  February  2,  1912. 
Jordan  :  The  Unseen  Empire.    1912. 
Jordan:  War  and  Waste.    1913. 
Hamilton-Grace:  Finance  and  War.     1910. 
Atkinson,  Edward:  Facts  and  Figures.     Lecture  6  (Hough  ton- 

Mifflin),  1904. 

Levi:  War  and  its  Consequences.    1881. 
Prevention  of  War,  World's  Work,  14,  9145-48. 
Bullock:  Cost  of  War.    Atlantic  Monthly,  95:  433-45. 
Powell:  The  Masters  of  Europe.    Saturday  Evening  Post.    June  19, 

1909. 


IX 

WAR  AND   SOCIOLOGY 

I.  Economic  evils  which  affect  social  conditions. 
A .  Effect  of  competitive  armament.     (See  Chapter  VI.) 

1.  Taxes  increased. 

2.  The  cost  of  living  increases,  high  prices  resulting  from 

scarcity   of  gold,    depreciation   of   securities   and 
paper  of  all  sorts,  cornering  or  storing  commodities 
for  high  prices,  etc.    A  commission  of  the  Massa- 
chusetts legislature  in  1910  made  an  investigation 
of  the  cost  of  living  and  declared  its  conviction 
that  militarism  is  a  most  far-reaching  influence 
increasing    and    perpetuating    high    prices.      (An 
extract   "The  Waste  of  Militarism"  printed  by 
the  World  Peace  Foundation,  1912.) 
a.  The  reduced  purchasing  power   of   money  since 
1895  is  shown  in  a  report  of  the  United  States 
Bureau  of  Labor. 

1895  purchasing  power  $i .  oo 

1905          "  "          .83 

1912          "  "  63 


81 


82 


NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 


6.  INDEX  NUMBERS  OF  CHANGES  IN  THE  LEVEL  OF  FOOD 
PRICES  SINCE  THE  YEAR  1900  IN  THE  UNITED  KING- 
DOM AND  CERTAIN  FOREIGN  COUNTRIES  AND  BRITISH 
DOMINIONS  OVERSEA 

(1900  =  100) 


COUNTRY 

1900 

1901 

1902 

1903 

1904 

1905 

1906 

United  Kingdom.  .  . 

IOO 

IOO 

IOI 

103 

IO2 

103 

102 

Foreign  Countries: 

Austria-Hungary  : 

(a)  Austria  .  .  . 

IOO 

IOO 

99 

IOI 

105 

1  08 

113 

(6)  Hungary.  . 

IOO 

IOI 

IO2 

103 

III 

122 

118 

Belgium 

IOO 

IOI 

IO2 

ii3 

IOO 

no 

112 

France  

IOO 

IOO 

QC 

A  *O 

98 

oo 

07 

Germany  

IOO 

103 

vo 

106 

V 

105 

yy 
105 

V  / 

114 

118 

Holland 

IOO 

IOO 

IOO 

IO2 

IO3 

IO2 

IO3 

Italy.  . 

IOO 

IOO 

00 

00 

07 

oo 

00" 

Norway  

IOO 

yy 

00 

yy 
00 

y  / 

O7 

yy 

IOO 

yy 

Russia  

IOO 

yy 

IO7 

yy 

IO2 

y  / 

112 

116 

United  States.  .  . 

IOO 

105 

/ 
in 

III 

113 

117 

Japan  . 

IOO 

O7 

IOO 

108 

1  20 

132 

127 

British  Dominions: 

y  / 

**/ 

Canada 

IOO 

TOO 

106 

IOO 

in 

TTC 

T" 

J.L/y 

XWy 

J 

Australia  

— 

IOO 

109 

105 

95 

IOI 

IOI 

New  Zealand  .... 

IOO 

IOI 

109 

109 

IO2 

107 

107 

(Table  continued  on  p.  83.) 


WAR  AND  SOCIOLOGY 


COUNTRY 

1907 

1908 

1909 

1910 

1911 

1912 

United  Kingdom.  .  . 

105 

108 

108 

109 

109 

US 

Foreign  Countries: 

Austria-Hungary  : 

(a)  Austria.  .  .  . 

H3 

118 

120 

126 

128 

135 

(6)  Hungary.  . 

122 

128 

131 

129 

137 



Belgium 

II  r 

116 

1  2O 

122 

128 

132 

France 

IOO 

IO2 

IOO 

IO4. 

117 

Germany  

116 

116 

124 

127 

T?8 

130  * 

Holland  

107 

109 

117 

123 

Italy.  . 

IOI 

112 

H4 

TT8 

1  2O 

Norway  

108 

IOO 

1  06 

108 

III 

119 

Russia  

130 

130 

127 

TT6 

121 

United  States  .  .  . 

122 

126 

133 

140 

139 



Japan    . 

134. 

136 

132 

132 

T38 



British  Dominions: 

Canada 

128 

I2Q 

133 

13^ 

136 

151 

Australia 

98 

1  06 

IO4 

103 

103 

TT6 

New  Zealand  .... 

112 

117 

108 

no 

116 

(From  Report  of  Board  of  Trade  of  Great  Britain,  1913: 
London  Weekly  Times,  August  15,  1913.) 

c.  Cost  of  clothing,  boots  and  shoes  advanced  in 

Great  Britain  from  5  to  15  per  cent  since  1895. 

d.  Rents  advanced  slightly. 

e.  In  Great  Britain  average  prices  have  since  1895 

advanced  in  various  districts  from  9  to  12  per 
cent. 

3.  Wages  did  not  advance  at  the  same  rate. 
a.  Advance  in  wages  1905  to  1912  in  Great  Britain. 

Building  trades 1.9  % 

Laborers 2.6    " 

1  Baden  only:  figures  for  the  remaining  States  not  yet  being  avail- 
able for  this  year. 


NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 


Engineering  trade: 

Skilled  men 5.5  % 

Laborers 3.9    " 

Printing  trade: 

Compositors 4.1    " 

(London  Weekly  Times,  August  15,  1913-) 

b.  The  relation  of  prices  and  wages  during  the  Civil 
War.    (Dewey:  Financial  History,  294.) 


YEAR 

PRICES 

MONEY  WAGES 

1860  
1861     .  .  . 

IOO.O 

loo  6 

IOO.O 

100  8 

1862  
1863 

117.8 
148  6 

102.9 

IIO    'J 

1864 

100  t; 

i2«;  6 

i86< 

216  8 

147  i 

4.  Salaries  advance  even  more  slowly  because  salaried 

men  do  not,  like  laborers,  have  organizations  to 
force  an  increase. 

5.  Unemployment  —  Firms  to  weather  a  period  of  stress 

discharge  men.    The  man  at  the  bottom  eventually 
bears  the  cost. 
B.  Effect  of  War.    (See  Chapter  VIL) 

1.  All  the  above  evils  are  aggravated. 

2.  The  economic  disorder  accompanying  the  advent  of 

war  forces  men  and  businesses  with  a  small  margin 
of  working  capital  to  the  wall,  or  to  continue  their 
business  at  a  disadvantage.  (See  Chapter  VII, 
Section  II,  B.) 

II .  Sociological  consequences  of  war. 
A.  Evil  consequences. 

i.  Unemployment,  poverty,  distress. 


WAR  AND  SOCIOLOGY  8«? 

; 

2.  Widowed,  orphaned  and  wounded  become  depend- 

ents. 

3.  Social  disturbances  and  unrest  and,  after  the  war, 

strikes  for  better  conditions. 

4.  Increase  of  crime,  disease  and  the  death-rate. 

a.  Crime  is  fostered  by  the  lawless  ideals  of  war  and 

by  the  increased  chance  war  gives  to  the  criminal 
class  to  ply  their  trade. 

b.  Diseases  are  more  common  at  home  during  war 

than  in  peace  (see  Chapter  X)  and  this  is  im- 
portant sociologically  if  not  biologically. 

5.  All  social  work  suffers  or  is  neglected  for  lack  of  funds, 

workers  or  time.  Schools  and  education  are  most 
seriously  injured.  The  social  processes  whereby 
society  in  time  of  peace  endeavors  to  improve  it- 
self are  suspended  and  leave  a  heritage  of  things 
undone  to  posterity. 

6.  War  reduces  respect  for  ordinary  law  and  morality, 

for  force  has  precedence.  "Inter  arma  leges 
silent."  What  is  the  effect  on  the  individual,  and 
is  it  wholesome  for  society? 

a.  War  babies  —  and  their  future. 

b.  Cessation  of  ethical  relations  with  the  foe. 
National  hatreds:  "The  Song  of  Hate";  rejection 

of  all  things  related  to  the  foe,  and  the  resultant 
evils. 
B.  Compensating  benefits. 

1.  Self-sacrifice  —  dying  for  a  cause.    Patriotism. 

2.  Reducing  petty  national  friction  and   substituting 

unity  of  action. 

3.  Developing  courage,  action,  heroism,  and  the  full  ex- 

ercise of  personal  talents. 

4.  Victory  —  perhaps. 


86  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

REFERENCES 

Report  of  the  International  Commission  to  Inquire  into  the 
Causes  and  Conduct  of  the  Balkan  Wars.  Carnegie  Endow- 
ment, Washington,  D.  C. 

Angell:  America  and  the  New  World-State.  1915.  pp.  148-185 
(Americans  in  Philippines). 

Angell:  War  and  the  Workers.  National  Labour  Press,  Man- 
chester, England. 

Hirst:  Political  Economy  of  War.  London,  1915.  "How  War 
Impoverishes." 

Novicow:  La  probleme  de  la  misere  et  les  phenomenes  economiques 
naturels.  Paris,  1908. 

Anitchkow:  War  and  Labor.    1900. 

Friedenswarte:  VII  (July,  1905),  pp.  130-136.    Germans  in  China, 

1000. 

Report  of  Massachusetts  Commission  on  the  Cost  of  Living. 

World's  Peace  Foundation.    1910. 
British  Parliamentary  Papers.    1913,  LXVI  [Cd.  6955].    Report  of 

Board  of  Trade  on  Cost  of  Living  of  Working  Classes. 
Walsh:  Moral  Damage  of  War.    1906.    References  at  the  end  of 

each  chapter. 
Andrew  and  Bushnell:  The  Queen's  Daughters  in  India.    3d  ed., 

1899.    Extract  printed  in  Jordan:  War  and  the  Breed.    1915. 

pp.  246-9. 

Levi :  War  and  its  Consequences.    1881. 
Chittenden:  War  or  Peace.    1911.    59-63. 
Jordan:  Imperial  Democracy.     1899.     "The  Captain  Sleeps." 
Weale:  Indiscreet  Letters  from  Peking.    1906. 
Bella,  Bella,  Horrida  Bella!     Westminster  Review,  157,  237-54, 
Dunant:  Un  souvenir  de  Solffrino.    2d  ed.  1862. 
Sakurai:  Human  Bullets.    1908. 
Dewey:  Financial  History  of  the  United  States.    1912. 


WAR  AND  BIOLOGY 

I.  The  principles  of  evolution. 

A .  Heredity  means  the  law  of  continuity  among  organisms, 

which  tend  to  reproduce  after  their  own  kind:  "like 
the  seed  is  the  harvest." 

B.  Variation:  organisms  though  tending  to  similarity  are 

never  quite  alike. 

C.  Law  of  natural  selection:  nature  selects  among  these 

variations  and  preserves  the  adaptable:  the  survival 
of  the  fittest.  This  phrase  means  those  most  fit  to 
meet  natural  conditions,  those  of  nature. 

D.  These  laws  apply  to  human  beings  as  to  lower  animals. 

II.  Artificial  or  unnatural  selection. 

A.  Any  process  by  which  the  normal  workings  of  nature 

are  altered  produces  artificial  selection,  and  an  al- 
tered product. 

1.  This  has  been  conspicuously  shown  by  the  experi- 

ments of  Luther  Burbank. 

2.  Eugenics  rests  on  the  principle  of  selection  for  pur- 

poses of  reproduction,  the  underlying  idea  being 
to  select  and  perpetuate  the  best,  and  thus  improv- 
ing the  race. 

B.  Reversed  selection:  when  this  process  of  artificial  selec- 

tion goes  to  the  point  of  selecting  the  fit  for  destruc- 
tion and  preserving  the  others  for  perpetuation  we 
have  reversed  selection:  the  survival  of  the  unfit. 

III.  War,  it  is  claimed,  causes  reversed  selection  in  physical 

qualities. 

A.  War  and  compulsory  service  select  physically  fit  men 

87 


88  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

for  armies  and  reject  the  physically  unfit  at  the  age 
of  greatest  reproductive  power. 

B.  These  are,  even  in  peace,  exposed  to  greater  danger  of 

diseases  —  especially  the  venereal. 

C.  In  war  the  men  in  armies  are  killed  or  rendered  unfit  by 

artificial  implements  which  make  no  distinction  as 
to  the  fitness  of  their  victims  and  they  suffer  heavier 
mortality  from  disease  than  those  who  stay  at 
home. 

i.  Artificial   causes:   Death  from  gunshot  and  other 
injuries  in  battle. 

a.  A  rough  estimate  (based  on  Bodart  and  Myrdacz, 

mentioned  in  the  references)  indicates  that  in 
wars  before  that  of  1914  losses  were  about  as 
follows: 

Average  number  of  men  killed  outright  in  land 
engagements  2.2%-  2.5%. 

Average  number  wounded,  8%  -  10%. 

(Ratio  of  killed  to  wounded,  i  :4.) 

Average  number  fatally  wounded,  10%. 

Average  number  of  whole  force  dying  from  wounds, 
about  i%.  (Attention  to  military  hygiene  has 
diminished  this  number  considerably.) 

b.  Indications  are  that  this  percentage  is  too  low  for 

the  present  war,  as  the  change  in  the  character 
of  fighting  changes  all  calculations. 

c.  The  loss  in  a  given  battle  is  different  from  the  loss 

during  the  whole  war. 

In  the  Russo-Japanese  War  (1905)  Japan's  losses 
from  action  in  battle  were  8.83%  of  the  whole 
army.  (Seaman,  104.) 

d.  Johnston  (Arms  and  the  Race,  26)  states  that  the 

less  destructive  the  weapons  used  in  war  the 
greater  the  loss  of  life;  and  that  the  deaths  from 


WAR  AND  BIOLOGY 


89 


artificial  causes  have  decreased  since  1850  from 
8%   to  |  of  i%. 

DEATHS  IN  THE  VICTORIOUS  ARMIES  IN  FOUR  RECENT  WARS. 


FRANCO-GERMAN 
WAB 


RUSSO-JAPANESE 
WAR 


Died  of  Wounds 


Died  of  Disease 


Note  the  diminishing  importance  of  illness  as  a  factor  in  the  death 
rate  of  the  armies.    The  present  war  should  show  a  further  ad- 
vance in  this  particular. 
(By  permission  of  The  Independent.     Printed  April,  19,  1915-) 

2.  Natural  causes:  disease.    Deaths  from  disease  depend 
on  sanitary  conditions. 

a.  In  the  Crimean  War  the  rate  was  as  high  as  16% 

in  the  armies  of  the  Allies;  four  men  died  of  sick- 
ness to  every  one  from  injury. 

b.  In  the  Franco-Prussian  War  deaths  in  the  German 

army  from  disease  (not  counting  wounds)  was 
1.8%  of  the  whole  force. 

c.  In  the  Russo-Japanese  War  the  loss  of  the  Jap- 

anese from  disease  was  2%  —  about  one-fourth 
the  loss  in  engagements.    (Seaman:  104.) 
D.  It  is  very  important  for  what  follows  to  note  that  the 
tendency  is  for  deaths  by  artificial  causes  to  increase 
and  deaths  by  natural  causes  to  decrease  as  sanita- 
tion and  military  hygiene  improve. 


90  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

E.  The  men  left  behind  become  the  fathers  of  the  next 

generation  and  perpetuate  their  own  inferior  quali- 
ties. 

F.  The  evil  effects  of  war  extend  to  the  civil  population, 

increasing  disease  and  the  death-rate.  (Dumas  — 
see  references.) 

IV.  It  is  also  claimed  by  some  that  war  institutes  a  reversed 

selection    and    a    deterioration    of    moral    qualities. 
(Jordan,  Seeck.) 

A.  The  courageous,  daring,  adventurous  and  those  ani- 

mated with  the  highest  love  of  the  cause  at  stake  are 
the  first  to  enlist:  cowards  and  those  with  lower 
ideals  remain  behind. 

B.  Those  who  join  the  army  die  in  greater  proportion  than 

those  who  remain  at  home,  because: 

1.  They  die  in  battle. 

2.  Their  very  qualities  of  courage  make  them  take  ex- 

ceptional risks. 

3.  They  are  more  likely  to  die  from  disease  than  those 

who  do  not  enlist.  This  is  true  even  in  times  of 
peace:  it  is  asserted  that  venereal  diseases  are  more 
prevalent  in  armies  than  in  the  civil  population. 

C.  The  stay-at-homes,   the  cowards,   the  deserters,   the 

inert,  the  ambitionless,  become  the  fathers  of  the 
next  generation. 

V.  These  contentions  are  by  no  means  generally  accepted. 
A.  Many  prominent  scientists  and  others  have  inclined  to 

accept  the  contentions:   Spencer,  Jordan,   Galton, 
Ammon,    Richet,    Schallmayer,    Kellogg,    Villerme, 
Novicow,  Legoyt,  La  Pouge,  Heckel,  Seeck. 
i.  Circumstances  tending  to  confirm  these  contentions. 

(Kellogg,  Bionomics  of  War,  pp.  46-49.) 
a.  There  seems  good  evidence  that  the  average  stature 
of  the  next  generation  of  French  people  was 


WAR  AND  BIOLOGY  91 

lowered  by  the  drain  of  the  Revolutionary  and 
Napoleonic  Wars  on  men  of  more  than  average 
stature.     (La  Population  Francaise,  1889-1892, 
III,  524-533.) 
b.  Infirmity  seems  to  have  been  greatly  increased  in 

the  new  generation  in  France. 
B.  Difficulties  and  objections. 

1.  The  physical  effects  of  war  on  the  race  must  be 

sharply  distinguished  from  the  moral  effects. 

2.  Certainly  men  have  never  been  selected  for  armies 

on  the  ground  of  their  moral  or  spiritual  quali- 
ties. 

3.  Granting  that  the  law  of  survival  holds  for  human 

beings  as  for  the  lower  animals,  it  does  not  at  all 
follow  that  war  has  reversed  selection. 
Until  modern  times  there  was  no  real  selection  for 
military  service  on  the  ground  of  physical  fitness; 
men  volunteered.  A  few  qualities  such  as  stature, 
age,  eyesight,  alone  were  taken  into  account,  and 
these  are  not  of  themselves  evidences  of  biological 
fitness.  Many  an  injured  soldier  returns  from  the 
war  still  biologically  fit. 

4.  Even  now  there  is  no  adequate  criterion  of  biological 

fitness. 

5.  Society  tends  to  root  out  the  unfit  at  home. 

a.  Cowards  and   deserters   cannot  be  a   dangerous 

factor  as  public  opinion  ostracises  them. 

b.  Women  prefer  soldiers  to  the  feeble  stay-at-homes 

and  this  counteracts  the  danger  of  perpetuation 
from  inferior  stock. 

6.  The  energy,  effort  and  confidence  engendered  by  war 

offset  its  injuries,  e.  g.,  Dutch  after  the  Spanish 
Wars. 

7.  As  a  nation,  under  pressure  for  men,  abandons  care- 


92  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

ful  selection  of  recruits,  the  danger  of  biological 
harm  lessens. 
VI.  The  danger  of  injury  to  the  race  is  increasing  with: 

A.  The  adoption  of  compulsory  service  instead  of  volun- 

teering. 

B.  More  scientific  and  rigid  examinations  of  recruits,  and 

rejection  of  the  unfit. 

C.  Increase  of  deaths  in  war  by  artificial  selection  as  ma- 

chinery improves,  as  compared  with  deaths  from 
disease  as  medical  science  and  sanitation  improve. 

REFERENCES 

Kellogg:    Eugenics    and    Militarism.      Atlantic    Monthly,    1912, 

pp.  99-108. 
Kellogg:  Bionomics  of  War.     Social  Hygiene,  December,   1914, 

pp.  44-52. 

Jordan:  War  and  the  Breed.    Boston,  1915. 
Jordan:  The  Blood  of  the  Nation.    1910. 
Jordan:  The  Human  Harvest.    1906. 
Jordan:  War  and  Manhood.    1910. 

Jordan,  David  Starr  and  Jordan,  Harvey  Ernest:  War's  After- 
math.   1914. 

Mitchell,  P.  Chalmers:  Evolution  and  the  War.    1915. 
Novicow:  War  and  its  Alleged  Benefits.    1911. 
Novicow:  Critique  du  darwinisme  sociale.    1907. 
Nasmyth,  George  W. :  Social  Progress  and  the  Darwinian  Theory. 

1916. 
Schallmayer:  Vererbung  und  Auslese  im  Lebenslauf  der  Volker. 

1903,  PP-  249-266. 
Schallmayer:  Der  Krieg  als  Ziichter. 
Ammon:  Die  natiirliche  Auslese  beim  Menschen.    1893. 
Ammon:  Die  Gesellschaftsordnung  lind  ihre  natiirliche  Grund- 

lagen.    1895. 
Goldscheid:  Hoherentwicklung  und  Menschenokonomie.    Leipzig, 

1912. 


WAR  AND  BIOLOGY  93 

Goldscheid:  Friedensbewegung  und  Menschenokonomie.    Berlin, 

1912. 
Popper-Lynkeus,  Josef:  Das  Individuum  und  die  Bewertung  der 

menschlichen  Existenzen.    Dresden,  1910. 
Lapouge:  Les  selections  sociales.    1896. 

Miiller:  Ein  Ziichtigungsversuch  an  Mais.    Kosmos,  1886,  II,  p.  22. 
Dumas:  Mortality  of  Civil  Population  in  Time  of  War.    Peace 

Movement,  March  30,  1912. 
Richet:  Le  passe  de  la  guerre  et  1'avenir  de  la  paix.    1907, 

pp.  75-90. 

Wolf:  System  der  Sozialpolitik.    1892.    I,  218. 
Pearson:  National  Life  from  the  Standpoint  of  Science.     1901. 
Seeck:  Geschichte  des  Untergangs  der  antiken  Welt.    1897-1911. 
La    Population    Francaise.    1899-1902.    II,    pp.    139-140;   III, 

pp.  524,  533.    Index  "Guerres"  and  "Tailles." 
Gal  ton:  Natural  Inheritance.    1889. 

Association  Medicale  Internationale  centre  la  guerre:  Actes,  1910. 
Bagehot,  W.:  Physics  and  Politics;  or  thoughts  on  the  application 

of  the  principles  of  "natural  selection"  and  "inheritance"  to 

political  society.    1873. 
Cannon,  Walter  B.:  Bodily  Changes  in  Pain,  Hunger,  Fear  and 

Rage.   London,  1915. 
Muller-Lyer,  D.  F.:  Der  Sinn  des  Lebens.    1910. 

STATISTICS  ON  Loss  OF  LIFE  IN  WAR 

Bodart:  Militar-historisches  Kriegs-Lexikon,  1618-1906.     1908. 
Myrdacz:  Handbuch  fur  k.  und  k.    Militarartzte,   1898-1905. 

Vol.  II. 
Levasseur:  Statistique  des  batailles  et  des  pertes  caus6es  par  la 

guerre  depuis  trois  siecles.    Journal  de  la  Soctit6  de  Statistique 

de  Paris,  1909,  224-236. 
Longmore:  Gunshot  Injuries.    1895. 
Seaman:  Real  Triumph  of  Japan.    1906. 
Phisterer:  Statistical  Record  of  the  Armies  of  the  United  States 

(Scribner's).    1883. 

Heitman:  Historical  Register.    1903.    II,  281-297. 
Journal  de  la  Societe  de  Statistique  de  Paris,  1909,  142;  417-427. 


94  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

Bloch:  Der  Krieg.    1899.    IV,  35-64;  V,  349-603- 

Bloch:  Future  of  War.    1902.    147-159. 

Crile,  George  W. :  A  Mechanistic  View  of  War  and  Peace.    (The 

Macmillan  Company.)    1915. 
Harbottle:  Dictionary  of  Battles.    1004. 
Mulhall:  Statistics.    1003,  586,  818. 

Army  and  Navy  Gazette,  October  28,  1911.    "Losses  in  War." 
Massachusetts  Commission  on  the  Cost  of  Living:  The  Waste  of 

Militarism.    World  Peace  Foundation,  1910. 
Great  Britain,   Parliamentary  Papers,    1007   (25),  XLIX,    729. 

Killed  and  Wounded  in  the  English  Wars,  1898-1903. 

STATISTICS  OF  BIRTHS,  MARRIAGES  AND  DEATHS,  AS  RELATED  TO 

WAR 

Statistisches  Jahrbuch  d.  deutschen  Reiches.  1911,  p.  22.  1850- 
1909. 

Rauchberg:  Die  Bevolkerung  Oesterreichs.  1895,  p.  27.  Statis- 
tics for  1822-1800. 

La  Population  Francaise.  1899-1902.  II,  p.  12,  Births,  1801- 
1888;  p.  58,  Deaths,  1801-1888;  p.  76,  Marriages,  1801-1888. 

Schnapper-Arndt:  Sozialstatistik.  1908.  Table,  p.  242.  Showing 
influence  of  military  service  on  marriage  rate. 


XI 

WAR    AND    THE    STATE:     POLITICAL    ASPECTS    OF    WAR    AND 
MILITARISM 

I.  War  always  tends  to  produce  centralization  of  power  and 
a  corresponding  reduction  of  personal  liberty  and  hence 
is  undemocratic  in  its  influence. 

A.  This  condition  is  inherent  in  the  military  conception. 

1.  Obedience  in  armies  and  navies  must  be  absolute. 
Secretary  Daniels  has  been  greatly  blamed  for  his 

efforts  to  "democratize"  the  navy  on  the  ground 
that  he  will  merely  demoralize  it;  as  Pelletan  is 
said  to  have  done  in  the  French  navy  a  few  years 
ago.  (N.  Y.  Sun,  Feb.  14,  1915;  Army  and  Navy 
Journal,  Jan.  16,  1915,  p.  616,  et  passim;  and  many 
others.) 

2.  It  is  apparent  in  the  bullying  and  abusive  tone  which 

militarists  and  military  journals  so  frequently  adopt 
when  it  comes  to  difference  of  opinion:  they  would 
suppress,  if  need  be  violently  crush,  the  contrary- 
minded  instead  of  mending  the  weaknesses  of  their 
own  positions.  It  is  the  theory  of  force. 

B.  A  military  class  is  an  inevitable  concomitant  of  an 

army  and  navy. 

i.  Men  who  enter  the  military  profession  have  just  as 
much  of  an  instinct  and  as  much  of  a  right  as  others 
to  struggle  for  their  own  advancement  and  the 
welfare  of  wife  and  children.  They  naturally  seek 
to  enlarge  their  profession  and  its  opportunities 
in  every  possible  way;  that  is,  they  seek  to  enlarge 
their  class  and  its  position  in  the  community. 
95 


96  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

2.  The  military  class  is  largely  drawn  from  the  "upper 

classes"  and  its  sympathies  and  affiliations  are 
with  the  aristocrats  rather  than  the  people.  How 
closely  the  officers  of  the  British  army  were  iden- 
tified with  the  Tories  appeared  when  the  Ulster 
Question  came  to  a  crisis,  and  officers  resigned 
rather  than  obey  the  government. 

3.  A  large  military  class,  animated  by  the  undemocratic 

spirit  noted  above,  becomes  a  menace  to  the  civil 
population  (e.  g.,  the  Zabern  incident),  to  the 
democratic  institutions  of  the  state  and  to  the 
peace  of  the  world. 

Armies  have  quite  as  often  been  the  agents  of  tyrants 
as  the  protectors  of  freedom. 

C.  The  military  class,  believing  in  force  as  a  means  of 

settling  questions,  naturally  is  impatient  at  delay  or 
pacific  settlement. 

It  is  military  men  and  nations  that  have  opposed  arbi- 
tration. 

The  militarists  have  shown  the  greatest  impatience  at 
Wilson's  Mexican  policy  of  "watchful  waiting." 

D.  The  military  class  naturally  wants  to  resort  to  arms 

for  other  than  the  above  reasons. 

1.  It  is  human  nature  to  want  to  see  how  well  one  can 

do  what  he  is  training  to  do;  and  how  well  guns 
and  other  equipment  work. 

2.  War  is  relief  from  the  ennui  of  ever  waiting  to  act; 

which  is  all  the  more  welcome  because  those  in 
the  service  usually  are  considered  "men  of  ac- 
tion." 

3.  War  furnishes  the  chance  for  distinction  and  advance- 

ment. 

n.  Democracy  versus  National  Efficiency. 
A.  Democracy  means  liberty  of  thought  and  of  person: 


WAR  AND  THE  STATE 


97 


this  means  diversity  in  society,  disagreement,  lack  of 
unity,  etc. 

B.  National   efficiency   means   common  purpose,   which 

means  unity,  therefore  restriction  of  personal  liberty, 
and  thus  a  strong  central  government. 

C.  The  question  is  whether  a  people  can  set  up  a  strong 

central  government  under  its  own  control,  or  whether 
it  must  abandon   democracy   to   secure  efficiency. 
Competitive  nationalism  favors  absolutism. 
III.  The  centralizing  action  of  war  on  a  free  state  appears  in 
many  ways. 

A.  Martial  law  is  proclaimed  and  constitutional  guarantees 

of  personal  liberties  are  thereby  suspended. 

B.  The  press  and  public  speech  are  put  under  censorship. 

This  is  an  anomaly  in  a  popular  government,  for  how 
can  people  vote  intelligently  unless  they  know  what  is 
transpiring? 

C.  Thus  elections  become  useless  and  are  abandoned. 

The  British  General  Elections,  which  should  have 
come  in  January,  1916,  were  omitted  and  Parliament 
prolonged  its  own  life. 

D.  This  coalition  government  acquires  autocratic  powers, 

and  the  legislative  body,  though  it  has  the  power,  is 
not  likely  to  exercise  restraint  inasmuch  as  the  cab- 
inet consists  of  the  leaders  of  all  parties. 

E.  The  centralized  government: 

1.  Conducts  the  military  operations  without  consulting 

the  people;  it  could  not  if  it  would. 

2.  Lays  down  minute  restrictions  for  individuals. 

3.  Conceals  news  or  issues  false  reports  to  keep  the  sym- 

pathy of  the  people. 

F.  Conscription,  mobilization  of  labor  and  resources  make 

individuals,  like  materials,  handled  by  the  govern- 
ment. Men  are  forced  to  fight  no  matter  whether 


98  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

they  believe  the  cause  to  be  just  or  not;  their  liberty 
of  conscience  is  denied.  A  few  exceptions. 

IV.  Compulsory  or  Universal  Service. 

A .  This  is  the  rule  hi  most  European  countries  and  Japan, 

and  also  in  Australia  and  New  Zealand.  In  the  latter 
it  was  adopted  hi  1909  largely  as  a  result  of  the 
agitation  of  the  National  Defense  League.  It  was 
opposed  by  the  New  Zealand  Freedom  League;  hi 
Australia  by  the  Australian  Freedom  League. 

B.  The  volunteer  system  was,  until  the  Great  War,  adhered 

to  hi  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States. 
In  Great  Britain,  the  National  Service  League  has 

advocated  compulsory  service.     Lord  Roberts  and 

others  approved  it. 
In  the  United  States,  a  demand  for  compulsory  service 

is  appearing. 

C.  Compulsory  service  has  political  dangers. 

1.  It  means  that  all  persons  within  the  age  of  compulsory 

service  are  subject  to  martial  instead  of  civil  law. 
Thus  the  government  may  use  martial  law  to 
achieve  things  it  could  not  do  under  civil  law. 

a.  Briand  hi  France  suppressed  a  strike  of  railway  em- 

ployees for  better  conditions,  by  calling  them  to 
the  colors,  that  is,  invoking  military  law. 

b.  The  British  laboring  men  oppose  conscription  be- 

cause they  fear  that  military  law,  once  they  are 
subject  to  it,  will  be  used  by  the  upper  classes, 
who  dominate  the  army  and  often  the  govern- 
ment, to  defeat  popular  demands  for  reforms. 

2.  The  essential  point,  as  far  as  democracy  is  concerned, 

is  whether  those  in  authority  favor  the  people. 

V.  The  political  dangers  from  centralization  through  war. 

A .  Formerly  it  was  to  be  feared  that  some  army  idol  would 
use  his  influence  to  become  ruler,  as  did  the  French 


WAR  AND  THE  STATE  99 

Terrorists  and  Napoleon.  There  are  abundant  in- 
stances of  this  in  the  past.  It  is  no  longer  a  real 
danger  in  well-established  republics.  The  attempt  of 
Boulanger  to  use  his  military  prestige  for  anti- 
government  purposes,  is  the  last  conspicuous  in- 
stance of  the  kind. 

B.  It  is  to  be  feared  that  any  war  will  increase  militarism  in 

a  country.  The  disbanding  of  the  United  States  army 
in  1865  was  regarded  with  concern  and  its  success  was 
considered  a  real  achievement.  Despite  the  violent 
criticism  of  Prussian  militarism  there  is  a  wide-spread 
disposition  to  imitate  the  Prussian  military  system, 
the  proposal  being  to  have  the  latter  without  the 
former.  Some  question  whether  this  is  possible. 

C.  War  stops  reforms  which  are  working  through  normal 

political  channels.  Some  hold  that  governments 
hard  pressed  by  movements,  such  as  Socialism, 
syndicalism,  labor  legislation,  welcome  war  as  a  means 
of  escape. 

REFERENCES 

Kingsley,  Darwin  P. :  Democracy  versus  Sovereignty.  New  York, 
1915.  (Privately  Printed.)  Also  New  York  Times,  Novem- 
ber 21, 1915. 

Sembat,  Marcel:  Faites  la  paix  ou  faites  un  roi. 

Jordan:  Imperial  Democracy.    1899. 

Seillieres,  Ernest:  L'Imperialisme  Democratique.     Paris,   1907. 

Burgess,  John  W.:  The  Reconciliation  of  Government  with  Lib- 
erty. New  York,  1915. 

Ferguson,  Charles:  The  Great  News  (Kennerly).    1915. 

COMPULSORY  SERVICE 

Oliver,  F.  S.:  Ordeal  by  Battle.    1915. 
Hamilton,  Sir  Ian:  Compulsory  Service.    1910. 
Roberts,  Lord:  Fallacies  and  Facts.    1911. 


ioo  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

Beresford,  Lord  Charles:  The  Betrayal.  Record  of  Facts  Concern- 
ing Naval  Policy  and  Administration  from  1902.  London,  1912. 

Shee,  George  R.  F.:  The  Briton's  First  Duty.  National  Service 
League,  London,  1907. 

von  der  Goltz:  The  Nation  in  Arms.    1906. 

Ford,  Reginald:  Warning  to  Emigrants  to  New  Zealand.  [Opposed 
to  Conscription.] 

L'Regon,  P.  J. :  The  New  Zealand  Defense  Act  and  What  it  Means. 
[Opposed  to  Conscription.] 

Additional  references  on  conscription.  Peace  Year  Book,  1911. 
pp.  183-4. 


XII 

NATIONALISM  AND  MORALS 

I.  National  righteousness.  A  common  charge  against  paci- 
fism is  that  it  favors  unrighteousness  by  failing  to 
resist  it.  This  is  called  the  "peace  of  unrighteous- 
ness." The  counterpart  is  that  a  war  is  justified  when 
it  is  for  righteousness.  This  is  true.  But  what  is 
righteousness,  and  who  determines  it? 

A.  Each  nation  always  considers  its  cause  absolutely  just, 

and  never  concedes  that  it  can  err.  Hence  it  approves 
in  its  own  case  precisely  what  it  condemns  in  other 
nations:  e.  g.,  the  United  States  went  to  war  with 
Spain  to  suppress  atrocities  in  Cuba,  yet  within  two 
years  it  was  justifying  American  atrocities  in  the 
Philippines  upon  the  people  just  "rescued"  from 
Spain  (Angell:  America  and  the  New  World-State, 
pp.  148-185).  The  views  of  the  Allies  and  of  the 
Central  powers  on  the  violation  of  Belgian,  Chinese 
and  Greek  neutrality  by  their  respective  opponents 
illustrates  the  point.  Americans  condemn  the  viola- 
tion of  Belgian  neutrality  and  approve  the  seizure  of 
Panama  on  the  basis  of  what  seems  righteous  to  them 
in  each  case. 

B.  What  is  to  be  regarded  as  righteousness  and  a  worthy 

national  cause  is  too  often  decided  by  rulers,  whether 
monarchial  or  elective,  and  not  by  the  people.  The 
people,  and  even  their  representatives,  have  little 
chance  to  know  of  the  preliminaries  leading  to  a  war. 
This  is  regarded  as  a  private  affair  of  a  government 


I 


102    .-'.     'N;vnONAtJSM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

and  even  in  England  a  common  reply  to  questions  in 
Parliament  is  "it  would  not  be  to  the  public  interest 
to  give  the  information. ' '  The  alleged  popular  clamor 
for  war  cannot  be  more  than  an  unreasoning  reaction 
(the  result  of  education)  to  such  information  as  au- 
thorities, who  are  concerned  about  justifying  their 
own  course,  give  out.  It  is  notorious  that  diplomatic 
documents  are  not  open  to  the  public  or  to  students 
for  a  half  century  or  so  after  an  event.  Wars  hi 
their  inception  are  virtually  the  private  business 
of  diplomats  and  are  eventually  approved  by  the 
emotionalism  of  an  uninformed  populace;  and  the 
official  censorship  sees  to  it  that  independent  thinkers 
f.  and  sentiment  for  ending  the  war  secure  no  hearing. 
(Nationalism  has  become  a  power,  like  the  religions 
of  old,  through  which  the  authorities  may  exploit  the 
i  people.  Emancipation  from  this  modern  tyranny  is 
»  needed  —  Democracy  should  begin  at  home. 

II.  Wealth  and  influence  have  the  ear  of  ministries  and  the 

latter  are  in  effect  executive  committees  of  the  former. 
Thus  the  alleged  righteousness  of  a  nation  in  any  given 
case  is  probably  the  interest  of  the  dominant  group 
behind  the  government  presented  for  popular  consump- 
tion in  the  usual  pious  phrases  about  national  honor  or 
destiny,  the  cause  of  civilization  and  humanity,  etc., 
etc. 

III.  The  mischievous  self-made  standard  of  righteousness 

ignores  the  existence  of  other  nations.  The  result  is 
international  anarchy.  Both  nations  cannot  always 
be  right.  Why  should  we  assume  that  any  one  nation 
is  always  right  when  in  civil  society  we  insist  that  the 
individual's  conception  of  right  must  yield  before  the 
general  conception?  Is  not  the  national  conception 
of  righteousness  just  as  arbitrary,  and  hence  im- 


NATIONALISM  AND  MORALS  103 

practicable,  as  the  discarded  individual  righteousness 
was  found  to  be?  Why  should  a  group  of  individuals 
be  justified  in  doing  what  it  punishes  one  of  its  number 
for  doing? 

IV.  The  conception  of  national  righteousness  subjects  re- 

ligion and  personal  conscience  to  enterprises  which,  as 
just  noted,  may  have  a  sordid  basis.  Declaring  God  to 
be  on  the  side  of  the  nation  puts  an  end  to  religion 
as  a  guiding  influence  and  reduces  it  to  a  sham  used 
for  self-justification.  That  such  a  procedure  pro- 
duces tares  is  no  wonder. 

A.  Espionage,  bribery,  trickery,  diplomacy  are  justified 

in  the  national  cause. 

B.  Untruthfulness  about  foreign  peoples  as  well  as  one's 

own  is  approved.  National  characteristics  are  ex- 
aggerated, foreign  qualities  are  minimized;  this, 
though  lying  in  the  name  of  patriotism,  is  still  lying. 
Patriotism  of  this  kind  is  sometimes  subsidized  by 
interests.  Newspapers  frequently  grossly  misrep- 
resent foreign  nations.  Text-books  are  given  to 
lauding  national  virtues,  would  probably  not  sell  if 
they  did  otherwise;  the  truth  does  not  pay  as  well  as 
misrepresentation. 

C.  In  international  affairs  morals  are  geographical,  that  is, 

they  depend  on  what  chance  to  be  national  bounda- 
ries. Thus  "planetary  morality"  which  is  the  ex- 
pression of  the  common  morality  in  humanity  is 
defeated. 

V.  Nationalism  hinders  reflection  and  calm  judgment  about 

foreign  questions.  Sentiment  and  passion  usually  re- 
place intellect.  Slogans  and  catch-words  are  very  use- 
ful in  bringing  this  about.  "Man  lives  not  by  bread 
-  alone,  but  chiefly  by  catchwords"  —  Robert  Louis 
Stevenson.  "  Remember  the  Maine,"  "  Fifty-four  forty 


104  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

or  fight,"  "Manifest  destiny,"  "God  wills  it,"  "Re- 
venge for  Sadowa,"  "Deutschland  iiber  alles,"  "Brit- 
annia rules  the  waves,"  "For  King  and  country," 
"Fur  Kaiser  und  Reich,"  "Dieu  et  mon  droit,"  "My 
country,  right  or  wrong,"  "Gott  mit  uns,"  "Gott 
strafe  England." 

VI.  Nationalism  breeds  national  vanity,  which,  being  un- 

reasoning, hinders  nations  from  dealing  with  each  other 
as  equals.  In  any  case  vanity  is  a  vice  and  not  a  virtue. 

VII.  What  is  right  in  a  difference  between  nations  should  not 

be  decided  by  the  nations  themselves  or  by  the  force 
they  possess,  but  by  an  international  court,  backed  by 
force,  as  is  the  case  when  differences  arise  between 
individuals  or  groups  within  a  state. 


XIII 

THE  ROLE  OF  FORCE 
FROM  FORCE  THROUGH  LAW  TO  JUSTICE  AND  PEACE 

I.  In  primitive   society,   according   to   theorists,    each  in- 

dividual, or  at  least  each  individual  family,  was  at 
war  with  every  other.  "  The  state  of  nature  is  a  state 
of  war."  —  Hobbes. 

A.  There  was  no  law  governing  their  relations. 

B.  Force  determined  what  was  right  in  any  difference. 

Thus  Faustrecht,  the  law  of  might,  was  accepted.  An 
individual  had  no  fundamental  rights;  all  he  had  was 
what  he  could  command  by  his  strength.  Therefore 
there  was  no  stability  or  security. 

C.  This  conception  of  primitive  society  is  now  disputed 

and  it  is  asserted  that  man  was  from  the  beginning  a 
social  animal  living  in  groups.  These  groups  have 
enlarged  throughout  history. 

II.  The  family,  clan  and  tribe  represented  a  union  of  in- 

dividuals or  individual  families;  a  social  group. 
A.  Internal  law  and  force. 

i.  Within  each  group  there  was  a  law  governing  the 

individuals. 

a.  It  was  supposed  to  have  a  supernatural  or  divine 
origin,  and  was  discovered  and  interpreted  in 
its  several  stages  by  the  patriarch,  by  prophets 
or  priests,  and  finally  by  chieftains  of  tribes  or 
tribal  kings  (the  primitive  Teutons  had  posi- 
tive law.  See  below).  Each  group  had  its  own 
God. 

105 


io6  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

6.  Great  reliance  was  placed  on  direct  expression  of 
divine  will  through  ordeals,  portents,  and  the 
like. 

2.  Force  was  restricted  within  each  group  by  the  legal 

machinery. 

3.  This  law  and  force  provided  a  means  of  securing 

justice  and  hence  favored  peace  and  order. 
B.  External  relations. 

1.  There  was  no  law  governing  the  relation  of  the  re- 

spective groups. 

2.  As  each  tribe  had  its  own  God,  whom  it  must  of  course 

obey  and  who  was  a  rival  of  every  other  tribal  god, 

war  between  tribes  became  a  religious  duty,  each 

believing  that  it  was  advancing  the  cause  of  its 

deity  by  extirpating  unbelievers.    This  is  illustrated 

by  the  instructions  of  Samuel  to  Saul  (i  Samuel,  15). 

Thus  the  use  of  force  between  tribes  was  considered 

a  part  of  religion  and  therefore  wars  were  common. 

III.  The  ancient  monarchies  and  empires  were  products  of 

the  tribal  system.    A  given  tribe  under  a  competent 

leader  extended  its  dominion  over  neighboring  tribes, 

which  became  subject  peoples. 

A.  Internal  law  and  force. 

1.  Within  such  a  monarchy  there  was  a  law  for  all, 

enunciated  by  the  ruler;  and,  as  he  was  regarded  as 
God's  anointed,  frequently  even  considered  a 
God  and  worshipped  as  such,  this  law  was  held  to 
be  of  a  supernatural  origin. 

2.  This  ruler  controlled  the  force  of  the  state  with  which 

he  secured  obedience  to  his  decrees.  Within  his 
realm  there  prevailed  peace  though,  in  this  case, 
often  an  imposed  peace.  The  Roman  Empire  in 
this  way  imposed  peace  on  all  subject  states,  the 
pax  Romana.  The  modern  pax  Britannica  also 


THE  ROLE  OF  FORCE  107 

represents  a  peace  produced  by  force  though  in 
time  it  comes  to  be  maintained  by  a  unity  of  in- 
terests. 

3.  Law  and  force  operate  to  secure  justice  and  peace. 
B.  External  relations.  Co-existence  of  states  was  incon- 
sistent with  the  views  of  the  times;  hence  a  powerful 
monarchy  sought  to  conquer  all  contiguous  peoples 
and  make  them  subject  to  its  internal  laws.  War 
was  accordingly  the  normal  relation  between  rival 
peoples. 

IV.  Feudalism  was  another  development  from  the  tribal 
stage.  The  tribal  heads  were  displaced  by  a  mili- 
tary aristocracy  which  enjoyed  absolute  power  over 
the  common  man,  but  in  turn  was  in  a  vague  way 
subject  to  the  king  of  a  given  country. 

A.  Internal  conditions. 

1.  Within  a  feudal  entity  the  local  baron  was  the  law- 

giver and  executor.  Hence  there  was  a  means  of 
securing  what  was  called  justice  and  this  favored 
peace.  As  these  rulers  were  supposed  to  be  God's 
agents,  their  decrees  were  accepted  as  God's 
will.  Ordeal  and  trial  by  battle  were  freely 
used. 

2.  Within  the  king's  jurisdiction,  that  is  between  the 

several  feudal  entities,  there  was  no  law  backed  by 
adequate  force.  The  king  was  nominally  and  le- 
gally superior  to  his  vassals,  but  the  latter  had  force 
and  used  it  against  each  other  and  sometimes 
even  against  the  king.  War  was  chronic.  The 
"imperial  peace,"  the  peace  of  God,  and  the  truce 
of  God  were  attempts  to  remedy  this  situation. 

B.  External  relations. 

i.  There  was  no  law  or  custom  governing  the  relations 
of  the  several  feudal  kingdoms. 


io8  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

2.  Hence  force  was  the  solvent  of  their  differences. 
The  substitution  of  monotheism  for  tribal  gods  made 
religion  less  of  a  driving  force  for  war,  as  all  kings 
were  supposed  to  be  riding  as  the  agents  of  one  and 
the  same  God. 

V.  Nations  succeeded  feudal  society,  because  kings  of  groups 
with  elements  of  cohesion  broke  down  the  power  of 
the  barons  and  centralized  government  in  their  own 
hands. 
A.  Internal  conditions. 

1.  These  monarchs  still  claimed  to  rule  by  divine  right 

and  this  claim  was  for  some  time  accepted.  Law 
was  considered  of  supernatural  origin. 

a.  The  Reformation  contributed  to  this  result.     In 

their  devotion  to  their  espoused  creed,  different 
peoples  rallied  about  their  sovereign  as  the 
champion  of  their  faith:  in  England  and  Spain 
this  circumstance  produced  a  recrudescence  of 
religious  differences  as  a  cause  of  war. 

b.  The  monarch  possessed  the  force  to  execute  the 

law  and  within  his  dominion  there  was  a  means 
of  securing  justice,  and  hence  there  was  order. 
Loyalty  was  expected  of  subjects;  it  represented  a 
personal  obligation  to  the  sovereign,  who  per- 
sonified the  state. 

2.  Natural  law.     The  religious  wars  of  the  sixteenth 

century  discredited  the  theory  of  divine  rights, 
that  kings  were  the  agents  of  God.  Hence  theorists 
sought  a  different  source  of  law,  one  which  was 
more  inclusive,  and  professed  to  find  it  in  nature, 
by  means  of  human  reason.  They  maintained  that 
this  law  was  universal,  hence  superior  to  local 
rulers,  and  contrary  to  their  dynastic  ambitions. 
Theu:  contentions,  which  were  widely  accepted 


THE  ROLE  OF  FORCE  109 

by  the  lettered  though  never  by  the  masses,  were 
instrumental  in  breaking  down  absolute  monarchy 
and  preparing  the  way  for  positive  law. 
3.  Positive  law.  (Voluntary,  customary,  man-made 
law.)  Reliance  upon  human  reason  to  discover 
law  worked  into  individual  responsibility  in  mak- 
ing law,  that  is,  into  democracy  or  self-government. 
Instead  of  accepting,  as  divine,  the  decrees  govern- 
ing human  relations  pronounced  by  prophets, 
priests  or  monarchs,  men  resolved  to  decide  these 
things  for  themselves  and  provided  machinery  for 
the  purpose. 

a.  Through   the   ballot   they   register   their   wishes: 

make  law. 

b.  By  elected  agents  they  seek  to  have  their  will 

executed:  they  jointly  control  the  force  which 
makes  the  law  respected. 

c.  Defects  in  the  machinery  (which  are  abundant), 

they  strive  to  correct  as  they  acquire  experience 
and  wisdom. 

Patriotism  succeeded  loyalty.  Patriotism  means 
an  obligation  to  the  particular  group  to  which 
one  chances  to  belong,  and  to  its  ideals.  The 
state,  in  fact,  became  impersonal,  but  it  con- 
tinued to  be  conceived  as  a  personality. 

Ultimately  this  system  rests  on  public  opinion: 
law  must  be  backed  by  force;  but  force  cannot 
be  effective  in  a  democracy  unless  public  opinion 
is  behind  it. 
B.  External  relations. 

i.  There  was  no  law  governing  the  relation  of  nations 

as  long  as  kings  by  divine  right  were  in  power. 

Hence  force  was  unrestrained. 
a.  With  the  conception  of  natural  law,  came  a  dimi- 


no  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

nution  of  royal  prerogative  and  a  conviction 
that  there  ought  to  be  a  law  of  nations.  (Gro- 
tius,  see  Chapter  XX.) 

b.  International  law  has  developed  since  that  time  to 

cover  a  great  many  relations,  with  the  object  of 
securing  justice  by  peaceful  means. 

c.  Its  development  was  stimulated  by  democracy,  for 

this  rests  largely  on  the  conception  of  the  fra- 
ternity and  equality  of  all  men,  and  therefore 
tends  to  break  down  the  historic  and  juridical 
differences  between  the  several  nations,  and  to 
substitute  an  international  relationship  based 
on  principles  of  humanity. 

d.  At  present,  as  under  feudalism,  the  law  between 

states  is  weak  (physically,  not  morally),  because 
force,  instead  of  being  behind  it,  is  in  the  control 
of  the  individual  states,  that  is,  law  and  force 
are  not  unified;  international  law  lacks  adequate 
sanction.  (See  Chapter  XX.) 

e.  It  should  be  noted  that  international  law  has  con- 

siderable moral  strength,  as  is  shown  by  the 
appeals  of  belligerents  against  those  who  violate 
it,  or  by  the  effects  upon  Germany  of  her  viola- 
tion of  Belgian  neutrality. 

/.  It  should  also  be  observed  that  international  law 
must,  like  law  within  a  nation,  ultimately  rest  on 
public  opinion  for  its  effectiveness. 
VI.  Summary. 

A.  Human  beings  have  historically  organized  into  ever 

enlarging  groups,  families,  clans,  tribes,  and  nations. 

B.  Within  these  groups,  no  matter  of  what  stage  or  size, 

there  has  always  been  a  law  common,  broadly  speak- 
ing, to  all  individuals  in  the  land.  Its  object  was  to 
provide  a  means  of  securing  justice  and  individual 


THE  ROLE  OF  FORCE  in 

rights,  for  true  law  is  an  expression  of  true  human 
interests. 

1.  The  origin  of  this  law  was  once  considered  to  be  super- 

natural.   Law  is  now  considered  man-made. 

2.  Law  was  formerly  not  applied  with  impartiality,  but 

there  were  privileged  classes.  The  tendency  of 
history  is  to  do  away  with  privilege  and  make  all 
equal  before  the  law. 

Its  highest  development  so  far  is  in  the  form  of  uni- 
versal suffrage.  A  free  election  provides  a  means  of 
ascertaining  the  popular  will,  provides  a  substitute 
other  than  forceful  revolution  through  which  to 
procure  progress  and  change,  and  is  the  greatest 
known  institution  making  for  justice  by  peaceful 
means  instead  of  by  selfish  violence.  It  is  the  great 
hope  of  the  future.  Political  machinery  produces 
law,  law  is  the  best  known  means  of  securing 
justice,  justice  means  peace.  War  is  inevitable 
only  when  the  machinery  of  popular  government 
fails  to  function. 
C.  Force  has  always  been  a  factor  in  human  affairs. 

1.  Under  primitive  conditions  force  was  the  sole  reli- 

ance and  each  undertook  to  secure  what  seemed 
just  to  him  by  means  of  force;  each  was  a  law  unto 
himself;  force  was  competitive. 

2.  With  the  erection  of  groups  of  men,  force  became  of 

two  kinds: 

a.  Internal  force,  that  within  a  given  group.  Each 
such  group  is  a  peace  society.  Force  was  taken 
from  the  individual  and  placed  under  the  control 
of  an  authority,  —  patriarch,  prophet,  chieftain, 
monarch,  or  elected  agent,  —  whose  function 
it  became  to  use  this  force  to  back  law  and 
justice. 


112  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

As  long  as  this  central  authority  was  himself 
sovereign  and  therefore  above  the  law,  justice 
was  not  assured.  But  when  the  people  became 
sovereign,  force  in  the  hands  of  their  elected 
executive  became  truly  cooperative.  It  became 
police  force.  Martial  force  is  in  fact  incom- 
patible with  democracy,  for  the  instant  one 
repudiates  the  decisions  of  democratic  govern- 
ment he  places  himself  above  the  whole  of  his 
society,  a  process  which,  if  permitted  and  copied, 
means  a  return  to  lawlessness  and  violence. 
Cooperative  force  in  connection  with  positive 
law-making,  provides  the  nearest  approach 
to  justice  that  is  so  far  known;  it  is  infinitely 
superior  to  savage  force.  Justice  means  peace, 
b.  External  force,  that  displayed  when  states  clash. 
Martial  force.  This  has  remained  competitive; 
as  with  the  primitive  individual,  each  state  is  a 
law  unto  itself.  Justice  between  nations  is  still 
sought  by  means  of  violence,  and  the  strongest 
is  held  to  be  right. 

VII.  Question:  If  enlarging  governmental  groups  and  im- 
proving democracy  within  those  groups  have  pro- 
moted justice  and  peace,  can  and  should  world  de- 
mocracy be  sought;  and  how  would  it  affect  justice 
and  peace? 

The  possibility  of  a  broader  democracy  and  a  closer 
union  of  states  depends  on  what  elements  of  such 
union  exist.  These  are  discussed  in  Chapter  XV. 

REFERENCES 

Sumner:  War.     Yale  Review,  October,   1911.     War  and  Other 

Essays,  1911. 
Sumner:  Folkways.    1907. 


THE  ROLE  OF  FORCE  113 

Spencer:  Descriptive  Sociology.    1873-81,  passim. 
Kellogg,  Vernon  Lyman:  Beyond  War.    New  York,  1912. 
Ferris,  Harry  S.:  Pax  Britannica.    1913. 
Woods,  Frederick  A.:  Is  War  Diminishing?  Boston,  1915. 


XIV 

THE  CHANGE  IN  THE  INSTITUTION  OF  WARFARE 

I.  War  is  an  institution  which,  like  other  institutions,  such 

as  church,  state,  taxation,  business,  education,  has  its 
history.    It  has  developed  and  undergone  changes. 

II.  The  change  hi  the  implements  of  war,  and  its  conse- 

quences. 

A .  Earlier  implements  were  mostly  shock  weapons  and  the 
combat  was  hand  to  hand. 

1.  Hence  individual  prowess,  strength  and  ability  was 

given  a  chance  and  the  fitter  man  was  likely  to 
emerge  victorious. 

2.  This  was  true  on  the  whole  through  the  Middle 

Ages,  though  during  the  latter  there  was  a  note- 
worthy peculiarity: 

a.  Only  men  of  rank  became  fighters  —  the  common 

people  did  not  become  soldiers. 

b.  Making  war  was  a  profession;  many  a  knight  lived 

by  attacking  his  neighbor  with  no  provocation 
other  than  a  desire  for  the  neighbor's  posses- 
sions. 

c.  The  much-vaunted  courage  of  the  medieval  knight 

is  largely  a  fiction. 
Knights  did  not  fight  to  kill,  but  to  capture  and 

hold  for  ransom.    If  captured,  their  vassals  had 

to  pay  the  ransom. 
They  and  their  steeds  were  armored;  hence  they 

had  little  fear  of  injury  —  all  the  more  as  the 

adversary  could  not,  under  the  rules  of  honor, 
114 


CHANGE  IN  THE  INSTITUTION  OF  WARFARE    115 

take  advantage  of  a  misfortune.  They  had  only 
to  fear  accidental  and  unintentional  injury. 
The  accounts  of  medieval  courage  were  written  by 
minstrels  who  were  patronized  by  the  knights 
whose  prowess  they  sang.  Much  of  the  tradi- 
tional view  of  that  day  still  clings  to  the  profes- 
sion of  arms  in  this. 

When  firearms,  which  were  really  dangerous,  were 
invented  the  knights  abandoned  the  preroga- 
tive of  being  the  fighters  and  hired  mercenaries 
to  wage  war. 

B.  The  introduction  of  missile  weapons,  such  as  firearms, 
of  poisonous  gases,  of  dreadnoughts,  submarines  and 
aircraft  has  changed  the  nature  and  effect  of  fighting. 

1.  Guns  have  steadily  been  made  more  effective,  in 

range,  accuracy,  and  rapidity  of  fire. 

By  improving  explosives. 

By  improving  mechanical  appliances  (sights,  igni- 
tion, loading,  automatic  feed,  range  finders, 
etc.). 

By  increasing  the  size  and  mobility  of  guns. 

2.  Hand-to-hand  fighting  has  been  reduced  to  a  mini- 

mum. Most  fighting  is  at  long  range,  by  means 
of  physical  forces;  machinery.  War  is  machine 
made.  (Lamszus.) 

3.  In  this  kind  of  warfare,  personal  prowess  or  ability 

counts  for  little,  if  anything.  Man  is  no  match  for 
the  machine,  hence,  weak  or  strong,  he  succumbs 
to  it.  Thus  modern  warfare  does  not  result  in  a 
survival  of  the  fittest  in  the  biological  sense,  ex- 
cept as  the  physical  qualities  of  the  individual 
give  him  strength  to  endure  the  shock  of  explosions 
and  the  hardships  of  the  campaigns. 

4.  Warfare,  in  this  particular,  becomes  a  struggle  be- 


n6  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

tween  brains,  inventive  ability  and  mechanical 
skill  of  the  belligerents. 

C.  Warfare  has  thus  become  a  matter  of  brains  instead 
of  brawn,  of  cold  scientific  knowledge  instead  of 
flaming  enthusiasm.  Personal  bravery  amounts  to 
little  compared  with  dogged  persistence  and  rational 
effort.  This  is  getting  to  be  more  and  more  an  age 
of  science. 

It  has  been  remarked  that,  as  wars  have  largely  been 
the  result  of  passion,  the  scientific  tendencies  of  the 
day  should  operate  to  restrain  hasty  wars. 
III.  Change  in  the  methods  of  warfare  and  its  consequences. 

A.  Changes  in  organization. 

1.  Armies  levied  for  a  given  war  have  been  displaced 

by  standing  armies. 

2.  Volunteering,  whether  of  mercenaries  or  nationals, 

has  (except  in  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States) 
yielded  to  compulsory  service  of  the  physically 
fit,  after  the  Prussian  pattern,  devised  as  a  means  to 
expel  Napoleon. 

3.  Loose,   disorganized  fighting   of   hordes  has   given 

way  to  fighting  between  machine-like  organiza- 
tions, well  trained  and  led  by  officers  versed  in 
tactics  and  strategy. 

4.  Foraging  and  self-supporting  armies  have  been  re- 

placed by  armies  provisioned  by  their  governments. 

5.  Neglect  of  the  wounded  and  dead  has  yielded  to 

sanitation,  medical  attention,  and  scrupulous  care 
of  the  victims  of  war. 

6.  Another  evidence  of  humanity  is  found  in  the  modern 

laws  of  war  granting  every  possible  immunity  to 
non-combatants. 

B.  Consequences. 

i.  The  system  of  compulsory  service  of  the  physically 


CHANGE  IN  THE  INSTITUTION  OF  WARFARE    117 

fit  exposes  an  artificially  selected  group  to  the 
ravages  of  war.    (See  Chapter  X.) 
2.  Armies  grow  automatically  with  population. 
IV.  Tendencies  and  attempts  to  debrutalize  war. 

A.  The  development  of  democracy  gave  the  individual  a 

power  and  also  a  value  he  did  not  possess  under 
monarchies.  The  effect  of  this  humanitarianisni  is 
apparent  in: 

1.  The  greater  care  of  sick  and  wounded.     This  was 

stimulated  by  the  advantage  it  brought  to  armies. 

2.  The  attempt  to  limit  war  as  far  as  possible  to  com- 

batants. 

3.  The  considerable  body  of  conventions,  chiefly  during 

the  last  half  century,  containing  laws  of  warfare 
on  land  and  sea.    (See  Chapter  XX.) 

B.  Care  of  the  sick  and  wounded  in  war. 

1.  Practically  no  arrangements  for  the  purpose  existed 

in  ancient,  medieval,  or  early  modern  wars. 
Sully  established  the  first  military  hospital  in  1594, 
and  Austria  did  so  about  the  same  time. 

2.  Real  development  began  with  the  Napoleonic  wars. 

a.  Larrey  (later  Napoleon's  chief  surgeon)  introduced 

"flying  ambulances";  gave  primary  aid  to  the 
wounded  and  removed  them  from  the  sphere  of 
action  (but  not  during  battle). 

b.  Percy  (Frenchman)  organized  the  stretcher-bearers 

(about  1793),  who  collected  the  wounded  dur- 
ing battle.  They  were  regarded  as  combatants. 

c.  Napoleon's  disregard  for  his  men  during  his  western 

wars;  only  in  his  Russian  campaign  did  he  show 
concern  for  their  welfare.  The  typhoid  epidemic 
in  the  French  Army,  1813. 

3.  Private   enterprise   for   a   time   outdid   the   states, 

which  indeed  exhibited  little  interest. 


Ii8  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

a.  The    Crimean   War    (1854-6)    demonstrated    the 

hopeless  inadequacy  of  methods  of  caring  for 
soldiers. 

Hunger,  typhoid  in  the  armies,  no  forage  obtain- 
able. 

One-third  of  the  French  succumbed  to  disease. 

Public  opinion  was  aroused  in  England;  fall  of  the 
Aberdeen  ministry,  1855. 

Private  organizations  came  to  the  rescue  of  the 
sufferers  hi  the  Crimea.  Florence  Nightingale. 

b.  Italian  War,  1859. 

Henri  Dunant  at  Solferino,  1859. 

Dunant's  experiences  related  in  "Un  souvenir  de 

Solferino."    This  book  contributed  very  largely 

to  the  Geneva  Convention. 

c.  Civil  War  in  the  United  States. 

Francis  Lieber  Code,  1863.    Scott:  Texts,  350-376. 
Many  private  relief  societies,  estimated  at  about 

7000. 
Provided  hospitals  and  nurses;  also  hospital  trains 

and  hospital  ships. 
Effectiveness  shown  at  Gettysburg,  where  by  the 

morning  of  July  4  all  the  sufferers  of  the  three 

days'  battle,  July  1-3,  were  cared  for. 

d.  Private  enterprise  culminated  in  the  Red  Cross 

Societies. 

4.  Government  action.  The  Geneva  Convention  for  the 
Amelioration  of  the  Condition  of  the  Sick  and 
wounded  of  Armies  in  the  Field,  1864.  (Scott: 
Texts,  376-378-) 

a.  Influence  of  Dunant  and  of  Moynier,  President  of 

the  Society  of  Public  Utility  of  Geneva,  in  bring- 
ing about  the  convention. 

b.  First  meeting,  1863.    Sixteen  nations  represented. 


CHANGE  IN  THE  INSTITUTION  OF  WARFARE     119 

c.  Meeting  of  1864.    Same  nations  represented. 
Provisions  adopted  (10  articles). 

(1)  Ambulances  and  military  hospitals  neutral  as 
long  as  sick  or  wounded  may  be  therein,  and 
they  are  not  held  by  a  military  force. 

(2)  All  persons  employed  in  connection  with  am- 
bulances or  hospitals  shall  have  the  benefit  of 
neutrality,  whilst  so  employed,  and  so  long  as 
there  remain  wounded  to  be  aided. 

(3)  These  persons  may,  even  after  occupation  by 
the  enemy,  continue  to  fulfill  their  duties  with 
their  ambulances  or  hospitals,  or  may  rejoin 
the  corps  to  which  they  belong.    To  be  aided, 
not  hindered,  in  doing  so. 

(4)  Equipment  of  military  hospitals  subject  to 
the  laws  of  war  and  cannot  be  carried  away 
by  above  persons  when  withdrawing.    Ambu- 
lances, under  the  same  conditions,  retain  their 
equipment. 

(5)  Inhabitants  of   the  country  may  aid   the 
wounded,  without  being  considered  belliger- 
ents.    They  are  to  be  encouraged  in  every 
way  to  aid  the  wounded. 

(6)  The  sick  and  wounded  are  to  be  cared  for  in- 
discriminately.    Those  who  recover  may  be 
paroled. 

(7)  Ambulances,  hospitals  and  persons  attached 
to  them  have  a  distinctive  flag  (or  light  at 
night),  which  must  in  every  case  be  accom- 
panied by  the  national  flag;  and  an  arm  badge 
is  given  to  neutralized  persons,  to  be  delivered 
by  the  proper  military  authorities. 

The  badge  is  to  be  a  red  cross   in  a  white 
field. 


120  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

(Turkey  gave  notice  in   1876,  that  her  badge 

would  be  a  red  crescent.) 
(8-10).    Ratifications,  etc. 

d.  Practically  all  nations  have  accepted  the  conven- 

tion. 

e.  Diplomatic  conference  of  Geneva,  1868,  proposed  to 

extend  the  above  rules  to  naval  warfare;  proposal 
was  not  ratified  then.    This  step  was  taken  at  the 
First  Hague  Conference,  1899. 
5.  Red  Cross  Societies. 

a.  Made  possible  by  the  Geneva  Convention.    Each 

nation  to  authorize  one  civic  society  to  send 
medical  aid  to  war. 

b.  In  Germany  and  France  the  Red  Cross  Society 

is  placed  under  military  control,  no  indepen- 
dent volunteer  service  being  permitted  in  the 
field. 

In  England  and  the  United  States  the  Red  Cross 
organizations  are  independent,  but  cooperate 
with  the  military  organizations  for  the  aid  of 
the  wounded. 

c.  American  National  Red  Cross  Society  founded  1881. 

Clara  Barton,  first  president  (d.  1912). 
Extended  its  relief  program  to  other  calamities 
besides  wars,  and  has  rendered  great  service  in 
various  directions. 

d.  The  several  national  Red  Cross  Societies  hold  inter- 

national congresses  at  intervals.  (For  a  list  of 
these  see  Annuaire  de  la  Vie  Internationale, 
1908-9,  p.  885.) 

The  Society  of  Geneva  is  regarded  as  a  central 
committee. 

e.  Problems  of  the  Red  Cross. 

Abuse  of  the  flag:  it  has  been  used  by  unauthor- 


CHANGE  IN  THE  INSTITUTION  OF  WARFARE    121 

ized  persons,  sometimes  out  of  ignorance,  sup- 
posing that  it  guaranteed  immunity,  sometimes 
deliberately  to  escape  the  fate  of  war. 
The  Red  Cross  in  civil  war.    The  convention  per- 
mitting the  Red  Cross  gave  the  society  the  right 
to  perform  its  functions,  under  certain  restric- 
tions, in  international  wars,  but  failed  (by  over- 
sight) to  grant  it  the  same  right  in  case  of  civil 
war.    This  will  undoubtedly  be  remedied. 
6.  All  nations  now  have  well  developed  and  organ- 
ized medical  staffs  and  hospital  corps  attached  to 
armies.    What  it  is  possible  for  these  branches  of 
the  army  to  achieve  was  demonstrated  by  the 
Japanese  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War.     See  Sea- 
man: The  Real  Triumph  of  Japan. 

V.  Bloch's  conclusions  as  to  the  effect  of  the  changes  in 

methods  of  warring  upon  future  wars. 

A.  That  any  war  between  first-rate  powers  will  be  in- 

decisive, and  tend  to  end  in  stalemate. 

B.  That  it  will  end  because  of  exhaustion  not  because  of 

military  superiority  of  either  party. 

C.  That  neutrals  alone  will  benefit  by  it. 

D.  That  the  economic  and  sociological  evils  of  indecisive 

war  are  likely  to  produce  revolutions.   This  happened 
in  Russia  after  the  Russo-Japanese  war. 
Bloch's  writings  and  views  on  the  futility  of  armaments 
influenced  the  Czar  of  Russia  in  taking  the  initiative 
for  the  first  Hague  Conference. 

VI.  Summary. 

A.  Formerly  war  was  waged  between  whole  peoples;  now  a 

distinction  is  made  between  combatants  and  non- 
combatants  and  the  latter  are  expected  to  be  spared 
as  much  as  possible. 

B.  War  formerly  meant  personal  antipathy  between  the 


122  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

combatants;  now  it  is  more  nearly  a  conflict  between 
two  causes. 

C.  Victory  formerly  meant  subjection  for  the  conquered; 

now  the  conquered  often  retains  his  independence. 

D.  Formerly  war  was  waged  with  little  or  no  preparation 

or  strategy;  it  has  gradually  been  reduced  to  a  science 
which  requires  experts  hi  all  departments. 

E.  Formerly  individual  prowess  counted,  and  a  skillful 

fighter  stood  some  chance  in  battle;  now  the  leaders 
of  the  army  are  expected  to  have  the  prowess,  and 
the  private  ordinarily  is  expected  to  do  nothing  more 
than  obey  orders  (which  is  contrary  to  the  spirit  of 
democracy) ;  and  under  fire  the  keen  and  wide-awake 
soldier  has  little  more  chance  to  escape  death  than 
the  sluggard  (except  perhaps  hi  retreat). 

"...  the  soldier  knew 

Some  one  had  blunder'd: 
Theirs  not  to  make  reply, 
Theirs  not  to  reason  why, 
Theirs  but  to  do  and  die." 

—  Tennyson. 

F.  Plundering  and  wanton  destruction  of  property,  which 

were  formerly,  the  rule,  are  now  discouraged. 

G.  Modern  public  opinion  demands  the  greatest  possible 

degree  of  humanity  in  war. 

H.  War  has  grown  very  much  more  expensive  than  it  was. 

7.  War  was  formerly  decided  upon  by  the  rulers  and  they, 
if  anybody,  were  the  beneficiaries;  their  subjects  who 
fought  risked  life  and  gained  little  except  by  plunder. 
To-day  the  people  theoretically  have  a  voice  in  de- 
ciding upon  war,  but  get  little  out  of  fighting  except 
the  satisfaction  of  being  victors.  Others  get  the 
prizes. 


CHANGE  IN  THE  INSTITUTION  OF  WARFARE     123 

/.  The  realization  of  this  and  the  enlargement  of  the  power 
of  the  people  over  foreign  policies  and  diplomatic 
machinery  militates  against  war. 

K.  Finally,  and  most  important,  in  view  of  the  changes  in 
warfare,  not  to  mention  other  changes,  one  cannot 
use  past  war  as  a  basis  for  argument  relating  to  the 
present. 

REFERENCES 
HISTORY  or  WARFARE 

Altenund  Albert :  Handbuch  f iir  Heer  und  Flo tte.  Vol.  IX.  Ber- 
lin, 1912. 

Bloch:  Der  Krieg.  1899.  (English  edition  abridged:  "Future  of 
War."  1902.) 

Jahns:  Geschichte  der  Kriegswissenschaften.    1889. 

Leitfaden  der  allgemeinen  Kriegsgeschichte.  Verfasst  im  Auftrage 
des  k.  und  k.  Reichs-Kriegs-Ministeriums.  Wien,  1896. 

Bodart:  Militar-historisches  Kriegs-Lexikon,   1618-1905.     1908. 

Jablonski:  Histoire  de  1'art  militaire.    1895. 

Derrecagaix:  Modern  Warfare.    3  vols.    1888. 

Dodge:  Great  Captains:  Alexander,  Hannibal,  Caesar,  Gustavus 
Adolphus,  Frederick  the  Great,  Napoleon.  1890-1907.  (Appen- 
dices.) 

Upton,  Emory:  The  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States.    1912. 

Huidekoper:  The  Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States. 
N.Y.  1915. 

Boutell  (Lacombe) :  Arms  and  Armour.    1907. 

Woods,  Frederick  Adams:  Is  War  Diminishing?     Boston,  1915. 

Viollet-le-Duc:  Annals  of  a  Fortress.    1876. 

Pannentier:  Album  Historique  (illustrations).    1900-1907. 

ANCIENT  WARFARE 

Phillipson:  International  Law  and  Custom  of  Ancient  Greece  and 

Rome.    1911.    II,  166-348. 

Whibley:  Companion  to  Greek  Studies.     1905.    Ch.  VI,  Pt.  10. 
Holmes:  Caesar's  Conquest  of  Gaul.    1899. 


124  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

MEDIEVAL  WARFARE 

Oman:  Art  of  War  in  the  Middle  Ages.    1885. 

Lacroix:  Military  and  Religious  Life. 

Gautier:  Chivalry.    1891. 

Lea:  Wager  of  Battle.    1892. 

Luchaire:  Social  France.    1912.    Chapter  VIII. 

NAVAL  WARFARE 

Mahan:  Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  History.    1894. 

Mahan:  Interest  of  America  in  Sea  Power.    1898. 

Mahan:  Lessons  of  the  War  with  Spain.    1899. 

Mahan:  Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  the  French  Revolution. 

1005. 

Mahan:  Naval  Strategy.    1911. 
Jane:  All  the  World's  Fighting  Ships.    Since  1898. 
v.  Maltzahn:  Naval  Warfare. 
Silbum:  The  Evolution  of  Sea  Power.    1912. 
Fulton,  Thos.  W.:  The  Sovereignty  of  the  Sea.    London,  1911. 
Stenzel:  Seekriegsgeschichte.    1907-11. 
Colomb:  The  History  of  Naval  Warfare.    1899. 
Hannay,  David:  The  Navy  and  Sea  Power.    1915. 
Klado:  The  Russian  Navy  hi  the  Russo-Japanese  War.     1005. 
Clark,  Stevens,  Alden,  Krafft:  A  Short  History  of  the  United  States 

Navy.    1911. 

Brassey:  Naval  Annual.    London. 
Navy  League  Annual.    London. 

SANITATION  IN  WAR 

Hetzel,  H:  Die  Humanisierung  des  Krieges  in  ihrer  Kultur- 

geschichtlichen  Entwickelung.    Frankfurt-a-O.    1889. 
Myrdacz:  Handbuch  fur  k.  und  k.  Militarartzte.     1898-1005. 

(Volume  II  is  a  history  of  sanitation  in  the  European  wars  of  the 

nineteenth  century.) 
Bloch:  Der  Krieg.    1899,  V,  481-563. 
France:  Bulletin  ofnciel  du  Ministere  de  la  Guerre.    Service  de 

sante.    1003. 
Seaman:  The  Real  Triumph  of  Japan.    1906. 


CHANGE  IN  THE  INSTITUTION  OF  WARFARE     125 

RED  CROSS 

Conference  Internationale  de  la   Croix-Rouge.     Compte  rendu. 

1885-1913. 

Barton:  The  Red  Cross.    1898. 
Barton:  A  Story  of  the  Red  Cross.    1904. 
Boardman,  Mabel  T.:  Under  the  Red  Cross  Flag  at  Home  and 

Abroad.    1915. 
Dunant:  The  Origin  of  the  Red  Cross.     "Un  Souvenir  de  Sol- 

ferino"  translated,  from  French  by  Mrs.  Wright,  Philadelphia, 

1911. 

Moynier:  fitude  sur  la  convention  Geneve.    1870. 
Moynier:  La  Croix-Rouge,  son  passe  et  son  avenir.    1882. 
The  Red  Cross  of  the  Geneva  Convention.    What  it  is,  Its  Origin 

and  History.    1881. 

Lueder:  Die  Genfer  Convention.    1876. 
Lueder:  La  convention  de  Geneve  au  point  de  vue  historique, 

critique  et  dogmatique.    1877. 
Criegen:  Das  rothe  Kreuz  in  Deutschland.    1883. 
Miiller,  Rudolf:  Entstehungsgeschichte  des  roten  Kreuzes.    Stutt- 
gart, 1897. 

GENERAL 

Suttner:  Ground  Arms!    1906. 
Semenoff :  The  Price  of  Blood.    1910. 
Sakurai:  Human  Bullets.    1908. 


XV 

MODERN  COMMUNICATION  AND   INTERNATIONALISM 

I.  The  improvement  of  transportation. 

A .  Transportation  is  from  eight  to  twelve  times  as  rapid  as 

it  was  a  century  and  a  half  ago. 

1.  This  is,  as  it  concerns  travel  and  commerce,  equiv- 

alent to  a  shrinkage  of  the  earth. 

2.  Furthermore,    the   multiplication   of   transportation 

facilities  (roads,  railways,  canals,  ocean  carriers, 
etc.)  has  opened  regions  which  were  formerly 
wholly  inaccessible. 

B.  The  result  is  that  the  products  of  a  region  are  no  longer 

confined  to  its  markets,  but  are  carried  into  any  mar- 
ket that  has  use  for  them.  There  has,  of  course,  been 
a  corresponding  expansion  and  interweaving  of  the 
financial  institutions  of  each  region  with  those  of 
every  other.  ^Capital  has  ceased  to  be  national  and 
is  largely  non-national;  it  goes  wherever  there  is  a 
prospect  of  profits.  Business  has  ceased  to  be  local 
and  has  become  world- wide;  world  economy  has  re- 
placed local  economy.  Each  part  of  the  world  has 
become  dependent  on  every  other. 

Labor  has,  like  capital,  become  highly  mobile  and  seeks 
employment  anywhere. 

Travel  is  a  natural  consequence  of  the  above  and  is  in- 
creasing. 

II.  The  improvement  in  communication. 

A.  Communication,  which  was  formerly  no  more  rapid 
than  travel,  is  now  practically  instantaneous,  thanks 
126 


INTERNATIONALISM  127 

to  telephone,  telegraph,  cable,  wireless,  and  to  news 
and  mail  services. 

B.  Information,  which  is  in  many  senses  merely  a  commod- 
ity, can  now  be  conveyed  rapidly  to  all  quarters  and 
has  accordingly  become  common  property.  News, 
good  ideas  no  matter  where  they  originate,  business 
orders  and  information  reach  the  whole  earth  in  in- 
credibly short  time. 

This  is  particularly  noticeable  in  financial  circles. 
Large  banks  with  their  foreign  correspondents  and 
their  means  of  rapid  communication  give  the  earth  a 
sensory  system,  which  quickly  learns  of  matters  of 
importance,  conveys  the  information  to  all  quarters, 
and  stimulates  the  readjustment  that  may  be  nec- 
essary. 

III.  Result:  internationalism  —  the  private  relation  of  the 

citizens  of  the  several  states  with  each  other,  and  the 

official  cooperation  of  the  states.    Jeremy  Bentham 

is  credited  with  coining  the  word  "internationalism" 

in  1780.    It  was  little  used  before  the  middle  of  the 

nineteenth  century.     {Juries,  p.  irJ)f 

A.  Unofficial  or  private  internationalism.    This  is  either 

individual  or  organized.    The  relations  of  individual 

citizens  of  one  country  with  those  of  another  are 

so  numerous  and  so  complex  that  their  existence 

and,  accordingly,  then:  significance  is  hardly  noticed. 

Organized  international  activity  is  much  more  easily 

observed  because,  as  will  be  noticed  below,  there  is 

often  a  society  with  headquarters,  officers  and  an 

official  organ. 

i.  Of  an  economic  character. 

Business  is  international;  buying  and  selling  is  con- 
ducted on  the  basis  of  profit  —  not  of  nationalism, 
^'except  in~so  far  as  this  is  affected  by  legislative  en- 


128  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

actments,  such  as  tariffs  on  foreign  goods.  Money 
is  non-national  —  one  might  even  say  unpatriotic, 
for  it  seeks  investment  where  the  profits  are  safest 
and  largest,  no  matter  if  it  is  abroad.  One  can 
justly  speak  of  a  business  world  and  a  financial 
world.  The  export  of  capital  has  reached  great 
proportions. 


BRITISH  EXPORT  CAPITAL 

(Economist,  Feb.  20,  1909) 
CAPITAL  INVESTED  IN  COLONIES  AND  DEPENDENCIES 

India £470,000,000 

Australasia 321,000,000 

Canada 305,000,000 

Transvaal : . . . .  220,000,000 

Cape  Colony 98,000,000 

Rhodesia,  E.  Af 59,000,000 

Natal 30,000,000 

Others 63,000,000 


£1,566,000,000 

CAPITAL  INVESTED  IN  FOREIGN  COUNTRIES 

United  States £485,000,000 

Japan 115,000,000 

Argentine 254,000,000 

Brazil 101,000,000 

Egypt 97,000,000 

Mexico 51,000,000 

Germany,    France,    Sweden,    Nor- 
way, Belgium,  Denmark 48,000,000 

China 47,000,000 

Russia 45,000,000 

Balkan    States    incl.    Turkey    and 

Greece 39,000,000 


INTERNATIONALISM 


129 


CAPITAL  INVESTED  IN  FOREIGN  COUNTRIES — Continued 

Italy,  Switzerland  and  Austria £26,000,000 

Spain 25,000,000 

Uruguay 25,000,000 

Cuba 21,000,000 

Chile 42,000,000 

Others 63,000,000 

Total  foreign  investment. .     £1,484,000,000 
Grand  total £3,050,000,000 

This  is  about  one-fifth  of  the  total  capital  of  the 
United  Kingdom,  which  is  much  greater  than  the 
foreign  investment  of  any  other  nation. 

2.  Of  an  intellectual  or  cultural  nature. 

a.  KnowledgeancUdeas  are  human,  not  national.    If, 
-"as  is  claimed,culture  is  national  in  its  creation, 

it  is  not  national  in  its  consumption.  Knowl- 
edge and  ideas  meet  a  like  response  everywhere. 
Men  of  like  professions  or  trades  understand 
"foreigners"  as  well  as  nationals.  Normally, 
each  group  forms  an  international  guild;  the 
engineering,  the  medical,  educational,  literary 
world.  Only  in  war  times  do  they  pretend  that 
there  are  fundamental  national  differences. 

b.  Literature,  —  which  depends  on  language,  the  chief 

external  characteristic  of  a  nation,  —  and  to  a 
less  degree  music  and  painting,  are  more  national 
than  science,  which  is  necessarily  non-national 
because  the  laws  of  nature  are  everywhere  the 
same;  the  emotional  elements  of  culture  are  more 
national  than  the  rational  elements. 

3.  Organized  international  activity.     (La  Vie  Interna- 

tionale, 1908-9,  537-12827}*    A  great  many  inter- 
ests have  felt  the  need  of  international  cooperation 


130  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

and  have  accordingly  held  international  congresses. 
In  a  number  of  cases  permanent  international 
organizations,  with  officers,  regular  meetings,  and 
official  organs  have  been  established.  To  illustrate 
the  types  of  international  activity,  the  following 
selected  list,  arranged  in  an  arbitrary  way,  is  given: 
Libraries. 

International  Institute  of  Bibliography. 
International  Catalogue  of  Scientific  Litera- 
ture. 

International  Congress  of  Librarians. 
Press. 

Reuter's  News  Service.    Havas,  Wolff,  Asso- 
ciated Press. 

International  Press  Association. 
Legislature. 

Interparliamentary  Union.     (Cremer,   1889.) 
One-fifth  of  the  members  of  national  legisla- 
tures are  members  of  it  (1910). 
Peace. 

International  Peace  Congresses.     (See  Chap- 
ter XVHL)/ 

International  Friendship  Societies. 
Ethical  and  Philanthropic. 

International  Union  of  Ethical  Societies. 

International  Congress  against  Immoral  Lit- 
erature. 

International  Congress  against  Intemperance. 

International  Congress  of  Protectors  of  An- 
imals. 

International  Union  against  Vivisection. 

International  Congress  against  Duelling. 

Red  Cross  Society. 

Friends  of  Young  Women. 


INTERNATIONALISM  13 1 

Religion. 

World  Alliance  of  Churches. 

World's  Parliament  of  Religions. 

Eucharistic  Congresses. 

Salvation  Army. 

Young  Men's  Christian  Association.  Over 
800,000  members. 

Young  Women's  Christian  Association. 
Sociology. 

International  Institute  of  Sociology. 

International  Institute  of  Statistics. 

International  Colonial  Institute. 

British  and  Foreign  Anti-Slavery  Society. 

International  Penitentiary  Commission. 
Labor. 

International  Socialist  Bureau. 

International  Federation  for  Sunday  Observ- 
ance. 

International  Association  for  the  Legal  Protec- 
tion of  Laborers. 

International    Cooperation.      (See    its    Year 

Book,  1910.) 
Law  and  Government. 

International  Law  Association. 

International  Alliance  for  Woman  Suffrage. 

International  Association  of  Lawyers. 
Insurance. 

International  Congress  of  Actuaries. 
Education. 

Universal  Federation  of  Christian  Stu- 
dents. 

Cosmopolitan  Club,  affiliated  with  Corda 
Fratres,  1911.  (Various  Congresses  have 
been  held.) 


132  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

Commerce  and  Transportation. 

International  Railway  Association. 

International  Marine  Association. . 

International  Free-trade  Congress,  1910. 
Philology. 

international      Languages:    £§ee      Chapter 

xxviyf 

Sciences:  Pure  and  Applied. 

(Many  of  them  have  international  organiza- 
tions.) 

International    Medical    Association    against 
War. 

Pan-American  Scientific  Congresses. 
Geography. 

International  Congress  of  Geography. 
International  Geodesy.    (Is  preparing  a  world 

map.) 

International  Polar  Commission. 
Fine  Arts. 

International  Institute  of  Public  Art. 
Sports. 

Olympic  Games. 

International  Aeronautical  Federation. , 
B.  Official  international  activities,  those  of  the  states  as 

such. 

i.  Non-political.  States  have  participated  in  confer- 
ences and  have  entered  into  various  conven- 
tions regarding  matters  of  convenience  to  their 
citizens,  but  which  have  no  political  impor- 
tance. 

Universal  Postal  Union  (1878).    Kgridgman:  First 
.Book  of  World  Law,  20-7 1.)7 
Practically  all  countries  are  members.    Head- 
quarters, Berne. 


INTERNATIONALISM  133 

Universal  Telegraph  Union  (1875). 

About  30  members. 
Convention  Concerning  the  Metric  System  (1875). 

About  23  states  have  accepted  it. 
Union  for  the  Protection  of  Industrial  Property 

(1883). 

About  19  members.    Headquarters,  Berne. 
Union  for  the  Protection  of  Works  of  Literature  and 

Art  (1886). 

About  15  states  are  members.    Headquarters, 

Berne. 
Union  Concerning  Railway  Transports  and  Freights 

(1890). 

Nine    states    are    members.     Headquarters, 

Berne. 
Union  for  the  Publication  of  Customs  Tariffs  (1890). 

About  30  members.    Headquarters,  Brussels. 
Phylloxera  Conventions  (1878,  1881). 

12  members. 
Convention  Concerning  Private  International  Law 

(1893,  1896,  1900). 

About  15  members. 
Sanitary  Conventions. 

Cholera  (1893,  1894,  1899). 

Plague  (1897,  1900). 
Monetary  Unions. 

Latin  Monetary  Union  (1865).    Five  members. 

Scandinavian   Monetary    Conference    (1892). 
Seventeen  states  represented:  no  practical 
result. 
Convention  for  the  Suppression  of  the  Slave-trade 

(1892). 
Convention  for  the  Preservation  of  Wild  Animals  in 

Africa  (1900).     Seven  signatories. 


134  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

Convention  Concerning  Bounties  on  Sugar  (1902). 
About  12  members.  Headquarters,  Brussels. 
Others  of  the  same  kind  relating  to  trade  in  arms, 
spirituous  liquors  (1899,  1906),  the  use  of  inter- 
national rivers,  canals,  and  waterways  generally, 
protection  of  ocean  cables,  radio-telegraphy,  rules 
of  traffic  at  sea,  international  signal  code,  fishing 
on  the  high  seas,  protection  of  travellers,  ex- 
change of  documents,  agriculture  (1905),  scien- 
tific expeditions,  World's  prime  meridian  (1884), 
"white  slavery"  (1904),  etc. 

2.  Political.    States  have  also  held  congresses  and  have 
made  joint  treaties  (as  distinct  from  bilateral)  con- 
cerning matters  involving  their  political  aspirations. 
a.  Inter-governmental  conferences,  congresses,  trea- 

\       . Ses,  etc. 

I  Final  Act  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna  (1815). 

"Concert  of  Powers." 
*   The  Holy  Alliance  (1815). 
Protocol    of    the    Congress    of   Aix-la-Chapelle 

(1818). 
Treaty  of  London   (1839).     Neutralization  of 

Belgium. 

Declaration  of  Paris  (1856). 
Geneva  Convention  (1867).     Neutralization  of 

Luxemburg. 

Declaration  of  St.  Petersburg  (1868). 
Congress  of  Berlin  (1878).    Near  Eastern  Ques- 
tion. 

General  Act  of  the  Congo-Conference  (1885). 
Treaty  of  Constantinople  (1888).     Suez  Canal 

neutral. 

Pan-American  Conferences  (1889-90,  1901,  1906, 
1910). 


INTERNATIONALISM  135 

Final  Act  of  The  Hague  Peace  Conference  (1899). 
Treaty    of    Washington    (1901).      Neutralizes 

Panama  Canal. 
Algeciras  Conference  (1906). 
Central  American  Conferences  (1906,  1907). 
Final    Act   of    the   Second   Hague   Conference 

(1907). 
The   Declaration   of   London    (1909).     Private 

property  at  sea,  etc.    Not  generally  ratified  as 

yet. 

"A.  B.  C."  or  Niagara  Falls  Conference,  1914. 
And   many   others   (Fried:   Handbuch  I,   127- 


b.  Inter-governmental    administration   and   joint-ac- 

tion. 

|  ""Bureau  of  American  Republics. 
Central  American  Bureau. 

Central  American  Court  of  Justice. 
Permanent  International  Bureau  at  The  Hague. 

'The  Hague  Tribunal  (1899). 
The  Danube  River  Commission  (since  1856). 
The  Congo  Commission  (1885). 
Pacific  blockade  of  Greece  by  the  powers  (1886). 
Joint  (temporary)  control  of  Samoa  (1889)  by 

Great  Britain,  Germany  and  the  United  States. 
The  joint  occupation  of  China  during  the  Boxer 

revolt  (1900). 
Joint  occupation  and  administration  of  Crete 

(1899-1913)  by  Great  Britain,  France,  Russia 

and  Italy. 
The  blockade  of  Scutari  by  an  international  naval 

force  (1913). 
Commissions  to  control  the  Turkish,  Egyptian 

and  Greek  Debts. 


136  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

I— 
c.  Voluntary  limitations  of  sovereignty.    (See  Chapter 

xxvy] 

C.  International  Conferences,  etc.,  summarized. 
i.  Number  between  1843  and  1910:  1977. 

Within  that  time  their  number  has  steadily  increased. 
"1840^-1860 28  international  congresses. 


;rl  1861-1870 69 

1871-1880 150 

1881-1890 295    "      " 

1891-1900 645 

1901-1910 790 

1840-1910 1977  international  congresses. 

(La  Vie  Internationale,  1908-9,  i,  175.) 

2.  Three  stages  in  their  history.   (La  Vie  Intern.,  1908-9, 


a.  Formation  of  a  scientific  organization  and  the  in- 

vitation of  foreigners  to  join  it.    Originated  in 
Germany  about  1823. 

b.  Creation  of  large  official   organizations.     Begun 

about  1860. 

c.  Formation  of  independent  associations  with  or  with- 

out state  aid.    Since  1895. 
3.  Headquarters. 

a.  Some  have  none. 

b.  Fixed:  Berne,   Brussels,  and  lately  The  Hague, 

favorites^!  putxn^/  AUA^-^C^ 

c.  Itinerant. 

D.  Results   flowing   from    the   preceding   circumstances. 

i.  The  isolation  of  nations  is  past;  a  fact  which  to  many 

alters  the  whole  status  and  hence  should  alter  the 

policy  of  nations,  which,  like  the  United  States, 

formerly  enjoyed  a  natural  isolation. 


r 


INTERNATIONALISM  137 

2.  The  volume  of  international  intercourse  has  aroused  a 

practical  as  well  as  academic  interest  of  each  people 
in  every  other. 

a.  It  is  claimed  by  many  that  this  knowledge  of  other 

peoples  tends  to  reduce  national  and  racial  prej- 
udices, and  hence  tends  toward  international 
friendship  and  the  brotherhood  of  man.  This 
is,  however,  not  necessarily  true,  for  acquaint- 
ance does  not  always  mean  friendship,  especially 
if,  as  in  the  case  of  nations,  there  is  commercial 
rivalry.  Relatives  are  sometimes  the  bitterest  of 
enemies. 

b.  However,  it  seems  to  be  true  that  international 

trade  and  intercourse  of  every  kind  tends,  like 
the  democratic  tendencies  noted  in  the  preced- 
ing chapter,  to  create  affiliations  between  the 
peoples  of  the  several  nations,  which  give  true 
elements  of  cohesion  and  cooperation. 

3.  Education,  to  be  up-to-date,  must  take  notice  of  this 

increasing  internationalism.    ' '  New  occasions  teach 
new  duties.'i. 
Summary. 

A.  The  economic  life  of  man  has  to  a  great  extent  become 

international. 

B.  His  cultural  and  intellectual  life  is  likewise  largely  in- 

ternational. 

C.  His  political  life  remains  national. 

D.  When  his  nation  goes  to  war  he  rallies  to  his  political  or 

national,  at  the  expense  of  his  international,  exist- 
ence. 

The  reason  for  this  conflict  in  his  life  seems  to  be  that 
man's  politic^Linsiitutions  have  fallen  behind,  and 
are  no  longer  in  agreement  with  the  actual  facts  of 
his  existence. 


138  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

REFERENCES 

COMMUNICATION 

Sundbarg:  Apercus  .  .  .  Tables,  pp.  270-286. 

Album  de  Statistique  Graphique.    1908.    Plate  28. 

Journal  de  la  Societe"  de  Statistique  de  Paris.     1909.     14-20. 

INTERNATIONALISM 

Annuaire  de  la  Vie  Internationale.     Brussels,   1905-7;   1908-9; 

1910-11. 

La  Vie  Internationale.    I9i2f. 

L'office  central  des  institutions  internationales.    1911. 
L'union  des  associations  internationales  et  la  constitution  d'un 

centre  international.    Brussels,  1912. 

Fried,  Alfred  H. :  Das  Internationale  Leben  der  Gegenwart.    Leip- 
zig, 1908. 
Hill,  David  J. :  World  Organization  as  affected  by  the  Nature  of  the 

Modern  State.    1911. 

Faries:  The  Rise  of  Internationalism.    1915. 
Reinsch,  Paul  S.:  Public  International  Unions.    1911. 
Reinsch,  Paul  S.:  International  Unions  and  their  Administration. 

Am.  Journal  of  International  Law,  I,  1007,  579-623. 
Reinsch,  Paul  S.:  World  Politics  at  the  end  of  the  Nineteenth 

Century.    London,  1910. 

Bridgman:  The  First  Book  of  World  Law.    1911. 
Bridgman:  World  Organization.    1905. 
Rothlisberger:  Die  Internationale  Aemter  in  Berne.    1911. 
Ruedorffer,  J.:   Grundziige  der  Weltpolitik  in  der  Gegenwart. 

1914. 
Exner:     Internationale     Gemeinschaftsarbeit    auf     technischen 

Gebiet. 

Phillips:  The  Confederation  of  Europe.    1914. 
Marvin,  F.  S. :  The  Living  Past. 
Internoscia,  Jerome:  New  Code  of  International  Law.    New  York, 

1910. 
Year  Book  of  International  Cooperation.    First  Year.    1910. 


INTERNATIONALISM  139 

INTERNATIONAL  CONGRESSES 

Lubin:  International  Institute  of  Agriculture  and  its  Bearing  on 

Labor.    Washington,  Government  Printing  Office. 
Eijkman:  L'internationalisme  scientifique.    1911. 
Baldwin:  International  Congresses  and  Conferences  of  the  Last 

Century  as  Forces  working  for  the  Solidarity  of  the  World. 

American  Journal  of  International  Law,  I.     1907.     575-578. 
Congress    Mondial    des    associations    internationales.      Proces- 

verbals  des  seances. 

Spiller:  Inter-racial  Problems.  1911.  57,233-260.  Bibliography. 
Russell,  Henry  B.:  International  Monetary  Conferences.  1898. 
On  Pan-Americanism.  See  Chapter  XXVI. 

CAPITAL  AND  BUSINESS 

Hobson:  The  Export  of  Capital.    1914. 

Paisch:   Great  Britain's   Capital  Investments  in  other  Lands. 

Journal  Royal  Statistical  Society.    1909.    pp.  465-480. 
Eijkman:  Internationalism  and  the  World's  Capital.    Independent, 

61,  200. 

Whitaker's  Almanack,  1910,  690-91.    1912,759.    [Foreign  invest- 
ments of  Englishmen.] 

Kobatsch:  La  politique  economique  internationale.    1913. 
Harms,   Bernhard:  Volkswirtschaft  und  Weltwirtschaft.      1912. 
Finance  and  Commerce.     Their  Relation  to  International  Good 

Will.     American   Association   for  International   Conciliation, 

No.  50. 
Hammond:  The  Business  Man's  Interest  in  Peace — Why  not 

Neutralize  China?    Maryland  Peace  Society,  No.  8. 
Osborne:  Influence  of  Commerce  in  the  Promotion  of  International 

Peace.    Washington,  Government  Printing  Office. 
Pepper:  Conciliation  through  Commerce  and  Industry  in  South 

America.    American  Association  for  International  Conciliation. 

New  York,  1910. 
Neymarck:  French  Savings.    In  Report  of  the  National  Monetary 

Commission,  61  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  Sen.  Doc.  494.    Washington, 

1910.    p.  176,  note.    [French  foreign  investments.] 


140  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

Riesser:  German  Great  Banks  and  their  Concentration.     Ibid. 

Senate  Document  593.    Washington,  1911,  pp.  527  f.    [German 

foreign  investments.] 
Bridgman:  The  Passing  of  the  Tariff.    1009. 

MISCELLANEOUS 

Wicker:  Neutralization  (Froude).    1911. 
Hodges:  The  Doctrine  of  Intervention.    1915. 
Loutfi:  La  Politique  sanitaire  internationale.    1906. 
See  also  References  to  Chapter  XXVI. 


XVI 

THE  FUNDAMENTALS   OF   THE  OPPOSITION   TO  WAR 

I.  Nationalism  and  the  current  conception  of  national  sov- 

ereignty together  with  their  corollaries  lead  to  war  and 
a  consequent  exaltation  of  the  role  of  force.  (See 
Section  IV  below.) 

A  restriction  of  sovereignty  and  of  existing  nationalism 
should,  then,  reduce  the  probability  of  war  and  alter 
the  function  of  martial  force. 

II.  The  basis  for  such  a  restriction  of  nationalism  is  at  hand. 

A.  Nationalism  has  performed  its  work.    It  increasingly 

hinders  progress  because  it  obstructs  the  develop- 
ment of  planetary  and  humanitarian  institutions, 
by  vitiating  international  law  in  which  the  interests 
of  mankind  find  their  expression. 

B.  A  nation  is  unstable  under  present  conditions  and  its 

stability  cannot  be  assured  by  force  because  no 
nation  can  possibly  protect  itself  against  every  com- 
bination of  rivals.  The  circumstance  that  the  usual 
remedy,  armed  defense,  does  not  guarantee  stability 
or  peace,  leaves  every  rational  mind  dissatisfied 
because  there  must  be  something  wrong  with  a 
remedy  that  does  not  cure. 

C.  The  nation  is  no  longer  the  cohesive  unit  of  society 

that  it  once  was.     A  transition  is  in  progress  which 
promises  in  time  to  extinguish  the  present  conception 
of  nations  as  cohesive  competitive  units. 
i.  Geographically:  Nations  have  always  freely  ignored 
natural  features  in  fixing   boundaries.     Modern 
141 


142  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

transportation  methods,  steamships,  railroads, 
tunnels,  cables  and  telegraphic  facilities  have  re- 
duced the  value  of  natural  boundaries. 

2.  Different  races,  languages  and  religions  are  found 

within  a  nation,  and  a  given  race,  language  or 
religion  is  found  in  various  nations. 

3.  No  nation  is  economically  isolated;  national  bound- 

aries do  not  exist  in  world  trade  except  as  they  are 
emphasized  by  national  tariffs.  The  very  existence 
of  tariffs  is  a  recognition  of  economic  intercourse 
between  nations. 

4.  The  greater  part  of  so-called  national  culture  (Kultur) 

is  intelligible  to  other  peoples.  The  ideals  of  dif- 
ferent nations  are  not  necessarily  in  conflict.  When 
it  is  expedient,  nations  can  easily  compose  their  dif- 
ferences no  matter  of  how  long  a  standing  (e.  g., 
France  and  England,  foes  from  1200-1900,  allies 
now).  The  conflict  of  national  ideals  is  irrepressi- 
ble only  when  it  suits  national  purpose  to  consider 
them  so.  (Angell:  The  World's  Highway.) 

5.  Only  in  the  political  or  juridical  sphere  is  nationalism 

still  a  reality.  This  does  not  mean  that  there  is  a 
difference  in  the  political  system,  but  that  political 
systems  which  may  be  quite  alike  are  under  dif- 
ferent managements.  In  other  words,  the  present 
political  institutions  governing  the  relation  of 
nations  are  out  of  keeping  with  the  economic  and 
cultural  phases  of  international  Me;  a  reconcilia- 
tion is  needed.  Certain  opponents  of  war  rest 
their  case  upon  this  feature  of  the  matter. 

6.  The  nation  represents  no  external  or  material  reality 

that  is  fundamentally  distinguishable  from  other 
nations.  What  distinctive  character  it  possesses 
is  something  abstract,  "A  nation  exists  where  its 


FUNDAMENTALS  OF  OPPOSITION  TO  WAR     143 

'  component  atoms  believe  it  to  be  a  nation"  — 
London  Nation,  June  26,  1915.  Nationalism  is  a 
faith,  a  religion,  and  as  such  it  is  a  real  working 
force.  It  originally  had  a  basis  in  external  condi- 
tions; education  has  perpetuated  the  old  concep- 
tions and  failed  to  coordinate  them  with  new  de- 
velopments. Internationalism  (see  Chapter  XV) 
has,  however,  in  great  measure  swept  away  the 
original  foundation  of  nationalism. 
a.  Commerce  and  finance  have  become  international- 
ized. 

Foreign  investments  benefit  the  investor  and  not 
the  average  citizen  of  the  home  nation  which 
^  is,  under  present  theories,  expected  to  back  up 

the  foreign  investor  and  help  him  Succeed.,  This 
tends  to  raise  doubt  as  to  nationalism  in  the 
mind  of  the  average  man. 

,  b.  The  intellectual  and  cultural  interests  of  men  are 
\  international,  not  national.  There  are  medical, 
educational,  financial,  scientific,  and  literary, 
worlds.  These,  though  severally  experiencing 
no  incompatibility  because  of  nationality,  are 
supposed  to  be  in  fundamental  conflict  when 
acting  in  groups.  The  evident  untruth  of  this 
supposition  militates  against  nationalism. 

D.  Practically  all  parts  of  the  earth  have  been  explored 

and  settled.  Nations  can  soon  no  longer  expand 
except  at  the  expense  of  each  other  and  hence  a 
perpetuation  of  nationalism  means  war  between 
great  nations  compared  with  which  past  wars  will 
appear  insignificant. 

E.  Nations  have  already  found  it  expedient  to  abandon  the 

extreme  sovereignty  of  former  times.  This  has  so  far 
generally  been  voluntary.  The  modern  individual 


144  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

cares  more  about  the  economic  conditions  than  the 
political  system  he  lives  under. 

1.  The   mere   necessity   of   systematizing    the   present 

international  intercourse  of  every  kind  demands 
treaties;  every  treaty  represents  a  restriction  of 
sovereignty  in  the  degree  to  which  the  treaty  gov- 
erns the  future  conduct  of  signatories. 

2.  Nations  have  cooperated  even  in  matters  of  a  political 

nature.  (See  Chapter  XV.  Also  Fried:  Handbuch 
I,  106-135.) 

3.  The  advantage  of  this  voluntary  surrender  is  a  se- 

curity that  cannot  be  attained  under  competitive 
force.  Charles  Richet  states  it  thus, 

"True,  I  limit  my  personal  liberty  and  divest  myself  of  a 
right  when  I  agree  not  to  shoot  off  a  revolver  on  the 
streets  whenever  I  feel  like  it.  But  in  submitting  to 
this  restriction  —  which  an  American  frontiersman 
will  not  tolerate  —  I  secure  the  advantage  over  him 
that  I  am  safer  on  the  streets  than  he,  since  my  fellow- 
citizens  may  not  shoot  either."  (Fried:  Handbuch  I, 
p.  108.) 

F.  There  are  precedents. 

1.  The  national  replaced  the  feudal  state  in  the  natural 

endeavor  to  make  the  political  institutions  fit 
economic  conditions  which  had  ceased  to  be  feudal. 

2.  The  United  States  is  a  federation  of  once  sovereign 

states,  whose  interests  had  become  largely  identical. 
It  rests  on  the  denial  of  the  full  sovereignty  of  the 
several  states. 

3.  The  German  Empire  is  a  Union  of  once  particularistic 

and  very  hostile  states.  It  is  typical  that  the  polit- 
ical union  was  preceded  by  economic  unity  rep- 
resented by  the  Customs  Union. 

4.  Italy  is  another  case.     There  are  strong  tendencies 


FUNDAMENTALS  OF  OPPOSITION  TO  WAR     145 

toward  federation  in  the  British  Empire.  Pan- 
Americanism,  as  interpreted  in  some  quarters,  is  a 
federative  movement. 

III.  International  organization  is  the  method  by  which  to 
restrict  nationalism  and  to  suppress  its  evils. 

A.  This   international   organization   may   follow   one   of 

several  lines.    (See  Chapter  XXVI.) 

B.  International  federation  is  condemned  as  Utopian  by 

many. 

1.  Fried  (Handbuch  I,  118)  on  the  contrary  holds  that 

a  project  is  Utopian  only  when  it  posits  a  construc- 
tive condition  instead  of  one  which  represents  a 
natural  development. 

2.  In  this  sense  international  organization  is  not  Utopian 

for  it  merely  means  a  reconstruction  of  international 
political  machinery  to  bring  it  into  keeping  with 
the  existing  economic  and  cultural  intercourse  be- 
tween nations.  In  other  words,  the  economic  bases 
for  world  organization  are  already  present;  and,  as 
in  the  unification  of  Germany,  the  political  con- 
ditions can  be  made  to  fit  the  economic. 

3.  The  opposition  to  the  development  of  closer  interna- 

tional relations  comes: 

a.  From  the  supposition  that  nations  represent  in- 

compatible ideals. 

b.  From  the  natural  inertia  and  "  standpattism "  of 

society. 

c.  From  ignorance  of  the  extent  of  international  Me, 

and  its  conflict  with  nationalism. 

d.  From  aristocratic  or  plutocratic  interests  which 

fatten  either  by  using  the  nation  to  promote 
selfish  interests  (tariffs,  foreign  investments)  or 
by  profiting  from  the  rivalry  of  nations  (munition 
makers). 


146  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

IV.  The  function  of  pacifism  is  to  reconstruct  society  by 
doing  away  with  the  institutions,  ideas  and  fallacies 
which  cause  war  and  erecting  others  which,  by  securing 
justice,  procure  peace. 

A .  Nationalism  is  the  fundamental  cause  of  war. 

1.  What  is  usually  called  the  cause  of  a  war  (the  murder 

of  the  Archduke,  the  sinking  of  the  Maine,  etc.),  is 
merely  the  occasion,  the  pretext  on  which  national- 
ism operates  and  justifies  its  action. 

2.  Human  nature  can  be  said  to  cause  war  only  because 

it  works  through  nationalism;  the  same  human 
nature  within  national  bounds  does  not  cause  war, 
but  is  taken  care  of  by  institutions  devised  for  the 
purpose. 

3.  National  expansion  in  any  form  causes  resistance. 

4.  Errors  and  fallacies  about  nationalism  cause  war. 

(See  Chapter  IV.)  Among  these  should  be  men- 
tioned: 

a.  Social  fatalism:  the  belief  that  war  is  inevitable. 

b.  Unilateral  aberration:  reasoning  about  international 

matters  in  terms  of  one  nation  only. 

c.  Irrepressible  conflict  of  ideas:  the  assumption  that 

nations  are  units  that  are  fundamentally  dif- 
ferent and  therefore  necessarily  hostile. 

B.  Contributory  causes.    Those  persons  or  interests  which 

may  profit  in  any  way  by  a  conflict  between  nations 
may  aid  in  precipitating  war. 

1.  Munition  makers. 

2.  Military  and  naval  men  who  get  a  chance  to  do  some- 

thing and  to  get  advancement. 

3.  The  common  man  who  finds  war  attractive  because 

it  gives  him  a  chance  for  travel  and  adventure,  a 
change  from  the  monotony  of  his  hum-drum 
life. 


FUNDAMENTALS  OF  OPPOSITION  TO  WAR     147 

4.  Persons  who  dislike  another  nation  and  get  satisfac- 
tion from  a  chance  to  attack  it. 
C.  Religious  groupings  formerly  caused  war.    Racial  dif- 

:es  may  succeed  nationalism  as  a  cause  of  war. 
V.  Weaknesses  and  taul 

A.  It  has  been  too  largely  idealistic  and  abstract.    This 

shows  evidence  of  being  corrected  by  the  modern 
inductive  pacifists.  Even  the  latter  are  charged  with 
being  too  intellectual  to  reach  practical  people.  It 
must,  however,  not  be  forgotten  that  all  reforms  are 
•  subject  to  the  foregoing  charges. 

B.  It  has  relied  too  largely  on  emotion  and  sentiment  in 

trying  to  eradicate  war  by  describing  its  horrors  and 
the  sufferings  of  women  and  children. 

C.  It  is  charged  with  being  negative  only,  standing  for 

"passivism,"  non-resistance,  peace-at-any-price,  de- 
fenselessness,  unilateral  disarmament.  Aggressive 
pacifism  is  wanted:  "Blessed  are  the  peace- makers." 

D.  It   has   toyed   with   irrational   catchwords:    "eternal 

peace,"  "disarmament,"  "lay  down  your  arms," 
"brotherhood  of  man." 

E.  It  has  suffered  from  those  who  join  its  ranks  be- 

cause it  was  fashionable  or  good  advertising.  The 
"P.  P.  P's."  —  Pacifists  for  Personal  Prominence. 

F.  Persons  who  join  the  fight  against  war,  at  first  show  a 

disposition  to  criticize  all  previous  pacifists  as  being 

"all  wrong."    The  result  is  a  divergence  of  opinion 

and  action.    This,  though  often  commented  on  by 

opponents  of  pacifism,  is  not  a  real  weakness,  as  it 

is  no  worse  than  disagreement  among  other  men. 

I.  The  reliance  on  any  one  method,  scheme  or  program 

to  bring  about  peace  is,  however,  a  doubtful  policy. 

a.  Religious  pacifism  has  long  been  tried  in  vain. 

b.  Socialism,  though  removing  strife  between  labor 


148  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

and  capital,  would  not  remove  the  present  racial 
prejudices. 

c.  Free  trade,  though  it  would  remove  certain  economic 

causes  of  war,  would  not  correct  other  causes. 

d.  Democracy,  alone,  will  not  bring  peace.     France, 

though  a  Republic,  breathed  revanche. 

e.  Universal    brotherhood,    though    helping    toward 

peace,  does  not  assure  it,  for  acquaintance  does 
not  remove  dislikes;  a  family  quarrel  is  noto- 
riously the  bitterest.   We  need  not  love  foreigners, 
we  merely  need  to  cooperate  with  them. 
/.  Disarmament   will   not   cure   the   military   spirit, 

which  is  part  of  nationalism. 
G.  Peace  must  be  made  more  interesting  and  attractive. 

REFERENCES 

Fried:  Handbuch  der  Friedensbewegung.    Leipzig,  1911-1913. 
Fried:  Die  moderne  Friedensbewegung.    1907. 
Fried:  Die  Grundlagen  des  Revolutionaren  Pazifismus.    1908. 
Fried:  A  Brief  Outline  of  the  Nature  and  Aims  of  Pacifism.    Amer- 

ican Association  for  International  Conciliation.     April,  1915. 
Butler,  Nicholas  Murray:  The  International  Mind.    New  York, 

1912. 

Angell:  The  Problems  of  the  War  and  the  Peace.    London,  1915. 
Angell:  The  World's  Highway.    1915. 
Angell:  America  and  the  New  World-State.    1915. 
Angell:  Arms  and  Industry.    New  York,  1914. 
Krehbiel:  Nationalism  —  an  Anachronism?     The  Survey,  June  3, 


Torres,  Alberto:  Le  probleme  mondial.    Etude  de  politique  Inter- 

nationale.   Rio  de  Janeiro,  1913. 
Torres,  Alberto:  Vers  la  Paix.    1909. 
Hirst,  F.  W.:  The  Arbiter  in  Council.    New  York,  1006. 
Richet,  Charles:  La  passe  de  la  guerre  et  Pavenir  de  la  paix.    1007. 
Hobhouse,  L.  T.:  The  World  in  Conflict.     New  York,  1915. 
Hull,  W.  L:  The  New  Peace  Movement.    Boston,  1912. 


FUNDAMENTALS  OF  OPPOSITION  TO  WAR     149 

Spencer,  Herbert:  Militancy  versus  Civilization.     London,  1915. 
Grane,  William  Leighton:  The  Passing  of  War.    1912. 
Wehberg,  Hans:  Die  Internationale  Friedensbewegung.      1911. 
Lippmann:  The  Stakes  of  Diplomacy.     1915. 
The  Great  Analysis:  a  plea  for  a  rational  world  order.    New  York, 

1912. 

How  Diplomats  make  War.     By  a  British  Statesman.     1915. 
Brailsford,  Henry  Noel:  The  War  of  Steel  and  Gold.    New  York, 


Pfeiffer,  Ludwig:  Die  Wahrheit  iiber  die  Kriegsgefahren.    Feststel- 

lung  der  Interessen  einzelner  Klassen  fiir  den  Krieg.    Leipzig, 

1912. 
Hiiber,  Max:  Die  soziologische  Grundlage  des  Volkerrechts.    Ber- 

lin, 1910. 

Stein,  Ludwig:  Die  Philosophic  des  Friedens.    Berlin,  1899. 
Stratton,  George  M.:  Syllabus  of  Lectures  on  The  Psychology  of 

the  War  Spirit.    1915. 

Toynbee,  Arnold  J.:  Nationality  and  the  War.    New  York,  1915. 
Gobineau,  Arthur  de:  The  Inequality  of  Human  Races.     New 

York,  1915. 

Plater,  Charles:  A  Primer  of  Peace  and  War.    New  York,  1915. 
Marshall,  Henry  Rutgers:  War  and  the  Ideal  of  Peace.    New  York, 


Nationalism  and  War  in  the  Near  East.  By  a  Diplomatist.  New 
York,  1915.  Published  for  the  Carnegie  Endowment  for  Inter- 
national Peace. 

Green,  T.  H.  :  Lectures  on  Principles  of  Political  Organization.   1895. 

Kropotkin:  Mutual  Aid  a  Factor  in  Evolution.    New  York,  1902. 

Sumner,  William  G.:  War  and  Other  Essays.    1911. 

Wells,  H.  G.:  The  World  Set  Free.    New  York,  1914. 

Gulick,  Sidney  L.:  The  Fight  for  Peace.    1915. 

Stilwell,  Arthur  E.:  Universal  Peace—  War  is  Mesmerism.  New 
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Revon,  Michel:  Philosophic  de  la  guerre.    1896. 

Lynch,  Frederick:  The  Last  War. 

Lynch,  Frederick:  The  Peace  Problem. 

Mead,  Lucia  Ames:  Swords  and  Plowshares. 


xvn 

DEDUCTIVE   OR  IDEALIST  PACIFISM   TO    1789 

I.  Deductive  pacifism  is  that  which,  premising  peace  as 
something  desirable,  labors  for  it  in  any  way  that 
promises  to  be  effective. 

The  ideal  of  peace  may,  in  its  origin,  be  religious,  emo- 
tional or  rational.  As  long  as  the  ideal  of  peace  is  the 
starting  point,  the  resultant  pacifism  is  a  priori  or 
deductive.  It  includes  all  sentimental  opposition  to 
war  and  its  horrors. 

n.  Deductive  pacifism  has  always  predominated,  though 
at  intervals  there  have  been  other  forms.    Only  in  the 
last  two  decades  has  a  real  addition  in  the  form  of 
inductive  pacifism  appeared. 
III.  The  history  of  deductive  pacifism. 

A .  That  peace  has  always  been  an  ideal  men  have  wished 

for,  appears  in  the  folklore  of  all  times  and  peoples. 

B.  In  ancient  times  peace,  for  the  most  part,  remained  an 

ideal  which  was  praised  and  recommended. 

1.  The  prophets  of  the  Old  Testament,  particularly 

Isaiah,  prophesied  and  praised  eternal  peace. 

2.  The  religions  of  the  Persians,  Chinese,  and  Hindus 

contain  the  peace  ideal. 

Among  the  Greeks,  Homer,  Euripides,  Aristophanes, 
^Eschylos,  Plutarch,  Epictetus  and  Zeno  give  ex- 
pression to  longing  for  peace.  The  last  two,  Stoics, 
preached  the  brotherhood  of  man  and  suggested 
a  world-state;  and  Plato  in  "Tamias"  and 
"Critias"  pictured  the  peace-state  "  Atlantis." 
150 


DEDUCTIVE  OR  IDEALIST  PACIFISM  TO  1789    151 

4.  The  Greeks  also  achieved  practical  results  in  peaceful 

settlements.    (See  Chapter  XXI.) 

5.  Of   the   Romans,   Ovid,   Lucretius,   Virgil,   Sallust, 

Seneca,  and  Probus  favor  peace  as  an  ideal.  Cicero, 
Tacitus,  and  MarcuSl^irelius  are  quite  outspoken 
in  this  opinion,  the  last  advancing  the  brotherhood 
of  man. 

6.  The  New  Testament  is  full  of  peace  sentiment,  and 

quite    naturally    the    Church    Fathers,    Ireneus, 
Clemens  of  Alexandria,  Tertullian,  Cyprian,  Lac- 
tantius  and  Augustine  restated  them. 
C.  In  the  Middle  Age. 

i.  The  conception  of  a  federation  of  states  was  common 
in  the  medieval  period.  Usually,  however,  the  con- 
ception had  at  bottom  the  purpose  of  organizing 
Christian  States  for  war  on  non-Christian  peoples, 
chiefly  on  Islam.  The  head  of  the  federation  was, 
depending  on  the  writer's  predilections,  to  be  the 
Pope  or  the  Emperor. 

a.  Thomas  of  Aquinas   (i3th  century)   favored   the 

Pope. 

b.  Dante's  "De  Monarchia"  conceives  of  a  federation 

under  the  Emperor;  The  Abbe  Honore  Bonnor 
in  "Arbre  de  Bataille"  (1380)  does  likewise. 

c.  Marsiglius  of  Padua  in  "Defensor  Pads"  (1324) 

proposed  to  transform  the  Church  Councils  into 
a  body  representing  the  European  States. 

d.  Peter  Dubois  in  "De  recuperatione  terre  Sancte" 

(1305)  constructed  what  is  the  oldest  document 
containing  a  plan  for  the  organization  of  states, 
and  a  proposition  for  a  permanent  European 
Court,  which  is  much  like  the  one  adopted  for 
the  Hague  Tribunal  in  1899. 

e.  George  Podiebrad  (1420-1471),  King  of  Poland, 


152  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

influenced  by  his  Chancellor  Antonius  Marius, 
advocated  an  eternal  peace  league  of  Christian 
princes,  with  a  congress  of  delegates  empowered 
to  settle  disputes.  The  object  was  not  peace 
but  a  league  of  friends  with  whom  to  oppose  an 
unfriendly  papacy. 

/.  Erasmus  (1467-1536)  opposed  war  in  numerous 
writings  notably  in  "Querela  pads"  and  "Ada- 
gia."  He  was  among  the  first  popularizers  of 
the  peace  idea. 

2>  The  truce  of  God  "Treuga  dei"  declared  hi  1041  and 
promulgated  for  all  Christendom  by  Urban  II  in 
1095  proscribed  fighting  for  certain  days  of  the 
week.  It  too  was  designed  to  suppress  strife 
among  Christians  in  order  to  make  the  crusades 
possible. 

3.  Many  disputes  were  arbitrated  hi  the  Middle  Age, 

the  Pope  figuring  most  frequently  as  arbitrator. 

4.  The  restrictions  upon  private  war  led  to  the  develop- 

ment of  duelling  as  a  prerogative  of  knights  and 
the  higher  classes  generally.    This  continued  un- 
restrained for  a  long  time,  until  the  developing 
\monarchs  acquired  strength  to  suppress  it. 
a.  Emperor  Maximilian  I  in  1495  decreed  the  "peace 

of  the  realm"  which  forbade  duelling. 
b.  In  France  it  was  Richelieu  chiefly  who  suppressed 

private  warfare. 
D.  Modern  Period:  religious  pacifism. 

1.  Luther  (1483-1546)  expressed  opposition  to  war. 

2.  The  Mennonites,  a  sect  originating  in  the  Netherlands 

about  1534,  adopted  non-resistance  as  one  of  their 
cardinal  doctrines.  They  have  held  to  it  to  this 
day. 

3.  The  Quakers  or  Friends,  under  the  leadership  of 


DEDUCTIVE  OR  IDEALIST  PACIFISM  TO  1789     153 

George    Fox    (1624-1691)    and    Robert    Barclay 
(1648-1690),  taught  non-resistance  and  peace. 

a.  Ann  Austin  and  Mary  Fisher  worked  in  Massachu- 
setts, 1656. 

b.^  William  Penn  (1644-1718)  carried  Quaker  princi- 
ples into  practice  in  his  colony,  Pennsylvania, 
(1682)  and  his  success  in  dealing  with  the  Indians 
remains  as  evidence  that  even  primitive  peoples 
will  be  friendly  and  pacific  neighbors,  if  they 
are  treated  fairly. 

Penn  in  1693  published  his  "Essay  towards  the 
Present  and  Future  Peace  of  Europe  by  the 
Establishment  of  an  European  Dyet,  Parlia- 
ment, or  Estates."  (Old  South  Leaflets,  IV, 
No.  75.)  This  advocates  a  permanent  inter- 
national congress  and  proposes  the  use  of  joint 
force  to  compel  members  to  submit  their  dif- 
ferences to  the  congress  and  to  accept  its  award. 

c.  John  Bellers  in  1710  published  a  book  based  on 

Penn's  ideas. 

d.  The   Quakers   secured   exemption   from   military 

service  in  the  American  colonies. 

e.  They  continue  active  in  urging  their  opposition  to 

force  and  war  through  their  peace  societies.    (See 
Friends'  Intelligencer,  January  22,  1916.) 
4.  Various  Christian  ministers  and  organizations  have 
from  tune  to  time  and  in  increasing  numbers  op- 
posed war.    There  is,  however,  the  greatest  differ- 
ence of  opinion  upon  the  proper  relationship  of 
Christianity  and  war.    The  following  regard  war  as 
opposed  to  Christianity: 

a.  The  Salvation  Army. 

b.  The  Church  Peace  Union  (70  Fifth  Avenue,  New 

York).    Endowed  by  Andrew  Carnegie. 


154  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

c.  The  Fellowship  of  Reconciliation  (92  St.  George's 

Square,  London,  S.  W.). 

d.  World  Alliance  of   Churches   (70  Fifth,  Avenue, 

New  York).  f 

5.  The  Bahaists,  instituted  by  Baha  Vllah  ujT  Persia, 
1851.    "Let  not  a  man  glory  in  this,  that  he  loves 
his  country;  let  him  rather  glory  in  this,  that  he 
loves  his  kind."— Baha  'o'llah.       *l 
Present  leader  is  Abdul  Baha.      /  '! 
£.  Modern  Period:  Early  individual  pacifists  and  their 

projects. 

i.Henry  IV  of  France  (1589-1610). '"  The  Great 
Design."  (English  edition  by  Mead,  1909.)  Pro- 
posed a  hegemony  subject  to  France  against  the 
Hapsburg  power;  therefore  not  a  ^disinterested 
peace  project.  Sully,  Henry's  minister,  is  sup- 

\posed,  by  some,  to  be  originator. 
2.  Emeric  Cruce  (Emeric  de  Lacroix  afiput  1590-1648); 
"Le  nouveau  Cynee"  1623;  "The  New  Cyneas" 
(Balch,  1909).     Proposes  an  international  council 
of  all   nations  with  headquarters  at  Venice   to 
settle  all  differences  and  preserve  the  peace.    He 
is  the  first  to  proclaim  free  trade  as  a  means  to 
peace. 
V   3.  Grotius  (1625)  and  Zouche.    (See  Chapter  XX.) 

4.  Campanella  (1568-1639)  projected  a  universal  mon- 

archy under  the  Pope. 

5.  Amos  Comenius  (1592-1676)  "  Consul tatio  catholica." 

Favored  peaceful  settlement  of  disputes. 

6.  Count  Ernest  of  Hesse-Rheinfels  (1623-93)  proposed 

a  league  of  Catholic  princes  to  settle  disputes  in 
a  tribunal  under  papal  supervision. 

7.  Duke  Charles  of  Lorraine  and  Bar  favored  some 

central  organization  of  states. 


DEDUCTIVE  OR  IDEALIST  PACIFISM  TO  1789    155 

8.  Other  opponents  of  war  of  this  period: 

Spinoza   (1632-77);   Samuel   Pufendorf   (1632-1604) 
^  favors  federation  and  arbitration;  Christian  Thom- 
asius    (1655-1728);   Friedrich  von  Logau   (1604- 
1655);  Archbishop  Fenelon   (1651-1715);  Pascal; 
La  Bruyere;  Pierre  Bayle;  John  Locke. 
F.  Period  of  Enlightenment  or  Rationalism: 

1.  Abbe  de  Saint-Pierre  (1658-1743). 

"Afirege  du  projet  paix  perpetuelle  invente  par  le 
roi  Henri  le  Grand  .  .  ."  1713  (Extract  in  Darby, 
International  Tribunals,  71  f.).  The  first  "co- 
herent" proposal  for  an  international  tribunal 
(Richet,  247).  Exercised  an  influence  toward  the 
creation  of  Holy  Alliance. 

2.  Rousseau  (1712-1778),  "Extrait  du  projet  de  paix 

perpetuelle  de  M.  L'Abbe  de  Saint-Pierre"  (Darby, 
IOS);  "Jugement  sur  la  Paix  Perpetuelle,"  (Darby, 


3.  Leibnitz  (1646-1716),  favored  federation  and  com--—  * 
mented  favorably  on  the  Abbe  de  Saint-Pierre's 
plan.  ^ 

*  4.  Montesquieu  (1689-1755),  approved  of  universal 
monarchy  or  federation,  and  commented  on  the 
disturbance  of  trade  occasioned  by  war. 

5.  Voltaire  (1694-1778),  opposed  Abbe  de  Saint-Pierre's/ 

project,  but  favored  his  aim,  the  elimination  of  war. 
In  his  usual  sarcastic  style  he  condemned  war  as 
advantageous  to  princes  and  aristocracy  only. 
During  his  stay  in  England  Voltaire  learned  to 
know  the  Quakers  and  mentions  them  and  their 
views  on  war  in  his  correspondence. 

6.  Prince  Kaunitz,  Prime  Minister  of  Austria,  made  a 

proposal  for  reduction  of  armaments  to  Prussia, 
about  1764.  (See  Chapter  XXV.) 


156  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

*7«  Jeremy  Bentham  (1748-1832),  incorporated  a  plan 
for  universal  and  permanent  peace  in  his  "Princi- 
ples of  International  Law."  Proposed  extension 
and  codification  of  international  law,  abandon- 
ment of  imperialism,  conventions  to  limit  arma- 
ments, free  trade,  an  international  congress  and 
an  arbitral  tribunal. 

8.  Benjamin    Franklin    (1706-1790),    "On    War    and 

Peace,"  1788.     (Old  South  Leaflets,  VI,  162.) 

9.  The    Encyclopedists    (Holbach,    Diderot,    Turgot); 

Ange  Gondart  (1720-1791);  La  Harpe;  Gaillard; 
Mayer;  Gottsched;  Palthen;  Totze;  Lilienfeld; 
Vattel;  Lessing;  Herder;  Wieland;  Schiller;  Hippel; 
Schinly;  Swift;  Hume;  Price. 

REFERENCES 

See  next  Chapter 


XVIII 

DEDUCTIVE  OR  IDEALIST  PACIFISM  SINCE  1789 

I.  The  Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic  Period  marks  the 
beginning  of  a  new  era  in  which  democracy  and  the 
brotherhood  of  man  have  been  in  the  ascendant.  These 
favor  cooperation  and  peace,  and  accordingly  pacifism 
has  gained  in  vigor  as  democracy  has  advanced. 

A.  The  formation  of  the  United  States  was  a  practical 

application  of  federation  of  states.  As  such,  as  well 
as  for  other  reasons,  it  is  an  event  of  greatest  historical 
importance. 

B.  Various  leaders  of  the  French  revolution  were  advo- 

cates of  peace  and  international  federation:  Beau- 
harnais,  Mirabeau,  Petion,  Cloots,  Abbe  Gregoire, 
Eschasseriaux,  Condorcet. 

C.  Immanuel   Kant   (1724-1804)   "Der   Ewige   Friede," 

1795.     "Perpetual  Peace"  a  translation,  by  Benja- 
min Trueblood,  American  Peace  Society. 
Throughout  Kant's  works  there  runs  a  criticism  of  war. •** 
In  "  Perpetual  Peace,"  which  is  drawn  up  in  the 
form  of  a  treaty,  he  favors  federation,  reduction  of 
armaments,    but   says   nothing   about   an   arbitral 
court.    His  aim  was  not  to  secure  peace,  but  to  show 
the  conditions  necessary  to  securing  it.    There  are 
three,  according  to  him: 

1.  Every  state  must  have  popular  government.     Sov- 

ereigns are  largely  responsible  for  war.    This  idea 
shows  Kant's  recognition  of  the  new  era. 

2.  International  law  shall  be  backed  by  a  federation  of  J 

free  states. 


158  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

""^  3.  There  must  be  world  citizenship,  permitting  men  to 
visit  everywhere,  but  not  allowing  ownership  in 
foreign  lands.  This  is  directed  against  imperial- 
ism. 

D.  Other  opponents  of  war   of   this  period:   Schelling, 
Zachariae,  Malinowsky,  Fries,  Batain,  Jean  Paul, 
Gustav  Hugo,  Heeren,  Krause,  Archduke  Charles 
of  Austria,  Fichte  (in  his  earlier  life),  de  Constant, 
Paoli-Chagny.      From    the    social   point    of    view: 
Fourier,  Saint-Simon,  Thierry. 
II.  During  the  nineteenth  century. 
A.  Peace  Societies. 

1.  New  York  Peace  Society,  founded  in  August,  1815, 

with  about  30  members.  David  Low  Dodge  (1774- 
1852)  first  president.  "The  Mediator's  Kingdom 
not  of  this  World."  1809.  ^ 

2.  Ohio  Peace  Society  founded  December  2,  *9±$. 

3.  The  Massachusetts  Peace  Society,  founded  in  Boston, 

December  28,  1815,  by  Noah  Worcester  (1758- 
1837)  and  William  Ellery  Channing  (1780-1842). 
Worcester:  "Solemn  Review  of  the  Custom  of  War." 
1814.    Edited  "The  Friend  of  Peace." 

4.  Other  societies  were  founded  in  Philadelphia,  Rhode 

Island,  and  Maine  and  their  union  as  the  American 
Peace  Society  occurred  in  New  York,  May  8,  1828, 
under  the  leadership  of  William  Ladd  (1778-1841). 
(Headquarters:  1834,  Hartford,  Conn.;  1837,  Bos- 
ton; since  1911,  Colorado  Building,  Washington, 
D.  C.) 

5.  The  Peace  Society  (English)  founded  in  London, 

June  n,  1816,  by  a  Quaker,  William  Allen  (1770- 
1843),  and  Joseph  Price.  (Headquarters:  New 
Broad  Street,  Finsbury,  London,  E.  C.)  Has 
since  1819  issued  the  "Herald  of  Peace."  Sent 


DEDUCTIVE  OR  IDEALIST  PACIFISM  SINCE  1789     159 

representatives  to  continent  to  spread  peace 
idea. 

6.  Peace  Society  at  Geneva,  founded  December  i,  1830, 

by  de  Sellon  (1782-1839),  who  got  the  idea  from 
London. 

7.  English  Quakers  founded  the  "Societe  de  la  morale 

chretienne"  in  Paris  in  1821,  which  in  1841  de- 
veloped a  peace  department.  Saint  Simon  and 
Fourier  had  helped  to  prepare  the  ground. 

8.  Peace  societies  in  1910.     About  160  societies  with 

many  branches. 

England,  22  societies  with  about  45  branches. 
France,  36  societies,  some  of  which  have  as  many  as 

40  branches. 

Germany,  3  societies  with  95  branches. 
Austria,  8;  Belgium,  3;  Hungary,  2;  Italy,  55;  Nor- 
way, 2;  Portugal,  3;  Russia,  2;  Spain,  2;  Sweden, 
8;  United  States,  17;  Canada,  i;  South  American 
States,  7;  Australia,  4;  Japan,  2;  Denmark,  2, 
with  37  branches. 

(For  a  list  of  peace  societies  see  Annuaire  du  mouve- 
mentpacifiste,  1910,  and  The  Peace  Year-book,  1911.) 
B.  International  Peace  Congresses. 

In  1841,  when  the  relations  between  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States  were  strained  over  a  boundary 
question,  Joseph  Sturge,  an  English  Quaker,  came  to 
America  to  consult  about  means  of  securing  better 
feeling.  During  his  stay  he  proposed  to  the  American 
Peace  Society  an  international  peace  congress,  which 
was  realized  in  1843. 

i.  International  peace  congress,  London,  1843.  Charles 
Hindley,  M.  P.,  president.  Really  an  Anglo- 
American  conference:  294  English,  37  American, 
and  6  continental  delegates. 


160  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

2.  International  Peace  Congress  at  Brussels,  1848. 

a.  Elihu  Burritt   (1810-1879),   "the  learned  black- 

smith" of  New  England,  through  extensive 
travel,  speaking  and  publication  contributed  very 
materially  to  the  development  of  peace  senti- 
ment in  Europe  and  to  the  international  peace 
congresses.  He  advocated  congresses  of  nations, 
arbitral  courts  and  peaceful  settlement  of  all 
disputes. 

b.  August  Couvreur  and  August  Visscher  of  Belgium 

secured  government  support. 

c.  Delegates  from  England,  United  States,   France, 

Belgium,  and  The  Netherlands.  Visscher,  presi- 
dent. Burritt's  influence  on  resolutions  very 
noticeable. 

3.  Paris,  1849,  Victor  Hugo,  President,  Richard  Cobden, 

Vice-President;  Frankfort-on-Main,  1850;  London, 
1851;  Manchester,  1852;  Edinburgh,  1853. 

With  the  Crimean  war  there  occurred  a  lapse  in  the 
congresses.  Congresses  were  held  in  Geneva,  1867; 
Paris,  1878;  Brussels,  1882;  Paris,  1889. 

Since  1889  they  have  practically  met  annually.  Per- 
manent headquarters  established  at  Berne  in  1891: 
"Permanent  International  Bureau  of  Peace."  List 
of  congresses  found  in  Annuaire  de  la  Vie  Interna- 
tionale, 1908-9. 

The  influence  of  these  Congresses  toward  developing 
official  international  congresses  and  ultimately 
the  Hague  Conferences  is  very  considerable.  The 
influence  of  World  Fairs  in  this  connection  is  also 
noteworthy.  (Faries:  Internationalism.) 
C.  Official  recognition  of  the  peace  idea. 

i.  This  is  briefly  treated  in  connection  with  the  develop- 
ment of  arbitration  (see  Chapter  XXI),  and  with 


DEDUCTIVE  OR  IDEALIST  PACIFISM  SINCE  1789    161 

the  development  of  official  international  confer- 
ences. (See  Chapter  XV.  See  also  Fried:  Hand- 
buch  II,  70-95.)  A  few  only  of  the  many  persons 
active  in  securing  government  recognition  can  be 
mentioned:  William  Jay,  Charles  Sumner,  Richard 
Cobden,  John  Bright  (Quaker),  Henry  Richard, 
Marquis  of  Bristol,  Randall  Cremer,  Frederic 
Passy,  Manzini. 

2.  The  Interparliamentary  Union,  founded  1889,  is  a 
most  significant  indication  of  the  strength  behind 
the  idea  for  the  improvement  of  international  rela- 
tions. 

a.  It  grew  out  of  the  proposal  of  Frederic  Passy  and 

Randal  Cremer  to  the  French  Foreign  Minister, 
Goblet,  to  have  delegates  of  Parliament  and  the 
French  Chambers  meet  to  discuss  an  arbitration 
agreement  like  that  between  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States.  The  minister  supported  it. 
The  proposed  meeting  occurred  in  1888  and 
called  a  meeting  to  be  held  at  the  Paris  exposi- 
tion, 1889.  At  the  latter  the  Union  became  per- 
manent as  a  medium  between  national  legisla- 
tures. 

b.  Any  member  of  a  National  legislature  may  become 

a  member  of  the  Interparliamentary  Union.  In 
1912  there  were  3,640  members.  Headquarters 
in  Brussels.  Publications:  Annuaire  de  1'Union 
Interparlementaire;  Documents  Interparlemen- 
taire. 

D.  The  year  1889  is  important  in  peace  annals,  as  it  marks 
several  events  of  significance:  First  Pan-American 
Congress;  Establishment  of  the  Interparliamentary 
Union;  Resumption  of  International  Peace  Con- 
gresses; the  acceptance  by  leading  governments  of 


j62  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

the  principle  of  arbitration.    These  all  were  forces 

which  helped  produce  the  Hague  Conference  in  1899. 

Since  1889  the  activities  against  war  have  become 

numerous  and  variegated. 

E.  Leo  Tolstoi  occupies  a  unique  place  in  pacifism.  In 
his  writings,  particularly  in  "War  and  Peace," 
he  advocates  extreme  non-resistance. 

REFERENCES 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  AND  YEAR  BOOKS 

Bibliographic  du  mouvement  de  la  paix.    Christiania,  1912. 

La  Fontaine,  Henri:  Bibliographic  de  la  paix  et  de  Parbitrage 
international.  1004. 

Catalogue  d'ouvrages  sur  la  paix  et  la  guerre  classes  dans  la 
Bibliotheque  du  Bureau  International  a  Bern.  1901. 

Huntsman,  M.  H.:  Peace  Bibliography.    1912. 

Hirst,  F.  W.:  Library  of  War  and  Peace.    London,  1907. 

La  Vie  Internationale.    Brussels,  1912  f. 

Mead,  Edwin  D.:  The  Literature  of  the  Peace  Movement.  Pam- 
phlet of  the  International  School  of  Peace,  now  World  Peace 
Foundation. 

Annuaire  du  mouvement  pacifiste.  Bureau  International  de  la 
Paix  a  Bern. 

The  Peace  Year  Book.    The  National  Peace  Council.    1910. 

Hicks,  F.  C.:  Internationalism.  American  Association  for  Inter- 
national Conciliation.  1913. 

Annuaire  de  PUnion  Interparlementaire.    Brussels.    (In  progress.) 

Annuaire  de  la  Vie  Internationale.  Brussels,  1905-7;  1908-9; 
1910-11. 

HISTORY  OF  PACIFISM 

Fried:  Handbuch  der  Friedensbewegung.    1911-13. 

Fried:  Die  moderne  Friedensbewegung  in  Deutschland  und  Frank- 

reich.    1908. 

Bloch:  Der  Krieg.    1899.    V,  1-197. 
Richet:  Le  passe1  de  la  guerre  et  Pavenir  de  la  paix.    1907.    243!. 


DEDUCTIVE  OR  IDEALIST  PACIFISM  SINCE  1789    163 

Loewenthal,  Eduard:  Geschichte  der  Friedensbewegung.  Berlin, 
1903. 

Darby:  International  Tribunals.    1904. 

Boyle:  History  of  Peace.    1902. 

Del  Vecchio,  Giorgio:  II  fenomeno  della  guerra  et  1'idea  della  pace. 
Torino,  1911. 

Patonie-Pierre,  Edmond:  Historique  du  mouvement  pacifique. 
Bern,  1899. 

Lange:  Les  origines  du  mouvement  pacifiste  organise".  In  Corre- 
spondence bi-mensuelle,  1909. 

Torres rLeProbleme  mondial.  1913.  29-54.  "L'ideedelapaixet 
son  evolution." 

Moritzen,  Julius:  The  Peace  Movement  of  America.    1915. 

Geer:  The  Beginning  of  the  Peace  Movement  [Peace  and  Truce  of 
God].  Hartford  Seminary  Record,  XXI,  227-243. 

Diotallevi:  Appunti  Storici  sul  Movimento  Pacifista  nel  Secolo 
XIX.  (Italian  Peace  Society.) 

Frank :  Les  Beiges  et  la  Paix.    1905. 

Sharpless:  A  Quaker  Experiment  in  Government.    1902. 

Davis,  Hayne:  Among  the  World's  Peacemakers.  An  Epitome  of 
the  Interparliamentary  Union.  New  York,  1907. 

Quidde,  L.:  Zur  Organisation  der  interparlamentarischen  Union. 
1911. 

Resolutions  textuelles  des  Congres  universels  de  la  paix,  tenus  de 
1843  a  1910.  .  .  .  1912. 

Martyrerspiegel,  1748.  (An  account  of  the  sufferings  of  early  non- 
resistants.) 

SPECIAL  AUTHORS 

Erasmus:  Against  War.    1915. 

Channing:  Discourses  on  War  (new  ed.,  1903). 

Dodge:  War  Inconsistent  with  the  Religion  of  Jesus  Christ  (new 

ed.,  1905). 
M6moires  pour  servir  a  Phistoire  de  France,  Due  de  Sully.    Ser.  2, 

vol.  3,  422-436.     (The  Great  Design.) 
Mead:    The    Great    Design.     (Ginn.)     1909.     Also  in  Bonn's 

Library. 


164  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

Bayet:  Les  e"crivains  politiques  du  XVTII  siecle.     1904.     16-22. 

[Projet  de  .  .  .  I'abbe'  de  Saint-Pierre.] 
Rousseau:    Oeuvres    completes    (Musset-Pathay).    V,    405-459. 

[Extrait  du  projet  .  .  .  de  I'abbe  de  Saint-Pierre.] 
Kant:  Perpetual  Peace.     Translated  by  Trueblood.     American 

Peace  Society.    1897. 
Trueblood:  William  Perm's  Holy  Experiment  in  Civil  Government. 

American  Peace  Society.    1006. 
Bentham:  A  Plan  for  an  Universal  and  Perpetual  Peace.    Ben- 

tham's  Works.    (Bowring  ed.)  II,  pp.  546-560. 
Ladd,  William:  Essay  on  a  Congress  of  Nations.    1840. 
Sumner:  Addresses  on  War.    1902. 
Dodge:  Mediator's  Kingdom  not  of  this  World  (new  ed.  by  Mead). 

1005- 

Tolstoi:  War  and  Peace.    New  York,  1889. 
Crosby:  Tolstoy  and  his  Message.    1003. 

BIOGRAPHY 

Evans:  Sir  Randal  Cremer.    1910. 

Hemenway:  The  Apostle  of  Peace.  Memoir  of  William  Ladd. 
Boston,  1872. 

Vesnitch:  Le  Cardinal  Alberoni  Pacifiste.  Revue  d'Histoire  Diplo- 
matique. 1912. 

Vesnitch:  Deux  precurseurs  francais  du  pacifisme  et  de  1'arbitrage 
international,  P.  Dubois  et  E.  Cruce.  Revue  d'Bistoire  Diplo- 
matique. 1911. 

CHRISTIANITY  AND  WAR 

Jefferson,  C.  E.:  Christianity  and  War.    1915. 

Gilbert:  The  Bible  and  Universal  Peace.    1914. 

Harnack:  Militia  Christi.    1005. 

Barr,  J. :  Christianity  and  War. 

Wilson,  W.  E.:  Christ  and  War.    1915. 

Solovyof,  Vladimir:  War  and  Christianity  from  the  Russian  Point 

of  View.    (Putnam.)    1915. 
Freeman,  D.  R.:  God  and  War.    An  exposition  of  the  principles 

underlying  creative  peace.    (Badger.)    1915. 


DEDUCTIVE  OR  IDEALIST  PACIFISM  SINCE  1789    165 


David  Willard:  The  Christian  Equivalent  of  War.    New 

York,  1915. 

Wehberg,  Hans:  Das  Papsttum  und  der  Weltfriede.    1915. 
Speer:  Jesus  and  War.    Pamphlet  35  of  the  Navy  League  of  the 

United  States. 

Luce:  In  the  North  American  Review,  153,  p.  678. 
Repplier,  Agnes:  Christianity  and  War.    Atlantic  Monthly,  Jan- 

uary, 1915. 

Weinel:  Die  Stellung  des  Urchristentums  zum  Staat.    1908. 
Ballou,  Adin:  Christian  non-resistance.    1910. 
Beals:  The  Higher  Soldiership.    Chicago,  1912. 
Temple,  William:  Christianity  and  War.    Papers  from  War  Time. 

Oxford  University  Press,  since  1914.    No.  i. 

MISCELLANEOUS 

Hetzel,  H.:  Die  Humanisierung  des  Krieges  und  Ihrer  Kultur- 

geschichtlichen  Entwicklung.    1889. 
How  Diplomats  make  War.    By  a  British  Statesman.    (Huebsch.) 


Selected  Quotations  on  Peace  and  War.  Compiled  and  published 
by  Federal  Council  of  the  Churches  of  Christ  in  America.  1915. 

[A  biographical  list  of  pacifists  is  to  be  found  in  Fried:  Hand- 
buch,  H,  pp.  313-422.] 


XIX 

INDUCTIVE  OR  PRACTICAL  PACIFISM 
INTERNATIONAL  POLITICAL   ENGINEERING 

I.  Inductive  pacifism  is  that  which  favors  peace,  not  as  an 
end  in  itself,  but  as  the  natural  and  logical,  but  in- 
cidental, consequence  of  other  aims.  It  is  rational  and 
not  emotional,  is  in  keeping  with  the  scientific  tend- 
encies of  our  age. 

Its  starting  point  is,  not  peace,  but  some  actual  condition 
of  the  present-day  international  relations  which  is  not 
what  it  ought  to  be.  It  proposes  a  remedy  which  is  the 
rational  conclusion  from  the  preceding  critical  study, 
one  which  will  harmonize  discordant  factors  and  result 
in  greater  efficiency.  Pointing  out  the  defect  or  fallacy 
is  the  first  step;  proposing  a  remedy  is  next  in  im- 
portance; securing  peace  is  incidental  to  the  remedy. 
Its  method  is  a  posteriori.  For  this  reason  some  object 
to  being  classed  as  peace  advocates.  Norman  Angell 
distinguishes  his  enterprise  from  pacifism  by  calling 
it  "civilism"  or  the  international  polity  movement. 
Political  engineering  well  describes  it. 
.  Inductive  pacifism  has  only  recently  become  important. 
It  is  largely  critical,  but  it  includes  much  of  the 
recent  so-called  "constructive  pacifism."  The  faults 
inherent  in  present  international  relations  have  been 
treated  in  detail  elsewhere,  and  need  merely  be  sum- 
marized here:  — 

The  supposed  economic  benefits  of  war  are  challenged: 
1 66 


INDUCTIVE  OR  PRACTICAL  PACIFISM         167 

"Angellism"  (see  Chapter  V);  and  the  economic 
harm  of  war  and  the  armed  peace  are  demonstrated. 
(See  Chapters  VI,  VII.) 

B.  The  biological  effects  of  war  are  investigated  and  are 

declared  to  be  injurious.    (See  Chapter  X.) 

C.  The  consequences  and  dangers  of  the  race  in  armaments 

are  studied  by  Bloch  and  others.     (See  Chapter  VI.) 

D.  The  weaknesses  of  international  law  and  its  collapse  in 

the  face  of  nationalism  are  studied.  (See  Chapter 
XX.) 

E.  Nationalism  is  scrutinized  and  questioned.    (See  Chap- 

ters IV,  XVI.) 

F.  Projects  for  reconstructing  society  are  advanced.    (See 

Chapters  XVI,  XXVI.) 


XX 

INTERNATIONAL  LAW 

I.  Ancient  times. 

A.  The  co-existence  of  states  was  not  a  recognized  prin- 

ciple; each  state  sought  to  subject  or  exterminate  all 
other  states.    Oriental  states  and  Roman  Empire. 
Thus  there  could  be  no  international  relations  in  the 
present  sense. 

B.  Greeks  admitted  the  principle  of  co-existing  states. 
The  Greek  city  states  all  represented  the  same  general 

culture  and  language. 

They  had  relations  properly  called  international. 
They  gradually  fell  to  quarreling  among  themselves  as 

did  their  neighbors  and  sought  to  subject  each  other. 

The  interf erence  of  Rome  put  an  end  to  their  struggles 

before  any  state  had  been  fully  victorious. 
n.  Medieval  times. 

A.  The  Teutonic  migrations  broke  up  the  Roman  Empire 

and  substituted  a  number  of  tribal  units  independent 
of  each  other. 

B.  This  new  society  abandoned  the  ancient  conception 

that  states  could  not  co-exist. 

1.  The  influence  of  the  Christian  religion  and  the  church. 

2.  The  Teutonic  ideal  admitted  the  existence  of  clans 

and  tribes  side  by  side. 

3.  The  confusion  and  darkness  of  the  early  medieval 

period  obscured  the  differences  between  peoples. 

C.  Medieval  states  had  relatively  slight  relations. 

i.  Under  the  feudal  system  a  state  was  not  a  homoge- 
168 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  169 

neous  organization,  but  rather  a  union  of  feudal 
entities  held  together  by  the  personal  bond  of  liege 
homage.  It  was  these  feudal  entities,  as  much  as 
the  states  themselves,  that  had  relationships  in  the 
earlier  middle  ages. 
2.  In  this  period  there  was  no  such  thing  as  international 

law. 
III.  The  beginnings  of  international  relations  and  laws. 

A.  International  relations  in  the  modern  sense  began  to 

appear  in  the  twelfth  century. 

1.  The  crusades  developed  a  sense  of  nationalism  among 

the  various  peoples  of  western  Europe. 

2.  The  feudal  system  began  to  yield  before  monarchical 

power. 

3.  The  Reformation  and  especially  the  religious  wars 

developed  The  sense  of^  nationalism  to  a  high  de- 
gree in  Europe. 

B.  In  this  period  states,  as  such,  steadily  increased  their 

dealings  with  one  another,  and  at  the  time  of  the  re- 
ligious wars  carried  their  animosities  and  national 
sentiments  to  exaggeration. 

C.  Early  writers  on  international  relations. 

1.  Legnano.    Professor  of  Law  at  Bologna. 

"De  bello,  de  represaliis,  et  de  duello,"  1360. 

2.  Belli.    (Italian.) 

"De  re  militari  et  de  bello,"  1563. 

3.  Bruno.     (German.) 

"De  legationibus,"  1548. 

4.  Victoria.     (Spaniard.) 

"Reflectiones  theologicae,"   1557. 

5.  Ayala.    (Spaniard  living  in  the  Netherlands.) 

"De  jure  et  officiis  bellicis"  .  .  .  1582. 

6.  Suarez.      (Spanish   Jesuit   at    Coimbra,    Portugal.) 

"Tractatus  de  legibus  et  de  legislatore,"  1612. 


I  yo         NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

7.  Gentilis.     (Italian.) 

"De  legationibus,"  1585. 
"Commentationes  de  jure  belli,"  1588-89. 
"De  jure  belli  libri  tres,"  1598. 
"Advocatio  Hispanica,"  1613. 
IV.  The  mcxlern  period. 

A.  National  consciousness  and  international  antipathies 

were  fully  developed  by  the  time  of  the  Thirty  Years 
War,  which  involved  practically  all  the  nations  of 
western  Europe. 

1.  The  consequence  of  this  bitter  period  was  an  over- 

emphasis on  national  independence;  the  absolute 
independence  of  a  state  from  every  other. 

2.  This  condition  arose  in  a  monarchical  age;  and  mon- 

archs  were  in  a  position  to  exploit  national  antip- 
athies. 

Government  by  the  people  has  replaced  monarchy. 
The  spread  of  democratic  principles  should  operate 
to  bring  nations  closer  together. 

B.  International  law  developed  in  this  age. 

1.  Hugo  Grotius  (1583-1635).     " Father  of  the  Law  of 

Nations." 

"De  jure  belli  ac  pacis  libri  tres."     1625.     (Engl. 
transl.     Whewell;    and    Extract    in    Old    South 
Leaflets,  Vol.  5,  No.  101,  pp.  1-24.) 
This  work  recognizes  both — 

Customary  or  voluntary  law.    (Positive  law.) 
Natural   law:   This   is   held   to  be  most  impor- 
tant,  hence:    Jus  gentium,   i.   e.,   law   of*  na- 
tions. 

2.  Zouche,  1590-1660.    (Englishman.) 

"luris  et  iudicii  fecialis,  sive  iuris  inter  gentes,  et 
quaestionum  de  eodem  explicatio."  (Edited  by 
Holland;  transl.  by  Brierly.) 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  171 

Emphasizes  voluntary  international  law  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  natural  law  of  Grotius.  Hence: 
Jus  inter  gentes,  i.  e.,  international  law. 

C.  Three  schools  of  the  law  of  nations. 

1.  Naturalists:  accept  natural  law. 

2.  Positivists:  reject  natural  law. 

3.  Grotians:  Recognize  natural  and  voluntary  law. 

D.  Historical  development. 

1.  Naturalists    and    Grotians    predominated    to    and 

through  French  Revolution. 

2.  Nineteenth  century  saw  triumph  of  positivists. 

V.  The  scope  of  international  law  has  continually  developed 
with  increasing  international  intercourse,  but  has 
always  been  somewhat  behind. 

A.  Conventions   regulating   the   relations  of  nations  in 

time  of  peace  have  been  found  useful  and  necessary 
and  have  constantly  increased  in  number. 

B.  During  the  nineteenth  century,  conventions  providing 

the  rules  for  war  have  been  adopted. 
The  principal  conventions  and  international  agreements 
which  have  placed  restrictions  on  warfare: 

1.  Declaration  of  Paris,  1856. 

Scott:  Texts  of  the  Peace  Conferences,  349. 

[Francis  Lieber  Code,  1863.  Not  a  treaty,  but  in- 
structions to  the  Federal  Army  in  the  Civil  War. 
Scott:  Texts,  350-376.] 

2.  Geneva  Convention,  1864.     (1868.) 
Scott:  Texts,  376-381. 

The  Red  Cross  developed  from  this.  (See  Chapter 
XIV.) 

3.  Declaration  of  St.  Petersburg,  1868. 
Scott:  Texts,  381-382. 

[Project  of  an  international  declaration  concerning 
the  laws  and  customs  of  war,  adopted  by  the 


172  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

Conference  of  Brussels,  August  27,  1874.    Scott: 
Texts,  382-389-] 

[Laws  of  war  on  land.  Recommended  for  adoption 
by  the  Institute  of  International  Law  at  its  session 
in  Oxford,  September  9,  1880.  Scott:  Texts, 
389-400.] 

4.  Hague  Peace  Conference,  1899. 
Scott:  Texts  1-92. 

5.  Convention  regarding  hospital  ships  (The  Hague), 

1004. 
Scott:  Texts,  400-402. 

6.  Second  Geneva  convention  for  the  amelioration  of 

the  condition  of  the  sick  and  wounded  of  armies 
in  the  field,  1906. 
Scott:  Texts,  402-409. 

7.  The  Second  Hague  Conference,  1907. 
Scott:  Texts,  93~334. 

8.  Declaration  of  London,  1909. 

U.  S.  Naval  War  College:  Intern.  Law  Topics,  1909. 
This  declaration  failed  to  secure  the  signature  of 
England,  which  as  the  chief  naval  power,  thus 
practically  defeated  it.  Still,  the  many  appeals 
to  the  declaration  during  the  Great  War,  indicate 
a  wide-spread  recognition  of  the  soundness  of  the 
principles  of  the  declaration. 

VI.  International  law  is  made  by  treaty  between  states, 
by  court  decisions  involving  international  relations 
which  may,  though  they  need  not,  become  precedents, 
and  in  some  measure  by  custom  which  nations  follow 
as  long  as  they  please.  International  law  is,  as  yet, 
merely  the  law  dictated  by  a  nation  with  power  to 
enforce  its  desires:  England  makes  sea  law.  As  trea- 
ties bind  only  those  who  make  them,  and  as  the  parties 
to  any  given  treaty  have  usually  been  small  in  number, 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  173 

international  law  may  be  very  different  between  dif- 
ferent pairs  of  nations.  International  law  is  not 
universal  and  lacks  uniformity. 

The  Hague  Conferences  began  to  remedy  this  grave  de- 
fect by  bringing  a  large  number  of  nations  together  to 
discuss  common  agreement.  It  is  the  nearest  approach 
to  a  codification  of  common  international  law  for  all 
nations  that  we  have  had,  and  it  needs  to  be  continued. 

VII.  Sanction.    International  law  as  yet  lacks  an  adequate 

sanction. 

A.  Nations  are  bound  only  by  treaties  which  they  sign. 

B.  They  are  bound  only  as  long  as  they  choose  to  be. 
There  is  no  force  to  compel  the  observance  of  a  treaty. 
Besides  full  sovereignty  of  a  nation  —  the  same  which 

determined  whether  it  should  sign  a  treaty  —  seems 
to  imply  the  right  to  abrogate  the  treaty;  for,  if  it 
cannot  do  so,  it  is  not  sovereign. 

C.  Public  opinion,  upon  which  all  law  —  including  national 

law  —  depends  for  its  effectiveness,  is  by  reason  of 
education,  not  behind  international  law  but  behind 
some  one  national  interpretation  of  international  law. 
Public  opinion  cannot  be  behind  both  nationalism 
and  international  law. 
When  it  is  back  of  a  law  of  nations  it  will  be  effective. 

D.  It  is  to  secure  an  adequate  sanction  that  a  world  fed- 

eration, a  world  police  and  similar  institutions  are 
being  proposed  in  many  quarters. 

VIII.  Five  morals  that  Oppenheim  deduced  from  the  devel-^ 

opment  of  the  Law  of  Nations  to  date.  (Oppen- 
heim, I,  73-76.) 

A  law  of  nations  can  exist  only  if  there  is  an  equilib- 
rium, a  balance  of  power,  between  the  members 
of  the  family  of  nations. 

International  law  can  develop  progressively  only  when 


174  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

international  politics,  especially  intervention,  are 

made  on  the  basis  of  real  state  interests. 
The  principle  of  nationality  is  of  such  force  that  it  is 

fruitless  to  try  to  stop  its  victory. 
Every  progress  in  the  development  of  international 

law  wants  due  time  to  ripen. 
The  progressive   development   of   international   law 

depends  chiefly  upon  the  standard  of  public  morality 

on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the  other,  the  economic 

interests. 

REFERENCES 

GENERAL  WORKS 

Oppenheim:  International  Law.    1912.    I,  pp.  44,  58. 

Wilson:  International  Law.    [sth  ed.]    1911. 

Borchard,  E.  M.:  The  Diplomatic  Protection  of  Citizens  Abroad. 


Fillet:  Les  Fondateurs  du  droit  international.    1904. 

Nys:  The  Development  and  Formation  of  International  Law. 

American  Journal  of  International  Law.    January,  1912. 
Oppenheim:  Die  zukunft  des  Volkerrechts.    1911. 
Pollock:  The  Modern  Law  of  Nations  and  the  Prevention  of  War. 

Cambridge  Modern  History,  XIII,  703-729. 
Niemeyer,  Th.:  Internationales  Recht  und  nationales  Interesse. 

1007. 
For  further  references  consult  any  authority  on  international  law; 

also  the  Peace  Year  Book.    1911.    p.  180. 

SPECIAL  TOPICS 

Phillipson:  International  Law  and  Custom  of  Ancient  Greece  and 

Rome.    1911. 

Phillipson:  Two  Studies  in  International  Law.    1908. 
Jacomet:  La  guerre  et  les  traitfe.    1009. 
Fiore:  Le  droit  Internationale  codifie"  et  sa  sanction  juridique. 

Paris,  1911. 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  175 

Bordwell:  The  Law  of  War  between  Belligerents.    1908. 

Spaight :  War  Rights  on  Land.    1911. 

Du  Payrat:  Le  prisionnier  de  guerre  dans  la  guerre  continentale. 

1910. 

Bowles,  T.  G.:  The  Declaration  of  Paris,  1856.    1900. 
Takahashi:   International  Law  applied   to   the  Russo-Japanese 

War.    1908. 
Holland:  Neutral  Duties  in  a  Maritime  War  as  Illustrated  by 

Recent  Events.    In  Proceedings  of  the  British  Academy,  1905-6, 

PP.  55-70. 

Root,  Elihu:  The  Sanction  of  International  Law.    American  Asso- 
ciation for  International  Conciliation.    1908. 
Halleck:  Military  Espionage.    American  Journal  of  International 

Law,  5,  590. 
The  Classics  of  International  Law,  edited  by  James  Brown  Scott. 

Carnegie   Endowment   for  International  Peace,   Washington, 

D.  C. 

Hugonis  Groti  de  jure  belli  et  pacis  libri  tres.    Washington,  1913. 
Grotius:  Rights  of  War  and  Peace.    Translated  by  Campbell. 

1901. 

IMMUNITY  OF  PRIVATE  PROPERTY  AT  SEA 

Bentwich:  The  Declaration  of  London.    1911. 

Monsell:   Declaration  of  London  explained.     In  Navy  League 

Annual,  1911-1912,  pp.  135-151. 
Bowles,  T.  G. :  Sea,  Law  and  Sea  Power,  as  they  would  be  affected 

by  Recent  Proposals.    1910. 
Fulton,  T.  W.:  The  Sovereignty  of  the  Sea.    1911. 
Great  Britain,  Parliamentary  Papers.     1909.     (Cd.  4554),  LIV, 

Correspondence  and  Documents  Respecting  the  International 

Naval  Conference  held  in  London,  December,  1908,  to  February, 

1909. 
Great  Britain,  Parliamentary  Papers.     1909.     (Cd.  4555),  LIV. 

Proceedings  of  the  International  Naval  Conference.  .  .  . 
Wehberg:  Capture  in  War  on  Land  and  Sea.     Translated  by 

Robertson.    1911. 
Hirst:  Commerce  and  Property  in  Naval  Warfare.    1906. 


1 76  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

Cohen:  Immunity  of  Enemy's  Property  from  Capture  at  Sea. 

1911. 

Dupuis:  Le  droit  de  la  guerre  maritime.    1899. 
Einicke:  Rechte  und  Pflichten  der  neutralen  Machte  im  Seekrieg 

nach  dem  Haager  Abkommen  vom  18  Oktober,  1907.    (Mohr.) 

1912. 
Latifi:  Effects  of  War  on  Property.    1909. 

PERIODICALS 

The  American  Journal  of  International  Law.    1007  f. 
Zeitschrift  fur  Volkerrecht  und  Bundesstaatsrecht.    1007  f. 
Revue  de  Droit  International  et  de  Legislation  Comparee.    Brux- 
elles,  1869  f. 


XXI 

INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION 

I.  Ancient  period. 

A.  Oriental  states:  arbitration  had  no  place  in  an  age  when 

some  one  state  must  be  supreme  and  all  others  sub- 
ject. 

B.  Greece:  Arbitration  well  known.     About  75  rg^es  re- 

corded. 

Arbiters:  Amphictyonic  Council,  oracles,  friendly  cities. 
Awards  executed  in  a  ratio  oTiy:  3. 

C.  Rome:  Arbitration  known,  but  the  extension  of  the  Em- 

pire tended  to  bring  it  into  disuse. 
Three  classes  of  arbitration  (Phillipson,  154). 
International,  federal,  administrative. 

II.  Medieval  period.    Not  a  feature  of  the  middle  ages 

though  many  differences  were  settled  by  means  of 
arbitration. 

A.  Arbiters:  pope,  emperor,  various  potentates,  cities. 

B.  Cases  of  arbitral  settlement  in  the  middle  ages  are  nu- 

merous, but  relatively  unimportant.  The  most 
famous  is  the  fixing  of  .the  Line  of  Demarcation  by 
Alexander  VI,  1493,  determining  the  Spanish  and 
Portuguese  claims  to  the  newly  discovered  lands  and 
seas. 

C.  Special  agreements  to  arbitrate  (Moch,  36-38). 

1238.  Treaty  of  alliance  between  Genoa  and  Venice 

contained  a  general  arbitral  clause. 
1291.  Three  Swiss  cantons  accepted  arbitration. 
1389.  Denmark  and  Norway  obliged  by  treaty  to 
177 


178  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

submit  their  differences  to  the  Hanse  for 
settlement. 

1418.  Hanseatic  cities  adopted  principle  of  arbitration. 

1516.  "Perpetual  peace"  between  France  and  Switz- 
erland recognized  the  principle. 
III.  Modern  period. 

A.  Early  advocates  of  arbitration.     (See  Chapters  XVII, 

XVIIL) 

B.  Arbitration  and  mediation  hi  the  early  modern  period. 
Monaco  and  Savoy,  1713.    (See  Bridgman:  First  Book 

of  World  Law,  72.) 

C.  Early  treaties  involving  the  principle  of  arbitration 

(Darby,  240  f.). 

"Conservators  of  Commerce,"  1606. 

Treaties  of  Westminster,  1654-1674. 

Treaty  of  Florence:  England  and  Savoy,  1669. 

Judges  Conservators,  1712.    (Assiento.) 

Treaty  of  Ryswick,  1697. 

Jay   Treaty:    United    States   and    England,    1794. 

L  Usually  regarded  as  the  first  modern  treaty  of 

arbitration. 

D.  The  acceptance  of  arbitration  by  legislative  bodies. 
(It  will  be  noticed  that  the  work  of  the  peace  advocates 

mentioned  hi  Chapters  XVII  and  XVIII  was  in  the 
main  of  a  private,  unofficial  character;  it  prepared  the 
way  for  legislative  or  official  consideration  of  arbitra- 
tion which  is  here  treated.) 
The  United  States  played  a  leading  role. 

1835.  Resolution  favoring  the  erection  of  an  inter- 
national tribunal  of  arbitration  adopted  by 
the  Senate  of  Massachusetts.  (Ladd  and 
Thompson.) 

1837.  Similar  resolution  adopted  by  both  House  and 
Senate  of  Massachusetts. 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION  179 

1842.  William  Jay  proposed  a  treaty  of  arbitration 
with  England. 

1851.  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  (Senate)  approved 
of  arbitration. 

1853.  Senate  of  the  United  States  unanimously 
adopted  Underwood  resolution  favoring 
arbitration. 

1870.  Arbitration  of  the  Alabama  claims. 

1874.  Senate  adopted  a  resolution  favoring  arbitra- 
tion in  the  settlement  of  international  dif- 
ferences. (Hamlin.) 

1874.  Resolution  in  House. 

1882.  President  Arthur's  message  favored  arbitration. 

1889.  First     Pan-American     Conference.       United 

States  favored  advanced  arbitration  agree- 
ment. 

1890.  Congress  approved  a  resolution  favoring  trea- 

ties of  arbitration  with  all  powers.     (Sher- 
man-Hitt.) 

1896.  President  Cleveland  favored  advanced  arbitra- 
tion treaty  with  Great  Britain. 

1904.  President  Roosevelt  took  steps  to  secure  a 
Second  Hague  Conference. 

1910.  President  Taft  advocated  unreserved  arbitra- 
tion. 

1913.  Secretary  of  State  Bryan  proposed  a  definite 
plan  whereby  no  dispute  shall  become  a 
cause  for  war  until  it  shall  have  been  re- 
viewed by  an  international  commission. 
This  to  supplement  arbitration  treaties. 
France,  first  in  Europe. 

1849.  Bouvert  introduced  a  resolution  in  favor  of 
arbitration  into  National  Assembly.  De- 
feated. 


i8o  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

England. 

1849.  Bill  favoring  arbitration  defeated  by  Com- 
mons after  violent  debate.  (Cobden,  Hob- 
house,  Milner-Gibson.) 

1873.  Commons  approved  arbitration,  though  op- 
posed by  Gladstone.     (Richard,  Lawson.) 
1887.  Bill  introduced  into  the  House  of  Lords  but 
withdrawn  because  of  the  opposition  of  Lord 
Salisbury.     (Marquis  of  Bristol.) 
1887.  Treaty  of  arbitration  with  United  States  at- 
tempted by  England  at  the  instance  of  John 
Bright. 
The  Netherlands. 

1873-4.  Question  of  arbitration  raised  in  the  States- 
General  by  Van  Eck  and  Bredius.     No 
action.    Carried  further  in  1878  and  1904. 
Italy. 

1873.  Mancini  introduced  a  bill  into  Chambers  favor- 

ing the  insertion  of  arbitral  clauses  in  trea- 
ties.   Adopted.    Has  been  put  into  practice. 
Sweden. 

1874.  Lower  House  adopted  resolution  favoring  a 

permanent  arbitral  tribunal.     (Jonassen.) 
Denmark. 

1875.  Measure  similar  to  the  last  above  defeated  in 

the  Folketing. 

1878.  Folketing   adopted   a   petition   favoring   the 
arbitration  of  differences  between  Scandi- 
navian states. 
Belgium. 

1875.  Senate  and  Chamber  of  Representatives 
adopted  a  measure  favoring  arbitration. 
(Couvreur,  Thonissen,  Kint  de  Rooden- 
beke.) 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION  181 

The  establishment  of  the  Interparliamentary  Union, 
1889,  and  the  initial  success  of  the  Pan-American 
movement,  1889,  practically  saw  the  triumph  of  the 
principle  of  arbitration  of  international  differences. 
Since  that  time  the  question  has  been  what  the  scope 
of  arbitration  shall  be,  as  will  appear  from  the  fol- 
lowing. 
IV.  Classification  of  treaties  of  arbitration. 

(Writers  differ  in  their  classification,  and  the  following 

grouping  is  a  combination  of  several  schemes.) 
In  all  treaties  of  arbitration  the  clause  of  reference  is 
particularly  important,  as  it  determines  the  char- 
acter of  the  treaty  as  well  as  the  class  of  matters  to  be 
submitted  to  arbitration.  (Am.  J.  of  Intern.  Law,  2, 
823  f.) 

A.  Treaties  submitting  a  specific  difference  to  arbitration, 

drafted  after  the  dispute  began  ("occasional"  arbi- 
tration). This  type  of  treaty  dates  from  about  1800. 

B.  Treaties  agreeing  to  submit  to  arbitration  future  differ- 

ences ("permanent").  This  type  of  treaty  dates 
from  about  1835.  The  principle  was  fairly  well 
accepted  by  1889.  These  treaties  submit  differences: 

1.  Over  the  interpretation  of  the  treaty  (containing  the 

clause  of  arbitration)  or  rising  out  of  it  ("a,  clause 

speciale"). 

First  of  this  kind:  Chile-Peru,  1823  (Moch,  9). 
For  a  list  (incomplete)  of  treaties  of  this  kind  see  La 

Fontaine:  Pasicrisie,  xii. 

2.  Over  any  matter,  whether  rising  out  of  treaties  or 

otherwise,  usually  excepting  certain  categories  of 
disputes  (general  treaties). 

[This  has  been  accomplished  (i)  by  inserting  a  clause 
to  that  effect  in  a  treaty  relating  to  another 
matter  ("  a  clause  generate."  The  first  treaty  of 


182  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

this  kind  according  to  La  Fontaine,  x,  is  Colom- 
bia-Central Republic,  1825.  La  Fontaine  gives 
an  incomplete  list  of  these  treaties);  or  (2),  by  a 
treaty  made  especially  for  the  purpose  (a  treaty 
of  arbitration  proper).  Moch,  p.  41,  seems  to 
hold  that  the  first  treaty  of  this  character  was  one 
between  Colombia  and  Peru,  1822.] 
Disputes  which  are  excepted  from  arbitration  by 
treaties: 

Questions  concerning  the  constitution  of  a  state. 
Questions  of  vital  interest,  independence,  national 
honor,  and  those  which  concern  the  interests  of 
third  parties.     (France-England,   1903;  U.  S.- 
England, 1908;  and  many  others.) 
Questions  not  justiciable  in  their  nature  by  reason 
of  not  being  susceptible  of  decision  by  the  ap- 
plication of  the  principles  of  law  or  equity.    (So- 
called  Taft  treaties  with  England  and  France, 
pending  1912.) 
C.  Compulsory  or  "obligatory"  treaties. 

Treaties  have  been  drawn  which  aim  to  define  what  dis- 
putes between  nations  cannot  be  said  to  compromise 
vital  interest,  independence,  national  honor,  or  the 
interests  of  third  parties,  or  any  of  the  subjects  in- 
cluded under  exceptions  from  arbitration,  and  which 
guarantee  to  submit  to  arbitration  all  disputes  of 
this  class.  These  are  treaties  of  compulsory  arbi- 
tration. Though  these  treaties  differ  somewhat  in 
detail  they  roughly  agree  that,  if  diplomacy  fails, 
arbitration  shall  be  regarded  as  compulsory  for  the 
following  classes  of  differences: 
i.  Disputes  concerning  the  application  or  interpretation 

of  any  treaty,  relating  to: 
(i)  Matters  of  international  private  law. 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION  183 

(2)  The  management  of  companies. 

(3)  Matters  of  civil  and  criminal  procedure  and  of 
extradition. 

2.  Disputes  concerning  pecuniary  claims  based  on  dam- 

ages (with  certain  limitations). 

3.  Differences  of  a  judicial  order.    (Am.  J.  of  Int.  Law, 

2,  823-30.) 

D.  Unlimited  treaties  agree  to  arbitrate  all  differences 
except: 

1.  Those  which  can  be  settled  by  diplomacy. 

All  the  treaties  make  this  exception,  but  it  does  not 
properly  constitute  a  reservation. 

2.  Those  which  affect  the  principles  of  the  constitution  of 

either  country. 

3.  Those  (between  individuals  and  states)  which  ac- 

cording to  the  existing  laws  of  the  country  fall 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  national  courts, 
unless  — 

The  difference  arises  out  of  the  application  of  a  con- 
vention between  the  states. 
Justice  has  been  denied. 

From  the  foregoing  it  appears  that  none  of  the  so-called 
treaties  of  unlimited  arbitration  agrees  to  submit  all 
international  disputes  to  arbitration;  rather,  they 
contemplate  the  arbitration  of  all  questions  which 
are  truly  international,  and  not  purely  governmental 
in  character. 

Treaties  of  this  kind  have  been  entered  into  by  Belgium, 
Siam,  Argentine,  Chile,  Denmark,  The  Nether- 
lands, Italy,  Colombia,  Ecuador,  Portugal,  and  the 
Central  American  States. 

It  should  be  observed  that  most  of  these  treaties  agree- 
ing to  submit  all  differences  to  arbitration  are  be- 
tween nations  that  are  of  second  class  or  are  remote 


184  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

from  each  other  and  whose  differences  are  therefore 
not  likely  to  be  acute  or  subject  to  settlement  by  war. 

E.  National  and  international  treaties  of  arbitration. 

1.  The  foregoing  are  national  treaties,  that  is  they  are 

agreements  which  each  contracting  party  made 
with  the  other  according  to  its  individual  conven- 
ience. If  each  of  the  forty-nine  sovereign  states  of 
earth  made  a  treaty  with  every  other,  there  would 
be  1,176  treaties.  This  complexity  has  led  to  a  de- 
sire for  a  general,  or  international  treaty  which 
all  nations  shall  accept. 

2.  International  treaties  already  exist  in  The  Hague 

Conventions  for  the  peaceful  settlement  of  inter- 
national disputes  (see  Chapters  XXII,  XXIII),  the 
Central  American  convention  to  erect  a  Court  of 
Justice  (see  Chapter  XXIV),  and  the  agreements 
of  the  Pan-American  Conferences. 

F.  Life  of  treaties  of  arbitration. 

Usually  for  five  or  ten  years:  renewable;  lapse  if  not 

renewed. 

Indeterminate:  run  until  abrogated. 

V.  Number  of  treaties  of  arbitration  is  hard  to  establish 
because  of  the  differences  in  classification,  and  in- 
completeness of  researches. 

A.  Treaties  of  occasional  arbitration;  number  not  ascer- 

tained. 

B.  Treaties  agreeing  to  submit  future  differences  ("  a  clause 

speciale"  and  "a  clause  generate"). 
La  Fontaine,  xiv-xv.    1821-1900. 

North  America 172 

Europe 87 

Africa I2 

Asia 6 

South  America 4 

Total... 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION  185 

Modi,  127-130.    1822-1909. 
314  treaties  of  all  classes. 

120  eliminated  because  counted  twice  or  expired. 
194  in  force  in  1909. 

Of  these,  163  are  treaties  of  arbitration  proper  ac- 
cording to  Moch's  classification. 

C.  Treaties  of  compulsory  or  "obligatory"  arbitration. 
These  were  made  in  pursuance  of  Article  19,  of  the 
Convention  for  Pacific  Settlement,  Hague  Confer- 
ence, 1899.  (Am.  J.  of  Int.  Law,  2,  823-30.) 

1903 2  treaties  of  this  kind. 

1904 27 

1905 48 

1906 49 

IQO? 53 

1908 80 

(Bulletin  de  la  Conciliation  Intern.  No.  3,  1908.) 
VI.  Arbitral    Procedure    (Ralston:    International    Arbitral 
Law    and    Procedure,    especially    pp.    17-85;    129- 
140). 

A.  Special  agreement  ("compromis,"  protocol).  Every 
case  is  submitted  to  arbitration  by  means  of  a  special 
agreement. 

1.  Names  the  arbiters.    (A  list  of  persons  who  have  been 

arbiters  in  Richet,  300-301.) 
Single  arbiter. 
Tribunal:  each  disputant  selects  arbiters  and  these 

selected  representatives  name  an  umpire. 

2.  Defines  the  power  of  the  arbiters. 

3.  Fixes  the  rules  of  procedure. 

4.  Defines  the  question  at  issue. 

5.  Promises  to  accept  the  award  (sometimes). 

6.  Special  agreement  as  provided  by  the  Hague  Con- 

ferences. 


186  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

1899, 1,  Art.  31  (Scott:  Texts,  36). 

1907, 1,  Art.  52  (Scott:  Texts,  177). 

Differences  about   the    special  agreement  may  be 

arbitrated. 
7.  Each  power  ratines  the  special  agreement  according 

to  the  provisions  of  its  constitution. 

B.  Procedure. 

The  procedure  is  determined  by  special  agreement.  No 
code  as  yet  accepted,  though  Hague  Conferences 
make  a  beginning,  1899, 1,  Art.  48:  The  "tribunal  is 
authorized  to  declare  its  competence  in  interpreting 
the  'Compromis'  .  .  .  and  in  applying  the  prin- 
ciples of  international  [the  word  '  international '  was 
omitted  from  the  draft  of  the  Convention  for  Pacific 
Settlement,  Art.  73,  1907]  law."  (Scott:  Texts,  40- 

41.) 

C.  Appeal  and  revision. 

Arbitration  implies  the  intention  to  accept  the  award. 
Hague  Conference,  1899,  I,  Art.  55:  "The  parties 
can  reserve  in  the  'Compromis'  the  right  to  de- 
mand the  revision  of  the  award.  In  this  case,  and 
unless  there  be  an  agreement  to  the  contrary,  the 
demand  must  be  addressed  to  the  Tribunal  which 
pronounced  the  award.  It  can  only  be  made  on 
the  ground  of  the  discovery  of  some  new  fact  cal- 
culated to  exercise  a  decisive  influence  on  the  award, 
and  which,  at  the  time  the  discussion  was  closed,  was 
unknown  to  the  Tribunal  and  to  the  party  demanding 
the  revision.  Proceedings  for  revision  can  only  be 
instituted  by  a  decision  of  the  Tribunal  expressly 
recording  the  existence  of  the  new  fact,  recognizing  in 
it  the  character  described  in  the  foregoing  paragraph, 
and  declaring  the  demand  admissible  on  this  ground. 
The  'Compromis'  fixes  the  period  within  which  the 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION  187 

demand  for  the  revision  must  be  made."     (Scott: 
Texts,  42-43-) 

Renewed  in  practically  the  same  terms  in  1907,  Conven- 
tion I,  Art.  83.    (Scott:  Texts,  186-7.) 
D.  The  sanction  of  arbitration:  public  opinion  only. 

VII.  Frequency  of  recourse  to  arbitration.     (Hague  cases. 

See  Chapter  XXIV  and  Appendix  V.) 

Moch,  26.    1800-1900.    212  cases.    All  accepted. 

Darby,  769-917.    1800-1900.    222  arbitrations  proper. 
1900-1904.      21 

Total       243  formal  arbitrations. 

Besides  these,  Darby  gives  297  instances  in  which  he 

considers  the  principle  of  arbitration  was  applied. 

La  Fontaine,  viii.    1794-1900,  177  arbitrations. 

1794-1820 15  cases. 

1821-1840 8 

1841-1860 20 

1861-1880 44 

1881-1900 90. 

By  countries  to  1901.    (To  1904,  Richet,  p.  304.) 

Great  Britain 70  (heads  the  list). 

United  States 56 

Chile 26 

France 26 

(For  the  complete  list  by  countries  and  by  grand 
divisions  see  La  Fontaine,  ix.) 

Richet,  362-4.    1794-1904.    210  cases. 

(Richet  gives  a  list  of  these  cases  by  years  and  by  dec- 
ades, showing  the  average  per  year.) 

VIII.  Serious  differences  settled  by  arbitration  (selected). 
Alabama  case  (1871-72);  The  Carolines  (Germany  and 

France,  1885);  Samoan  case  (United  States,  Ger- 
many, England,  1899);  Guiana  boundary  (England- 
Venezuela,  1899;  United  States  intervened);  Casa- 


i88  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

blanca  affair  (Germany-France,  1909);  House-tax 
case  (England,  France,  Germany- Japan,  1905), 
etc. 

IX.  Classes  of  differences  submitted  to  arbitration. 
Boundary  disputes  (probably  most  abundant),  territory, 

violation  of  territorial  integrity,  pecuniary  claims  of 
all  kinds  (including  the  crown  jewels  of  the  House  of 
Hanover),  commerce,  navigation  of  rivers,  fisheries, 
interpretation  of  treaties,  violations  of  treaties,  in- 
demnities, immigration,  citizenship,  tariffs,  seizure  of 
ships,  false  arrests  (sovereignty?  —  succession  to  the 
throne  of  Persia,  1835;  inheritance  in  Lippe-Detmold, 
1897;  House-tax  in  Japan,  1905;  Ottoman  Public 
Debt,  1903). 

X.  Success  of  arbitration:  Every  award  has  been  accepted. 
(Some  mention  the  award  of  the  King  of  the  Nether- 
lands in  the  Canadian  boundary  case  between  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain,  1831,  as  an  excep- 
tion.  However,  the  United  States  rejected  the-  award 
on   the  ground  that  the  arbiter  had  exceeded  his 
powers  hence  this  is  not  a  real  refusal  to  accept  the 
decision.    The  difference  was  settled  by  the  Webster- 
Ashburton  Treaty  in  1842.) 

Bolivia  and  Peru  threatened  to  reject  an  arbitral  sen- 
tence in  1909,  but  finally  accepted  it. 

XI.  The  cost  of  arbitration.    It  is  insignificant  compared  to 

the  cost  of  war. 

XII.  The  weakness  of  arbitration. 

A.  There  is  no  means  of  compelling  nations  to  resort  to 
arbitration.  The  Hague  Conventions  give  third 
nations  no  authority  except  to  remind  nations  at  dis- 
pute of  the  Hague  Tribunal.  (The  League  to  En- 
force Peace  suggests  a  remedy  for  this  weakness. 
See  Chapter  XXVI.) 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION  189 

B.  Nations  submit  only  those  differences  which  they  do  not 

consider  worth  fighting  for,  that  is,  unimportant 
matters.  Arbitration  is  a  palliative,  not  a  cure,  for 
war. 

C.  Powerful  nations  need  not  submit  even  unimportant 

differences  with  weak  states  to  arbitration. 

D.  Nations  object  to  obligating  themselves  in  advance  to 

arbitrate  differences,  as  such  an  obligation  would  in 
effect  be  a  limitation  of  their  sovereignty  or  freedom 
of  action. 

E.  Arbitration  operates  to  the  advantage  of  the  weak  or  un- 

prepared nation,  by  giving  it  time  to  prepare;  accord- 
ingly a  nation  ready  to  act  cannot  accept  arbitration 
of  vital  matters. 

F.  Arbitral  awards  lack  an  adequate  sanction. 

1.  Public  opinion  is  the  only  sanction  so  far,  and  it  is 

not  enough  developed  or  unified  to  have  any  weight 
in  international  affairs. 

2.  Several  plans  for  making  arbitral  awards  effective 

have  been  proposed. 

a.  Surrendering  the  object  in  dispute  to  the  arbiters 

beforehand,  to  be  disposed  of  according  to  the 
sentence;  or,  if  that  is  not  feasible,  giving  some 
pledge  which  is  to  be  sequestered  if  the  award  is 
not  accepted;  such  as  territory,  a  building,  prop- 
erty, lien  on  customs,  a  ship,  etc. 
(Chile  offered  to  deposit  one  million  dollars  with 
the  Hague  Tribunal  in  her  dispute  with  the 
United  States,  1909.) 

b.  Loss  of  neutrality  for  the  state  refusing  to  accept 

award.    (Proposed  by  Vianna  at  Latin  American 
Scientific  Congress  at  Montevideo.) 


igo  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

REFERENCES 

HISTORY  OF  ARBITRATION 

La  Fontaine:  Pasicrisie  Internationale.    1902. 

Moore:  History  and  Digest  of  International  Arbitrations  to  which 
the  United  States  has  been  a  party.  1893-94.  United  States 
Government  Document.  3267.  7  volumes. 

Me'rignhac,  Alexandre:  Traite  theorique  et  pratique  de  1'arbitrage 
international;  le  role  du  droit  dans  le  fonctionnement  actuel  de 
1'institution  et  dans  ses  destinees  futures.  Paris,  1895. 

Moch:  Histoire  sommaire  de  1'arbitrage  permanent.  1910.  [Bib- 
liography, pp.  5-6,] 

Revon,  Michel:  L'arbitrage  international.  Son  passe,  son  present, 
son  avenir.  Paris,  1892. 

Scott:  The  Hague  Peace  Conferences  of  1899  and  1907.    1909.  I, 

188-253. 

Bloch:  Der  Krieg.    1899.    V,  1-197;  VI. 
Balch,  Thomas  Willing:  L'evolution  de  1'arbitrage  international. 

Philadelphia,  1008. 

Richet:  Le  passe  de  la  guerre  et  1'avenir  de  la  paix.  1907.  243  f. 
Moxey:  International  Law.  American  Law  Review,  40,  188-196. 
Darby:  International  Tribunals.  1004. 

Darby:  International  Arbitration.     International  Law  Associa- 
tion, 22d  Report,  17-37. 
La  Fontaine,  Henri:  Histoire  sommaire  et  chronologique  des 

arbitrages  internationaux.    Bruxelles,  1002. 
Myers,  Denys  P.:  Revised  List  of  Arbitration  Treaties.    World 

Peace  Foundation,  1912. 
Myers,   Denys   P.:  Arbitration  Engagements   now   existing   in 

Treaties,  Treaty  Provisions  and  National  Constitutions.    World 

Peace  Foundation,  1915. 
Descamps  et  Renault:  Recueil  international  des  traites  du  XX 

siecle.    1905. 
Lord:  List  of  Treaties  containing  Provisions  for  Settlement  by 

Arbitration.    Ann.  Am.  Acad.  Pol.  Sci.  2,  471-487. 
Nijhoff:  Traitfe  g6ne*raux  d 'arbitrage,  communiques  au  Bureau 

International  de  la  Cour  Permanente  d'Arbitrage.    1911. 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION  191 

Peace  Year  Book,  1911,  119  f.    Treaties  since  1899. 

Phillipson :  International  Law  and  Custom  of  Ancient  Greece  and 
Rome.  1911. 

Rasder:  International  Arbitration  Among  the  Greeks.  Published 
by  the  Norwegian  Nobel  Institute.  1912. 

Westerman:  Interstate  Arbitration  in  Antiquity.  Classical  Jour- 
nal, 2,  197-211. 

Tod,  M.  N.:  International  Arbitration  Among  the  Greeks.  Ox- 
ford, 1913. 

Moore,  John  Bassett:  The  United  States  and  International  Arbi- 
tration. Washington,  1892. 

Quesada:  Arbitration  in  Latin  America.    1907. 

Van  der  Busch:  Le  proces  international  entre  la  Bolivie  et  le 
Perou.  1909. 

Library  of  Congress:  List  of  References  on  International  Arbitra- 
tion. (Government  Printing  Office,  1908.) 

Cambridge  Modern  History,  XII.    1911.    Bibliography,  954-956. 

(Consult  also  periodicals,  encyclopedias,  treatises  on  international 
law,  etc.) 

(A  collection  of  all  known  arbitrations  and  arbitration  treaties  is  in 
preparation  by  John  Bassett  Moore.) 

GENERAL 

Ralston:  International  Arbitral  Law  and  Procedure.    1910. 
Morris:  International  Arbitration  and  Procedure.    1911. 
Wehberg,  Hans:  Das  Problem  eines  internationalen  Staatenge- 

richtshofes.    Munchen  und  Leipzig.    1912. 
Descamps:  Die  Organisation  des  internationalen  Schiedsgerichts. 

Munchen,  1897. 
Lammasch,  Heinrich:  Die  Lehre  von  der  Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit  in 

ihrem  ganzen  Umfange.    1913. 
Lammasch,  Heinrich:  Internationale  Schiedsgerichsbarkeit.    Son- 

derabdmck  aus  dem  "Staatslexikon."     (Gorres.)      [Contains 

Bibliography.] 
Dumas,    Jacques:    Les    sanctions    de    1'arbitrage    international. 

Paris,  1905. 
Dumas:  De  la  responsabilite"  du  pouvoir  executif  consid6re*e  comme 


192  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

Tune  des  sanctions  de  1'arbitrage  international.    Extract  from 

Revue  Polilique  et  Parlementaire.    August,  1901. 
M6rignhac,  A.:  Le  traite  d 'arbitrage  permanent  au  XX*  siecle. 

1904. 

Scott:  Texts  of  the  Peace  Conferences  at  The  Hague.    1008. 
Balch:  International  Courts  of  Arbitration.    1874. 
Andre":  De  1'arbitrage  obligatoire  dans  les  rapports  internationaux. 

1903. 

Nys:  Les  origines  du  droit  international.    1894. 
Gennadius:  Record  of  International  Arbitration.    1004. 
Seve:  Cours  d'enseignement  pacifiste.    1910.    217-291. 


XXII 

THE  FIRST  HAGUE  CONFERENCE 

May  18 — July  29, 1899 

I.  Origin. 

A.  The  way  for  the  Hague  Conferences  was  blazed  by  the 

various  advocates,  notably  William  Ladd,  mentioned 
in  Chapters  XVII  and  XVIII;  also  by  the  Universal 
Peace  Congresses  and  the  Pan-American  Congresses. 

B.  The  First  Hague  Conference  was  called  by  the  Czar, 

who  had  been  influenced  by  Bloch.  (See  Chapter 
XIV.) 

1.  Rescript  of  the  Czar,  August  24  (O.  S.  Aug.  12),  1898. 

2.  Second  Rescript,  January,  1899  (O.  S.  Dec.,  1898), 

Scott:  Texts  of  the  Peace  Conferences  at  The 
Hague,  p.  4. 

II.  Place.    The  Hague,  as  convenient,  and  the  capital  of  a 

smaller  nation.     Meetings  were  held  in  the  House  in 
the  Woods  ("Huis  ten  Bosch"). 

III.  Participation. 

A.  Difficulty  as  to  what  powers  should  be  invited. 

B.  Russia  invited  all  those  having  representatives  at  St. 

Petersburg;  a  few  exceptions.  The  fact  that  the 
Papacy  was  not  asked  to  participate  created  ill- 
feeling  which  appeared  at  the  final  session  (Scott: 
Conferences,  I,  84  f .) 

59  powers  claimed  sovereignty;  26  were  represented. 

20  European  (Monaco,  San  Marino,  Papacy,  omitted). 

4  Asiatic:  China,  Japan,  Siam,  Persia. 

2  American:  United  States,  Mexico. 
193 


194  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

100  delegates;  from  i  to  8  per  nation.  Each  country 
had  one  vote.  Delegates  seated  alphabetically  (by 
countries). 

IV.  Organization. 

A.  Conference.    When  all  the  delegates  met,  the  meeting 

was  called  a  plenary  session.    There  were  ten  of  these. 
President:  Baron  de  Staal  (Russia)  not  well  versed  in 

parliamentary  procedure. 
Cabinet  consisting  of  "first  delegates." 
Steering  committee  of  first  delegates  of  the  seven 

great  powers. 

B.  Commissions. 

1.  Armaments  and  the  use  of  new  implements,  50  mem- 

bers. 

a.  Military  warfare. 

b.  Naval  warfare. 

2.  Laws  and  customs  of  warfare,  67  members. 

a.  Military. 

b.  Naval. 

3.  Arbitration  and  other  means  of  preventing  war,  59 

members.  This  commission  achieved  the  most  im- 
portant work  of  the  Conference. 

Commissions  on  Petitions,  15  members. 

Commission  on  Editing,  4  members. 

(Each  state  had  right  to  be  represented  on  a  commis- 
sion and  the  first  delegates  determined  member- 
ship.) 

C.  Honorary  offices.    There  were  quite  a  few  of  these  and 

the  appointments  were  made  with  a  view  to  keeping 
delegates  in  a  good  humor. 

V.  Ceremonies  and  social  functions  were  prominent  fea- 

tures of  the  Conference;  often  they  were  arranged 
with  a  view  to  facilitating  the  work  of  the  Conference 
by  winning  or  placating  influential  persons.  The 


THE  FIRST  HAGUE  CONFERENCE  195 

importance  of  the  social  side  of  the  Conference  in 
relation  to  its  achievements,  must  not  be  overlooked. 
The  American  delegation  arranged  a  Grotius  ceremony 
for  July  4. 

VI.  Procedure. 

The  language  of  the  Conference  was  French,  but  any 
delegate  might,  on  request,  have  an  address  trans- 
lated into  his  language.  Full,  but  not  verbatim  re- 
ports of  the  sessions  were  kept. 

The  sessions  were  secret,  because  the  delegates  feared 
that  differences  in  the  Conference  would  be  featured 
and  probably  exaggerated  by  the  press,  and  thus  re- 
act injuriously  on  the  Conference. 

The  reporters,  who  called  themselves  "the  ambassadors 
of  the  peoples"  strenuously  objected,  and  finally  sum- 
maries of  the  work  of  each  session  were  authorized 
and  released  by  the  Commission  on  Editing. 

Many  deputations,  delegations  or  petitions  were  directed 
to  the  Conference,  which  refused  to  receive  some  of 
them  (the  Persians)  in  compliance  with  the  desires 
of  certain  powers. 

Propositions  were  first  considered  and  developed  by  the 
appropriate  commission  and  then  submitted  to  the 
Conference  in  plenary  session.  Thus  the  real  work 
was  done  in  the  Commissions. 

VII.  Achievements. 

A.  The  greatest  achievement  was  undoubtedly  the  fact 

that  the  Conference  accomplished  anything  at  all,  for 
it  was  generally  expected  to  fail.  The  success  of  the 
first  venture  led  to  the  Second  Hague  Conference. 
The  Final  Act  has  been  called  the  "Magna  Charta  of 
International  Law." 

B.  The  common  deliberation  and  general  agreement  of  a 

large  number  of  nations  to  given  principles  of  law 


196  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

was  of  the  highest  importance  as  it  marks  the  nearest 
approach  to  codification  of  international  law  to  that 
date. 
C.  The  resolutions  of  the  Conference,  embodied  in  the 

Final  Act,  were  of  three  kinds: 
i.  Conventions;   there  were   three  of   these.     (Scott: 

Texts,  21-79.) 

a.  Convention  for  the  peaceful  adjustment  of  inter- 
national differences.    (Scott:  Texts,  31-45.) 
Good  offices  and  mediation  to  be  tried. 
Object:  to  permit  third  powers  to  help  disputants 
bring  their  differences  to  arbitration,  or  to  bring 
a  war  to  an  end. 

Encouraged  by  both  the  Hague  Conferences. 
1899,  I.  Arts.  2-8.    (Scott:  Texts,  24-26.) 
1907, 1.  Arts.  2-8.    (Scott:  Texts,  157-159.) 
International  commissions  of  inquiry  created  and 
pronounced    "useful"    (and    "desirable"    in 
1907).     Ralston,  315-318.     First  formal  rec- 
ognition by  Hague  Conference,  1899,  I,  Arts. 
0-14.    (Scott:  Texts,  26-28.) 
If  powers  cannot  settle  a  matter  by  diplomatic 
means,  a  commission  may  be  appointed  to  in- 
vestigate the  facts. 
Constituted  by  special  agreement.    (See  Chapter 

XXI.) 

Powers  are  expected  to  help  the  work  of  the 
commission  by  furnishing  the  facts  hi  their  pos- 
session. 

Report  of  the  commission  has  about  it  nothing  of 
the  character  of  an  award,  and  leaves  the  na- 
tions at  dispute  their  entire  freedom. 
Commission  employed  in  the  "Dogger  Bank" 
>l       affair,  1904,  and  in  the  differences  between 


THE  FIRST  HAGUE  CONFERENCE  197 

France  and  Italy  over  the  seizure  of  ships 
during  the  Tripolitan  war,   1912.    (See  Ap- 
pendix V.) 
Second  Hague  Conference,  (i 007,  I.  Arts.  9-36 

Scott:  Texts,  159-168)  elaborates  the  scheme. 
Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration  established.    The 
best  thing  accomplished  by  the  first  Conference. 
(Scott:  Texts,  30-45.) 

Germany  offered  the  chief  opposition,  which  was 
overcome  by  the  work  of  Zorn  backed  by  Andrew 
D.  White  and  Rolls.  There  was  an  attempt  to 
provide  for  compulsory  arbitration  of  given 
differences.  This  was  defeated  by  German  op- 
position. 

After  the  court  was  agreed  upon,  the  United  States 
made  a  reservation  calculated  to  exclude  matters 
affecting  the  Monroe  Doctrine  from  the  scope  of 
arbitration.    (Scott:  Conferences  I,  80.) 
Nations  agreeing  to  this  convention  and  the  propor- 
tion of  the  world's  population  represented  by 
them. 

World's  population,  1899:  1,531,463,430. 
Signatories,  22  powers,  representing  54  %  of 

the  world's  population. 

Signatories  with  reservation,  4  powers   rep- 
resenting 8%  of  the  world's  population. 
Total  signers,  26  powers,  representing  62%. 
Adhering  to  the  Convention  later  (not  having 
been  represented  at  The  Hague),  18  powers, 
representing  29%. 

Total  accepting  Convention,  44  nations,  rep- 
resenting 91%  of  the  world's  population. 
b.  Convention  regarding  the  laws  and  customs  of  war 
on  land.    (Scott :  Texts,  45-7 1 .) 


198  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

Adopted  a  code  of  warfare,  based  on  the  Lieber 
Code,  which  sought  not  only  to  alleviate  suffer- 
ing, but  to  prevent  it  as  well. 

c.  Convention  for  the  adaptation  to  maritime  war- 
fare of  the  principles  of  the  Geneva  Convention, 
1864.  (Scott:  Texts,  71-79.) 

2.  Declarations.    (Scott,  79-85.) 

a.  To  prevent  the  launching  of  projectiles  and  ex- 

plosives from  balloons  or  by  other  similar  new 
methods.  (Scott:  Texts,  79-80.)  For  five  years. 

b.  To  prohibit  the  use  of  projectiles  the  only  object  of 

which  is  the  diffusion  of  asphyxiating  or  delete- 
rious gases.  (Scott:  Texts,  81-83.) 

c.  To  prohibit  the  use  of  bullets  which  expand  or 

flatten  easily  in  the  human  body  (mushroom  or 
dum-dum  bullets)  such  as  bullets  with  a  hard 
envelope,  of  which  the  envelope  does  not  entirely 
cover  the  core,  or  is  pierced  with  incisions. 
(Scott:  Texts,  83-85.) 

The  opposition  to  these  declarations  was  strongly 
supported  by  Captain  Mahan,  delegated  from  the 
United  States.  (White:  The  First  Hague  Con- 
ference.) 

3.  Wishes.  (Scott:  Texts,  20-21.) 

a.  For  a  revision  of  the  Geneva  Convention. 

b.  Insertion  of  rights  and  duties  of  neutrals  in  pro- 

gram of  an  international  conference. 

c.  For  a  study  of  employment  of  new  types  and  cali- 

bers of  guns. 

d.  For  consideration  of  limitation  of  armaments  and 

war  budgets. 

e.  For  consideration  by  a  future  conference  of  the  in- 

violability of  private  property  at  sea. 
/.  For  consideration  by  a  future  conference  of  the 


THE  FIRST  HAGUE  CONFERENCE  199 

question  of  bombardment  of  posts,  towns  and 
villages  by  naval  forces. 

VIII.  Signatures,   ratifications,  and  reservations.      (Scott: 
Hague  Conventions  and  Declarations,  pp.  229-234.) 

REFERENCES 

Conference  Internationale  de  la  Paix.     (Nijhoff)  1899.    [Official 

minutes.] 

Scott:  Texts  of  the  Peace  Conferences  at  The  Hague.    1908. 
Scott:  The  Hague  Peace  Conferences.    1909. 
Scott:  The  Hague  Conventions  and  Declarations  of  1899  and  1907- 


Hull:  The  Two  Hague  Conferences.    1908. 

Higgins:  The  Hague  Peace  Conferences  and  other  International 

Conferences  concerning  the  Laws  and  Usages  of  War.     1909. 
Schiicking,  Walther:  Staatenverband  der  Haager  Konferenzen. 

Miinchen  und  Leipzig,  1912. 
Myers:  The  Record  of  The  Hague.    World  Peace  Foundation. 

Vol.  Ill,  1913,  No.  10,  Part  II;  Vol.  IV,  1914,  No.  6,  Part  III. 
Myers:  The  Commission  of  Inquiry.    World  Peace  Foundation. 

November,  1913.    Vol.  Ill,  No.  n,  Part  I. 

Merignhac:  La  conference  internationale  de  la  paix.    Paris,  1900. 
Nippold,   Otfried:   Die   Fortbildung  des  Verfahrens  in  volker- 

rechtlichen  Streitigkeiten.     Ein  volkerrechtliches  Problem  der 

Gegenwart  speziell  im  Hinblick  auf  die  Haager  Friedenskon- 

ferenzen.    1907. 

Stead,  William  T.:  Chronique  de  la  Conference  de  la  Haye.    1899. 
Holls:  Peace  Conference  at  The  Hague.    1900. 
Renault:  The  Work  of  The  Hague,  1899.    1907.     (Mean,  1908.) 
White,  A.  D.:  Autobiography.    Parts  relating  to  Hague  Confer- 

ences.    1905.    Printed  as  separate  under  the  title,  The  First 

Hague  Conference.    1912. 
Choate:  The  Two  Hague  Conferences.    1912. 
Zorn:  Article  in  Deutsche  Revue.    November,  1906. 


XXIII 

THE   SECOND  HAGUE   CONFERENCE 

June  i5~October  18,  1907 

I.  Origin.    (Scott:  Texts,  93-111.) 

Requested  by  the  Interparliamentary  Union  in  St.  Louis, 
1904,  which  sent  a  delegation  to  President  Roosevelt, 
asking  him  to  take  the  initiative. 
Circular  of  Secretary  Hay,  1904. 

Roosevelt  relinquished  the  honor  of  calling  the  Confer- 
ence to  the  Czar. 

Czar  issued  invitation  and  program. 
Limitation  of  armaments,  at  the  request  of  the  United 

States,  Spain,  England. 
Collection  of  contract  debts.    Requested  by  the  United 

States. 
H.  Place:  The  Hague;  Hall  of  the  Knights  ("De  Ridder- 

zaal"). 
HI.  Participation. 

More  nations  invited  than  to  First  Conference  (South 

American  Republics). 

59  states  claimed  sovereignty:  47  were  invited;  44 
accepted,  representing  more  than  96%  of  the 
world's  population. 

21    European   states    (Norway   having   become   in- 
dependent).    The  Papacy  was  not  invited. 
4  Asiatic. 
19  American. 
256  delegates:  i  to  n  per  country  (including  technical 


THE  SECOND  HAGUE  CONFERENCE  201 

delegates);  one  vote  per  country;  delegates  seated  as 
before. 

IV.  Organization:  much  like  that  of  the  First  Conference. 

A .  Conference.    Eleven  plenary  sessions. 
President:  M.  Nelidow  of  Russia. 

Steering  committee  consisting  of  the  first  delegates  of 
the  Great  Powers. 

B.  Commissions. 

1.  Arbitration. 

a.  Projects  for  arbitration  and  prevention  of  war,  103 

members. 

b.  Maritime  prizes,  89  members. 

2.  War  on  land. 

a.  Laws  and  customs  of  war  on  land,  79  members. 

b.  Rights  and  duties  of  neutrals  on  land,  and  declara- 

tion of  war,  82  members. 

3.  War  on  the  sea.  J 

a.  Bombardment  of  ports,  and  the^tee  of  submarine 

mines,  torpedoes,  etc.,  73  merries. 

b.  Belligerent  ships  in  neutral  waters;  and  the  applica- 

tion of  the  Geneva  Convention  to  naval  warfare, 
82  members. 

4.  Maritime  law,  114  members. 
Commission  on  petitions,  5  members. 
Commission  on  editing,  29  members. 

V.  Ceremonies  and  festivities  were  like  those  of  the  First 

Conference. 

Some  considered  the  social  functions  to  be  overdone  to 
the  detriment  of  the  work  of  the  Conference. 

Cornerstone  of  the  Palace  of  Peace  (gift  of  Carnegie) 
laid,  July  30. 

Each  country  to  furnish  something  in  the  way  of  dec- 
oration for  the  structure.  (Suggestion  of  d'Estour- 
nelles  de  Constant.) 


202  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

VI.  Procedure. 

Much  the  same  as  in  the  First  Conference.    The  pro- 
ceedings were  more  open. 

VII.  Achievements. 

A.  The  Second  Conference  achieved  less  striking  results 

than  the  first;  indeed  its  chief  work  lay  in  improving 
and  developing  the  work  of  the  former  Conference. 
The  session  dragged  out  to  considerable  length  and 
grew  tedious  for  the  delegates. 

B.  The  work  of  the  Conference  embodied  in  the  Final 

Act  was  of  several  kinds: 

1.  Conventions. 

Convention  I,  for  the  pacific  settlement  of  interna- 
tional disputes.    (Scott:  Texts,  155-193.) 
Improved  the  procedure  of  the  Permanent  Court 
of   Arbitration,   and   the   facilities   of   good 
offices,  mediation  and  commissions  of  inquiry, 
party  to  a  dispute  may,  without  consult- 
the  other,  declare  its  willingness  to  submit 
the  difference  to  arbitration. 
Arbitration  remained  voluntary  except  in  case 
of  contract  debts  (Convention  II)   and  of 
Prize  (Convention  XII). 

Convention  II,  limiting  the  use  of  force  for  the  re- 
covery of  contract  debts.     (Scott,  193-198.) 

Force  to  be  used  only  after  arbitration  has  failed. 
Conventions  III,  IV,  V.    Further  rules  of  warfare  on 

land.    (Scott,  198-240.) 

Conventions  VI,  XI,  XIII.    Rules  for  maritime  war- 
fare.   (Scott,  240-288.) 

Convention  XII,  relative  to  the  creation  of  an  inter- 
national Prize  Court.    (Scott,  288-315.) 

2.  Declaration  prohibiting  the  discharge  of  projectiles 

and  explosives  from  balloons.    (Scott,  332-334.) 


THE  SECOND  HAGUE  CONFERENCE  203 

The  nations  were  cautious  in  signing  this. 

3.  Declarations  of  principle.    (Scott,  137-8.)    The  Con- 

ference unanimously: 

a.  Admitted  the  principle  of  compulsory  arbitration. 

b.  Declared  that  certain  disputes,  particularly  those 

relating  to  the  interpretation  and  application  of 
treaties,  may,  without  restriction,  be  submitted 
to  compulsory  arbitration. 

4.  The  conference  expressed  its  faith  in  the  usefulness  of 

international  conferences,  urged  the  limitation  of 
military  expenditure,  and  further  examination  of 
means  to  this  end. 

5.  Opinions.    The  Conference: 

a.  Recommended  the  adoption  of  the  proposed  Court 

of  Arbitral  Justice.     (Scott,  141-154.    See  also 

350-) 

b.  In  case  of  war  pacific  relations,  particularly  com- 

mercial and  industrial  relations,  of  belligerents 
and  neutrals  should  be  maintained  by  all. 

c.  Powers  should  by  treaty  regulate  the  position,  as 

regards  military  charges,  of  foreigners  residing 
within  their  territories. 

d.  Regulations  relative  to  the  law  and  customs  of 

naval  warfare  should  figure  in  the  program  of  the 
next  Conference,  and  that,  as  far  as  possible, 
powers  should  at  sea  apply  the  laws  and  customs 
of  war  on  land. 

6.  The  Conference  expressed  a  wish  for  a  third  Confer- 

ence to  be  "held  within  a  period  corresponding  to 
that  which  has  elapsed  since  the  preceding  Confer- 
ence." The  calling  of  this  new  Conference  was 
taken  out  of  the  hands  of  any  one  government  and 
given  to  an  international  committee  which  is  to  meet 
for  that  purpose  about  two  years  before  Conference 


204  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

assembles.    A  Committee  has  charge  of  preparing 
the  program.    Preliminary  steps  were  taken  in  The 
Hague  in  February,  1912,  for  the  summoning  of  the 
Third  Conference  in  1915,  and  France,  Sweden, 
Denmark,    Norway    and    The    Netherlands    had 
moved  hi  the  matter.    The  Great  War  has  post- 
poned the  further  consideration  of  a  Conference. 
VUL  Signatures,   ratifications,   and   reservations.     (Scott: 
Hague  Conventions  and  Declarations,  pp.  235-259.) 

REFERENCES 

Scott:  Texts  of  the  Peace  Conferences  at  The  Hague.     1908. 

Deuxieme  conference  internationale  de  la  paix.  Actes  et  docu- 
ments. (Nijhoff)  1907. 

Commissions  rationales  de  la  paix  et  preparation  de  la  troisieme 
conference  de  La  Haye.  1911. 

Courrier  de  la  Conference  de  la  paix.  Published  by  W.  T.  Stead 
under  the  auspices  of  the  Fondation  pour  Pmternationalisme  a 
La  Haye.  1907$ 

Stead,  William  T.:  Le  parlement  de  Phumamte.  Amsterdam, 
1007. 

Scott:  American  Addresses  at  the  Second  Hague  Peace  Confer- 
ence. Boston,  1910. 

Wehberg:  Kommentar  zu  d.  Haager  Abkommen  betreffend  die 
friedliche  Erledigung  internationaler  Streitigkeiten,  vom  18 
Oktober,  1907.  1911.  [Contains  bibliography  on  Hague  Con- 
ferences.] 

Nippold,  Otfried:  Die  zweite  Haager  Friedenskonferenz.     1908. 

Schiicking,  Walther:  Der  Staatenverband  der  Haager  Konferen- 
zen.  1912. 

Zorn:  Das  Volkerrechtliche  Werk  der  beiden  Haager  Friedens- 
konferenzen.  Sonderabdruck  aus  Zeitschrift fur  Politik.  Berlin, 
1009. 

Bourgeois,  L6on :  La  deuxieme  conference  de  la  Haye.    Paris,  1907. 

Renault,  Louis:  Les  deux  conferences  de  la  paix,  1899  et  1907. 
Paris,  1908. 


XXIV 

THE  INTERNATIONAL  JUDICIARY 

I.  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration,   1899.    (Scott:  Texts, 
pp.  30-45;  170-188.) 

A.  Administration  of  the  court. 

1.  Permanent  Administrative  Council  consists  of  dip- 

lomatic representatives  accredited  to  The  Hague. 
Organizes  and  administers  the  International  Bureau. 

2.  International  Bureau;  record  office  of  court. 
Secretarial  in  character;  has  custody  of  archives. 
Makes  necessary  preparations  and  gives  its  prem- 
ises for  court  purposes. 

Publishes  the  documents  of  cases  determined  by  the 

court. 
Expenses  carried  by  signatory  powers  in  proportion 

fixed  by  Universal  Postal  Union. 

B.  Jurisdiction. 

1.  Competent  for  all  arbitration  cases  unless  parties 

agree  to  institute  a  special  tribunal. 

2.  Non-signatory  powers  may  use  court  free. 

C.  Organization. 

1.  Judges.     (See  list  of  in  World  Almanac  1916,  pp. 

130-132.) 

Each  power  selects  four  or  less  persons.    Same  per- 
son may  be  selected  by  several  powers. 

150  selected  up  to  1912. 

Term  six  years;  renewable. 

2.  Judges  for  any  particular  case. 

Each  disputant  selects  an  equal  number  of  judges 
from  list  above. 

205 


206  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

Only  one  may  be  from  nation  of  disputant  (1907 

amendment). 

These  four  choose  an  umpire. 
Failing  to  agree,  selection  is  entrusted  to  a  third 

power. 
This  failing,  each  party  selects  a  different  power 

and  these  two  determine  the  umpire. 
This  failing,  after  two  months,  each  party  selects 

two  judges  from  list  above  (not  nationals)  and  lot 

determines  which  of  these  is  to  be  umpire  (1907). 
3.  Arbitrators  enjoy  diplomatic  privileges  and  immu- 
nities. 

D.  Operation. 

1.  Preliminaries. 

a.  Agreement  of  nations  necessary  to  bring  case  before 

the  court  (amendment  1907). 

b.  "Compromis"  (text  of  this  agreement)  states  dif- 

ference and  arbitrators'  powers. 
c.  Signatory  powers  have  duty  of  reminding  other 
states  of  court. 

2.  Procedure. 

a.  To  sit  at  The  Hague  unless  some  other  place  be 

selected  by  the  arbitrators  (1907). 

b.  Language  to  be  used  determined  by  the  court. 

c.  Discussions  public  only  if  parties  assent. 

d.  Recorded  in  "proces-verbaux." 

This  supplied  to  the  powers  invited  to  the  Second 
Peace  Conference  as  well  as  to  powers  which  have 
adhered  to  the  convention  (1907). 

E.  Deliberations  of  the  court  private  ("and  remain  secret," 

1007). 

3.  Award. 

a.  Given  by  majority  vote,  accompanied  by  reasons. 
Minority  may  record  dissent  when  signing. 


THE  INTERNATIONAL  JUDICIARY  207 

b.  Award  is  binding  upon  parties. 

c.  No  appeal  from  the  award. 

d.  Revision  permitted  if: 

(1)  Stipulated  by  "compromis"  and  within  time 

stipulated. 

(2)  New  facts  of  vital  importance  are  discovered 

which  were  unknown  at  time  of  award  to 
court  and  party  demanding  revision.  (Court 
determines  that  question,  1907.) 

e.  Drawn  up  in  writing  and  read  at  a  public  meeting  of 

the  tribunal,  the  agents  and  counsel  of  the  parties 
being  present. 
4.  Expenses  of  a  hearing. 

Each  party  pays  its  own  and  an  equal  share  of  the 

court's. 

F.  Cases  decided  by  the  court  (See  Appendix  V). 
II.  International  Prize  Court,  1907.     (Scott,  pp.  288-317.) 

A.  Administration. 

1.  The  Administrative  Council  fulfills  with  regard  to  the 

Prize  Court  the  same  functions  as  to  the  Permanent 
Court  of  Arbitration  but  only  representatives  of 
contracting  powers  may  be  members  of  it. 

2.  The  International  Bureau  acts  as  registry  to  the 

court. 

B.  Jurisdiction. 

1.  Cases  appealed  under  fixed  conditions  after  having 
been  tried  in  national  courts.    No  further  appeal. 

2.  It  has  always  been  assumed  that  the  declaration  of 
London  will  serve  as  a  sort  of  code  for  the  court. 

C.  Organization. 

1.  Composed  of  judges  and  deputy  judges  appointed  by 

the  contracting  powers. 

2.  Appointed  for  six  year  term;  appointments  renewable; 

judges  equal  in  rank;  seniority  obtains. 


208  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

3.  The  court  is  composed  of  fifteen  judges;  8  powers  are 

represented  all  the  time:  Germany,  United  States, 
Austria-Hungary,  France,  Great  Britain,  Italy, 
Japan,  and  Russia.  Judges  from  others  sit  "by 
rota,"  as  shown  by  a  table  in  Scott,  pp.  316-7. 

4.  Paid  by  International  Bureau.    No  other  compensa- 

tion allowed. 

D.  So  far  the  court  has  not  been,  used. 
HE.  Central  American  Court  of  Justice,  1907.    (International 
Bureau  of  American  Republics,  Vol.  25,  pp.  1351-57.) 

A.  Administration. 

1.  Court  elects  its  own  officials,  including  president, 

vice-president,  secretary,  and  treasurer. 

2.  Makes  its  own  rules  of  procedure. 

3.  Sits  at  city  of  Cartago  in  Costa  Rica  unless  necessary 

to  move. 

B.  Jurisdiction. 

1.  "All  controversies  or  questions  which  may  arise 

among  them  of  whatsoever  nature  and  no  matter 
what  their  origin  may  be,  in  case  the  respective 
Departments  of  Foreign  Affairs  should  not  have 
been  able  to  reach  an  understanding." 

2.  Also  international  questions  which  may  arise  be- 

tween a  Central  American  government  and  a  for- 
eign government. 

3.  Questions  between  an  individual  and  a  Central  Amer- 

ican government. 

4.  Shall  also  have  jurisdiction  over  the  conflicts  which 

may  arise  between  the  legislative,  judicial  and  ex- 
ecutive powers. 

C.  Organization. 

i.  Five  justices,  named  by  the  legislative  body  of  the 
respective  powers  and  also  two  substitutes  from 
each. 


THE  INTERNATIONAL  JUDICIARY  209 

2.  Appointed  for  five  years  and  can  carry  on  no  other 

work  during  period. 

3.  All  five  necessary  for  a  quorum.    Agreement  of  three 

or  more  necessary  for  a  decision. 

4.  Judgments    communicated    to    all    five    Republics. 

Binding  and  final.     Salaries  paid  by  treasurer  of 
the  court.    Expenses  borne  equally  by  all  nations. 
D.  This  agreement  is  valid  for  ten  years. 
IV.  Proposed   Court  of  Arbitral  Justice,   planned  at   the 
Second  Hague  Conference,  1907.     (Scott:  Texts,  pp. 
141-154.) 

A.  Administration. 

Administered  by  International  Bureau. 

B.  Jurisdiction. 

1.  Cases  to  be  decided  on  their  merits. 

2.  Only  signatory  powers  can  use  it. 

C.  Organization. 

1.  Composed  of  judges  and  deputy  judges  selected  from 

persons  of  high  standing  in  their  respective  coun- 
tries, as  far  as  possible  from  members  of  the  Per- 
manent Court  of  Arbitration.  Method  of  appoint- 
ment left  to  individual  nations. 

2.  Term  of  judges  12  years;  equal  in  rank;  seniority. 

3.  Three  judges,  selected  annually  by  others,  form  dele- 

gation to  carry  the  administrative  work  of  court. 

4.  This  delegation  is  competent  to  decide  certain  types 

of  questions  if  disputants  submit  them;  but  each 
disputant  has  the  right  to  have  one  of  its  nationals 
act  as  judge  in  a  case  in  which  it  is  concerned. 

5.  Judge  not  to  act  in  case  where  his  country  is  a  liti- 

gant. 

6.  Salaries  paid  by  International  Bureau.     No  other 

compensation  permitted. 

7.  Enjoy  diplomatic  privileges  and  immunities. 


210  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

D.  Procedure. 

1.  Court  to  meet  at  fixed  times  and  sit  until  business  is 

finished. 

2.  Sits  at  The  Hague  and  cannot  be  transferred  unless 

absolutely  obliged  by  circumstances. 

3.  A  report  of  the  doings  of  the  court  drawn  up  every 

year  by  the  delegation  and  sent  to  contracting 
powers. 

E.  The  Hague  Conference  left  it  to  diplomatic  agency  to 

complete  the  erection  of  this  court;  this  has  never 
occurred. 

REFERENCES 

Wilson,    George   Grafton:   Hague   Arbitration   Cases.     (Ginn.) 


Scott:  Hague  Peace  Conferences.    1909,  1,  423-464. 

Wehberg,  Hans:  Kommentar  zu  dem  Haager  "Abkommen,  be- 

treffend  die  friedliche  Erledigung  internationaler  Streitigkeiten." 

1007. 
Wehberg:  Ein  internationaler  Gerichtshof  fur  Privatklagen.    Ber- 

lin, 1911. 

Tettenborn:  Das  Haager  Schiedsgericht.    Bonn,  1911. 
Meili    und    Mamelok:    Das    internationale    Privat  -  und    Zivil- 

prozessrecht  auf  Grund  der  Haager  Conventionen.    1911. 
Moulin:  La  doctrine  de  Drago.    Paris,  1908. 
Ozanam:  La  jurisdiction  internationale  des  prises  maritime.    1910. 
Consult  works  on  International  Law. 

SOURCES 

Scott:  Texts  of  the  Peace  Conferences  at  The  Hague.     1908. 
Recueil  des  Actes  et  Protocoles  concernant  le  Litige  du  "Fonds 

Pieux  des  Californies."    La  Haye,  1002. 
Recueil  des  Actes  et  Protocoles  concernant  le  Litige  entre  L'Alle- 

magne,  La  France,  et  La  Grande  Bretagne,  et  Le  Japon.    La 

Haye,  1004. 
Recueil  des  Actes  et  Protocoles  concernant  le  Litige  entre  L'Alle- 


THE  INTERNATIONAL  JUDICIARY  211 

magne,    L'Angleterre,    et   L'ltalie    et    Venezuela.    La   Haye, 

1904. 
Recueil  des  Actes  et  Protocoles  concernant  le  Differend  entre  La 

France  et  La  Grande  Bretagne  a  propos  des  boutres  de  Mascate. 

La  Haye,  1905. 
North  Atlantic  Coast  Fisheries  Tribunal  of  Arbitration.     The 

Hague,  1910. 
Protocoles   des   Seances   du   Tribunal   d' Arbitrage  .  .  .  au   su- 

jet  .  .  .  de  la  Compagnie  des  bateaux  a  vapeur  "Orinoco." 

La  Haye,  1910. 
Rapport  du  Conseil  Administratif  de  la  Cour  Permanente  d'Arbi- 

trage  sur  les  travaux  de  la  Cour  sur  le  fonctionnement  des 

services  administratifs  et  sur  les  defenses  pendant  PAnnee. 

1901  f. 


XXV 

MISCELLANEOUS   PROJECTS   FOR   PEACE   THROUGH   DIPLOMACY 

I.  Diplomatic  agreements  and  proposals  to  remove  friction 

between  nations. 
A.  Readjustment  of  boundaries  and  territories. 

1.  Boundaries  and  territorial  acquisitions  have  often 

been  satisfactorily  arranged  without  war. 

Boundary  and  separation  of  Norway  and  Sweden, 
1905. 

Canadian-American  boundary  settlements.  In  this 
connection  the  agreement  not  to  fortify  the  Cana- 
dian frontier  and  the  effect  of  this  step  on  the  good 
relations  of  Canada  and  the  United  States  should 
be  noted. 

Louisiana  purchased  from  France  by  the  United 
States,  1803. 

Gadsden  Purchase  by  the  United  States,  1853. 

Alaska  purchased  from  Russia  by  the  United  States, 
1867. 

Brazil  purchased  a  disputed  area  from  Bolivia  in  1904. 

Partition  of  Samoa  by  Great  Britain,  Germany  and 
the  United  States. 

2.  Proposals  for  territorial  and  boundary  readjustments. 
Proposal  that  the  United  States  voluntarily  surrender 

the  Panhandle  to  Canada.  House  Joint  Res.  146, 
introduced  by  Mr.  Smith  of  Maryland,  Oct.  31, 
1913.  Also  H.  J.  Res.  83. 

[Though  not  related  to  boundaries,  the  voluntary  act 
of  the  United  States  hi  returning  the  amount  of  the 

212 


PROJECTS  FOR  PEACE  THROUGH  DIPLOMACY    213 

Boxer  Indemnity  to  China  may  be  mentioned  here 
as  an  instance  of  international  good  will.] 

B.  Neutralizations. 

1.  Neutralizations  in  the  past.     (See  Chapter  XXVI.) 

2.  Proposed  neutralizations. 
Alsace-Lorraine,  Philippines,  Panama  Canal. 

C.  Immunity  of  private  property  at  sea. 

The  Hague  Conventions  provided  for  the  immunity  of 
private  property  on  land.  Similar  immunity  on  the 
sea  was  opposed  and  defeated  by  Great  Britain,  both 
at  The  Hague  and  also  at  the  London  Conference 
(1909).  The  United  States  has  long  advocated  this 
principle  and  stood  for  it  at  the  Hague  Conferences. 
(White:  The  First  Hague  Conference.) 

D.  Joint — or  world — control  of  arenas  of  conflict  (Lipp- 

mann's  proposal). 

E.  Many  disputes  have  been  settled  by  diplomatic  means. 

A  few  of  the  graver  disputes  have  been  designated 
by    Fried    (Handbuch    I,    96-103)    as    "unfought 
wars." 
II.  Schemes  to  delay  the  outbreak  of  war:  "Cold  storage 

treaties." 

A.  This  is  the  idea  behind  commissions  of  inquiry  (see 
Chapters  XXII,  XXIII),  and  particularly  behind  the 
Bryan  Treaties  by  which  the  signatories  agree  that 
all  disputes  which  cannot  be  settled  by  diplomacy 
shall  go  before  an  international  commission  which 
shall  have  a  year  to  investigate,  during  which  neither 
disputant  may  declare  war.  Thirty  treaties  of  this 
kind  between  United  States  and  other  nations. 
(November,  1915.)  Argentine,  Brazil  and  Chile 
entered  into  a  similar  treaty  May  28,  1915.  See 
New  York  Times,  September  20,  1914.  Myers:  The 
Commission  of  Inquiry;  The  Wilson-Bryan  Peace 


214  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

Plan.    World  Peace  Foundation,  November,  1913. 
Vol.  Ill,  No.  u,  Parti. 

B.  The  objection  to  these  treaties  is  that,  like  arbitration, 
they  give  an  unprepared  power  a  chance  to  prepare 
and  therefore  deprive  the  ready  nation  of  the  fruits 
of  its  vigilance  and  effort. 
III.  Limitation  of  Armaments. 

A.  There  has  usually  been  a  demand  for  disarmament,  re- 

duction of  armaments,  or  limitation  of  armaments, 
chiefly  on  the  part  of  religious  pacifists  and  peace 
societies,  on  the  ground  that  the  possession  of  arms 
is  a  cause  of  war. 

The  Interparliamentary  Union  has  considered  dis- 
armament. 
The  League  to  Limit  Armaments,  43  Cedar  Street, 

New  York. 

Others  regard  armaments  as  a  result  of  the  danger  of 
war,  which  is  inherent  in  the  present  nationalism, 
hence  attack  the  latter  as  the  root  of  the  evil. 

B.  Official  projects. 

1.  Prince  Kaunitz,  Prime  Minister  of  Austria,  about 

1764,  proposed  to  Prussia  that  each  country  dis- 
miss three-fourths  of  its  army.  Prussia  declined. 
Joseph  II  of  Austria  renewed  the  suggestion  in 
1769,  but  Frederick  the  Great  again  declined. 
(Fried:  Handbuch  II,  p.  32.) 

2.  The  Agreement  not  to  fortify  the  Canadian  frontier, 

1817,  was,  in  effect,  a  limitation  of  armaments. 

3.  Robert  Peel,  in  House  of  Commons,  1841. 

4.  Garibaldi's  manifesto,  1860  (unofficial). 

5.  Disraeli  in  1862  in  the  House  of  Commons  proposed  a 

convention  with  France  for  limiting  armaments. 
Cobden's  "The  Three  Panics,"  1863,  was  prob- 
ably responsible  for  Disraeli's  proposal. 


PROJECTS  FOR  PEACE  THROUGH  DIPLOMACY    215 

6.  Napoleon  HI  in  1853  stated  his  design  to  call  a 

European  Conference  to  reduce  armaments.  He 
discussed  the  project  in  1867  with  Czar  Alexander 
II  and  William  I  of  Prussia.  He  made  another 
proposal  to  Prussia  in  1870  through  the  English 
Ambassador,  but  Bismarck  rejected  it.  France 
voluntarily  reduced  her  army  from  100,000  to 
90,000  and  the  bill  to  this  effect  became  a  law  two 
weeks  before  the  Franco-Prussian  war  broke  out. 

7.  Bismarck  broached  the  idea  of  a  Franco-German 

agreement  in  1870  before  the  Franco-Prussian 
war  ("Une  Lettre  inedite  de  Bismarck,"  printed 
in  Le  Matin,  Feb.  14,  1914). 

8.  Deputy  Gotz  in  the  Reichstag  of  the  North  German 

Union  1867,  and  Virchow  in  1869  introduced  bills 
for  reduction  of  armaments.  In  1879  Deputy 
van  Biihler  introduced  a  resolution  into  the  Ger- 
man Reichstag  calling  for  a  conference  to  secure  a 
limitation  of  armaments.  Resubmitted  it  in  1880. 
Bismarck  defeated  it. 

9.  In  1878  Crispi  suggested  a  restriction  of  armaments 

to  Bismarck,  who  rejected  it. 

10.  Henry  Richard,  in  1880,  urged  Parliament  to  attempt 

a  reduction  of  armaments. 

11.  Argentine  and  Chile  limited  naval  armaments  by 

treaty,  1902-1903.  (British  and  Foreign  State 
Papers,  95,  759;  96,  311-12.)  "The  Christ  of  the 
Andes"  commemorates  the  treaty. 

I  12.  Churchill's  proposal  to  Germany  for  a  "naval  hol- 
iday," 1913. 

13.  The  Congress  of  the  United  States  on  June  25, 1910, 
by  joint  resolution  authorized  a  Commission  of 
five  to  inquire  into  the  possibility  of  securing  some 
limitation  of  armaments,  and  of  constituting  the 


216  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

combined  navies  of  the  world  into  an  international 
police  force.  The  Commission  was  never  ap- 
pointed. 

14.  The  First  Hague  Conference  was  called  chiefly  to 
consider  a  limitation  of  armaments.    Its  endeavor 
has  been  noted.    (See  Chapter  XXII.) 
C.  There  are  practical  difficulties  to  any  program  for  dis- 
armament.    (Hobson:  Towards  International  Gov- 
ernment, p.  15  f.) 

1.  Difficulty  in  securing  consent  of  suspicious  govern- 

ments. 

2.  What  constitutes  an  equal  reduction  on  the  part  of 

several  nations? 

3.  Russia  could  not  disarm  the  Cossacks. 

4.  Advance  contracts  for  munitions  would  hinder  any 

limitation  of  armaments. 
IV.  Agencies  working  for  the  improvement  of  international 

relations  through  diplomacy  and  international  law. 
Institut  de  droit  international,  founded  1873.    n  rue 

Savaen,  Ghent. 
International  Law  Association,  founded  1873;  took  its 

present  name  in  1895.     i  Mitre  Court  Buildings, 

Temple,  London,  E.  C. 
American   Society  of  International  Law,   Founded 

1906.    2  Jackson  Place,  Washington,  D.  C. 
American  Institute  of  International  Law,  Founded 

1915.    2  Jackson  Place,  Washington,  D.  C. 
American  Society  for  Judicial  Settlement  of  Interna- 
tional Disputes,  founded  1909.   14  West  Mt.  Vernon 

Place,  Baltimore. 
The  National   Council  for  Arbitration  and  Peace, 

founded  1911  (in  connection  with  the  Lake  Mohonk 

Conference). 
Lake  Mohonk  Conference  on  International  Arbitra- 


PROJECTS  FOR  PEACE  THROUGH  DIPLOMACY    217 

tion,  founded  1895,  by  Albert  K.  Smiley.    Lake 

Mohonk,  New  York. 
Societe  beige  de  1'Arbitrage  et  de  la  Paix,  founded 

1889.    Square  Vergote  9,  Brussels. 
Societe  francaise  pour  1'Arbitrage  entre  nations  (in 

connection  with   the  Interparliamentary  Union), 

founded  1867.    24  rue  Pierre  Curie,  Paris. 
Groupe  parlementaire  francaise  de  1'Arbitrage  Inter- 
national.   27  bis  Avenue  Henri  Martin,  Paris. 
International  Arbitration  League,  founded  1870.    183 

St.  Stephen's  House,  Victoria  Embankment,  S.  W., 

London. 
International    Arbitration    and    Peace    Association, 

founded  1880.    40-41,  Outer  Temple,  Strand,  W.  C. 

London. 
Societa  Operaia  pro  Arbitrate  internazionale  obliga- 

torio  e  Disarmo.    Casa  del  Popolo,  Milano. 
Schwedische  Friedens  —  und  Schiedsgerichtsvereini- 

gung,  founded  1883.  Regeringsgatan  74,  Stockholm. 
World's  Court  League  of  America,  founded  1915.    18 

East  4ist  Street,  New  York. 

REFERENCES 

d'Estournelles  de  Constant:  Limitation  of  Naval  and  Military 
Expenditure;  Report  drawn  up  in  the  name  of  the  Commission 
entrusted  with  the  discussion  of  the  problem  at  the  Conference 
of  the  Union  in  Rome  in  the  Month  of  October,  1911.  1912. 

Umfrid,  O.:  Die  Formel  der  Abriistung  mit  besonderer  Beriick- 
sichtigung  des  englischen  Abriistungsvorschlages. 

Umfrid,  O.:  Poistungsstillstannd.    1911. 

Blymyer,  William  Hervey:  Observations  on  compulsory  arbitra- 
tion and  disarmament  under  penalty  of  non-intercourse,  in- 
cluding a  plan  for  a  convention.  New  York,  1907. 

Foster,  John  W.:  Limitation  of  Armament  on  the  Great  Lakes. 


218  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

Carnegie   Endowment   for   International   Peace,    Division   of 

International  Law.    1914. 
Levermore,  Charles  H.:  The  Anglo-American  Agreement  of  1817 

for  Disarmament  on  the  Great  Lakes.    World  Peace  Founda- 
tion.   Boston,  1914. 
Dunning,  William  Archibald:  The  British  Empire  and  the  United 

States.    A  review  of  their  relations  during  the  century  of  peace 

following  the  treaty  of  Ghent.    1914. 
Lodge,  Henry  Cabot:  One  Hundred  Years  of  Peace.    New  York, 

1912. 
Rashdau:   Der   Friedensgedanke   und   die   Neutralisierung   der 

europaischen  Grenzen.    Deutsche  Rev.    December,  1910. 
Lippmann:  The  Stakes  of  Diplomacy.     1915. 
Griffin:  List  of  References  on  International  Arbitration.    (Library 

of  Congress.)    Washington,  1908.    [On  limitation  of  armaments, 

pp.  63-69.] 
Koeben:   Der   aussichtsreichste   Schritt   zur   Beschrankung   der 

Seeriistungsausgaben.    1911. 
Crane:  International  Disarmament.    1898-99. 
Picard:  La  question  de  la  limitation  des  armaments  de  nos  jours. 

(Jouve.)    1911. 
Toinet:  La  limitation  conventionelle  des  armaments.    (Pedone.) 

1912. 


XXVI 

INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION  AND  FEDERATION 
THE  LIMITATION  OF  NATIONAL   SOVEREIGNTY 

I.  Diplomatic    settlements   have   this  fundamental   short- 

coming, that  the  interests  of  a  given  nation  take  prec- 
edence over  international  law,  as  has  been  shown  so 
well  by  the  Great  War.  Thus  diplomacy  and  inter- 
national law,  which  are  relied  upon  to  help  nations  in 
their  dealings  with  each  other,  fail  when  they  run 
counter  to  the  interests  of  a  nation;  they  are  useful 
for  ordinary  questions,  but  fail  in  crises,  and  nothing 
more  can  be  expected  of  them  as  long  as  nationalism 
prevails.  For  this  reason  it  is  advocated  that  there 
must  be  some  form  or  reorganization  with  concomitant 
restriction  of  the  present  sovereignty  of  nations. 

II.  The  extent  to  which  sovereignty  shall  be  restricted. 

A.  Internationalists  hold  that  nationalism  is  no  longer 
expressive  of  the  age,  but  that  federation  is  not, 
as  yet,  feasible;  that  the  present  sovereignty  of 
states  is  detrimental,  but  that  one  cannot  hope  to 
change  the  theory  suddenly.  Hence,  they  propose 
internationalism,  that  is,  a  sort  of  confederation,  a 
cooperative  union  of  sovereign  states,  a  true  concert 
of  powers.  The  individual  schemes  vary  greatly  and 
are  usually  not  very  explicit,  chief  emphasis  being 
placed  on  faults  of  the  present  system.  {Fried  (Hand- 
buch  II,  267)  speaks  of  an  international  "Zweckver- 
band,"  meaning  voluntary  union  of  states  for  special 
219 


220  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

purposes  like  the  Postal  Union.  Lippmann's  pro- 
posal for  control  of  " arenas  of  conflict"  by  interna- 
tional commissions  is  of  this  orderTj 

1.  Internationalists  favor  Pan-Europeanism  rather  than 

a  United  States  of  Europe. 

2.  Pan- Americanism  belongs  to  this  class. 

a.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  unilateral  and  constitutes 

an  extension  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  United 
States  beyond  its  boundaries.  Thus  it  may  be, 
and  to  some  extent  is,  resented  by  Latin  America. 

b.  For  this  reason  Pan-Americanism  is  advocated  as  a 

voluntary  cooperative  agreement  —  not  an  al- 
liance —  of  the  states  of  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere./The  A.  B.  C.  Conference  at  Niagara 
Falls, 

B.    Federationists/  (Note  Chapters  XVII,  XVIIL}' 
i.  The  contentions  of  the  federationists. 

a.  They  believe  that  nationalism  is  out  of  date;  that 

as  long  as  it  and  national  sovereignty  exist,  war 
and  its  ills  will  continue;  that  international  law 
can  never  remedy  these  evils,  because  inter- 
national law  is  merely  the  embodiment  of  prin- 
ciples to  which  rival  self-seeking  nations  agree, 
and  they  agree  to  nothing  that  they  consider 
essential  to  themselves;  that  the  fundamental 
step  toward  eliminating  war  is  an  organization 
with  power,  above  the  several  states,  which  shall 
determine  what  is  right  and  just  in  any  given 
case. 

b.  They  hold  that  nations  should  retain  their  local 

autonomy  in  order  to  develop  their  own  quali- 
ties and  institutions,  their  Kultur,  to  the  highest 
possible  extent. 

c.  They  would  have  nations  lose  their  absolute  sover- 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION  221 

J  i         . 
CAxJLA/^-' 

eignty  so  that  their  .Klultur  may  be  safe,  as  long 
as  sovereignty  survives,  nations  will  think  that 
their  peculiar  ideals  are  in  conflict  with  other 
ideals,  and  there,  will  ,be  war,  in  which  one  tries 
to  suppress  the'Kultur  of  the  other.  Only  under 
some  federation  will  local  Kulturs  be  safe. 

2.  The  basis  for  federation  is  at  hand. 

a.  The  interdependence  and  interrelation  of  nations 

actually  exists  in  adequate  measure  in  all  fields 
except  the  political. 

b.  Even  in  the  political  field  there  are  marked  tenden- 

cies away  from  nationalism. 

The  many  voluntary  conventions  respecting  com- 
mon interests. 

The  Hague  Conferences  suggest  a  world  legisla- 
ture, a  parliament  of  man;  but  in  fact  they  were 
conferences  of  ambassadors. 

The  Hague  Tribunal  may  prove  to  be  the  beginning 
of  a  world  court. 

c.  Federations  have,  as  a  whole,  been  successful. 
The  Achaian  League,  B.  C.  281-146. 

The  Swiss  Confederation,  A.  D.  i29i-date. 
The  United  Provinces,  A.  D.  1579-1795. 
United  States,  i789~date. 
German  Empire  (1866),  i87i-date. 
South  African  Union,  1910. 

3.  Federation  implies  a  central  organization. 

4.  Federation  also  implies  a  change  in  the  conception  of 

patriotism.  jjnstead  of  being  national  it  must  be 
planetary.  /"^Above  the  nations  is  humanity"  — 
..^Goethe. 

(The  old  patriotism:  "Our  country!  May  she  always 
be  in  the  right,  but  our  country  right  or  wrong."  — 

Stephen  Decatur. 


222  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

The  new  patriotism:  "Our  country!  When  right  to 
be  kept  right,  when  wrong  to  be  put  right." — 

Carl  Schurz. 
5.  Projects. 
;ra;~\Villiam    Ladd's    project    (See   Chapter  XVIII.) 

which  is  that  of  the  American  Peace  Society. 
b.  The  Armed   International   Tribunal   Association. 
(Temporary  Headquarters:  1707  H  Street,  Wash- 
ington, D.  C.) 

C.  Cosmopolitans  would  obliterate  all  national  bound- 
aries and  have  a  world  government  and  world  citizen- 
ship. "Cosmocracy."  It  is  not  very  widely  ad- 
vocated. *  t 

HE.  The  means  and  methods  of  restricting  national  sover- 
eignty. 

A.  Some  plans  contemplate  voluntary  restriction. 
There  has  been  a  slight  tendency  to  place  what  was 
regarded  as  the  general  interest  above  the  interests 
of  individual  states.  This  tendency,  of  course,  im- 
plies a  limitation  of  the  liberty  of  individual  states, 
a  restriction  of  their  sovereignty,  and  hence  it  cannot, 
under  prevailing  conceptions,  expect  to  make  head- 
way. 

i.  Intervention  is  an  illustration.  One  or  several  states 
claim  a  right  to  intervene  hi  the  affairs  of  another. 
International  law  recognizes  a  well-defined  right 
to  intervene.  It  is  significant  to  note  that,  if  there 
is  such  a  thing  as  intervention  by  right,  there  is  no 
such  thing  as  the  absolute  sovereignty  of  nations. 
Intervention  in  the  affairs  of  another  nation  on  the 
ground  of  humanity  is  an  admission  that  humanity 

takes  precedence  over  national  sovereignty. 

Intervention  in  Naples   (1821)   and  Spain   (1823), 
by  Austria  and  France  respectively  to  overthrow 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION  223 

anti-monarchical  governments;  it  was  done  with  a 

semblance  of  enforcing  treaties. 
Intervention  of  the  United  States  in  Cuba  (1898),  on 

the  plea  of  humanitarianism. 
The  Monroe  Doctrine,  representing  as  it  does  a  claim 

of  the  United  States  to  a  paramount  interest  in  the 

Western  Hemisphere,   implies   limitations  of  the 

action  of  Latin  American  states. 

2.  Neutralization  of  a  state  involves  a  limitation  of 

sovereignty  (Wicker:  Neutralization).    The  chief 

instances  of  neutralization  are: 
Switzerland,   1815. 
Belgium,  1839  (violated,  1914). 
Black  Sea,  1856  (abrogated  1871). 
Luxemburg,  1867  (violated,  1914). 
Congo  Basin,  1885. 

3.  Guarantees  of   territorial   integrity  also  involve  a 

surrender  of  sovereignty.    They  are  rare. 
Protocol  of  London,  1850,  guaranteed  the  integrity 
of  Denmark  excepting  Schleswig  and  Holstein. 

4.  Extra-territorial  rights  denote  a  surrender  of  sover- 

eignty on  the  part  of  the  state  which  grants  them. 

The  Capitulations  in  Turkey,  and  the  consular  juris- 
dictions of  foreign  powers  in  Persia,  China  and 
formerly  in  Japan  were  of  this  kind. 
B.  Others  propose  leagues  of  several  states  strong  enough 

to  impose  their  interpretation  of  what^  is  for  the 

general  good.     "Peace  syndicates."     (Afolinari,  251, 

287.) 

i.  This,  though  fundamentally  different  in  purpose,  is 
much  like  present  alliances  and  may  simply  result 
in  an  opposing  combination  of  states,  and,  hence, 
in  a  perpetuation  of  the  theory  of  equilibrium  or 
balance  of  power. 


224  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

2.  Theoretically  it  is  nothing  new,  for  it  still  contains  the 

fallacious  principle  which  is  causing  all  war,  that 
each  party  decides  what  is  right  without  con- 
sulting the  other,  and  then  tries  to  enforce  its 
opinion. 

3.  Proposals  of  this  class  are  innumerable;  a  few  are 

given  for  illustration. 
League  of  neutrals  (Molinari,  258;  287^ 
League  of  Great  Britain,  France  and  the  United 

States  (fullerton:  Problems  of  Power). 
Federation  of  the  English-speaking  world  (Johnston: 

Arms  and  the  Race,  i4$)J 
League  of  the  Allies  in  the  Great  War  (Hobhouse: 

The  World  in  Conflict). 
An  international  police.     This  has  long^  and  often 

been  advocated  in  some  form  or  other:  Henry  IV, 

Grotius,  Abbe  de  Saint-Pierre,  Penn,  Concert  of 

European     Powers     1815,    Hpjy    Alliance,     etc. 

Roosevelt's  "Posse  comitatus.^ 
The    League    to    Enforce    Peace.       (See    Chapter 

XXVIIL) 
League  of  Economic  non-intercourse.     (See  Chapter 

XXVIIL) 

ZrLco-f  H*fi**f) 
REFERENCES 

Fried,  A.  H.:  Handbuch  der  Friedensbewegung.    1911-13. 
Fried,  A.  H.:  Europaische  Wiederherstellung.    1915. 
Hobson:  Towards  International  Government.    1915. 
Lippmann,  Walter:  The  Stakes  of  Diplomacy.    1915. 
Nasmyth,  George  W.:  Towards  World  Government.     Reprint 

from  the  Survey.    November  20,  1915. 
Novicow,  J.:  La  Federation  de  1'Europe.    Paris,  1001. 
Ostwald,  Wilhelm:  Die  Organisation  der  Welt.    1910. 
Schucking,  Walter:  Die  Organisation  der  Welt.     Leipzig,  1908. 
Duplessix,  E.:  L'organisation  Internationale.    Paris,  1909. 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION  225 

Bolce,  Harold:  The  New  Internationalism.    1907. 

Hill,  D.  J.:  World  Organization  as  Affected  by  the  Nature  of  the 

Modern  State.    1911. 

Ladd,  William:  Essay  on  Congress  of  Nations.    1840. 
Nangest:  La  paix  universelle  et  le  disarmament  militaire  par 

1'organisation  de  la  volonte  des  nations.    1909. 
Reinsch:  Public  International  Unions.    1911. 
Bridgman:  The  First  Book  of  World-Law.    1911. 
Trueblood:  Federation  of  the  World.    1899. 
Kamarowsky:  Tribunal  International.      (French  translation  by 

Westman)  Paris,  1887.    233-263. 

Crafts:  A  Primer  of  the  Science  of  Internationalism.    1908. 
VII  International   Congress  of  Universal  Peace:  International 

Code. 

Molinari:  Grandeur  et  decadence  de  la  guerre.    1898. 
Novicow:  Die  Gerechtigkeit  und  die  Entfaltung  des  Lebens.    1907. 

367-96. 

Dumas:  Universal  Peace.    New  York,  1908. 
Hearing  of  May  7,  1910,  on  Joint  Resolution  to  authorize  the 

appointment  of  a  commission  to  draft  articles  of  international 

federation  and  for  other  purposes.    House  Joint-Resolution  187, 

6ist  Congress,  2d  Session,  Washington.    (Government  Print- 

ing Office.)    1910. 

Crawford:  United  States  of  Europe.    Fortnightly  R.,  80,  992. 
Holt:  Dawn  of  the  World's  Peace.    World's  Work,  21,  14128  f. 
La  Fontaine:  Existing  Elements  of  a  Constitution  of  the  United 

States  of  the  World.    American  Association  for  International 

Conciliation.    1911. 
Hugo,  Victor:  The  United  States  of  Europe.   World  Peace  Founda- 

tion.   1914. 
Bourgeois,  L.:  Pour  la  societe  des  nations.    Le  Figaro,  20,  XI. 

MONROE  DOCTRINE  AND  PAN-AMERICANISM 
Bingham:    The   Monroe   Doctrine,  —  An   Obsolete   Shibboleth. 


Hull:  The  Monroe  Doctrine:  National  or  International?     1915. 
President  Wilson's  Message,  December  7,  1915. 


226  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

[Blakeslee]  :  Clark  University  Conferences  on  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 


Chandler,  Charles  Lyon:  Inter  American  Acquaintances.     (Uni- 

versity Press)  Sewanee,  Tennessee,  1915. 
The  New  Pan  Americanism.    World  Peace  Foundation,  Febru- 

ary, 1916.  Vol.  VI.  No.  i.  Part  I. 
Usher,  R.  G.:  Pan-Americanism.  1915. 
Moore,  J.  B.:  The  Growth  of  Pan-American  Unity.  Independent. 

January  n,  1915. 

Barrett,  John:  The  Pan-American  Union.     Washington,   1911. 
Fried:  Pan-Amerika.    Berlin,  1910. 

"Le  Bresil"  (Rio  Janeiro).    November  2,  November  16,  1913. 
Bulletin  of  the  International  Bureau  of  American  Republics. 

Washington,  1891-1899. 
Bulletin  of  the  Pan-American  Union.    Washington,  1893  f. 

MISCELLANEOUS 

Annuaire  de  1'Union  Interparlementaire.    Brussels.    (In  progress.) 
Annuaire  de  la  Vie  Internationale.     Brussels,   1905-6;  1908-9; 

1910-11. 

La  Vie  Internationale.    Brussels,  1912  f. 
Suttner,  Bertha  von:  Ground  Arms!    (McClurg.)    1906. 
Freeman:  History  of  Federal  Government  in  Greece  and  Italy. 

1893. 

Spiller:  Inter-Racial  Problems.    1911.    383  f. 
Wicker:  Neutralization.    1911. 
Andersen,  Hendrik  Christian:  Creation  of  a  World  Center  of 

Communication.    Paris,  1913. 
Hodges:  The  Doctrine  of  Intervention.    1915. 
Taft,  W.  H.:  The  United  States  and  Peace.    1914. 
(See  also  references  to  Chapter  XVHI.) 


XXVII 

MISCELLANEOUS  FORCES  WORKING  FOR  THE  IMPROVEMENT  OF 
INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

I.  Socialists  and  laboring  classes. 

A.  Before  the  Great  War,  the  socialists  of  the  leading 

nations  declared  that  the  fundamental  struggle  of 
society  was  between  classes  and  not  between  nations. 
They  professed  to  be  internationals;  in  some  cases,  — 
Herve  and  the  anti-militarists  of  France  —  they  were 
anti-patriotic.  Briand  some  years  ago  recommended 
a  general  strike  of  workmen  to  check  a  country  from 
declaring  war. 

B.  International  socialism  collapsed  under  the  war,  thus 

showing  much  less  power  than  it  was  supposed  to 
have. 

II.  Woman. 

A .  Her  nature. 

1.  Sees  and  concerns  herself  more  about  social  and 

economic  evils;  and  will  want  to  have  these  re- 
moved in  place  of  indulging  in  war. 

2.  Is  less  combative  by  nature  than  man;  is  opposed  to 

violence. 

3.  Is  less  destructive  and  wasteful  than  man. 

4.  Often  experiences  the  losses  and  consequences  of  war 

more  keenly  than  man. 

5.  Suffrage  gives  her  the  power  to  express  her  opinion 

effectively. 

6.  International    marriages   among   the   upper   classes 

often  lead  to  a  closer  relationship  between  those 
in  authority  in  different  nations. 
227 


228  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

B.  The  Woman's  Peace  Party,  organized  in  Washington, 

D.  C.,  January  10,  1915.  Jane  Addams,  National 
Chairman. 

Platform:  "The  purpose  of  this  Organization  is  to 

enlist  all  American  women  in  arousing  the  nations  to 

respect  the  sacredness  of  human  life  and  to  abolish 

war.    The  following  is  adopted  as  our  platform: 

"i.  The  immediate  calling  of  a  convention  of  neutral 

nations  in  the  interest  of  early  peace. 
"  2.  Limitation  of  armaments  and  the  nationalization  of 

their  manufacture. 

"3.  Organized  opposition  to  militarism  in  our  own  coun- 
try. 

"4.  Education  of  youth  in  the  ideals  of  peace. 
"5.  Democratic  control  of  foreign  policies. 
"6.  The  further  humanizing  of  governments  by  the 

extension  of  the  franchise  to  women. 
"7.  'Concert  of   Nations'   to  supersede  'Balance  of 

Power.' 
"8.  Action  toward  the  gradual  organization  of  the  world 

to  substitute  Law  for  War. 
"9.  The  substitution  of  an  international  police  for 

rival  armies  and  navies. 
"  10.  Removal  of  the  economic  causes  of  war. 
"  ii.  The  appointment  by  our  Government  of  a  commis- 
sion of  men  and  women,  with  an  adequate  appro- 
priation, to  promote  international  peace." 

C.  The  interest  of  women  is  shown  by  their  activity  in  the 

great  humanitarian  society  of  the  Red  Cross;  the 
International  Congress  of  Women  at  The  Hague, 
April,  1915;  the  International  Conference  of  Women 
Workers  to  Promote  Permanent  Peace  at  the 
Panama-Pacific  Exposition,  July,  1915;  the  Peace 
Sections  in  Women's  Clubs,  etc. 


MISCELLANEOUS  FORCES  AND  NATIONS       229 

III.  Free  traders. 

Tariffs  create  artificial  restraints  of  trade.  The 
fundamental  purpose  of  protective  tariffs  —  to  prof- 
it by  reducing  foreign  competition  —  is  a  cause  for 
international  disputes  and  war. 

Emeric  Cruce  was  the  first  to  link  free  trade  with 
peace. 

The  Cobden  Club,  and  its  early  leaders,  Richard 
Cobden  and  John  Bright,  favored  free  trade  as  a 
means  to  peace. 

IV.  International  languages,  —  World  language. 

The  difference  in  languages  is  a  real  obstacle  in  all 
endeavors  to  bring  different  nationalities  together; 
it  is  to  overcome  this  that  international  languages 
are  advocated.  There  are  various  of  these:  Ido, 
Esperanto  (Zamenhof's  scheme),  Solresol,  Volapiik, 
Neutral,  Pan-roman  (Universal),  Interlingua,  Sim- 
ple, Adjuvilo,  Langue  bleue  (Bollack's  scheme),  etc. 
Ido  and  Esperanto  are  the  most  important. 

V.  Foundations. 

A.  The  World  Peace  Foundation   (endowed  by  Edwin 

Ginn,  1910),  40  Mt.  Vernon  Street,  Boston. 
Subsidiary:  American  School  Peace  League,  403  Marl- 
borough  Street,  Boston. 

B.  The   Carnegie   Endowment   for   International   Peace 

(endowed  by  Andrew  Carnegie,  1910). 

1.  Division   of    Intercourse   and   Education,   Nicholas 

Murray  Butler,  Director,  407  West  nyth  St.,  New 
York. 

Subsidiary:  American  Association  for  International 
Conciliation,  F.  P.  Keppel,  Secretary,  407  West 
ii7th  St.,  New  York  City. 

2.  Division  of  Economics  and  History,  John  Bates  Clark, 

Director,  407  West  nyth  Street,  New  York  City. 


230  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

3.  Division  of  International  Law,  James  Brown  Scott, 
Director,  2  Jackson  Place,  Washington,  D.  C. 

C.  Carton  Foundation.    To  promote  the  study  of  Inter- 

national Polity.    Maurice  V.  Brett,  Secretary,  White- 
hall House,  Whitehall,  London,  S.  W. 

D.  Nobel  Peace  Prize. 

Founded  by  Alfred  Nobel,  1895,  as  one  of  five  annual 
prizes  distributed  by  the  Nobel  Committee  of  the 
Norwegian  Storthing,  —  Headquarters,  Drammen- 
svei  19,  Christiania,  Norway. 

Recipients: 

1901.  H.    Dunant,    founder    of    the    Red    Cross 

Society,    and   Frederic   Passy   of   Paris, 
Nestor  of  the  peace  movement. 

1902.  E.  Ducommun  and  A.  Gobat,  successive  sec- 

retaries of  the  International  Peace  Bureau 
of  Berne. 

1903.  Randal  Cremer,  founder  of  the  Interparlia- 

mentary Union. 

1904.  Institute  of  International  Law. 

1905.  The  Baroness  von  Suttner. 

1906.  Theodore  Roosevelt. 

1907.  L.  Renault  of  France  and  E.  T.  Moneta  of 

Italy. 

1908.  K.  P.  Arnoldson  of  Sweden  and  Frederick 

Bajer  of  Denmark. 

1909.  M.  A.   Beernaert  of  Belgium  and  Baron 

d'Estournelles  de  Constant  of  France. 

1910.  The  International  Peace  Bureau. 

1911.  T.  M.  C.  Asser  of  Holland,  founder  of  the 

Institut  de  Droit  International,  and  Alfred 
Fried  of  Vienna,  editor  of  the  Friedenswarte. 

1912.  No  award  (later  to  Elihu  Root  of  the  United 

States). 


MISCELLANEOUS  FORCES  AND  NATIONS       231 

1913.  Senator  Henri  La  Fontaine  of  Belgium. 
1914  and  1915.    No  award. 

E.  Church  Peace  Union,  Founded  by  Andrew  Carnegie, 
Frederick  Lynch,  Secretary,  70  Fifth  Avenue,  New 
York  City. 

VI.  International  Friendship  Societies.     See  the  Interna- 
tional Peace  Year  Book,  1915,  pp.  69-70. 

REFERENCES 

WAR  AND  SOCIALISM 

Humphrey,  A.  W.  :  International  Socialism  and  the  War.    London, 


Walling:  The  Socialists  and  the  War.    New  York,  1915. 
Wells,  H.  G.:  The  War  and  Socialism.    1914. 
Fendrich,  Anton:  Der  Krieg  und  die  Sozialdemokratie.     1915. 
Feuerstein:  Sozialdemokratie  und  Weltgericht. 
Must  we  Arm?    Hillquit-Gardner  Debate.    Rand  School  of  Social 
Science.    1915. 

WAR  AND  WOMAN 

Stobart,  Mrs.  St.  Clair:  War  and  Women.    From  experience  in  the 

Balkans.    1915. 
Hansbrough:  War  and  Woman.    An  Exposition  of  Man's  Failure 

as  a  Harmonizer.    1915. 
Schreiner,  Olive:  Woman  and  the  War.    1914. 
d'Estournelles  de  Constant:  Woman  and  the  Cause  of  Peace. 

American  Association  for  International  Conciliation.    1911. 
Mead:  Woman  and  War.    World  Peace  Foundation.    1914. 
Publications  of  the  Woman's  Peace  Party. 

INTERNATIONAL  LANGUAGES 

Couturat  et  Leau:  Histoire  de  la  langue  universelle.    1003. 
Couturat  et  Leau:  Les  nouvelles  langues  Internationales.     1907. 
Guerard:  English  as  an  International  Language.     Pop.  Science 

Monthly,  October,  1911. 

Novicow:  La  langue  Internationale  auxiliaires  de  Pavenir.    1911. 
Vizetelly:  Communication  to  Chicago  Dial.    October  14,  1915. 


xxvm 

SCHEMES    FOR    DIMINISHING   THE   CHANCE   OF   WAR    AND    FOR 
COMPELLING  NATIONS   TO  KEEP  PEACE 

I.  Miscellaneous  proposals. 

A.  General  strike  of  the  laboring  classes  is  advocated  by 

socialists. 

B.  Discouraging  enlistment  in  armies.     Anti-Enlistment 

League. 

C.  Limiting  armaments,  and  opposing  enlargement  of  ar- 

maments, on  the  ground  that  the  present  rivalry 
in  armaments  is  practically  certain  to  lead  to  war. 
(See  above,  Chapter  XXV.)  League  to  Limit  Ar- 
maments, 43  Cedar  Street,  New  York;  Rational  De- 
fense League,  Washington,  D.  C.;  American  Union 
against  Militarism,  Munsey  Building,  Washington, 
D.C. 

D.  Making  an'impartial  and  thorough  investigation  of  the 

facts  of  an  international  difference  before,  instead 
of  after,  the  war. 

E.  Providing  for  publicity  of  all  the  facts  in  dispute. 

Combating  the  dissemination  of  fictitious  news. 
Enacting  an  International  Libel  Law.  Reducing 
sensationalism  in  the  press. 

F.  Improving  international  law. 

1.  Codifying  international  law. 

2.  Providing  for  periodic  meetings  of  the  Hague  Con- 

ference. 

3.  Increasing  the  authority  of  the  Hague  Conferences,  in 

the  direction  of  making  them  more  truly  a  world 
legislature. 

232 


SCHEMES  FOR  DIMINISHING  CHANCE  OF  WAR    233 

G.  Improving  the  system  of  arbitration. 

1.  Increasing  the  scope  of  arbitration.   Making  unlimited 

treaties  of  arbitration. 

2.  Providing  for  judicial  settlement  of  differences. 

(American  Society  for  the  Judicial  Settlement  of 
International  Disputes,  Baltimore.) 

3.  Securing  a  general  treaty  of  arbitration  to  be  signed 

by  all  powers. 

4.  Inserting  a  clause  in  the  constitution  of  countries 

binding  them  by  their  fundamental  law  to  resort  to 
arbitration.  This  has  been  done  by  Brazil,  Vene- 
zuela, Ecuador,  San  Domingo,  and  certain  Central 
American  States. 

Brazil.     Constitution  of  1891,  Art.  34,  Sec.  II.  (Dodd: 

Modern  Constitutions,  I,  158.) 

"The  national  congress  shall  have  exclusive  power  to 
authorize  the  government  to  declare  war,  when 
arbitration  has  failed  or  cannot  take  place,  and  to 
make  peace." 

Venezuela.    Constitution  of   1904,   Art.    120.     (Larned: 

History  for  Ready  Reference,  VII,  686.) 
This  article  provides  that  all  international  treaties  shall 
contain  the  clause:  "All  differences  between  the  con- 
tracting parties  shall  be  decided  by  arbitration  with- 
out going  to  war." 

5.  Extending  the  scope  of  compulsory  arbitration. 

H.  Wiping  out  secret  diplomacy,  and  providing  for  popular 
control  of  treaties,  and  for  a  plebiscite  before  war  is 
declared.  Union  of  Democratic  Control.  (See  be- 
low.) 

I.  Establishing  an  international  coinage  and  monetary 
system. 

/.  Prohibiting  war  loans  and  the  export  of  money  to  bellig- 
erents; declaring  money  contraband. 


234  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

K.  Providing  substitutes  for  war. 

1.  William  James,  in  his  "Moral  Equivalent  of  War", 

urges  social  conscription  under  which  the  con- 
scripts would  perform  peaceful  duties  related  to  the 
welfare  of  the  state. 

2.  Felix  Adler  advocates  a  reform  of  social  conditions 

that  will  make  ordinary  life  more  attractive  and 
remove  the  premium  and  economic  pressure  on 
going  to  war. 

3.  Ray  Stannard  Baker:  The  Great  American  Conscrip- 

tion.   American  Magazine,  January,  1916. 

4.  Making  peace  more  attractive. 

"When  peace  is  made  as  handsome  as  war  there 
will  be  hope  of  war's  passing."  —  Woodrow  Wilson. 

5.  MacKaye:  A  Substitute  for  War,  1915. 

6.  Smith,  Luther  E.:  Municipal  Pageants  as  Destroyers 

of  Race  Prejudice,  —  hi  Proceedings  of  the  Saga- 
more (Mass.)  Sociological  Conference,  July,  1914. 

7.  Jane  Addams:  Newer  Ideals  of  Peace.    The  chance  for 

enterprise  in  social  work. 
L.  Providing  symbols  or  emblems:  peace  flags,  buttons, 

uniforms,  minister  or  secretary  of  peace,  etc. 
M.  Economic  pressure  and  non-intercourse,  boycotts.     It 
would  mean  refusing  to  recognize  the  nation,  its 
officials,   its  acts,  papers,  stamps,  citizens,   ships, 
goods,  declining  to  trade  with  it,  refusing  loans, 
cancelling  bonds  and  stocks  listed  at  boards  of  trade, 
putting  discriminating  tariffs  on  its  goods,  etc. 
Pacific  blockades  belong  to  this  group. 
N.  Compelling  recourse  to  arbitration. 

i.  The  League  to  Enforce  Peace  formed  in  Independence 

Hall,  Philadelphia,  June  17,  1915  (Headquarters, 

70  Fifth  Avenue,  New  York),  has  four  proposals: 

Article  I.  "All  justiciable  questions  arising  between 


SCHEMES  FOR  DIMINISHING  CHANCE  OF  WAR    235 

the  signatory  powers,  not  settled  by  negotiation, 
shall,  subject  to  the  limitations  of  treaties,  be  sub- 
mitted to  a  judicial  tribunal  for  hearing  and  judg- 
ment, both  upon  the  merits  and  upon  any  issue  as 
to  its  jurisdiction  of  the  question." 

Article  II.  "All  other  questions  arising  between  the 
signatories  and  not  settled  by  negotiation,  shall  be 
submitted  to  a  council  of  conciliation  for  hearing, 
consideration  and  recommendation." 

Article  III.  "The  signatory  powers  shall  jointly  use 
forthwith  both  their  economic  and  military  forces 
against  any  one  of  their  number  that  goes  to  war, 
or  commits  acts  of  hostility,  against  another  of  the 
signatories  before  any  question  arising  shall  be 
submitted  as  provided  in  the  foregoing."  1 

Article  IV.  "Conferences  between  the  signatory 
powers  shall  be  held  from  time  to  time  to  formulate 
and  codify  rules  of  international  law,  which,  unless 
some  signatory  shall  signify  its  dissent  within  a 
stated  period,  shall  thereafter  govern  in  the  de- 
cisions of  the  judicial  tribunal  mentioned  in  art- 
icle I." 

a.  Article  III  is  most  significant  in  this  connection. 
It  proposes  to  compel  recourse  to  arbitration  (not 
peace)  by  the  use  of  economic  and  military  force. 

1  On  January  20,  1916,  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  League  to 
Enforce  Peace  revised  this  Article  so  as  to  bring  it  into  agreement  with 
the  plan  of  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  mentioned  elsewhere  in  this 
section.  The  revised  Article  reads: 

"The  signatory  powers  shall  jointly  use  forthwith  their  economic 
forces  against  any  of  their  number  that  refuses  to  submit  any  question 
which  arises  to  an  international  judicial  tribunal  or  council  of  concilia- 
tion before  threatening  war.  They  shall  follow  this  by  the  joint  use 
of  their  military  forces  against  that  nation  if  it  actually  proceeds  to 
make  war  or  invades  another's  territory." 


236  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

That  is,  it  proposes  to  limit  the  sovereignty  of 
states  in  this  one  respect  that  they  shall  not  go 
to  war  before  trying  peaceful  settlement.  It  does 
not  propose  to  compel  the  acceptance  of  an  ar- 
bitral award. 

b.  The  place  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace  in  the 

natural  course  of  development  is  thus  stated  by 
Hamilton  Holt. 

The  first  step  to  restrict  war  was  to  devise  ma- 
chinery to  make  war  less  probable.  This  was 
attempted  by  the  Hague  Conference. 

The  second  was  urging  the  use  of  this  machinery 
as  has  been  done  by  many. 

The  third  is  compelling  the  use  of  the  machinery. 
This  is  the  proposal  of  the  League  to  Enforce 
Peace. 

The  fourth  will  be  to  compel  nations  to  accept 
the  decision  of  the  machinery. 

c.  The  difficulties. 

The  signatories  are  to  act  against  any  one  of 
their  number  that  commits  "acts  of  hostility, " 
but  each  nation  retains  the  power  to  decide 
what  constitutes  an  act  of  hostility,  hence 
agreement  will  be  difficult. 
Like  arbitration  and  "cooling  off"  treaties  this 
proposal  operates  to  deprive  the  ready  nation 
of  its  advantage  by  giving  the  other  a  delay. 
The  League  affects  only  signatories.    Nations  | 
which  refuse  to  join  may  be  most  dangerous 
to  peace. 

2.  The  proposal  of  the  Special  Committee  of  the  Cham- 
ber of  Commerce  of  the  United  States  on  the  Eco- 
nomic Results  of  the  War  on  American  Business 
(Edward  Filene,  Chairman),  Nov.,  1915. 


SCHEMES  FOR  DIMINISHING  CHANCE  OF  WAR    237 

a.  It  proposes   the  organization  of  commercial  and 

financial  non-intercourse  —  a  boycott  (to  be 
followed  by  military  force  if  necessary)  to  be 
applied  to  nations  entering  the  agreement  and 
then  going  to  war  without  first  submitting  their 
differences  to  a  tribunal.  The  Chambers  of 
Commerce  of  the  United  States  approved  it  by  a 
large  majority,  1915. 

b.  It  encounters  the  same  difficulties  as  the  League  to 

Enforce  Peace. 
II.  The  European  War  has  resulted  in  many  suggestions  for 

securing  a  lasting  peace. 

A.  One  of  these  is  that  of  the  Central  Organization  for  a 
Durable  Peace,  Theresiastraat  51,  The  Hague  (suc- 
cessor to  the  Nederlandsche  Anti-Oorlog  Raad)  which 
has  the  following  Minimum-Program: 

1.  No  annexation  or  transfer  of  territory  shall  be  made 

contrary  to  the  interests  and  wishes  of  the  popula- 
tion concerned.  Where  possible  their  consent  shall 
be  obtained  by  plebiscite  or  otherwise. 
The  States  shall  guarantee  to  the  various  nationalities, 
included  in  their  boundaries,  equality  before  the 
law,  religious  liberty  and  the  free  use  of  their  native 
languages. 

2.  The  States  shall  agree  to  introduce  in  their  colonies, 

protectorates  and  spheres  of  influence,  liberty  of 
commerce,  or  at  least  equal  treatment  for  all  na- 
tions. 

3.  The  work  of  the  Hague  Conferences  with  a  view  to  the 

peaceful  organization  of  the  Society  of  Nations 

shall  be  developed. 
The  Hague  Conference  shall  be  given  a  permanent 

organization  and  meet  at  regular  intervals. 
The  States  shall  agree  to  submit  all  their  disputes  to 


238  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

peaceful  settlement.  For  this  purpose  there  shall 
be  created,  in  addition  to  the  existent  Hague  Court 
of  Arbitration: 

a.  A  permanent  Court  of  International  Justice. 

b.  A  permanent  international  Council  of  Investigation 

and  Conciliation. 

The  States  shall  bind  themselves  to  take  concerted 
action,  diplomatic,  economic  or  military,  in  case 
any  State  should  resort  to  military  measures  in- 
stead of  submitting  the  dispute  to  judicial  decision 
or  to  the  mediation  of  the  Council  of  Investigation 
and  Conciliation. 

4.  The  States  shall  agree  to  reduce  their  armaments. 

In  order  to  facilitate  the  reduction  of  naval  arma- 
ments, the  right  of  capture  shall  be  abolished  and 
the  freedom  of  the  seas  assured. 

5.  Foreign  policy  shall  be  under  the  effective  control  of 

the  parliaments  of  the  respective  nations. 
Secret  treaties  shall  be  void. 

B.  The  Union  of  Democratic  Control.    King's  Chambers, 
London,  W.  C.    Program: 

1.  No  Province  shall  be  transferred  from  one  Govern- 

ment to  another  without  consent  by  plebiscite  of 
the  population  of  such  Province. 

2.  No  Treaty,  Arrangement,  or  Undertaking  shall  be 

entered  upon  in  the  name  of  Great  Britain  without 
the  sanction  of  Parliament.  Adequate  machinery 
for  ensuring  democratic  control  of  foreign  policy 
shall  be  created. 

3.  The  Foreign  Policy  of  Great  Britain  shall  be  not 

aimed  at  creating  Alliances  for  the  purpose  of  main- 
taining the  "  Balance  of  Power,"  but  shall  be  di- 
rected to  the  establishment  of  a  Concert  of  the 
Powers  and  the  setting  up  of  an  International 


SCHEMES  FOR  DIMINISHING  CHANCE  OF  WAR    239 

Council,  whose  deliberations  and  decisions  shall  be 
public,  part  of  the  labor  of  such  Council  to  be  the 
creation  of  definite  Treaties  of  Arbitration  and  the 
establishment  of  Courts  for  their  interpretation 
and  enforcement. 

4.  Great  Britain  shall  propose  as  part  of  the  Peace  settle- 
ment a  plan  for  the  drastic  reduction  by  consent  of 
the  armaments  of  all  the  belligerent  Powers,  and  to 
facilitate  that  policy  shall  attempt  to  secure  the 
general  nationalization  of  the  manufacture  of 
armaments,  and  the  control  of  the  export  of  arma- 
ments by  one  country  to  another. 

C.  Additional   proposals.     (See   references   and   Chapter 
XXX.) 

REFERENCES 

Richet:  Le  passe  de  la  guerre  et  1'avenir  de  la  paix.    1907. 
Jeffrey:  How  to  Abolish  War.    American  Journal  Political  Science, 

I,  492. 
Mead,  Lucia:  Educational  Organizations  Promoting  International 

Friendship.    1911. 

Courtney  of  Penwith:  Peace  by  Justice. 
Neuwirth:  Weltcongress  und  Weltarmee,  oder  der  Weltfriede. 

1896. 

Carnegie:  League  of  Peace.    Pop.  Science  Monthly,  68,  398-424. 
Nys:  The  Necessity  of  a  Permanent  Tribunal. 
Felix:  La  vie  des  mineraux,  la  plasmogenese  et  le  buomecanisme 

universel.    1911.    [Science  militates  against  war.l 
Bollack:  La  monnaie  internationale.    La  Reme.    June  15,  1911. 
de  la  Grasserie:  De  1'ensemble  des  moyens  de  la  solution  pacifiste. 

1904. 

Dumas:   La  colonisation.    Essai  de  doctrine  pacifiste.     1904. 
Moch:    Vers   la    federation    d'occident:    Desarmons   les    Alpes. 

1905. 
Stratton,  G.  M.:  The  Control  of  the  Fighting  Instinct.    American 

Association  for  International  Conciliation.    1913. 


240  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

Frost:  Safeguards  for  Peace:  A  scheme  of  state  insurance  against 

war.    1005. 
Richard:  Constitutional  Safeguards  against  War.     Outlook,  84: 

20-32. 
Brewer:  Enforcement  of  Arbitral  Awards,  in  Mohonk  Addresses. 

(Ginn.)    104-115. 
Stein:  An  International  Police  to  Guarantee  the  World's  Peace. 

1910. 

Dumas:  Les  sanctions  de  Parbitrage  international.    1905. 
Dumas:   De  la  responsibilite   du    pouvoir    executif    considered 

comme  Tune  des  sanctions  de  Parbitrage  international. 
Cattell:   Science  and   International   Good   Will.     Pop.   Science 

Monthly,  April,  1912,  405-11. 
Passy,  Frederic:  Pour  la  Paix.     Notes  et  Documents.     Paris, 

1009. 

Mead,  Lucia:  Swords  and  Ploughshares.    (Putnam.)    1912. 
James,  William:  The  Moral  Equivalent  of  War.    American  Asso- 
ciation for  International  Conciliation.    1910. 
Addams,  Jane:  Newer  Ideals  of  Peace.    1007. 
MacKaye,  Percy:  A  Substitute  for  War.    1915. 
Adler:  The  World-Crisis  and  its  Meaning.    1915. 
Lyon,  Davis  Willard:  The  Christian  Equivalent  of  War.     1915. 
(See  also  references  to  Chapters  XXVII  and  XXX.) 

LEAGUE  TO  ENFORCE  PEACE 

Lowell:  A  League  to  Enforce  Peace.    Atlantic  Monthly,  September,  ^ 
1915.    Reprinted  by  World  Peace  Foundation.    1915. 

League  to  Enforce  Peace.    New  York,  1915. 

"Ten  Objections  to  an  International  Police."  Advocate  of  Peace. 
August,  1915. 

Holt:  "Ten  Objections  to  the  Ten  Objections."  Ibid.  Novem- 
ber, 1915. 

BOYCOTT 

Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the  United  States.  Referendum  No.  1 1 
on  the  Report  of  the  Special  Committee  on  Economic  Results 
of  the  War  and  American  Business.  November,  1915. 


SCHEMES  FOR  DIMINISHING  CHANCE  OF  WAR     241 
Angell:  Boycott  versus  Bayonets.    Saturday  Evening  Post,  July  24, 


Angell:  The  World's  Highway.    1915. 

Bollack,  Leon:  La  loi  mondiale  de  boycottage  douanier.    Paris, 

1912. 
Samuels,  F.  S.  :  International  Boycott  as  a  Solution  of  the  World 

Peace  Problem.    Oakland,  California,  1914. 
A  British  Statesman:  How  Diplomats  Make  War.    1915. 
Hagedorn,  Hermann:  Makers  of  Madness.    A  play  in  one  act  and 

three  scenes.    (Macmillan  Company.)    1914. 
Hardy,  Thomas:  The  Dynasts. 

Pamphlet  Series  of  the  Union  of  Democratic  Control.    (37  Norfolk 
Street,  Strand,  London,  W.  C.) 

The  Morrow  of  the  War.    Explaining  the  Policy  of  the  Union. 

Angell:  Shall  This  War  End  German  Militarism? 

Russell,  Bertrand:  The  Offspring  of  Fear. 

Brailsford,  H.  N.:  The  Origins  of  the  Great  War. 

Ponsonby,  Arthur:  Parliament  and  Foreign  Policy. 

The  National  Policy. 

The  International  Industry  of  War. 

MacDonald,  J.  Ramsay:  War  and  the  Workers. 

Why  we  Should  State  Terms  of  Settlement. 

Towards  an  International  Understanding. 

Swanwick,  H.  M.:  Women  and  War. 

[Pole,  A.]:  The  Polish  Question. 

Angell:  The  Prussian  in  our  Midst. 

The  Balance  of  Power. 


XXIX 

EDUCATION  AND  PEACE 

I.  Education  is  to  prepare  persons  for  a  life  that  is  before 

them. 

A.  Hence  first  and  foremost  it  must  teach  right  think- 

ing. 

B.  It  cannot  be  merely  a  perpetuation  and  preservation  of 

the  past. 

C.  It  must  be  fully  up-to-date. 

Hence  it  must  be  increasingly  scientific. 

This  means  a  reduction  of  fear,  superstition,  igno- 
rance, all  of  which  have  a  considerable  connection 
with  war. 

It  means  telling  the  truth  about  war,  peace,  national- 
ism, etc. 

It  means  taking  account  of  internationalism  now  in 
existence. 

D.  Education  (study,  travel,  reading,  etc.),  if  at  all  im- 

partial, has  a  tendency  to  remove  bias  and  prejudices 
of  all  kinds.  The  removal  of  international  and  inter- 
racial prejudices  is  a  proper  function  of  education. 

II.  Military  training  bears  the  natural  fruit. 

A.  The  effect  of  education  along  military  lines  is  thus 
stated  by  Maude  in  his  translation  of  Clausewitz 
"On  War,"  I,  p.  viii.  August,  1914,  proved  his  state- 
ment to  be  true. 

"  Clausewitz's  work  has  been  the  ultimate  foundation  on 
which  every  drill  regulation  in  Europe,  except  our  own, 
242 


EDUCATION  AND  PEACE 


243 


has  been  reared.  It  is  this  ceaseless  repetition  of  his 
fundamental  ideas  to  which  one-half  of  the  male  popula- 
tion of  every  Continental  Nation  has  been  subjected  for 
two  to  three  years  of  their  lives,  which  has  tuned  their 
minds  to  vibrate  in  harmony  with  his  precepts,  and  those 
who  know  and  appreciate  this  fact  at  its  true  value  have 
only  to  strike  the  necessary  chords  in  order  to  evoke  a 
response  sufficient  to  overpower  any  other  ethical  con- 
ception which  those  who  have  not  organized  their  forces 
beforehand  can  appeal  to." 

B.  Compulsory  military  training  especially  in  schools  is, 
to  say  the  least,  a  doubtful  institution  in  a  demo- 
cratic state.  Democracy  exalts  personal  rights  and 
conscience;  military  training,  to  be  efficient,  re- 
quires obedience  and  abandonment  of  personal 
rights. 
III.  Various  media  have  been  used  to  educate  for  peace. 

A.  The  Schools. 

1.  American  School  Peace  League,  403  Marlborough 

Street,  Boston.  It  has  sought  among  other  things 
to  get  schools  to  celebrate  May  18  as  Peace 
Day. 

2.  College  courses  in  international  relations. 

B.  Books,  journals,  circulars,  lectures,  etc. 

C.  Pictures,    photographs,    cartoons,    motion    pictures, 

paintings  (Wirtz,  Verestchagin).  Review  of  Reviews, 
29:  545-50.  Outlook,  70:  270-6. 

D.  Museums.    Lucerne  Peace  Museum,  founded  by  Bloch. 

E.  Exhibits  at  expositions. 

F.  Exchanges  of  professors  and  students. 

G.  Celebration   of    the   One   Hundred   Years   of   Peace 

between    the    United    States    and    Great   Britain, 


H.  Drama.    (See  Appendix.) 


244  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

/.  Music  as  an  international  language. 
IV.  The  cause  of  peace  will  be  helped  by  placing  correct 
emphasis  on  certain  subjects. 

A.  Commercial  geography  should  be  taught  at  the  ex- 

pense of  political  geography.  The  former  is  more 
instructive  of  modern  conditions  and  gets  more  at  the 
heart  of  modern  international  forces. 

B.  Contemporary  politics  needs  to  be  taught  much  more 

generally  and  carefully  than  is  at  present  the 
case. 

1.  Under  modern  popular  government  the  citizen  is 

often  required  to  vote  on  questions  that  involve 
foreign  affairs. 

2.  The  study  of  the  subject  will  show  that  there  is  a 

broad  similarity  in  the  problems,  aspirations  and 
institutions  of  all  civilized  nations,  and  will  develop 
the  international  point  of  view,  the  "international 
mind." 

3.  It  will  counterbalance,  and  likewise  complete  the 

ordinary  historical  knowledge,  which  generally  is 
not  up-to-date. 

C.  History. 

i.  It  should  try  to  teach  the  truth.  The  truth  about  the 
past  will  deprive  war  of  much  glamor. 

The  truth  about  causes  of  war. 

The  truth  about  service  in  the  army  as  a  private. 

The  truth  about  the  fruits  of  war. 

The  frequent  failure  of  war  to  settle  or  improve  mat- 
ters. 

The  growth  of  law. 

The  spread  of  democracy. 

The  use  and  success  of  arbitration. 

The  achievements  of  the  Hague  Conferences. 

The  truth  in  history  will  counteract  the  effect  of 


EDUCATION  AND  PEACE  245 

romanticism  in  fiction  and  literature  such  as  "The 
Charge  of  the  Light  Brigade,"  the  courage  of 
Medieval  Knights,  and  the  like. 

2.  Continuity  of  history  should  be  emphasized. 
History  is  genetic,  not  cataclysmic. 
Results  of  this  conception: 

The  present  is  not  justified  by  the  past. 

There  is  growth  hi  time  of  peace  as  well  as  in 

war. 
War  is  not  the  only  or  the  greatest  motive  power 

of  progress. 
War  is  not  the  motive  force  of  progress,  but  merely 

the  clash  of  forces  resulting  from  progress. 
Progress  does  not  necessarily  mean  war,  as  ideas 

absolutely  subversive  of  accepted  beliefs  have 

made  their  way  without  bloodshed:  Darwinism. 
Abolition  of  slavery  in  Great  Britain. 
The  only  solid  progress  is  that  which  comes  from 

sound  growth;  progress  forced  by  war  alone  is 

not  lasting. 
The  chief  emphasis  should  be  placed  on  the  trend 

of  civilization,  instead  of  mere  occurrences  of  the 

past,  as  is  so  often  the  case. 

3.  History  should  be  made  more  nearly  a  "biography 

of  man"  instead  of  a  record  of  his  political  do- 
ings. 

Should  touch  all  sides  of  human  endeavor. 

Should  measure  the  success  or  expediency  of  any  pro- 
cedure in  terms  of  all  of  man's  interests,  instead 
of  merely  in  terms  of  political  consequences.  A 
step,  which  has  good  political  consequences,  may  be 
bad  considered  from  an  economic,  social  or  moral 
point  of  view. 

The  objection  of  time:  it  is  impossible  to  teach  all 


246 


NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 


sides  of  history  in  the  time  allotted  to  the  sub- 
ject. 

This  does  not  justify  teaching  what  is  untrue. 

If  anything  is  to  be  omitted,  it  should  be  the  interest- 
ing rather  than  the  true.  (The  reverse  has  been  too 
common.) 

Writers  of  texts  of  history  have  already  begun  to 
reduce  the  space  given  to  wars  and  to  increase 
other  matter  in  proportion. 


UNITED  STATES  HISTORY— THE  WAR  OF  1812 


QUACZ- 

ENBOS  1 

HOLMES  2 

MONT- 
GOMERY 3 

HART* 

Pages  in  book 

4.^8 

•22? 

tfc 

e8? 

Total  pages  to  war  .  . 

+y 

218 

0*0 

123 

ovo 

145 

O^o 

H3 

Percentage  

47.6% 

38% 

39.7% 

19-3% 

Pages  to  this  war  

44 

12 

6 

8 

Percentage  

9-6% 

3-7% 

1.6% 

i-3% 

Detailing  maneuvers 

32K 

5# 

5 

3 

Percentage 

7% 

i  7% 

i  l% 

c% 

Total  illustrations  in 

/  /v 

•*••/  /o 

•"••O  /O 

•0  /O 

book  

63 

87 

82 

146 

Illustrations    to    this 

o 

A.t^.\S 

war   

8 

5 

4 

5 

Percentage  

12.7% 

5-7% 

4-9% 

3-4% 

Total  maps  in  book.  . 

42 

7 

72 

56 

Maps  for  this  war  .  .  . 

9 

i 

5 

i 

Percentage  

21.4% 

14-3% 

6.9% 

r.8% 

^uackenbos:    Illustrated    School  History  of   the   United   States, 
1861. 

2  Holmes:  Sheldon's  History  of  the  United  States,  1884. 

8  Montgomery:  American  History,  1896. 

4  Hart:  Essentials  in  American  History,  1905. 


EDUCATION  AND  PEACE  247 

GREEK  HISTORY— PELOPONNESIAN  WAR,  431-404  B.  C. 


GILLIE  * 

PlNNOCK  2 

OMAN3 

MOREY  4 

Pages  in  book  

47  c 

384 

546 

•2  C7 

Total  to  war  
Percentage  
Pages  to  this  war  
Percentage  
Detailing  maneuvers 
Percentage   .  .  . 

216 

45.5% 

80 

16.8% 
iQ 

4% 

174 
45-3% 
52 
13-5% 
19 
S% 

319 
58.4% 
126 

23-1% 
48 

88% 

43^ 
12.3% 
13 
3-7% 
6 

I  7% 

Total  illustrations  in 
book  

o 

32 

o 

07 

Illustrations   to    this 
war  

o 

4 

o 

I 

Percentage  

12.5% 

1% 

Total  maps  in  book.  . 
Maps  for  this  war.  .  . 
Percentage  

i 

0 

2 
2 

100% 

12 

33-3% 

40 

12.5% 

REFERENCES 

Cabot,  Ella  Lyman,  and  others:  A  course  in  citizenship. 

Seve:  Cours  d'enseignement  pacifiste.    1910. 

Passy:  La  paix  et  1'enseignement  pacifiste.    1904. 

Miiller,  Arthur:  Pazifistisches  Jugendbuch.     Wien  und  Leipzig. 

1910. 
Barolin,  Johannes  C.:  Der  Schulstaat.     Vorschlage  zur  Volker- 

versohnung  und  Herbeifiihrung  eines  dauernden  Friedens  durch 

die  Schule.    Wien,  1909. 

Delassus:  Precis  d'enseignement  pacifiste.    1910. 
Gulliver:  The  Friendship  of  Nations.    (Ginn.)    1912. 

1  Gillie:  History  of  Ancient  Greece,  1843. 
2Pinnock:  Goldsmith's  Greece,  1851. 

3  Oman:  History  of  Greece,  1895.     (Oman  is  a  writer  on  the  history 
of  war.) 

4  Morey:  Outlines  of  Greek  History,  1903.  , 


248  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

Robinson:  The  New  History.    1912. 

Annual  Reports  of  the  American  School  Peace  League.  Boston. 
1909  f. 

Suggestions  and  Bibliography  for  Program  for  Peace  Day.  1915. 
Chicago  Peace  Society. 

Andrews,  Fannie  Fern:  Peace  Day,  Suggestions  and  Material  for 
the  Observance  in  the  Schools.  United  States  Bureau  of  Educa- 
tion, Bulletin,  1912:  No.  8,  Whole  Number  476,  Washington, 
Government  Printing  Office.  1912. 

Andrews,  Fannie  Fern:  The  Promotion  of  Peace.  United  States 
Bureau  of  Education,  1913,  No.  12,  Whole  Number  519,  Wash- 
ington, Government  Printing  Office.  1913. 

Mead,  Lucia  Ames:  Program  for  Peace  Meetings.  World  Peace 
Foundation. 

Mead,  Lucia  Ames:  A  Primer  of  the  Peace  Movement.  American 
Peace  Society.  1913. 

Gould,  F.  J.:  Victors  of  Peace.    1915. 

Gould,  F.  J.:  Heroes  of  Peace.    1915. 

Chamberlain,  Leander  T.:  Patriotism  and  the  Moral  Law. 
1900. 

Gordy,  W.  F. :  Teaching  Peace  in  the  Schools  through  Instruction 
in  American  History. 

Larned:  Peace  Teaching  of  History.  Atlantic  Monthly,  101:  114- 
121. 

Sturdee:  Teaching  of  History  on  War.    Westminster  Review,  158: 

124-34- 
Report  of  a  Committee  of  Three  appointed  by  the  American  Peace 

Society:  The  Teaching  of  History  in  the  Public  Schools  with 

Reference  to  War  and  Peace.    1006. 
Proposed  Course  on  International  Peace.    (Issued  by  the  Federal 

Council  of  the  Churches  of  Christ  in  America.)     New  York. 
Hale:  Creation  of  Public  Opinion,  Mohonk  Address.     (Ginn.) 

1910.    86-94. 
Mead:  Peace  Teaching  in  American  Schools  and  Colleges.    Out- 

look  83:  376-382. 
Mead:  Teaching  Patriotism  in  the  Public  Schools.     American 

Peace  Society. 


EDUCATION  AND  PEACE  249 

Andrews:  Relation  of  Teachers  to  the  Peace  Movement.  Educa- 
tional Review,  28:  279-289. 

Hart:  School  Books  and  International  Prejudices.  American 
Association  for  International  Conciliation. 

Stevenson:  The  Teacher  as  a  Missionary  of  Peace.  Peace  Com- 
mittee, Philadelphia,  1909. 

Nattan-Laurier:  Les  menaces  des  guerres  futures  et  les  travaux  de 
Jean  de  Bloch.  1904. 

Edwards:  Suggestions  for  the  Teaching  of  Peace  Through  History. 
Journal  of  Education,  January,  1912. 

Showerman:  Peace  and  the  Professor.  American  Association  for 
International  Conciliation.  1911. 

Life,  The  War  Number.    October  2,  1913. 

Educational  Series  of  the  National  Peace  Council.     (London.) 

1.  Teachers  and  International  Peace.    Report  of  a  Conference  of 

Teachers,  presided  over  by  Sir  John  Macdonell. 

2.  Heath,  Carl  and  Gould,  F.  J.:  Humane  Teaching  and  Interna- 

tional Peace. 

3.  Gould,  F.  J.:  The  Peace  Movement  among  the  Young:  Positive 

Methods  of  Teaching. 

4.  Seth,  James:  Universities  and  the  Peace  Movement. 

5.  Rowntree,  Arthur:  Education  in  Relation  to  Internationalism. 

6.  Carpenter,  J.  Estlin:  The  Promotion  of  International  Peace 

through  the  Universities. 

7.  Hobson,  John  A. :  The  Importance  of  Instruction  in  the  Facts  of 

Internationalism . 

8.  Impey,  E.  Adair:  Military  Training  Considered  as  Part  of 

General  Education. 


XXX 

THE    GREAT    WAR    AND    PACIFISM 

I.  The  Great  War  has  refined  or  reversed  the  thought  of 

the  opponents  of  war  and  has  made  them  more  guarded 
in  their  statements,  for  it  has  brought  the  realization 
that  war  is  not  so  improbable  or  impossible  as  was 
asserted. 

A.  A  number  of  pacifists,  chiefly  churchmen,  have  be- 

come, if  not  non-resistants,  at  least  more  firmly 
convinced  that  the  only  thing  that  can  overcome 
evil  is,  not  force,  but  the  spiritual  weapon  of  good- 
will. The  Fellowship  of  Reconciliation  (temporary 
address,  70  Fifth  Avenue,  New  York). 

B.  Many  have  abandoned  pacifism. 

II.  The  Great  War  has  justified  the  contention  of  the  op- 

ponents of  militarism  that  competitive  armaments  do 
not  secure  peace,  but  produce  war. 

III.  The  Great  War  has  demonstrated  the  inadequacy  of  the 

existing  "preventatives"  for  war.  It  has  shown  that 
nationalism,  as  it  now  is  understood,  makes  war 
probable. 

IV.  It  has  stimulated  thinking  along  the  line  of  a  better 

system,  and  has  produced  a  great  number  of  pro- 
posals, on  the  one  hand,  for  bringing  the  Great  War  to 
a  close,  and  on  the  other,  for  establishing  permanent 
peace. 

A.  Plans  for  bringing  the  Great  War  to  an  end  ("putting 
out  a  conflagration").     "The  hardest  operation  of  a 
war  is  to  stop  it."    See  references  below. 
250 


THE  GREAT  WAR  AND  PACIFISM  251 

1.  Several  governments  have  offered  mediation. 

2.  A  Congress  of  neutral  nations  to  initiate  peace  pro- 

ceedings has  been  widely  advocated. 

3.  Continuous  mediation  without  armistice. 
Proposed  by  Julia  Grace  Wales  of  the  University 

of  Wisconsin. 
Adopted  by  the  International  Congress  of  Women  at 

The  Hague,  April  28-30,  1915.    It  has  been  advo- 

cated by  the  Woman's  Peace  Party,  116  South 

Michigan  Street,  Chicago. 
Various  futile  attempts  have  been  made  to  secure 

the  backing  of  some  neutral  government  for  the 

project. 
Henry  Ford  was  influenced  by  advocates  of  this  plan 

to  send  out  his  "  peace  ship."    Dec.,  1915. 
B.  Plans  for  securing  permanent  peace  ("building  a  fire- 
proof structure").    There  have  been  a  great  many  of 
these,  and  no  more  is  attempted  than  to  give  an  in- 
complete list  of  them.    See  references  below. 

REFERENCES 
ON  STOPPING  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

Wales,  Julia  Grace:  Continuous  Mediation  without  Armistice. 

Woman's  Peace  Party.    Chicago,  1915. 
A  Conference  of  Neutral  States.    World  Peace  Foundation.    June, 

1915.    Vol.  V,  No.  3,  Part  I. 
Addams  Jane:  The  Revolt  against  WTar.     The  Survey,  July  17, 


Resolutions  of  the  National  Peace  Conference  under  the  Auspices 
of   the   Emergency   Peace   Foundation.     Chicago,   February, 


Bernheimer,  C.  L.:  Peace  Proposal.  A  Business  Man's  Plan  for 
Settling  the  War  in  Europe.  Pamphlet.  Also  New  York  Evening 
Post,  January  12,  1915. 


252  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCIETY 

ON  PERMANENT  PEACE:  ORGANIZATIONS 

The  Union  of  Democratic  Control,  King's  Chambers,  London, 

W.  C.    (See  Chapter  XXVIII.) 
The  Central  Organization  for  a  Durable  Peace,  Theresiastraat  51. 

The  Hague.    (See  Chapter  XXVIII.) 
The  Armed  International  Tribunal  Association.    Oscar  T.  Crosby, 

1707  H  St.,  N.  W.,  Washington,  D.  C. 
The  World's  Court  League  of  America.    18  East  4ist  Street,  New 

York. 
League    for  World    Peace,   Woodward    Building,   Washington, 

D.  C. 
Society  to   Abolish  War.     Charles   F.  Dole,  Jamaica   Plains, 

Mass. 
Committee  for  the  Study  of  the  Principles  of  a  Durable  Treaty  of 

Peace.    Hallestrasse  41,  Berne,  Switzerland. 
Babson's  Statistical  Bureau,  Wellesley  Hills,  Massachusetts. 
American  League  to  Limit  Armaments,  43  Cedar  Street,  New 

York  City. 
Federation  of  International  Polity  Clubs.    George  W.  Nasmyth, 

President,  Fred  B.  Foulk,  Secretary,  40  Mount  Vernon  Street, 

Boston,  Mass. 
League  to  Enforce  Peace.    William  H.  Taft,  President,  W.  H. 

Short,  Secretary,  70  Fifth  Avenue,  New  York  City. 
Woman's  Peace  Party.     Jane  Addams,  President,   116  South 

Michigan  Avenue,  Chicago,  Illinois. 

Bund  Neues  Vaterland,  Berlin  W.  50.     Tauentzienstrasse  9. 
Nederlandsche  Anti-Oorlog  Raad,  Theresiastr.  51,  The  Hague, 

Netherlands. 
Committee,  "United  States  of  Europe,"  Nico  van  Suchtelen, 

Secretary,  Blaricum,  Netherlands. 
Comite  de  los  "  Amigos  de  la  Unidad  Moral  de  Europa."    M.  En. 

Duran,  Ateneo  Barcelones,  Barcelona,  Spain. 
Bund   fur  Organisierung   menschlichen   Fortschritts.     Prof.   R. 

Broda,  General  Secretary,  60  Avenue  de  Rumine,  Lausanne, 

Switzerland. 
Citizens  of  the  World,  Tom-na-Monachan,  Pitlochry,  Scotland. 


THE 


GREAT  WAR  AND  PACIFISM  253 


Grand  Army  of  the  Prince  of  Peace,  138  South  Oxford  Street, 
Brooklyn,  New  York. 


ON  PERMANENT  PEACE:  LITERATURE 

Towards  the  Peace  that  Shall  Last  ("  The  Litany  ")  .  Issued  by  the 
Henry  Street  Group,  —  The  Survey,  March  6,  1915. 

Dickinson,  G.  Lowes:  War  and  the  Way  Out.  Atlantic  Monthly, 
December,  1914,  and  April  and  May,  1915.  Also  printed  sep- 
arately. Extracts  published  in  World  Peace  Foundation  pam- 
phlet, April,  1915. 

Angell:  America  and  the  New  World-State.    1915. 

Angell:  The  World's  Highway.    1915. 

Nasmyth,  George:  Constructive  Mediation.  An  Interpretation  of 
the  Ten  Foremost  Proposals.  The  Survey,  March  6,  1915.  Also 
separately. 

Hobson,  John  A.:  Towards  International  Government.    1915. 

Fried,  Alfred  H.:  Europaische  Wiederherstellung.     Switzerland, 


Buxton  (Editor),  Dickinson,  Brailsford,  Hobson,  Lee,  Snowden, 
and  others:  Towards  a  Lasting  Settlement.  1915. 

Jordan,  David  Starr:  The  Ways  to  Lasting  Peace.    1916. 

Royce:  War  and  Insurance.    1914. 

Kingsley,  Darwin  P.:  Democracy  versus  Sovereignty.  New  York 
Times,  November  21,  1915,  also  published  as  a  pamphlet. 

Fayle,  Ernst  C.:  The  Great  Settlement.    London,  1915. 

Lippmann:  The  Stakes  of  Diplomacy.    1915. 

Gulick,  Sidney  L.:  The  Fight  for  Peace.    New  York,  1915. 

Ritter,  Wm.  E.:  War,  Science  and  Civilization.     Boston,  1915. 

War  Obviated  by  an  International  Police.    The  Hague.    (NijhofT.) 


Jefferson,  Charles  E.  :  Christianity  and  International  Peace.  1915. 
Crane,  Frank:  War  and  the  World  Government.  New  York,  1915. 
Babson,  Roger  W.:  The  Future  of  World  Peace.  Boston,  1915. 
Benson,  Allen  L.:  A  Way  to  Prevent  War.  Girard,  Kansas,  1915- 
The  Overthrow  of  the  War  System.  By  Members  of  the  Woman's 
Peace  Party.  1915. 


254  NATIONALISM,  WAR  AND  SOCI 


Addams,  Jane;  Balch,  Emily  G.;  and  Hamilton,  Alice:  Women  at 

The  Hague.    1915. 
Schvan,  August:  Permanent  Peace.    The  Survey,  March  6,  1915. 

Also  New   York   Times,  December   20,    1914,   and  American 

Journal  of  International  Law,  vol.  8,  51. 
Otis,  Harrison  Gray:  World  Embracing  Plan  to  End  Wars.    Los 

Angeles.    1915. 
Brandeis,  Louis  D.:  An  Essential  of  Lasting  Peace.     Harper's 

Weekly,  March  13,  1915. 
Holt,  Hamilton:  The  Way  to  Disarm.    American  Association  for 

International  Conciliation.    October,  1914. 
Roosevelt:  America  and  the  World  War.    1915. 
Straus,  Oscar:  The  Way  to  Lasting  Peace.     New  York  Times, 

November  21,  1915. 

Eliot,  Charles  W.  :  Some  Roads  Towards  Peace.    New  York,  1915. 
Crozier,  Alfred  Owen:  Nation  of  Nations;  The  Way  to  Permanent 

Peace.    1915. 
Shumaker,  E.  Ellsworth:  The  World  Crisis  and  The  Way  to  Peace. 


Atkins,  Gaius  Glenn:  The  Maze  of  the  Nations  and  the  Way  Out. 

1915- 
Adler,  Felix:  The  World  Crisis  and  Its  Meaning.     New  York, 


Stilwell,  Arthur  Edward:  To  All  the  World  (Except  Germany). 

London,  1915. 
Russell,  Bertrand:  War  and  Non-resistance.     Atlantic  Monthly. 

August,  1915. 

WAR  AND  PACIFISM 

Heath,  Carl:  Pacificism  in  Time  of  War.    London,  1915. 
Angell:  Peace  Theories  and  the  Balkan  War.    1913. 

MISCELLANEOUS 

Mez,  John:  Peace  Literature  of  the  War.    American  Association 

for  International  Conciliation.    January,  1916. 
Mez,  John:  Syllabus  of  Material  on  the  War  and  Peace  Problem, 


GREAT  WAR  AND  PACIFISM  255 

American  Association  for  International  Conciliation.    February, 
Lange  and  Berry:  Books  on  the  Great  War.    (Grafton.)    London, 


How  to  Study  the  Problems  of  the  War.    Council  for  the  Study  of 
International  Relations,  Westminster,  S.  W. 


APPENDIX 


TOTAL  NAVAL  EXPENDITURES  BY  PRINCIPAL  NAVAL  POWERS 

(Knight,  Navy  Yearbook,  630!  Congress,  3d  Session,  Senate  Docu* 
ment  637,  p.  859,  1914.) 


FISCAL 
YEAR 

GREAT 
BRITAIN 
April  i- 
March  31  l 

UNITED  STATES 
July  i-Jime  30 

GERMANY 
April  to 
March 

FRANCE 
January  to 
December 

1900-1901 

$145,792,850 

$61,721,695 

$37,173,074 

$72,683,180 

1901-2  .  .  . 

150,569,190 

68,438,301 

46,315,800 

67,079,011 

1902-3  .  .  . 

150,679,328 

82,977,641 

48,818,700 

59,217,558 

1903-4  .  .  . 

173,548,058 

104,126,192 

50,544,000 

59,740,222 

1904-5  .  .  . 

179,138,049 

116,655,826 

49,110,300 

60,178,623 

1905-6..- 

161,117,947 

109,725,059 

54,918,000 

6i,565,779 

1906-7... 

152,954,342 

98,392,144 

58,344,300 

59,514,296 

1907-8... 

151,880,617 

"7,353,474 

69,133,500 

2  60,685,813 

1908-9... 

156,401,161 

120,421,579 

2  80,737,626 

2  62,194,916 

1909-10.  . 

181,936,341 

122,247,365 

2  95,047,820 

64,899,589 

1910-11.  . 

202,056,258 

111,791,980 

2  103,302,773 

74,102,439 

1911-12.  . 

211,596,296 

I33,559,o7i 

2  107,178,480 

2  80,371,109 

1912-13.  . 

224,443,296 

129,787,233 

2  109,989,096 

2  8  1,  69  2,83  2 

1913-14.  . 

2  237,530,459 

136,858,301 

2  112,091,125 

2  90,164,625 

1914-15.. 

2  260,714,275 

2-3  141,872,786 

"3,993,329 

1  123,828,872 

1  Does  not  include  amounts  expended  under  naval  works  acts  during 
the  years  1896-1909,  amounting  to  about  $155,000,000. 

2  Appropriation. 

3  Includes  $4,635,000  this  year's  allotment  of  proceeds  from  sale  of  the 
Idaho  and  Mississippi. 

257 


258  APPENDIX 

II 

ARMY  APPROPRIATIONS  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  POWERS 
(World  Almanac,  1915,  p.  434) 

Great  Britain 1914-5 $143,331,350 

France "      202,141,122 

Russia "      393,193,808 

Italy 80,025,234 

German  Empire "      293,289,155 

Austria-Hungary "      47,571,755 

Japan "      47,037,809 

United  States "      *  94,229,047 

m 

LEADING  PACIFIST  PERIODICALS 

Advocate  of  Peace.    Founded,  1846.    Washington,  D.  C. 
War  and  Peace.    Founded,  1913.    London. 
Peace  Forum.    Founded,  1912.    New  York. 
Maryland  Quarterly.    Founded,  1910.    Baltimore. 
The  Arbitrator.    Founded,  1870.    London. 
Concord.    Founded,  1884.    London. 

The  Herald  of  Peace  and  International  Arbitration.    Founded, 
.  1819.    London. 

Peace  and  Goodwill.    Founded,  1882.    London. 
The  Cosmopolitan  Student.    Madison,  Wisconsin. 
Die  Friedenswarte.    Founded,  1899.    Berlin. 
Volker-Friede.    Founded,  1900.    Esslingen. 
Der  Friede.    Founded,  1894.    Bern. 
Die  Friedens-Bewegung.    Founded,  1912.    Bern. 
La  Paix  par  le  Droit.    Founded,  1891.    Nimes. 
Les  £tats-Unis  d'Europe.    Founded,  1868.    Bern. 

1  This  does  not  include  the  cost  of  fortifications,  Military  Academy, 
etc.  (which  represent  an  addition  of  about  $50,000,000),  pensions,  or  the 
expenditures  of  the  several  states  on  the  National  Guard. 


APPENDIX  259 


Le  Mouvement  Pacifiste.    Founded,  1912.    Bern. 
La  Paix.    Founded,  1908.    Geneva. 
La  Vita  Internazionale.    Founded,  1898.    Milan. 
Vrede  door  Recht.    Founded,  1900.    s'Gravenhage. 
Freds-Bladet.    Founded,  1892.    Copenhagen. 
Fredsfanan.    Founded,  1898.    Stockholm. 
Heiwa.    Founded,  1911.    Japan. 


PAMPHLETS 

American  Association  for  International  Conciliation,  407  West 
1 1 7th  Street,  New  York. 

World  Peace  Foundation.  40  Mt.  Vernon  Street,  Boston,  Massa- 
chusetts. 

The  National  Peace  Council,  167  St.  Stephen's  House,  West- 
minster. 

American  Society  for  the  Judicial  Settlement  of  International 
Disputes.  Baltimore. 

Conciliation  International.    15  Rue  Soufflot,  Paris. 

Internationale  Organisation.    Berlin,  W.  Biilowstrasse  66. 


YEAR  BOOKS,  ALMANACS  AND  CALENDARS 

Annuaire  du  mouvement  pacifiste.    Bern. 

The  Peace  Year-Book.    Issued  by  the  National  Peace  Council. 

London. 

Annuaire  de  TUnion  Interparlementaire.    Brussels. 
Annuaire  de  la  Vie  Internationale.    Brussels. 
Year  Book  of  the  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace. 

Washington,  D.  C. 
Les  Prix  Nobel.    Stockholm. 
Almanach  de  la  Paix.    Paris. 
Pro  Pace.    Milan. 

Der  Weg  zum  Weltfrieden.    Pazinstische  Chronik.    Berlin. 
The  Peace  Calendar  and  Diary,  1916.    Paul  Elder  and  Company. 

San  Francisco. 


2<5o  APPENDIX 

IV 
FICTION  AND  DRAMA 

Suttner,  Bertha  von:  Ground  Arms!  (Lay  Down  Your  Arms). 
1008. 

Tolstoi:  War  and  Peace.    1889. 

Tolstoi:  Sevastopol.    1888. 

Zola :  The  Downfall.    1 898. 

Andreief :  The  Red  Laugh. 

Wiegand  and  Schauerman:  The  Wages  of  War.    Poet  Lore.   1908. 

Comfort:   Routledge  Rides  Alone. 

Ular,  A:  Die  Zwergenschlacht. 

Richet:  Fables  et  Recits  Pacifiques.    1904. 

Brownell,  Atherton:  The  Unseen  Empire.    1914. 

Dix,  Beulah  Marie:  The  Moloch.  1915.  (Played  by  Holbrook 
Blinn.) 

Newton,  W.  Douglas:  War.    1915. 

Noyes,  Alfred:  Rada.    A  Drama  of  War  in  One  Act.    1914. 

Palmer,  Frederick:  The  Last  Shot.    1914. 

Trask,  Katrina:  In  the  Vanguard.    1913. 

Wentworth,  Marion  Craig:  War  Brides.  1915.  (Played  by 
Nazimova.) 

Euripides:  The  Trojan  Women.  (Presented  by  the  Woman's 
Peace  Party.) 

Aiken,  Ednah:  The  Hate  Breeders.    (Bobbs-Merrill.)    1916. 

ZangwilhThe  War  God.    1911. 

Janson:  The  Pride  of  War.    1912. 

Hardy:  The  Dynasts.    1915. 

Copley,  Frank:  The  Impeachment  of  President  Israels. 

Scidmore,  E.  R.:  As  The  Hague  Ordains.    1007. 

Johnston,  Mary:  Cease  Firing. 

Parker,  Gilbert:  The  Judgment  House.  (Arraignment  of  paci- 
fism). 


APPENDIX  261 


COMPLEMENTARY  NOTES  TO  V 
(See  page  263.) 

Case  16.  —  In  1911  the  Portuguese  Republic  passed  a  law  separating 
the  state  and  church  and  abolishing  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Holy 
See.  In  1912  the  state  voted  to  take  over  all  church  properties,  many  of 
which  were  owned  or  controlled  by  Roman  Catholic  religious  orders. 
Foreign  governments  objected  to  the  treatment  of  properties  owned  by 
the  religious  of  their  nationalities  established  in  Portugal.  As  a  conse- 
quence, the  arbitral  tribunal  is,  by  the  compromis,  "  charged  with  passing 
upon  the  claims  relative  to  the  properties  of  French,  British  and  Spanish 
nationals  expropriated  by  the  government  of  the  Portuguese  Republic 
after  the  proclamation  of  the  Republic." 

Case  17.  —  France  vs.  Peru  regarding  claims  of  creditors.  On  May  i, 
1910,  France  and  Peru  agreed  by  protocol  that  fr.  25,000,000  would  be 
deducted  from  a  loan  to  be  placed  by  Peru  on  the  official  Paris  Bourse  to 
pay  certain  French  creditors.  On  October  8,  1912,  the  French  minister 
to  Peru  complained  that  the  said  creditors  were  not  included  in  a  list  of 
creditors  submitted  to  the  Congress.  Peru  replied  that  the  protocol 
recognized  the  French  creditors  conditionally  only  and  that,  as  its  condi- 
tions were  not  realized,  Peru  was  not  under  obligation.  A  compromis 
was  signed  at  Lima  on  February  2,  1914. 

Case  18.  —  On  January  28,  1915,  the  German  armed  cruiser  Prim 
Eitd  Friedrich  sank  on  the  high  seas  the  American  steel  sailing  vessel 
William  P.  Frye,  Seattle  to  Queenstown,  Falmouth  or  Plymouth,  with  a 
cargo  of  wheat  owned  by  the  American  charterer.  The  United  States 
presented  to  Germany  a  claim  for  $228,059.54  for  damages  suffered. 
The  German  Government  admitted  liability  under  the  Prussian-Amer- 
ican treaties  of  1785  (Art.  12),  1799  (Art.  13),  and  1828  (Art.  12),  but 
insisted  on  prize  court  proceedings.  The  United  States  held  further 
that  indemnity  was  due  by  reason  of  violation  of  the  treaty  pro  visions; 
Germany  held  that  the  payment  was  "a  duty  or  policy  founded  on  the 
existing  treaty  stipulations."  Payment  of  the  indemnity  is  to  be  made 
without  prejudice  to  the  question  of  treaty  interpretation. 


262 


APPENDIX 


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INDEX 


A.  B.  C.  Conference,  135,  220 

Achaian  League,  221 

Adams,  H.  C.,  78 

Addams,  Jane,  30,  35,  234,  240, 

251,  254 

Adler,  Felix,  234,  240,  254 
Advocate  of  Peace,  258 
Air-craft,  use  of,  198,  202 
Aix-la-Chapelle,  Congress  of,  134 
Alabama  claims,  179 
Algeciras  Conference,  135 
Allen,  A.  W.,  47,  54 
Alliances,  32,  48,  223,  238 
Alsace-Lorraine,      28,      38,      42, 

213 

American  Association   for   Inter- 
national   Conciliation,     229, 

259 

Defense  League,  13 
Defense  Society,  13 
Institute  of  International  Law, 

216 
Journal  of  International  Law, 

176 
League   to   Limit   Armaments, 

252 

Peace  Society,  158, 159,  222 
School  Peace  League,  229,  243, 

248 
Society  of  International  Law, 

216 
Society  for  Judicial  Settlement 

of  International  Disputes,  216, 

233,  259 
Union  against  Militarism,  232 


Americanism,  3 

Amphictyonic  Council,  177 

Andrews,  Fannie  Fern,  248,  249 

Angell,  Norman,  5,  6,  7,  22,  25, 
35,  38,  44,  66,  80,  86,  101, 
148,  166,  241,  253,  254 

Annexation  of  territory.  See  Ex- 
pansion 

Annuaire  de  la  Vie  Internationale, 
138,  162,  226,  259 

Anti-Enlistment  League,  232 

Anti-militarists,  227 

Anti-patriotism,  227 

Aquinas,  151 

Arbitration,    14,    152,    156,    162, 
1771.,  179,  i8if.,  194,  201,  233, 
234,  238,  239,  244,  26if. 
unreserved,  179,  183 

Arbitrator,  The,  258 

Argentine,  215 

Armaments,  31,  68,  228,  238,  239 
limitations  of,  14,  148,  155,  156, 
157,  194,  198,  200,  203,  214, 
228,  232 

Armament  makers,  50,  51 

Armed  International  Tribunal  As- 
sociation, 222 

Armed  peace,  12,  46f.,  70 

Army  League,  13 

Association  Medicale  Internation- 
ale centre  la  guerre,  93 

Atkinson,  Edward,  79,  80 

Australia,  98 

Australian  Freedom  League,  98 

Austria-Hungary,  28,  117,  222 


265 


266 


INDEX 


Babson,  67,  252,  253 

Bahaists,  154 

Bailey,  Warren  Worth,  55 

Balance  of  power,  15,  32,  48,  49, 
223,  228,  238 

Balch,  Thomas  Willing,  190,  192 

Balkan  War,  254 

Balloons.    See  Air-craft 

Banks,  58,  127 

Bankruptcy,  76,  77 

Barton,  Clara,  125 

"Battle  Cry  of  Peace,"  56 

Belgium,  10,  30,  101,  no,  134, 
180,  223 

Bellers,  John,  153 

Belloc,  Hilaire,  37 

Bentham,  Jeremy,  127,  156,  164 

Beresford,  Lord  Charles,  100 

Berlin,  Congress  of,  134 

Bernhardi,  2,  3,  6,  7,  9,  10,  14, 
15,  18,  19,  20,  21,  24,  31 

Bethmann-Hollweg,  10,  22 

Bibliography  of  the  Peace  Move- 
ment, 162 

Biography  of  pacifists,  165 

Biology  and  war,  2  if. 

Birth-rate,  30,  94 

Bismarck,  215 

Black  Sea,  223 

Bloch,  16,  56,  67,  80,  94,  121,  123, 
124,  163,  190,  193,  243 

Blockade,  n,  135,  234 

Boardman,  Mabel  T.,  125 

Bodart,  88,  93,  123 

Boers,  39,  89 

Bollack,  Leon,  239,  241 

Boulanger,  09 

Bourgeois,  Leon,  204,  225 

Boxers,  135,  213 

Boycotts,  234,  237 

Brailsford,  25,  149,  241 


Brazil,  212,  233 
Brewer,  David  J.,  240 
Briand,  98,  227 
Bridgman,  138,  140,  225 
Bright,  John,  161,  180,  229 
Brotherhood  of  man.     See  Hu- 
manity 

Brownell,  Atherton,  260 
Brussels,  Conference  of,  172 
Bryan,  William  Jennings,  179,  213 
Bureau   of   American   Republics, 

135 

Burritt,  Elihu,  160 
Business,  75,  127 
Butler,  Nicholas  Murray,  51,  57, 

148, 229 

Canadian- American  boundary, 
212,  214,  243 

Capitulations,  223 

Carnegie,  Andrew,  153,  201,  229, 
231,  239 

Carnegie  Endowment  for  Inter- 
national Peace,  175,  229,  259 

Catch-words,  26,  103,  147 

Causes  of  war,  i6f.,  102,  142,  146, 
244,  250 

Censorship,  97,  102 

Central  America,  135, 184,  208,  233 

Central  Organization  for  a  Dur- 
able Peace,  237,  252 

Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the 
United  States,  235,  236,  240 

Chamberlain,  Houston  Stewart,  23 

Channing,  William  Ellery,  158, 163 

Chauvinism,  25,  52,  56 

Chile,  189,  215 

China,  30,  101,  135,  150,  213,  223 

Chittenden,  H.  M.,  35,  86 

Choate,  Joseph  H.,  199 

Christ  of  the  Andes,  The,  215 


INDEX 


267 


Christianity  and  war,  164 

Church  Peace  Union,  153,  231 

Churchill,  Winston,  215 

Civilism,  166 

Civilization,  4,  9, 17,  20,  21,  29,  32, 
102,  129,  142,  245.  See  also 
Kultur 

Civil  War,  69,  77,  89,  118 

Clan,  105 

Clark,  John  Bates,  229 

Classes,  84,  96,  98,  in,  145,  227, 
232 

Clausewitz,  14,  24,  31,  242 

Cobden,  Richard,  57,  160,  161, 
1 80,  214 

Cobden  Club,  56,  229 

Colonies,  9,  10,  39,  237 

Combatants,  117 

Commerce,  18,  36,  143,  237 

Commercial  Geography,  244 

Commissions  of  inquiry,  196,  202, 
213,  264 

Communication,  i26f. 

Compulsory  arbitration.    See  Ar- 
bitration 
service,  13,  87,  92,  98,  99,  116, 

243 

Concert  of  powers,  219,  228,  238 
Concord,  258 
Conferences,    international,    i34f. 

See  International  congresses 
Congo  Conference,  134,  135,  223 
Congresses,  international.  See 

International  congresses 
Congress  of  neutral  nations,   251 
Conscience,  n,  31,  98,  103 
Conscription,  n,  97,  234 
Continuous  mediation,  251 
Contraband,  233 
Contract  debts,  200,  202 
Cooperating  society,  xi 


Corda  Fratres,  131 

Cosmopolitan  Club,  131 

Cosmopolitan  Student,  258 

Cosmopolitanism,  27,  158,  222 

Cost  of  military  establishments, 

47,  258 
living,  77,  81 

Courage,  17,  19,  26,  29,  32,  85,  90, 
115.    See  Coward 

Court  of  Arbitral  Justice,  203,  209 

Courtney  of  Penwith,  239 

Coward,  17,  29,  90.     See  Courage 

Cramb,  J.  A.,  24 

Credit,  41,  58,  63 

Cremer,  Randal,  130, 161, 164,  230 

Crete,  135 

Crime,  85 

Crimean  War,  89,  118,  160 

Cruce,  Emeric,  154,  229 

Crusades,  169 

Culture.      See  Civilization;   Kul- 
tur 

Customary  law,  109 

Customs  Union,  144 

Czar,  The,  121,  193,  200 

Dante,  151 

Danube  River  Commission,  135 
Darby,  William  Evans,  163,  190 
Darwinism,  2,  7,  201.,  26,  28,  87, 

91,  115,  245 
Davis,  Hayne,  163 
Deaths.    See  Loss  of  life 
Debt,  public,  64,  68f.,  135 
Deductive  or  idealist  pacifism  to 

1789,  1501. 
Delaisi,  Francis,  56 
Democracy,  34,  69,  95,  96,  97,  98, 
102,  109,  no,  112,  148,  1571., 
170,     228,     243,     244.      See 
Monarchy;  Elections 


268 


INDEX 


Denmark,  10,  30,  180,  223 
Descamps,  190,  191 
Dewey,  John,  25,  66,  79,  86 
Dickinson,  G.  L.,  45,  253 
Diplomacy,  n,  56,  102,  103,  149, 

165,  21 2f.,  219,  241 
Disarmament.    See  Armaments 
Disease,  85,  88,  90,  117 
Dodge,    David    Low,    158,    163, 

164 

Dogger  Bank,  196,  264 
"Dorking,  Battle  of,"  53,  56 
Drama,  243,  260 
Dreyfus,  50 
Dubois,  Peter,  151 
Dumas,  Jacques,  90,  93,  191,  225, 

239,  240 

Dum-dum  bullets,  198 
Dunant,  Henri,  86,  118,  125,  230 
Dunning,  W.  A.,  218 

Economic   consequences   of   war, 

21,  36f.,  58f.,  236 
necessity,  17 
Ecuador,  233 

Education,  19,  85,  137,  242f. 
Efficiency,  19,  21,  96 
Eijkman,  139 
Elections,  34,  97,  109,  in,  227. 

See  Democracy 
Eliot,  Charles  W.,  254 
Embargo  on  munitions,  239 
Encyclopedists,  156 
"  Englishman's  Home,"  53 
Erasmus,  152,  163 
Esher,  Viscount,  44 
Esperanto,  229 
Espionage,  49,  103 
d'Estournelles  de  Constant,  201, 

217,  230,  231 
Eugenics,  87 


Evolution.    See  Darwinism 
Expansion,  7,  9,  10,  14,  22,  36,  38, 

39,  76,  146,  237 
Experts,  13,  49 
Explosives,  115 
Extra-territorial  rights,  223 

Fallacies  about  nationalism,  26!., 

146 

Faries,  138 
Faustreckt,  105 
Federation,  3!,  144,  145,  151,  157, 

173,  22of. 

Federation  of  International  Polity 

Clubs,  252 
Fellowship  of  Reconciliation,  154, 

250 

Feudalism,  107,  168 
Fiat  money,  64,  77 
Fichte,  23 

Fighting  instinct,  17 
Filene,  Edward  A.,  236 
Firearms,  115 
Fiske,  Rear-Admiral  Bradley  A., 

16,  25 
Force,  xi,  12,  14,  28,  31,  95,  104, 

1051.,  109,  in,  112,  141,  144; 

aggressive  and  defensive  force, 

14;  martial  force,  xi;  police 

force,  xi,  32 
Ford,  Henry,  251 
Foreigners,  4,  129 
Foster,  John  W.,  217 
Fox,  George,  153 
France,  5,  10,  13,  38,  41,  49,  69, 

72,  95,  98,  99,  124,  148,  179, 

197,  222 

Franco-German  war,  69,  89 
Franklin,  Benjamin,  156 
Free  trade,   148,   156,   229.     See 

Tariffs 


INDEX 


269 


Fried,  Alfred  H.,  25,  35,  57,  138, 
145,  148,  162,  213,  219,  224, 

226,  253 

Friedenswarte,  86,  259 
Friends.    See  Quakers 
Frightfulness,  14 

Carton  Foundation,  23,  44,  230 

Gases,  198 

Geneva    Conventions,    118,    134, 

171,  172,  198 
Germany,  5,  n,  13,  28,  30,  39,  41, 

49,  73,  no,  144,  197,  215,  221 
Germany,  Crown  Prince  of,  56 
Gettysburg,  118 
Goethe,  221 
Goltz,  von  der,  24,  100 
Good  offices,  196,  202 
Gordy,  W.  F.,  248 
Gould,  F.  J.,  248,  249 
Ginn,  Edwin,  229 
Graham,  30,  35 
Grane,  W.  L.,  45,  149 
"Great  Analysis,  The,"  149 
Great  Britain,  5,  u,  13,  15,  28, 

30,  39,  71,  82f.,  96,  108,  128, 

145,  i59,  175,  180,  213,  243 
"Great  Design,  The,"  154,  163 
"Great  Illusion,  The,"  35,  36f. 
Great  War,  The,  2,  34,  69,   204, 

227,  237,  250,  251,  254 
Greece,  101, 135, 150, 168, 177 
Grotius,  154,  170,  175,  195 
Guerard,  A.  L.,  231 
Gulick,  Sidney  L.,  149,  253 
Gulliver,  247 

Hague  Conferences,  15,  121,  135, 
160,  172,  179,  184,  186,  i93f., 
2oof.,  205,  216,  232,  236,  237, 
244 


Hague  Conference,  The  First,  193^ 
Conference,  The  Second,  2oof. 
Tribunal,  135,  189,   2O5f.,  210, 

211,  221,  26lf. 

Hansbrough,  231 

Hay,  John,  200 

Heath,  Carl,  249,  254 

Hegel,  2,  20 

Henry  Street  Group,  253 

Henry  IV  of  France,  154, 163 

Herald  of  Peace,  258 

Heroism.    See  Courage 

Herve,  227 

Hetzel,  H.,  124,  165 

Hicks,  F.  C,  162 

Hill,  David  Jayne,  138,  225 

Hirst,  F.  W,  35,  65,  78,  86,  148, 

162,  175 

History,  16,  27,  244 
Hoarding  money,  60 
Hobbes,  105 
Hobhouse,  L.  T.,  148 
Hobson,  J.  A.,  25,  56,  139,  224, 

249,  253 

Hobson,  R.  P.,  53 
Hodges,  140,  226 
Holls,  Frederick,  197,  199 
Holt,   Hamilton,    225,    236,   240, 

254 

Holy  Alliance,  134 
"How    Diplomats    Make    War," 

56,  149,  165,  241 
Hugo,  Victor,  5,  160,  225 
Huidekoper,  F.  L.,  54,  123 
Hull,  W.  L,  55,  148,  iQ9,  225 
Human  nature,    17,    20,   32,  96, 

146 
Humanity,  3,  102,  103,  no,  137, 

148,  157,  223,  228 
Hundred  Years  of  Peace,  218,  243 
Hygiene,  military,  89 


270 


INDEX 


Ido,  229 

Imperial  peace,  107 

Imperialism,  9,  40,  156,  158.  See 
also  Expansion 

Implements  of  war,  114 

Indemnity,  22,  36,  37,  41,  65,  69, 
213 

Independence,  96,  182.  See  De- 
mocracy 

Inductive  or  practical  pacifism, 
i66f. 

Inevitability  of  war,   12,  14,  16, 

i7,33 
Injustice,  3,  10,  19.    See  Justice; 

Righteousness 

Insurance  against  war,  12, 13, 31 
Inter  arma  leges  silent,  85 
Inter-locking  directorates,  51 
International     Bureau     at     The 

Hague,  205,  207,  209 
Commissions   of   Inquiry,    179, 

196,  202,  213,  264 
Congress    of    Women    at   The 

Hague,  228,  251 
congresses,  125,  130,  134,  136, 

156,  159,  199 
cooperation,  129,  135 

court,    104,    2osf.     See   Hague 

Tribunal 

Friendship  Societies,  231 
law,    3,     10,     no,    141,    156, 

157,  i68f.,  172,  173,  219,  220, 
230,  232 

Law  Association,  216 
"International  mind,"  244 

organization.    See  Federation 

police,  224,  228 

polity,  1 66 
Internationalism,    2,    i26f.,    142, 

143,  219,  227,  242 
Interparliamentary    Union,     130, 


161,  162,  181,  200,  214,  226, 

259 

Intervention,  222 
Investments,  foreign,  36,  38,  40, 

126,  128,  143 
Ireland,  28 
Islam,  151 

Isolation  of  nations,  136 
Italy,  118,  144,  180,  197 

James,  William,  30,  35,  234,  240 
Jane,  54,  124 
Japan,  13,  52,  98,  223 
Jay,  William,  179 
Jefferson,  C.  E.,  55,  164,  253 
Jingoism,  25,  52,  56 
Johnson,  Alvin  S.,  67,  80 
Johnston,  R.  M.,  24,  31,  35,  54,  88 
Jordan,  David  Starr,  29,  56,  80, 86, 

QO,  92,  253 

Jordan,  Harvey  Ernest,  92 
Judges  of  the  Hague  Court,  205 
Justice,  3,  4,  10,  105!,  112.    See 

Injustice;  Righteousness 

Kant,  Immanuel,  157,  164 
Kaunitz,  Prince,  155,  214 
Kellogg,  Vernon  Lyman,  35,  90, 

92,  113 

Keppel,  F.  P.,  229 
Kingsley,  Darwin  P.,  99,  253 
Knights,  114 
Kobatsch,  45,  57,  139 
Kropotkin,  35,  149 
Krupp,  50,  52 
Kultur,  4,  8,  9,  27,  142,  220.    See 

also  Civilization 

Labor,  30,  84,  98,  126,  232 
Ladd,  William,  158,  164,  178,  193, 
222,  225 


INDEX 


271 


LaFontaine,  Henri,  162,  190,  225, 
231 

Lake  Mohonk  Conference,  216 

Lammasch,  Heinrich,  191,  262!. 

Languages,  international,  142,  229, 
231,  244 

Law,  85,  105!.,  244.    See  Interna- 
tional law 

Laws  of  warfare,   117,  194,  197, 
201,  202,  203 

Lea,  Homer,  7,  24,  28,  35,  56,  124 

League    of    Economic    non-inter- 
course, 224 
to  Enforce  Peace,  The,  188,  224, 

234,  240,  252 
to  Limit  Armaments,  214,  232 

Levermore,   Charles  H.,   55,   218 

Liberty,  95,  96,  182 

Lieber,  Francis,  i,  23,  118,  171, 
198 

Lippmann,  Walter,  149,  213,  218, 
220,  224,  253 

Literature,  20,  129 

London,  Declaration  of,  135,  172 
Conference,  213 
Treaty  of,  134 

Loss  of  life,  21,  85,  88f. 

Louisiana  Purchase,  212 

Lowell,  A.  Lawrence,  240 

Loyalty,  12,  108,  109.     See  Pa- 
triotism 

Lubin,  David,  139 

Luce,  Rear  Admiral  Stephen  B., 
6,  19,  24,  34,  165 

Lucerne  Peace  Museum,  243 

Luther,  Martin,  152 

Luxemburg,  134,  223 

Lynch,  Frederick,  149,  231 

MacKaye,  Percy,  234,  240 
Magdalena  Bay,  52 


Mahan,  Rear  Admiral  Alfred  T., 

3,  12,  24,  36,  45,  124,  198 
Maine,  The,  103 
Manifest  destiny,  5,  26,  104 
Maritime  warfare,  198,  202 
Markets,  40 
Marriages,  94,  227 
Martial  law,  97,  98 
"Martyrerspiegel,"  163 
Massachusetts  Peace  Society,  158 
Maude,  12,  13,  14,  16,  21,  22,  24, 

242 
Maxim,  Hudson,  16, 18,  24,  32,  35, 

51,54 

Mead,  Edwin  D.,  162,  164 
Mead,  Lucia  Ames,  55,  149,  231, 

239,  240,  248 
Mediation,  196,  202 
Medieval  courage,  115 
Mennonites,  152 
Merignhac,  190,  192,  199 
Mexico,  13,  52,  96 
Mez,  John,  254 

Middle  Ages,  114,  151,  168,  177 
Militarism,  xi,  81,  951.,  99,  228, 

250 
Military  class,  95 

expenditure,  limitation  of,  203 
spirit,  148 
training,  19,  242 
Moch,  Gaston,  190,  239 
Molinari,  24,  67,  225 
Moltke,  1 6 
Moloch,  The,  260 
Monarchy,  68,  95,  96,  97,  98,  106. 

See  Democracy 
Monroe  Doctrine,  197,  220,  223. 

See  Pan-Americanism 
Moore,  John  Bassett,  190, 191,  226 
Morality,  85,  90,  101 
Moratoria,  60 


272 


INDEX 


Moritzen,  Julius,  163 
Morris,  Robert  C.,  191 
Munition  makers,  145,  146,  228, 

239 

Museum,  Lucerne  Peace,  243 
Mushroom  bullets,  198 
Music,  244 
Mutual  aid,  29 

Myers,  Denys  P.,  190,  199,  213 
Myrdacz,  88,  93,  124 

Naples,  222 

Napoleon  I,  31,  34,  99,  116 

Napoleon  III,  215 

Napoleonic  wars,  69,  91,  117 

Nasmyth,  George  W.,  35,  92,  224, 

253 

Nation,  defined,  i 
National  Defense  League,  13,  98 

destiny,  5,  26,  102,  104 

hatreds,  85 

honor,  17,  26,  30,  102!,  182 

ideals,  142 

Peace  Council,  249,  259 

Security  League,  13 

Service  League,  13,  98 
Nationalism,  if.,  9,  26,  27,  101, 
102,  108,  141,  143,  169,  219, 
220,  242,  250 
Nationality,  i,  28,  237 
Nationalization  of  munition  mak- 
ing, 228,  239 
Natural  law,  108,  170 

selection,  87 
Naval  expenditures,  257 

power,  12,  37,  46 
Navy  League,  9,  13,  16 
Navy  League  Annual,  54,  1 24 
Neutrals,  u,  101,  189 

rights  and  duties  of,  198,  201 
Neutralizations,  no,  134,  213,  223 


News,  52,  97,  103,  127,  232 
"New  Cyneas,  The,"  154 
New  York  Peace  Society,  158 
New  Zealand,  13,  98 
New  Zealand  Freedom  League,  98 
Niagara  Falls  Conference,  135,  220 
Nippold,  Otfried,  25,  56,  199,  204 
Nobel  Peace  Prize,  12,  230,  259 
Non-combatants,  116,  117 
Non-intercourse,  234,  237 
Non-resistance,  147,  250,  254 
Norway,  212 

Novicow,  Jacques,  25,  35,  44,  45, 
66,  86,  oo,  92,  224,  225,  231 
Nys,  Ernest,  174,  192,  239 

Obligatory  arbitration.     See  Ar- 
bitration 

Ohio  Peace  Society,  158 
Olympic  Games,  132 
Opium,  30 

Oppenheim,  173,  174 
Orange  Free  State,  39 
Ordeals,  106,  107 

Pacifism,  xi,  26,  101,   146,  150!., 

162,  25of. 

Pacific  blockades,  234 
Pacific  Coast  Defense  League,  13 
Pageants,  234 
Palace  of  Peace,  201 
Pan-American    Conferences,    134, 

161,  179,  184,  193 
Pan-Americanism,  135,  145,  181, 

220.    See  Monroe  Doctrine 
Panama,  23,  101,  135,  213 
Pan-Europeanism,  220 
Panhandle,  Alaska,  212 
Papacy,  151,  152,  177,  193,  200 
Paris,  Declaration  of,  134,  171 
Parliament,  97 


INDEX 


273 


Parliament  of  man,  221 

Passivism,  147 

Passy,  Frederic,  161,  230,  240,  247 

Patriotism,  n,  19,  53,  76,  85,  103, 
109,  221,  222.  See  Loyalty 

Pax  Britannica,  106 

Pax  Romana,  106 

Peace,  xi,  14,  20,  29,  33,  iosf.,  112, 
141,  150,  237;  imperial  peace, 
107;  lasting  peace,  150,  237, 

251,    252f. 

Peace-at-any-price,  27,  48,  147 

Day,  243 

societies,  158 

Society,  The,  158 

of  unrighteousness,  101 

Year  Book,  The,  162,  174, 191 
Peloponnesian  War,  247 
Penn,  William,  153 
Pensions,  65 
Periodicals,  258 
Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration, 

197,  202,  205 
Permanent  International  Bureau 

at  The  Hague,  135,  160 
Perris,  George,  50,  55,  56,  113 
Persia,  28,  150,  223 
Pfeiffer,  Ludwig,  55,  56,  80,  149 
Philippines,  23,  101,  213 
Phillipson,  66,  123,  174,  191 
"Planetary  morality,"  103 
Plebiscite,  233,  237 
Plutocracy,  76,  145.     See  Classes 
Poisonous  gases,  198 
Poland,  28,  31 
Police  force,  32,  224,  228 
Political  aspects  of  war,  9$f. 
Popper-Lynkeus,  29,  35,  93 
Population,  9,  21,  94 
Positive  law,  109,  171 
Poverty,  84 


Preferential  treatment.    See  Tar- 
iffs 

Preparedness,  12,  13,  32,  47,  53, 
54,  76 

Prices,  77,  81,  82 

Private    property,    immunity   of, 
58,  175,  198,  213 

Privilege.    See  Classes 

Prize  court,  202,  207 

Progress,  20,  245 

Projects  for  peace,  2i2f. 

Protectorates,  9,  237 

Prussian  militarism,  99,  116 

Public  debt,  68f . 
finance,  6 if. 
opinion,  109,  173,  189 

Publicity,  232 

Purchase  of  territory,  212 

Quakers,  152,  158,  159 

Quarantine,  13 

Quidde,  L.,  163 

Quotations  on  Peace  and  War,  165 

Races,  4,  26,  142,  147,  234 

Ralston,  J.  H.,  191 

Ransom,  114 

Rational  Defense  League,  232 

Reason,  33,  109 

Recruiting,  91,  92 

Red  Cross,  118,  125,  171,  228 

Reduction    of    armaments.      See 

Armaments 
Reforms,  98,  99 
Reformation,  108,  169 
Reichstag,  215 
Reinsch,  Paul,  138,  225 
Religion,  20,  102,  103,  106,  142, 

i47 

Religious  pacifism,  147,  152 
wars,  169 


274 


INDEX 


Renault,  199,  204,  230 
Repudiation,  68,  69,  76,  77 
Revanche,  148 
Reversed  selection,  87 
Revolution,  xi,  76,  78 
Revolutionary     and     Napoleonic 

Period,  69,  91,  157 
Richard,  Henry,  161,  215,  240 
Richet,  Charles,  67,  90,  93,  144, 

148,   163,   190,   239,  260 
"Rifleman,  A,"  22,  24 
Rights,  fundamental,  3,  9 
Righteousness,  national,  6,  18,  30, 

101,  224.    See  Justice 
Roberts,  Lord,  15,  22,  98,  99 
Robinson,  J.  H.,  248 
Role  of  force,  The,  105!. 
Roman    Empire,    106,    151,    168, 

177 
Roosevelt,  3,  6,  18,  19,  179,  200, 

230,  254 

Root,  Elihu,  175 
Rousseau,  155,  164 
Royce,  Josiah,  253 
Ruskin,  20,  24 
Russell,  Bertrand,  241,  254 
Russo-Japanese  War,  88,  89,  121 

St.    Petersburg,    Declaration    of, 

134,  171 

Saint-Pierre,  Abbe  de,  155 
Salvation  Army,  153 
Samoa,  135,  212 
Samuel,  106 

Sanction,  no,  173,  187,  189 
Sanitation,  89,  116,  124 
Saul,  106 

Schreiner,  Olive,  231 
Schucking,  Walther,  199,  204,  224 
Schvan,  254 
Science,  46,  129,  242 


Scott,  James  Brown,  175,  100, 192, 
199,  204,  210,  230 

Seaman,  88,  89,  93,  124 

Secret  diplomacy,  ioif.,  233,  238. 
See  Diplomacy 

Secret  treaties,  n 

Self-preservation,  18 

S£ve,  192,  247 

Seven  Seas  Magazine,  9 

Sick,  care  of,  117 

Slavery,  19,  245 

Slogans.    See  Catch-words 

Social  Darwinism,  2of.,  28,  245 
fatalism,  146 

Socialism,  99,  147,  227,  231,  232 

Society  of  Nations,  237 

Sociology,  68f.,  234 

"Song  of  Hate,  The,"  85 

South  African  Union,  221 

Sovereignty,  i,  2,  141,  173,  222 
limitation  of,  144,  219 

Spain,  101,  108,  222 

Spencer,  90,  113,  149 

Spheres  of  influence,  237 

Spiller,  139,  226 

Standing  armies,  116 

Stead,  W.  T.,  199,  204 

Stein,  23,  149,  240 

Stilwell,  A.  E.,  67,  149,  254 

Stockton,  Richard,  Jr.,  21,  24,  54 

Strategy,  116 

Stratton,  George  M.,  25,  149,  239 

Strikes,  xi,  23,  85,  227,  232 

Sturge,  Joseph,  159 

Suez  Canal,  134 

Suffrage.    See  Elections;  Democ- 
racy 

Sully,  117,  154,  163 

Sumner,  Charles,  161 

Sumner,  William  G.,  112,  149,  164 

Superstition,  242 


INDEX 


275 


Survival   of   the   fit.     See    Dar- 
winism 
Suspension  of  specie  payment,  60, 

63 
Suttner,  Bertha  von,  125,  226,  230, 

260 

Sweden,  180,  212 
Switzerland,  30,  221,  223 
Syndicalism,  99 

Tactics,  116 

Taft,  179,  226 

Tariffs,  80,   128,   142,  229.     See 

Free  trade 
preferential,  36,  39 
Tavenner,  C.  H.,  55 
Taxation,  63,  68,  76,  77,  78,  81 
Text-books,  103,  246 
Thirty  Years  War,  170 
Thoroughness,  14 
Tolstoi,  162,  164,  260 
Torres,  Alberto,  148,  163 
Transportation,  126 
Trask,  Katrina,  260 
Treaty,  134,  172,  173,  184 
Treitschke,  7,  18,  21,  24 
Trial  by  battle,  107 
Tribe,  105 

Tribute.    See  Indemnity 
Tripoli  tan  War,  197 
Truce  of  God,  152 
Trueblood,  Benjamin,  164,  225 
Turkey,  135,  223 
Turtle  Bay,  52 
"Typhoon,  The,"  53 

Ulster,  96 
Umfrid,  O.,  217 
Unemployment,  61,  84 
"Unilateral  aberration,"  146 
Union  of  Democratic  Control,  233, 
238,  241,  252 


United  States,  5,  9,  n,  13,  15,  33, 
34,  69,  70,  74,  98,  101,  144, 
157,  i59,  178,  189,  212,  215, 
221,  223,  243 

United  States  of  Europe,  220 
Universal  peace,  17,  20 
Peace  Congresses,  193 
Postal  Union,  132,  205,  220 
service,    98.      See   Compulsory 

service 

Unlimited  treaties  of  arbitration, 
179,  183.  See  Arbitration 

Venezuela,  233 
Verestchagin,  243 
Vie  Internationale.    See  Annuaire 
Vienna,  Congress  of,  134 
Villard,  O.  G.,  55 
Violation  of  treaties,  10 
Virility,  20,  29 
Vital  interest,  182 
Voltaire,  155 
Voluntary  law,  109,  171 
Volunteer  system,  92,  98, 116.    See 
Compulsory  service. 

Wages,  83 

Wales,  Julia  Grace,  251 
Wallas,  Graham,  25 
Walling,  W.  E.,  231 
War,  xi 

divine  institution,  16,  34 

benefits  of,  191.,  74,  85;  cost 
of,  61;  economic  consequences 
of,  s8f.,  84;  humanizing,  228 

babies,  85 

brides,  260 

loans,  233 

scares,  51 

of  1812,  246 

and  biology,  87f. 

and  Christianity,  164 


276 


INDEX 


War  and  Peace,  44,  258 
and  sociology,  8 if. 
and  the  state,  95!. 

Washington,  135 

"Watchful  waiting,"  96 

Wehberg,  149,  165,  175,  191,  204, 
210 

Wells,  H.  G.,  149,  231 

Wentworth,  Marion  Craig,  260 

White,  Andrew  D.,  197,  199 

"White  man's  burden,"  26 

Who's  Who  in  the  Peace  Move- 
ment, 165 

Wicker,  140,  226 

Wilson,  George  Graf  ton,  174,  210 

Wilson,  Woodrow,  96,  225,  234 

Wirtz,  243 

Woman,  227f.,  231,  254 

Woman's  Peace  Party,  228,  251, 
252 

Women's  clubs,  228 

Wood,  Major-General,  12,  55 


Worcester,  Noah,  158 

World  Alliance  of  Churches,  154 

citizens,  27,  158,  222 

Court  League  of  America,  252 

fairs,  1 60 

Peace  Foundation,  229,  259 

police,  173 

state.    See  Federation 
Wounded,  care  of,  117 
Wyatt,  5,  20,  23,  24 

Year  Books,  138,  259 
"Yellow  peril,"  26 
Young  Men's  Christian  Associa- 
tion, 131 

Zabern,  96 
Zangwill,  260 
Zola,  260 

Zorn,  197,  199,  204 
Zouche,  154,  170 
Zweckverband,  219 


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